

Austrian Themes in Serbia 1683-1918.

A Collection of Studies



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SADRŽAJ

PREDGOVOR.....	5
PREFACE	7
Prof. dr Nikola Samardžić	
AUSTRIA, TURKEY AND FRANCE IN 1683	9
Prof. dr Vladan Gavrilović	
ROMANIANS-TRADERS IN THE HABSBURG MONARCHY IN THE 18 TH CENTURY	65
Prof. dr Boro Bronza	
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF RAGUSA AND AUSTRIA THROUGHOUT THE SECOND HALF OF THE 18 TH CENTURY AND THE ROLE OF SERBS FROM HERZEGOVINA	79
Prof. dr Nenad Ninković	
THE ILLYRIAN COURT DEPUTATION AND THE STATUS OF SERBS IN THE HABSBURG MONARCHY	103
Pavle Petković, msr	
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SETTLEMENT OF 1867 AND THE QUESTION OF ITS REVISION IN VIENNESE POLITICAL PUBLIC	133
Prof. dr Goran Vasin	
SVETOZAR MILETIĆ, THE SERBIAN QUESTION AND POLITICS IN 1868.	191
Prof. dr Slavojka Beštić-Bronza	
REFLECTIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE ON RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 1910-1920	227

PREDGOVOR

Zbornik radova *Austrijske teme u Srbiji 1683-1918*, nastao je kao rezultat projekta *Istorijski identitet Srba u Vojvodini 1690-1990*, odnosno posebno kao rezultat okruglog stola održanog u Novom Sadu novembra 2024. Posebno je bila naglašena ideja promocije projekta kod kolega iz Banja Luke, Niša i Beograda koji su učestvovali na skupu i na taj način aktivno učestvovali širenju ideja koje su zaživele na projektu i koje su takođe rezultat istraživanja i sakupljanja istorijske građe na samom projektu. Kroz zbornik radova jasno se vidi u formi rezultata da je veliki broj tema veza i uticaja Habzburške monarhije na Srbe i srpsko, ali i balkansko pitanje u fokusu autora, ali da je savremena historiografija značajno zainteresovana za ove teme u eri globalnih promena, turbulentnih dešavanja globalne svakodnevice, što temama daje na značaju I upotrebnoj vrednosti u analizi procesa dugog istorijskog trajanja. Stoga teme istorije Jugoistočne Evrope imaju svoje mesto u globalnoj te lokalnoj istoriji, što rezultate projekta i samog Zbornika, afirmiše, pokazuje da je značajan borj austrijskih tema u Srbiji neistražen, ali da su stare teme ponovo aktuelne i da se mogu drugačije interpretirati sa novim izvorima koji su istraženi upravo na samom projektu *Istorijski identitet Srba u Vojvodini 1690-1990*. Na taj način Zbornik dobija I na aktuelnosti, ujedno može da bude ideja za dalje istraživanja i buduće istraživače u uvek ključnim temama istorije Habzburške monarhije I istorijskog identiteta Srba u Vojvodini.

Novi Sad, mart 2025.

PREFACE

The collection of papers *Austrian Themes in Serbia 1683–1918* was created as a result of the project *The Historical Identity of the Serbs in Vojvodina 1690–1990*, and in particular as an outcome of the round table held in Novi Sad in November 2024. A special emphasis was placed on promoting the project among colleagues from Banja Luka, Niš, and Belgrade, who participated in the event and thus actively contributed to the dissemination of ideas developed within the project, as well as to the collection and analysis of historical sources. The papers in this volume clearly show that a large number of topics are devoted to the connections and influences of the Habsburg Monarchy on the Serbs and the Serbian, as well as the broader Balkan question. Contemporary historiography demonstrates a strong interest in these themes, especially in the context of global transformations and turbulent developments in the modern world, which further enhances their relevance and analytical value for understanding long-term historical processes. The history of Southeastern Europe thus occupies an important place within both global and local historical frameworks. The results of this project and of the present volume confirm that a significant number of Austrian-related topics in Serbian history remain underexplored. At the same time, they show that traditional subjects can be reinterpreted from new perspectives, thanks to the sources discovered and examined within the project *The Historical Identity of the Serbs in Vojvodina 1690–1990*. In this way, the volume gains contemporary significance and may serve as an inspiration for further research and for future scholars interested in

the key themes of the history of the Habsburg Monarchy and the historical identity of the Serbs in Vojvodina.

Novi Sad, March 2025

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AUSTRIA, TURKEY AND FRANCE IN 1683

Abstract: The Westphalian order exposed the Habsburgs to the pressures of France and Turkey, and Austria was forced to maintain two major fronts of conflict. After the Peace of Nijmegen in 1679 France directed Ottomans against Austria while supporting Hungarian dissidents, but failed to keep Poland in its sphere of influence. The victories of after the second siege of Vienna in 1683 shaped Austrian politics for the remainder of the century. The fall of Slavonia and Belgrade in 1688 inspired uprisings among Balkan Christians, who became a growing military force within Habsburg military and political influence that surpassed the combined support of all Austrian allies in 1683, and significantly reduced Ottoman pressure on Central Europe, allowing the Habsburgs to shift their strategic focus toward their long-term priorities: Italy and the Mediterranean. Austria preserved the idea of the Holy Roman Empire by assuming its leadership and identity and Austria emerged as a reliable patron of German interests. It was largely thanks to Austria that the political order established in 1648 endured for the next century and a half. Austria was now assuming a new leadership role within the Habsburg realm while Germans were becoming a minority. By the end of the 17th century, five major national groups lived under Austrian Habsburg rule: Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Croats, and Serbs. This diversity required the development of institutions and careful governance. After years of death, suffering, destruction, and poverty, Vienna stood on the threshold of a great future. However, much of Baroque Vienna, built under Leopold I and his successor Joseph I, has since disappeared due to later urban development, especially by the early 20th century.

Keywords: Austria, Turkey, France, Vienna, Hungarian question

Austrian New Identity and Activities

The Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) left the Holy Roman Empire fragmented, torn apart by a disorganized and confusing system of jurisdiction. Aspirations for independence among its constituent territories became increasingly pronounced. In this fractured landscape, Austria

emerged as the only remaining power striving to unify the Empire under a common framework of statehood and a coherent foreign policy. It remained uncertain whether the Empire would retain its hierarchical structure—with the emperor and electors at the helm—or dissolve into a loose confederation. Austria became the principal guarantor of survival even for those entities seeking greater autonomy, particularly the weakest: dioceses, abbeys, counties, territories of imperial knights, cantons, and imperial cities. This created a peculiar and delicate balance of power between Austria and the Empire as a whole. The dependence of these smaller estates on imperial protection formed a broad and, from the Habsburg perspective, profitable client base. In the course of the Counter-Reformation, and in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War, Austria increasingly assumed the role of the alter ego of the Holy Roman Empire. The Austrian Habsburg Monarchy directed foreign policy and maintained the army, yet even within its hereditary lands the nobility kept control over both executive power and judiciary. When faced with threats to their traditional prerogatives, they set aside their differences and united against the monarchy.

By means of the breadth of influence achieved by the House of Habsburg, geography and the constellation of opportunities, regardless of constitutive weaknesses, Austria maintained influence both in Western and Eastern Europe. The Austrian Habsburgs introduced fundamentals of an efficient state administration, expanded educational opportunities for the upper classes, while bringing the nobility under dynastic control. Ferdinand III (1637–1657) and Leopold I (1657–1705) preserved the peculiar Habsburg instinct for survival and evolution. The Westphalian order

exposed the Habsburgs to the pressures of France and Ottoman Empire, and Austria was forced to maintain two major fronts of conflict. Since 1526, Austria had been entangled in the enduring Hungarian question. The Habsburgs refused to accept the loss of Hungary, a territory of profound ideological, symbolic, and strategic importance in Southeastern Europe, even along the eastern Adriatic coast as the Treaty of Zadar (Zara), signed in 1358, had placed the Republic of Ragusa under Hungarian rule.

An important pillar in international relations was papal Rome. Severely weakened during the Thirty Years' War, the Holy Roman Empire could no longer fulfill the papacy's expectations in advancing Counter-Reformation policies. With its influence diminished, Rome saw Austrian Central Europe as its last significant opportunity to regain political relevance. By then, papal authority had largely receded to the Italian peninsula. The Peace of Westphalia effectively transferred the mantle of Catholic leadership to the Habsburgs, whose confessional absolutism became the new driving force of the Counter-Reformation. In Austria, this spirit deeply permeated the political and administrative structures: all government positions were reserved for Catholics, religious orders were revitalized, and religious fervor animated public life. Political authority and religious commitment worked hand in hand. Leopold I, genuinely devout, did not shy away from using force. His rule was underpinned by a sense of divine mission, marked by conviction and perseverance. He endured personal tragedies with stoic resolve. Intimately, he remained open-minded and intellectually curious. While the Jesuits dominated education and intellectual life through schools and universities, two of Leopold's closest spiritual advisers were Capuchin friars: Emerich Sinelli and Marco

d'Aviano. The emperor entrusted them with significant influence in political, military, and spiritual affairs, granting them a rare openness in matters of state. Proximity to papal Rome also served Austria's long-term strategic interests, as Italy increasingly became a priority in Habsburg foreign policy. Italian, rather than French, was the established language of Austrian diplomacy. Leopold I was fluent in German and Latin—using the latter particularly when addressing his Hungarian subjects—and also spoke Spanish, his mother's native tongue. However, he deliberately refused to speak French, favoring Italian instead. The unique Austrian state gradually matured over the course of a century, from 1648 to 1748. Separatist tendencies were contained while using both military alliances and competent, efficient administration. Yet, while the ruler symbolized unity, he also embodied division, holding multiple titles such as Duke in Austria, Count in Tyrol, King of Bohemia, and Margrave in Moravia. The government functioned as an extension of the royal house, effectively a euphemism for Austria itself. In the absence of a centralized administration, each province operated as a distinct political entity, or *Standestaat*, where the ruler shared power with the estates. The administration was divided into four main offices: Austrian, Czech, Hungarian, and Transylvanian. Austria remained an unfinished state, characterized by complex and often ambiguous relations between the Habsburg dynasty, their hereditary lands, and the Holy Roman Empire. A dedicated Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not yet been established. Instead, domestic affairs were managed by the Austrian and Bohemian Court Chancelleries. Overall policy was directed by the *Geheime Konferenz* (Secret Conference), a body of ministers who often held prestigious court appointments. The Imperial *Reichsvizekanzler*

(Vice-Chancellor) oversaw matters concerning the estates of the Holy Roman Empire, while the *Hofkriegsrat* (Aulic War Council) managed military affairs, particularly those related to the Ottoman Empire.

Austria's persistent state of incompleteness was largely shaped by the unresolved Hungarian question. As their influence within the Holy Roman Empire waned, the Habsburgs increasingly withdrew to Austria, focusing on its immediate interests and leveraging its sphere of influence. They transplanted their model of absolutism and the Counter-Reformation's brand of Catholicism into the Austrian heartlands. The feudal power of Protestant nobles in the Czech and Austrian territories was decisively dismantled. Protestantism survived only in limited areas—parts of Silesia and among segments of the Lower Austrian nobility. Large-scale emigration followed: nearly 200,000 Protestants left the Czech lands, and around 100,000 departed from the Austrian hereditary territories. Most of the remaining Protestant nobility eventually converted to Catholicism, and the Habsburg lands became a showcase of Baroque Catholic uniformity. Only the Hungarian estates consistently resisted this religious and political consolidation. By this point, the Habsburgs had abandoned any serious claim to universal monarchy. Catholicism, in turn, risked becoming a ritualized formality, lacking deeper conviction. Many former Protestants outwardly conformed to Catholic practices while privately maintaining skepticism, or even hostility, toward its doctrines. This phenomenon of crypto-Protestantism, evident in both popular religion and intellectual life, fostered official suspicion toward any simplistic equation of public conformity with genuine belief. In this context, Austrian Baroque emerged

as both an ideological and aesthetic response, a cultural bulwark against the dual threats of Protestant dissent and the advancing Ottoman Empire.

In the final two decades of the seventeenth century, as Austria advanced its territorial reach into Southeastern Europe, a notable ideological homogenization emerged within the establishment. Although Austria was increasingly asserting itself as a significant actor in European relations, the structural underpinnings of Habsburg authority remained tenuous. Its persistent reliance on traditional frameworks of imperial and religious legitimation appeared increasingly obsolete when measured against the evolving Enlightenment ideal of the rational state. This ideological dissonance rendered Austria largely resistant to the Enlightenment's critique of teleological tradition, as it remained enveloped in the ornate and self-assured aesthetics of the Baroque. Austrian Baroque, essentially an adaptation of Italian artistic forms mobilized to project Habsburg power, evolved into a distinctive cultural synthesis of Italian, German, and Central European elements. Yet, for all its artistic and architectural accomplishments, the cultural paradigm of the Habsburg regime remained deeply rooted in a pronounced confessional intolerance.

While confessional intolerance was a widespread phenomenon also in Western Europe, the Habsburg manners retained a particularly entrenched and exclusionary character. Austrian Baroque culture, for all its grandeur, harbored a darker undercurrent of profound anxieties and xenophobic tendencies. The expulsion of the Jewish community from Vienna by Emperor Leopold I, influenced not only by the economic interests of Viennese merchants but also by the fervent Catholicism and Spanish influence, exemplifies the unstable dialectic of self-assurance and

insecurity that permeated Austrian Baroque culture, a dynamic partly rooted in the Habsburgs' precarious position in international relations. The ideological disjunction between the Baroque ideology and political reality was stark: on the European stage, Austria was compelled to rely on Protestant German allies in its struggle against Catholic France, while France, in turn, exploited Hungarian Protestants and the Ottoman Empire as instruments against Austria.

The Hungarian Question

From 1526 to 1686, most of Hungary was either under direct Ottoman rule or functioned as a vassal state. Transylvania remained virtually independent, while Austria controlled only about a third of the former Hungarian Kingdom. With its long and exposed eastern frontier, Hungary endured significant devastation from the movement of military forces and frequent warfare.¹ Hungary was chronically troubled, prompting the Ottoman administration to closely monitor the population's mood. The Turks primarily occupied the cities, while Hungarians stayed in the suburbs. Mosques were constructed—though more often, existing churches were converted—and public amenities such as baths, fountains, and lodgings were established. Communication between Ottoman officials and the local population was facilitated by a class of Hungarian intermediaries educated in both Christian and Muslim schools. Outside the urban centers, the Ottomans made little effort to penetrate rural communities. Instead, they assumed the role of the former landowners, collecting taxes and attempting

¹ Stoye : 36-40.

to maintain demographic records used by the treasury in Istanbul. However, the region faced ongoing depopulation and economic weakness. Large, sparsely populated areas along the Danube, Drava, and Tisza rivers—interconnected by extensive wetlands—had to be maintained for strategic and administrative purposes. The Ottomans did not enforce Islamization in Hungary, nor did they implement the *devshirme*. However, they strictly limited the rights of Christians to maintain, repair, or construct churches. By denying the Catholic hierarchy the ability to exercise public authority, the Ottoman administration created space for the survival of Calvinism. While the spread of Protestantism in the 16th century may have weakened resistance to Ottoman expansion, Hungarian Calvinists—opposed to Habsburg religious and social policies—actively sought support from both the Ottoman Empire and France. Political factions also tended to align with the Ottomans. The major conspiracies of the Hungarian and Croatian nobility were responses to both political arbitrariness and the pressures of the Counter-Reformation. The “Long War” (1593–1606) was followed by a period of relative peace lasting until 1663, though skirmishes and tensions persisted along the Austrian–Ottoman border. This frontier remained volatile and served as a source of irregular income. Ottoman forces frequently raided the region, seizing livestock, horses, slaves, and hostages. Lawlessness and disorder enriched high-ranking provincial officials, while the central government benefited financially by reducing expenditures on local administration and troops. Despite widespread corruption, the strength of the Ottoman presence remained undiminished—from the middle courses of the Sava and Drava rivers, northward to Buda and Esztergom, and east and southward to the borders of Transylvania. Border control also relied on

political maneuvering. In its dealings with Christian neighbors, the Ottoman Empire strategically used its vassal states—Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia, and the Crimean Tatars. Meanwhile, the Sultan maintained direct authority over the territories along the eastern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains. Transylvania was the most important Ottoman vassal state and a key intersection of international relations within the triangle formed by Austria, the Ottoman Empire, and France. After the collapse of Hungary in the 16th century, the Transylvanian princes and estates struggled to preserve their precarious freedom and balanced their position by never fully submitting to either Ottoman or Habsburg authority. Hungary was also divided by the status of its nobility, who, driven by the instinct for survival and the desire to preserve vast feudal privileges—as was common across Eastern Europe—formed an economically and culturally isolated landowning caste. Approximately 30,000 aristocratic families constituted the Hungarian “nation” while a small elite of around 200 magnate families held seats in the Upper House of the Hungarian Diet (*Parlamentum Publicum*, *Parlamentum Generale*, Hungarian: *Országgyűlés*). Some magnates were extraordinarily wealthy—13 families owned nearly two-fifths of all villages. These magnates often became culturally alienated: many adopted partial Germanization, settled in grand palaces in Vienna, and yet remained distant from the Austrian establishment. They continued to speak Hungarian among themselves and were distinguished by their unique clothing and customs. One prominent figure was Pál (Paul) I, 1st Prince Esterházy of Galántha (1635–1713), who served as Palatine of the Kingdom of Hungary from 1681 to 1713 and as an Imperial Field Marshal. A loyal supporter of Emperor Leopold I, he built a magnificent palace in

Eisenstadt, Austria (his birthplace and, a century later, the residence of composer Joseph Haydn under Esterházy patronage).

Amid complex and shifting circumstances—including provincial separatism, the dominance of large landowners, conflicts between Catholics and Calvinists, and the lack of resources in a backward economy—the Hungarian question could not be reduced to a simple choice between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, nor solely to aspirations for future independence.

Austria was compelled to make concessions to the Hungarian aristocracy while facing simultaneous pressure from both the Ottoman Empire and France. Transylvania emerged as one of the most sensitive and strategically important regions in European diplomacy. Seeking independence from both Austria and Turkey, Prince György II Rákóczi (1648–1660) attempted to exploit the exhaustion of the warring parties during the Thirty Years' War by pursuing the Polish crown. In 1649, he formed an alliance with Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky—who had launched a rebellion against Poland in present-day Ukraine—as well as with the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia. However, Rákóczi took no further action for several years. He hoped for a conflict between Austria and Turkey and counted on support from Sweden, then facing resistance from Poland and Muscovy in its bid for dominance in Northern Europe. Austria responded by forming an alliance against Sweden with Denmark and Brandenburg. Swedish King Charles X Gustav (1654–1660) invaded the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Second Northern War (1655–1660), known in Poland as “The Deluge”. Swedish forces captured

Warsaw and Kraków, forcing Polish King John II Casimir to flee. Although Poland managed to regroup and reclaim Warsaw, it suffered further defeats. Charles X eventually allied with Elector Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg, recognizing him as both ally and vassal. Muscovy also joined the war on Poland's side, besieging Riga—then the second-largest city in the Swedish kingdom. As Swedish efforts in Poland stalled, Charles X redirected his campaign toward Denmark and Norway. Meanwhile, György II Rákóczi retreated to Transylvania with Polish support but was decisively defeated when Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha intervened in 1658. Rákóczi defected to the Austrian side, but under Ottoman pressure, the Transylvanian Estates deposed him. He died in 1660 during another Turkish invasion of Transylvania. Austria then backed János Kemény as the new prince, but Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha (1661–1676) defeated Austrian forces and installed Mihály Apafi (1661–1690) as vassal governor. However, real power in Transylvania was held by Apafi's adviser and chancellor, Mihály Teleki.

With the capture of Transylvania, the Ottomans advanced into Royal Hungary—the last remaining Hungarian territory under Austrian control.

In the fourth Austro-Turkish War (1663–1664), the Ottomans continued their operations in Transylvania while advancing toward Vienna. This conflict was also part of the broader Cretan War (1645–1669), also known as the War of Candia (*Guerra di Candia*), between the Ottoman Empire and Venice. The war drew in a wide array of international actors—most notably, a French corps assisted the Venetians in defending Crete, an unexpected development that briefly strained the otherwise cordial Franco-

Ottoman relations. Both diplomacies worked to smooth over the incident. In 1663, the Ottomans captured the key fortress of Nové Zámky (Hungarian: Érsekújvár), near Pressburg (modern-day Bratislava, Hungarian: Pozsony). The imperial court in Vienna, alarmed by the advance, temporarily relocated to Linz. Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha spent the winter in Belgrade to prepare for the next year's campaign. Meanwhile, Crimean Tatar raids into Moravia and Silesia spurred broader European support for Austria. Throughout the winter, Croatian Ban Nikola VII Zrinski (Hungarian: Miklós Zrínyi, 1620–1664) launched guerrilla-style raids against the Ottomans. In 1661, he constructed his own fortress, Novi Zrin (Hungarian: Új-Zrínyivár or Zrínyi-Újvár), in the sparsely populated buffer zone between Austria and the Ottoman Empire. On February 1, 1664, Zrinski attempted to disrupt Ottoman communications by destroying the heavily fortified Suleiman Bridge at Osijek (Hungarian: Eszék), which connected Darda and Osijek across the Drava River. However, his campaign was undermined by the refusal of Imperial generals to support him, as the Habsburg court viewed Zrinski with suspicion, fearing he harbored separatist ambitions. The Ottomans retaliated by occupying Novi Zrin. Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha then led a major offensive against Austrian forces under General Raimondo Montecuccoli. The decisive battle occurred on August 1, 1664, near the town of St. Gotthard on the Rába River, close to the Austrian-Hungarian border. The Austrian army successfully halted the Ottoman advance along a nearly 7-kilometer front stretching from Jennersdorf to St. Gotthard (Hungarian: Szentgotthárd).

Although neither side could claim a decisive victory, the Ottomans were unable to continue their advance. Peace was concluded at Vasvár (German: Eisenburg) on August 10, 1664, with terms set to last for 20 years. As part of the agreement, Austria withdrew its forces from Transylvania and recognized the rule of the Ottoman vassal, Mihály Apafi. This allowed the Ottomans to preserve control Transylvania and parts of northern Hungary. Leopold I agreed to pay the Sultan a monetary compensation and ceded three key fortresses in present-day Slovakia. The Sultan responded with gifts of equal value. For the first time, a diplomatic equality was established between Austria and the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, in 1669, Venice was forced to abandon Crete and accept peace with the Ottomans in exchange for the restoration of its trade privileges.² Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha recognized the importance of maintaining good relations with France. He restored French trade privileges, and in return, received assurances that France would refrain from supporting Ottoman enemies. However, the Peace of Vasvár proved to be an unstable truce, generating dissatisfaction among all parties involved. Austria justified its significant concessions by citing the need to defend the German borders against Louis XIV (1661–1715). Hungary remained vulnerable to the ongoing Ottoman threat. The Hungarian and Croatian nobility viewed the treaty as extremely unfavorable, believing that Austria had effectively legitimized Ottoman control over the conquered territories.

In response to the Treaty of Vasvár, the Magnate Conspiracy—known in Croatia as the Zrinski–Frankopan Conspiracy and in Hungary as the Wesselényi Conspiracy—reflected deep disillusionment with Austrian

² Cardini : 173-188.

policy and a renewed turn toward complex international alliances. The conspirators sought support from France, Poland, Sweden, Venice, and even the Ottoman Empire. Nikola Zrinski aimed to form a united army with Croatian and Transylvanian backing to liberate Hungary from Austrian control. However, he died unexpectedly in 1664 while hunting a wild boar, just months after the treaty was signed. Leadership of the movement passed to his younger brother, Petar Zrinski, and to Ferenc Wesselényi, the Palatine of Royal Hungary. Leopold I, unwilling to break the truce with the Ottomans and not taking the conspiracy seriously at first, nonetheless viewed the plotters as a political threat. While seeking broader support in Hungary, he was also prepared to suppress the movement. The death of Wesselényi in 1667 further weakened the rebels, especially as the Ottomans were preoccupied with the siege of Crete. By 1670, the conspirators began openly inciting resistance against Leopold I and called for a Protestant uprising in Royal Hungary. In March 1671, the leaders—including Petar Zrinski, Fran Krsto Frankopan, and Ferenc Nádasdy III—were arrested and executed. The Austrian army occupied Royal Hungary, Calvinist churches were destroyed, and Leopold I suspended the province's self-government.³

The harsh reprisals sparked a new wave of rebellion. Leading the discontented Hungarian nobility, Imre Thököly would become a central figure in the complex triangle of relations between Austria, the Ottoman Empire, and France for the next quarter-century.⁴ Imre Thököly was born in 1657 in Késmárk, Royal Hungary, as the fifth son of Count István Thököly and Mária Gyulaffy. His father was one of the wealthiest aristocrats in

³ Stoye : 47-49.

⁴ Samardžić, N : 81-97.

Upper Hungary (present-day Slovakia), while his mother was the granddaughter of Transylvanian Prince Stephen Bethlen. Imre was the only son to survive childhood and inherited his mother's estates in Transylvania in 1659, along with his uncle's lands in Máramaros County. István Thököly died on December 4, at the onset of a new wave of rebellion. According to some accounts, Imre escaped to Poland, though he ultimately found refuge in Transylvania. In 1673, in an effort to suppress all resistance in Royal Hungary, Emperor Leopold I appointed a *Directorium* to govern the region, led by Johann Caspar von Ampringen, Grand Master of the Teutonic Order. This move intensified persecution, prompting many Hungarian nobles, Protestants, and fugitive serfs to seek refuge in Ottoman-controlled Hungary. Imre Thököly rallied both nobles and peasants in the mountainous regions of present-day Slovakia and in areas bordering Transylvania, forming the *kurucok* movement. These so-called crusaders—also referred to as *malcontents*, a vague and euphemistic term in French—launched frequent raids into the borderlands of Royal Hungary. (Over time, the term *kuruc* came to refer to Hungarians advocating for strict national independence, while *labanc* designated those favoring cooperation with the Habsburgs.) The *malcontents* made frequent raids against the borderlands of Royal Hungary. Under Habsburg reprisals that followed, Thököly's estates in Royal Hungary were confiscated, though he preserved his wealth in Transylvania. On the advice of Mihály Teleki, Chancellor to Prince Apafi, Thököly continued his education at the Reformed College of Nagyenyed (modern-day Aiud, Romania). Louis XIV began to take a more active interest in Transylvanian affairs when his envoys signed a treaty with Prince Apafi in Warsaw in May 1677. France pledged to provide annual

subsidies to support the *kurucok* movement against the Habsburgs. In return, Apafi—while not formally declaring war on Emperor Leopold I—agreed to place the *kurucok* under professional command and to offer asylum to rebels if needed. On 26 September 1677, the Transylvanian princely council appointed Imre Thököly as commander of the *kurucok* army. Although Mihály Teleki was officially named supreme commander on 16 February 1678, in accordance with the treaty with France, Thököly kept the leadership. In June 1678, the *kuruc* and Transylvanian forces invaded Royal Hungary. Thököly quickly captured the fortresses of Szendrő and Murány in early August. Teleki and the Transylvanians laid siege to Eperjes but withdrew upon learning of the approach of an Austrian army in mid-August. Thököly continued his campaign, rallying Slovak peasants and capturing Igló and Rózsahegy, as well as the mining towns along the Garam (Hron) River. On 10 October, he seized Besztercebánya (modern-day Banská Bystrica, Slovakia). By the end of the year, Thököly had established control over 13 counties in Royal Hungary. His prestige soared, and he soon held undisputed authority over the *kurucok*. During the next two years, he successfully resisted Habsburg garrisons in Hungary and gradually undermined the authority of Prince Apafi, who vacillated between allegiance to the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. Thököly's movement became a focal point in European diplomacy, with agents from Warsaw and Paris offering him generous terms. His actions contributed to the re-establishment of the Franco-Ottoman alliance, placing Hungary once again at the center of international concern.

The first major crisis in European international relations after the Peace of Westphalia unfolded through a dynamic interplay of events. In the

War of Devolution (1667–1668), France occupied large parts of the Spanish Netherlands and Franche-Comté—both provinces of the Holy Roman Empire ruled by Habsburg Spain. Louis XIV justified his claims using the obscure legal principle of *Jus Devolutionis*, arguing that these territories had “devolved” to him through his marriage to Maria Theresa of Spain, daughter of Philip IV and Elisabeth of France. In Vienna, Spain urged Leopold I—husband of the younger Infanta, Margaret Theresa—to intervene in defense of the Habsburg “family pact”. The imperial court was divided into factions: the informal “Spanish Party”, represented by Counts Johann Maximilian von Lamberg and Franz Karl von Auersperg, and possibly including Hermann von Baden, President of the *Hofkriegsrat*, who was suspected of being on the Spanish payroll; the “German Party”, led by Johann Adolf, Prince of Schwarzenberg, who believed Austria should focus on the imminent threat from the Ottomans in the south; and the “French Party”, represented by Václav Eusebius František, Prince of Lobkowitz, who defended the interests of the German principalities at the Imperial Diet and recognized that some of them, under immediate French pressure, could become potential allies of France.⁵ Although politically weak and pulled in multiple directions, Leopold I was already contemplating the Spanish succession following the death of Philip IV in 1665. However, during the War of Devolution, he refrained from joining the anti-French coalition. In early 1668, he concluded a secret agreement with Spain and Milan—excluding the Netherlands and Naples—aimed at securing future claims. These ambitions, however, risked alienating Hungary. Meanwhile, a new

⁵ Cardini : 208-218.

Hungarian rebellion temporarily relieved Poland and Venice from Ottoman pressure.

Inclusion of Poland

The ending of the War of Candia in 1669 freed the Ottoman Empire to redirect its attention toward Eastern Europe, where tensions were escalating among Poland, the Cossacks, and Muscovy. At the same time, Louis XIV of France sought to build an alliance against Austria. He worked to align with King Jan III Sobieski of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania (1674–1696), as well as with Prince Apafi of Transylvania. In response, Emperor Leopold I, in turn, supported Dutch Calvinists in their struggle against French expansion. France hoped that Poland would assist the Hungarian rebels and encouraged Polish claims to Silesia and Prussia. To secure Polish cooperation, Louis XIV provided King Jan III with 100,000 scudi and promised an annual subsidy of 200,000 scudi in the future. Anticipating potentially pivotal role of Poland, Pope Clement X dispatched one of his most skilled diplomats, Apostolic Nuncio Francesco Buonvisi to Warsaw. Beginning in early 1673, Buonvisi worked to win over the Polish magnates and facilitate an alliance between Poland and Austria against the Ottoman Empire. Buonvisi was transferred to Vienna in 1675. In 1675, Poland subdued the Cossacks under the leadership of Petro Doroshenko and regained control over Ukraine. Recognizing the growing threat from the Ottoman Empire, King Jan III Sobieski promptly started to raise the troops. Turkish-Tatar forces soon posed a serious threat to Khotyn and Kamianets-Podilskyi, located in what is now Chernivtsi Oblast in western Ukraine.

Despite efforts by Louis XIV of France to prevent Poland from entering into conflict with the Ottoman Empire—attempting to dissuade the Beglerbey of Buda, Ibrahim Pasha—his intervention came too late. At least, after a bloody yet inconclusive battle unfolded near Żurawno on the Dniester River, a truce between Poland and the Ottoman Empire was signed on 26 October 1676, and two years later, it was formalized by the Treaty of Istanbul. As a result, the Ottomans retained control over Kamianets and parts of western Ukraine, with Podolia becoming an Ottoman pashalik. The agreement was met with disapproval by both the Pope and the Emperor. King Jan III made it clear that any continuation of the war against the Turks would require tangible support. It became evident that both Polish and Hungarian magnates were increasingly at odds with Austrian interests, while Jan III himself vacillated between France or Austria.⁶

Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha died unexpectedly on November 3, 1676. He was succeeded by his adopted brother and son-in-law, Kara Mustafa Pasha (1676–1683), a man of considerable intelligence and ambition, but also known for his cruelty and, greed, impetuous and unreliable. Unlike many high-ranking Ottoman officials of the time, Kara Mustafa was a Muslim by birth—the son of an Anatolian spahi. Records are scarce, and there can be no comprehensive biography of Kara Mustafa Pasha. It is believed he was born between 1620 and 1635, and educated and married into the influential Köprülü family. He served as deputy to Fazıl Ahmed at the Sultan's court during the Grand Vizier's absences. Contemporary accounts of Kara Mustafa Pasha are often contradictory. While some diplomats occasionally praised his courtesy, more frequently

⁶ Stoye : 43-45.

they were unsettled by his arrogance and domineering presence during audiences. These displays of anger were likely calculated, intimidation being a deliberate tool of political power. References to the grandeur of his household underscore his immense wealth and influence. Kara Mustafa Pasha quickly established a dominant influence over Sultan Mehmed IV (1648–1687), who presided over a period of revival associated with the Köprülü era. Known for his devout piety, Mehmed IV also developed a strong passion for hunting from a young age, earning him the epithet *Avcı* (“the Hunter”).

Kara Mustafa Pasha redirected Ottoman policy counting on Habsburg weakness and strained relations between Austria and Poland—tensions partly fueled by French diplomacy. Although he maintained an interest in Ukraine, he did not support shifting Ottoman pressure from Hungary to Poland. Nevertheless, there is no solid evidence that he intended to launch an attack on Austria immediately after assuming power. His military efforts in 1677 and 1678 to capture the Cossack capital of Chyhyryn ended in failure.

On the other side, Jan III Sobieski, who owed much of his political strength to the support of Louis XIV, still considered further Ottoman expansion too high a price to pay. He was well aware that the Ottoman Empire had no intention of abandoning its ambitions in Eastern Europe. The Turkish garrison stationed in Kamianets represented a persistent threat to Poland’s security. Jan III’s rapprochement with Austria was primarily dynastic in nature. Negotiations, mediated by the apostolic nuncio in Vienna, Buonvisi, explored the possibility of a marriage between the Polish prince Jakub

Ludwik Henryk Sobieski and a Habsburg princess. However, these talks ultimately resulted only in an agreement that the Empress and the Pope would serve as godparents at the baptism of Jan III's second son, Aleksander Benedykt Stanisław Sobieski.⁷ Relying on French support, the Ottoman Empire began to pose a threat to both Austria and Poland. The dynastic coalition that followed was initiated by Pope Innocent XI (1676–1689), who, anticipating a renewed Ottoman offensive, persuaded Leopold I to enter into negotiations with the Hungarian rebels.⁸ Leopold agreed to a truce, and Imre Thököly married the Croatian Countess Jelena Zrinska—daughter of the Croatian Ban and rebel leader Petar Zrinski, and widow of the Transylvanian Prince Ferenc Rákóczi—with the reluctant consent of the Emperor. At the Diet of Sopron (German: Ödenburg) in 1681, a meeting of the Hungarian estates, Leopold I restored the autonomy of “Royal Hungary,” reinstating traditional privileges to the magnates. These included the right to elect a palatine, who would preside over both the Hungarian Council of Governors and the Diet—an attempt to secure their support against the Ottomans. However, Leopold may have underestimated the situation; his concessions came too late, and his belief that negotiations with Thököly, based on the guarantees provided by the Diet, would lead to a lasting agreement proved to be a miscalculation.⁹

Deeply concerned by the Ottoman successes on the eastern front in Ukraine, Pope Innocent XI urged Jan III to continue resisting the Turkish advance. Both the Pope and Emperor Leopold I were contending with the expansionist ambitions of Louis XIV. By securing the renewal of the

⁷ Cardini : 219-232.

⁸ Stoye : 67.

⁹ Bérenger (1967) : 31-40.

capitulations—treaties granting privileges to foreign powers within the Ottoman Empire—Louis XIV positioned himself as the Porte’s favored interlocutor. At the same time, he presented himself to Europe as the foremost protector of Christian rights within the Ottoman Empire and the Holy Places in Palestine. While Louis XIV managed to keep the Turks and Barbary pirates at bay in the Mediterranean, papal efforts to involve Venice in the peace negotiations at Nijmegen in 1678 ultimately failed. Both Spain and Austria vetoed the participation of the Venetian envoy, Giovan Battista Nani, citing his *Historia della Repubblica Veneta* as being too strongly influenced by anti-Habsburg sentiment. Nonetheless, Pope Innocent XI remained focused on a singular, well-defined objective: to recreate the conditions necessary for forming a new Holy League. Pope Innocent XI was particularly alarmed by the terms of the 1679 Treaty of Nijmegen. His nuncio in Vienna, Buonvisi, warned that France continued to pose a threat to the Holy Roman Empire. In response, the Holy See sought to forge a broad anti-Ottoman coalition—one that would even include Muscovy and Shiite Persia. The Pope issued a strong appeal to Poland, Bavaria, and Spain, declaring that the time had come for a *sacra adversus Turcas expeditio*, for *bellum adversus Turcam*, *bellum sacrum*. He framed the Ottoman threat as universal challenge, asserting that an attack on any Christian state was, in essence, an attack on all of Christendom.

Significant changes followed in French diplomacy after the successful conclusion of the Treaty of Nijmegen in 1679. Charles Colbert de Croissy was appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he began planning a series of “peaceful annexations,” particularly targeting Alsace and the Rhineland. In Istanbul, France installed a new ambassador,

Gabriel Joseph de Lavergne, Vicomte de Guilleragues and Seigneur de Montségur. (Meanwhile, in October 1680, Bernardin Kadot de Sébeville was appointed as Louis XIV's extraordinary envoy to the Emperor of Austria.) Covering up his ambitions in the Rhineland, Louis XIV chose to outwardly comply with all the provisions of the Peace of 1679, and temporarily withdrew his overt support for the Hungarian *malcontents*. He anticipated that the new ambassador Guilleragues would work to encourage the Ottoman Porte to ease its pressure on Poland and to dissuade Poland from pursuing any potential rapprochement with Austria.¹⁰ The aggressive ambitions of Kara Mustafa Pasha brought an end to the more measured and pragmatic policies carefully developed by his predecessor. In 1678, the Ottoman Empire concluded peace with Poland, and in 1681 with Muscovy, thereby freeing up resources to focus on expansion toward the Dnieper and the upper Danube. Louis XIV, seizing the opportunity presented by the looming Ottoman pressure on Austria, advanced his own territorial ambitions in Alsace. Meanwhile, both the Papacy and Poland were preparing for war. Pleased with the diplomatic progress being made, Pope Innocent XI decided to reward the papal nuncio in Vienna, Francesco Buonvisi, by elevating him to the rank of cardinal on 1 September 1681. However, as early as September 1681, Thököly broke the truce and raised an extraordinary army. This force was bolstered by a Turkish contingent of approximately 7,000 troops, along with 12,000 Moldavians and Vlachs. This diverse coalition of Muslim, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Orthodox soldiers also enjoyed the sympathy of local Jewish communities. In recognition of his efforts, Sultan Mehmed IV granted Thököly the title of

¹⁰ Duparc : 86-98.

"King of Upper Hungary"—a designation largely referring to the territory of present-day Slovakia, on the condition that he pay an annual tribute.

On September 30, French troops occupied the imperial city of Strasbourg. The Free Imperial Cities of Ulm and Cologne feared that this move could mark the beginning of a systematic French offensive along the entire right bank of the Rhine. The "Three Bishoprics" of Metz, Toul, and Verdun had already been officially annexed by France. French forces had also entered Alsace. Strasbourg, being partly Lutheran, raised concerns among the Pope and Alsatian Catholics, who expected Louis XIV to demonstratively suppress the Protestant population, both to assert Catholic dominance and to offset his controversial support for the Turks and Hungarian Calvinists. Meanwhile, the 20-year ceasefire established by the Treaty of Vasvár in 1664 was nearing its expiration. Leopold I remained hesitant, distracted by his ambitions to claim the Spanish inheritance and eager to appease the expectations of the "Spanish party".

Louis XIV zealously guarded his title of *Rex Christianissimus*, or *Roi Très-Chrétien*, even as he was increasingly referred to as "the Turk," and his court mocked as "turbanized". To justify his actions before the Christian public, he ordered Admiral Abraham Duquesne, Marquis du Bouchet, to assert French naval dominance in the Mediterranean. In 1680, the French fleet pursued corsairs from Tripoli, and in 1681 bombarded the island of Chios—under Ottoman rule since 1566—where some corsairs had taken refuge. The attack damaged a mosque and resulted in the deaths of 250 people. Although Louis XIV had no intention of launching a full-scale war against the Ottoman Empire, French merchants sought to appease the Porte's anger with a payment of 80,000 crowns. The Grand Vizier, enraged,

threatened to imprison the French ambassador, Guilleragues, in the Seven Towers, and possibly have him strangled. As a result, the French fleet limited its subsequent operations to targeting Barbary corsairs, with Duquesne bombarding Algiers in 1682 and 1683. Louis XIV's so-called "petty crusade" was largely a public relations effort aimed at distracting Christian opinion from his controversial alliances. Guilleragues, despite the tensions, managed to navigate the crisis. Though he held a low opinion of Ottoman military strength, he believed that Austria would be sufficiently weakened by French pressure along the Rhine and by France's support for Hungarian *malcontents*.¹¹ Indeed, in December 1681, Leopold I succeeded in concluding a six-month truce with Thököly, who nevertheless continued to raise the troops. As the Turkish threat grew more imminent, the influence of the "pontifical" party at Leopold I's court gained strength. Pope Innocent XI urged a resolution in the Rhineland that would at least halt the armed conflict between Austria and France, thereby enabling a focus on war in Hungary. The papal demands were strongly supported by the emperor's confessor, the Capuchin friar Marco d'Aviano, who explained to the French ambassador Sébeville that only peace in the West would make a crusade against the Ottomans feasible.

Throughout 1681 and 1682, Leopold I focused on reorganizing the armed forces. It became increasingly necessary to deploy troops on both the Rhine and Hungarian fronts, and he was fully aware of the risks involved. Convinced that the truce with the Ottoman Empire could be renewed, he continued to pursue his dynastic ambitions regarding the Spanish succession. In July and August 1681, a peace mission was discussed, to be

¹¹ Stoye : 338-340.

entrusted to the Extraordinary Emissary Count Alberto Caprara. This came at a time when France and Thököly were actively encouraging Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha to break the truce. Dissatisfied with the performance of Ambassador Baron Georg Christoph Kunitz, the *Hofkriegsrat* selected *internuntius* Caprara to be dispatched to the Porte. Likely delayed by Leopold's obligations at the Hungarian Diet in Sopron, Caprara departed for Istanbul only on 3 February 1682. However, Caprara was not granted full plenipotentiary powers to offer meaningful concessions, nor was he provided with sufficient funds for diplomatic gifts or bribes. As a result, he was treated more like a hostage than a negotiator. Austria, at this point, still underestimated the seriousness of the Turkish threat. The "Spanish party" at court shifted its priorities to the Western Front, focusing on the growing danger posed by France. Alarmed by French territorial advances in the Rhineland, King Charles XI of Sweden entered into an alliance with the Dutch Republic in July 1682. Meanwhile, Maximilian Emmanuel, the Wittelsbach Elector of Bavaria and cousin of Louis XIV, was promised the hand of Archduchess Maria Antonia, Leopold's eldest daughter—a marriage that was concluded in 1685. Marco d'Aviano played a key role in mediating the rapprochement between the Bavarian elector and the emperor. Another prince elector, Johann Georg III of Saxony, also distanced himself from French aggression, aligning more closely with the imperial cause.¹² Further concessions to France could have proven fatal to Habsburg power and prestige, yet Austria remained unprepared for a conflict with the Ottoman Empire in Hungary.

¹² Wheatcroft : 23.

Meanwhile, Caprara was sending increasingly urgent warnings about Turkish military preparations. At the beginning of 1682, envoys of Thököly and Prince Apafi entered negotiations with the Ottoman Porte regarding their participation in the forthcoming campaign. Thököly enjoyed the confidence of French diplomacy, while Apafi was viewed as indecisive, caught between Turkish pressure and Austrian promises. French Ambassador Guilleragues patiently negotiated with the envoys of both sides, and sought to persuade the Hungarians that Leopold I, whom he described as “a slave to Spanish politics,” could not be trusted and would ultimately show them no leniency. Thököly lobbied for leadership over the rebellious Hungarian estates and demanded that his status be formally recognized in any treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Austria, thereby affirming his sovereignty. He also accused Apafi of colluding with Vienna, further deepening the divisions among the Hungarian factions.¹³ Thököly was ordered, if he wished to be recognized as the king of Hungary, to bring Poland to his side.¹⁴

As his mission was not taken seriously, Caprara was received at the Ottoman Porte only after more than two months, attending two formal conferences on 22 June and 6 July 1682. During the negotiations, Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha presented a series of demands: the annulment of all Austrian territorial gains from 1664; an annual tribute of 50,000 florins from the “Kingdom of Hungary”; full pardon and repatriation of Hungarian rebels, including restitution of their confiscated property; the transfer of

¹³ Guilleragues, *Correspondance* (eds. Frédéric Deloffre, Jacques Rougeot), Vol. II, Librairie Droz, 1976, 543, Au Roi, Péra, le 14^e de janvier 1682; 558, Au Roi, Péra, le 14^e de janvier 1682; 576, Au Roi, Péra, le 4^e de février 1682; 588, Au marquis de Vitry, le 27^e de février 1682.

¹⁴ Guilleragues : 622-623, Au marquis de Vitry, Péra, le 4^e d’avril 1682.

several border fortresses to Thököly; and the disarmament of Graz and Leopoldstadt—effectively leaving Vienna undefended. The Grand Vizier likely knew these demands were unacceptable, amounting to an implicit declaration of war. Caprara's reception was largely ceremonial, and in accordance with Ottoman custom, he was effectively held as a hostage. Nevertheless, he continued to send back detailed reports on unmistakable signs of military preparations.¹⁵ He even advised the **Aulic Council** to launch a preemptive strike against Thököly, aiming to deprive the Ottoman Empire of its most important ally and source of support in Hungary.¹⁶

Aware of the threats, Austria persistently negotiated with Thököly, who—through his marriage to Jelena Zrinski—had gained additional prestige and influence, positioning himself as a potential candidate for the throne of a future united and "liberated" Hungary. The wedding took place at Munkács Castle (Ukrainian: Мункач) in June 1682. Thököly also viewed the marriage as a strategic tool in his dealings with Vienna. He offered to demobilize his kurucok in exchange for the Emperor ceding Royal Hungary. After the usual hesitation, Leopold I agreed to the first demand but refused the second—despite pressure from Spanish diplomats, who were eager for Austria to withdraw from the Eastern Front and fully commit to the war against France in the West. Even Pope Innocent XI considered it preferable to hand over the remaining Habsburg-controlled part of Hungary to Thököly rather than see it fall to the Ottomans, though he recognized that such a move would bolster the Calvinist cause.¹⁷

¹⁵ Guilleragues : 636, Au Roi, Péra, le 27^e d'avril 1682.

¹⁶ Höbelt : 35

¹⁷ Cardini : 253-259.

Austria wasted valuable time also seduced by Thököly's skillful diplomacy, as he never allowed himself to be dismissed as irreconcilable.¹⁸ His primary goal was to consolidate territorial control. In northeastern Hungary, the largest estates and their revenues still belonged to the shared legacy of the Rákóczi and Báthory families. Vienna placed its hopes in Sophia Báthory, a staunch Catholic and widow of György II Rákóczi, who had named Leopold I as executor of her will and guardian of their son, Ferenc I Rákóczi. She died in 1680. Leopold I was ultimately misled, as became evident when he consented to the marriage between Jelena Zrinski and Thököly. Thököly had no intention of abandoning his alliance with the Ottoman Empire—at least not while he believed the Sultan held the upper hand. His confidence was bolstered by the French occupation of Strasbourg and subsequent French encouragement. Thököly now sought the Hungarian crown from the Ottomans rather than from Austria. By 1681, some Ottoman troops stationed north of the Danube had joined him, and by early 1682, reinforcements arrived from Bosnia and Serbia. Ibrahim Pasha, the Beglerbeg of Buda, assisted Thököly in capturing several Habsburg strongholds in Slovakia. Just ten days after his wedding, Thököly visited Ibrahim Pasha in Buda, and together they presented themselves at the Ottoman court. In July 1682, Sultan Mehmed IV recognized Thököly as the vassal prince of “Upper Hungary”. Thököly returned and seized the fortress of Kassa (Slovak: Košice), establishing his residence there with support from local Lutherans. On August 15, he also captured Fülek (Slovak: Fil'akovo). Mehmed IV sent him a *berat*, a flag, and a saber, formally investing him as governor in the name of the Padishah, thus making him a

¹⁸ Stoye : 50.

“servant of the Porte” Coins minted under his authority bore the inscription *Emericus dux Ungariae*.¹⁹

The Siege of Vienna

The Porte decided to resume hostilities in the presence of Sultan Mehmed IV on August 6, 1682. The existing peace treaty with Austria, set to expire in 1684, was disregarded. The designated targets were Győr, the principal city of northwestern Hungary, and Komárom—fortresses that controlled navigation along the Danube and were considered the gateway to the Royal Hungarian and Austrian capitals. The conquest of Vienna, the “Red Apple”, would allow Mehmed IV to proclaim himself heir to the Western Roman Empire, following the precedent of Mehmed II the Conqueror, who had claimed succession to the Eastern Roman Empire. After all, the Padishah formally bore the title *Sultan-i-Rum*. These imperial ambitions made Mehmed IV susceptible to the influence of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha, who anticipated a swift Austrian capitulation, possibly facilitated by French diplomatic mediation. Although some viziers opposed the campaign, their objections were ultimately silenced.²⁰ Anticipating a Turkish offensive, Emperor Leopold I sought to secure the western front by appealing to the three ecclesiastical electors and the Elector Palatine for support. However, their combined military strength and political influence were minimal, and they feared provoking Louis XIV. They argued that the gravity of the Ottoman threat made a Vienna–Paris agreement essential

¹⁹ Guilleragues : 723-725, Au Roi, Péra, le 3^e d’ octobre 1682 ; 739: Au Roi, Péra, le 19^e d’ octobre 1682.

²⁰ Stoye : 45.

before any other action could be taken. In Italy, Leopold I turned to the Pope and other Italian rulers for financial and diplomatic assistance, painting a bleak picture of the looming danger. Meanwhile, Louis XIV hardened his course towards the Papacy with the *Declaration of the Clergy of France*, in *Four Gallican Articles*, promoted in 1682, by imposing the rights and powers of the monarchy above the rights and powers of Rome. A renewed Austrian peace initiative soon followed, with Caprara receiving orders to offer 300,000 thalers in exchange for an extension of the truce. However, the Grand Vizier dismissed all his appeals, treating him more like a hostage, or even a prisoner of war, than a diplomatic envoy.²¹ The French ambassador met with Caprara and reported to Louis XIV that the Ottomans were emboldened by the weakness of Austrian forces along the border. He also noted that Thököly was actively working to depose Apafi, although it was evident that the Ottomans still sought to maintain a balance in their regional relations. Guilleragues, the ambassador, made false assurances to Caprara, claiming that France would support Austria in the event of a Ottoman invasion.²² In Vienna, there was a persistent belief that war could still be postponed.²³ Hermann von Baden, president of the *Hofkriegsrat*, argued that it was France, not the Ottomans, that posed the greater threat and could never be trusted. While Caprara was engaged in futile negotiations with the Porte, he was simultaneously conspiring to form a new coalition against France, working closely with Count Georg Waldeck,

²¹ Guilleragues : 747, Au Roi, Péra, le 23^e d' octobre 1682.

²² Guilleragues : 760-762, Au Roi, Péra, le 22 de novembre 1682.

²³ Cardini : 267-268.

a trusted confidant of Stadtholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Guelders, and Overijssel in the Dutch Republic William of Orange (1672-1702).²⁴

On January 11, 1683, the defense of Hungary was entrusted to a committee of high-ranking officers: Enea Silvio Caprara—a descendant of the renowned generals Raimondo Montecuccoli and Ottavio Piccolomini, who had served under Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, during the Dutch War against France—Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg, the military governor of Vienna, and Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden-Baden. Strategic fortresses along the Danube—Komárom, Győr, Pressburg, and Leopoldstadt (a central district of Vienna, forming a large island with Brigittenau, surrounded by the Danube Canal and named after Leopold I)—were placed under their supervision.²⁵ Győr was fortified by the Italian volunteer Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, a distinguished scholar and natural scientist who also served as both emissary and soldier. He also witnessed secret relations established by local magnates Draskovich and Batthyány with Thököly as they tried to insure themselves in case of Ottoman victory.²⁶ Among the Hungarian nobility, the most powerful magnate, Pál Esterházy, also joined the preparations for defense. A major diplomatic success was achieved when Maximilian II Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria—a Wittelsbach prince with close ties to France—was persuaded to join the alliance, though he demanded substantial subsidies and territorial guarantees. Leopold I also secured an alliance with Lutheran Saxony, further strengthening the anti-

²⁴ Höbelt : 28.

²⁵ Stoye : 64-66.

²⁶ K. und K. Kriegs-Archiv, Türkenkrieg 1684, fasc. 164, 188-232, Luigi Conte Marsigli, Venezia, li 28 Giugno 1684.

Ottoman coalition.²⁷ On April 21, 1683, the *Hofkriegsrat* decided that the main body of troops under Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, should be deployed around Komárom. Duke of Lorraine was required to coordinate closely with his council of officers, the Emperor, and the Hofkriegsrat, which was chaired by Margrave (Prince) Hermann of Baden-Baden—a Field Marshal and the Emperor’s representative at the Perpetual Diet in Regensburg. Duke of Lorraine had fought in the French cavalcade against the Turks in the 1664 campaign, from 1682 he was in semi-retirement, representing the Emperor as the governor of Tirol, in Innsbruck. In November 1682, Leopold I concluded another seasonal truce with Thököly. In January 1683, Thököly convened a Diet of the Hungarian estates in the counties around Košice. Palatine Pál Esterházy protested the move, but Vienna nonetheless authorized a delegate to negotiate with Thököly and the assembled deputies. Margrave Hermann of Baden believed that, if an agreement could be reached, Thököly might persuade the Porte to abandon its plans for a military campaign. Among the instructions given to the Austrian envoy, only one point proved truly practical: to address those deputies who appeared sympathetic to Austria. It was believed that not everyone within Thököly’s camp supported his authoritarian approach or accepted Ottoman sovereignty. However, on June 21, Thököly abruptly announced the end of the truce, breaking his earlier promise to give one month’s notice. Thököly’s advances in Slovakia posed a direct threat to Poland, leaving Kraków and its surrounding territories particularly vulnerable. His growing influence unexpectedly became a key factor in drawing Poland closer to Austria. France, recognizing the danger, warned

²⁷ Cardini : 270-288.

the Ottoman Porte in vain: Poland, they insisted, was a French ally, and any attack against it would force France to make a difficult choice.²⁸ Indeed, Jan III temporarily set aside his longstanding demand for a marriage alliance between his son and a Habsburg princess. His primary objective was to recover lost territories in Podolia, which required exerting military pressure on the Ottomans in Hungary. Leopold I agreed to subsidize Jan III, who in turn committed to raising an army of 40,000 men. The agreement was finalized on March 31, 1683. After prolonged negotiations with the estates, as magnates resisted, the Sejm ratified the treaty on April 18. The decision to go to war was ultimately made by the Grand Vizier, who imposed impossible conditions on the Austrian envoy. The impending Turkish assault on Vienna quickly captured the attention of the European public, especially as Vienna served as a central hub for the transmission of information between Southeastern and Western Europe. The first printed newspapers began reporting weekly on the escalating tensions between the Ottoman Empire and Austria, with one of the most dramatic moments being the announcement of the Turkish declaration of war in March 1683. Periodical *Gazette*, published in Paris on April 3, reported a new dispatch from Caprara, where he detailed his negotiations with the Aga of the Janissaries (an indication of how low his diplomatic status had fallen). The Porte demanded a series of fortified towns in exchange for extending the truce. Caprara, lacking the authority to concede such extraordinary terms, was met with a blunt response: the Sultan was powerful enough to seize what he wanted by force. Although placed under strict guard, Caprara managed to gather valuable intelligence and relay detailed reports back to

²⁸ Guilleragues : 815, Au Roi, Péra, le 5e de mars 1683.

Vienna. His conclusion was grim—there was no indication that the Emperor could achieve anything through diplomacy, while Thököly was actively raising a powerful army.²⁹ In the lead-up to war, Austria first needed to secure peace along the western borders of the Empire. On January 20, 1683, Pope Innocent XI invited Louis XIV to join the Christian coalition or at least offer support. Louis XIV responded that he would take no action against Leopold I as long as Austria remained at war with the Ottoman Empire, and that he would refrain from aiding the Turks. However, behind the scenes, Louis XIV continued to reassure the Porte that no French assistance—whether official, private, voluntary, or covert—would reach Leopold I, in stark contrast to France’s intervention during the Cretan War 1663–1664. Louis XIV was also convinced that the Ottoman demand for the surrender of Győr and Komárom would be among the most difficult for Austria to resist.

Mehmed IV spent the unusually cold winter comfortably in Edirne, and at the end of March 1683, he set out for Belgrade. Both Ottoman sources and Western observers described the campaign’s early stages as chaotic and grueling—bridges collapsed, waves of mud swallowed people and animals, and floods and landslides plagued the march. The Ottoman army arrived in Belgrade on May 3–4, where it had to wait for the arrival of vassal contingents from Hungary, Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia, as well as troops from Syria, Egypt, and North Africa. On May 13, in a grand ceremony, Mehmed IV handed over the Prophet’s banner to Kara Mustafa Pasha, officially appointing him as *serasker* (commander-in-chief). With this symbolic act, the Sultan returned to the capital, leaving Kara Mustafa

²⁹ Haffemayer : 805-814.

in charge of the campaign.³⁰ The Ottoman army likely numbered up to 150,000 soldiers, though its composition was of mixed quality. At its core stood the Janissary infantry and the Spahi cavalry. Including support personnel, the total force may have reached around 180,000. While the army was numerically impressive and visually intimidating, its artillery was limited in quantity and somewhat outdated. Nevertheless, the sheer size and presence of the force made it a formidable and fearsome sight.

Austria urgently needed a strong response, but only Poland could provide the necessary additional military force—and negotiations dragged on. A significant revelation emerged: the French ambassador in Poland and the Polish ambassador in France had discussed the possible dissolution of the Sejm and even the overthrow of King Jan III Sobieski. Despite these tensions, an agreement was eventually reached: Leopold I would raise 60,000 troops, and Poland would contribute 40,000. To support the Polish war effort, Leopold allocated 200,000 thalers. The alliance between Austria and Poland was guaranteed by Pope Innocent XI, who pledged 400,000 florins to Leopold I and 500,000 to Jan III. Supreme command of the combined forces was to be entrusted to Jan III Sobieski. Leopold I signed the agreement on May 2. At the same time, Innocent XI appealed to all Italian states for military or financial aid. Contributions soon arrived from Tuscany, Genoa, Lucca, and Savoy, while the Pope and several cardinals personally donated substantial sums. Leopold I entrusted command of the Imperial Army to Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, who remained the *de facto* commander-in-chief, while Jan III was content with the formal title.

³⁰ Guilleragues : 836, Au Roi, Péra, le 10e d' avril 1683; 855: Au Roi, Péra, le 17e de mai 1683; 876-877: Au Roi, Péra, le 14e de juin 1683.

Supreme command remained under the authority of the *Hofkriegsrat*. On May 6 and 7, Leopold conducted a ceremonial review of the corps at Kittsee, south of Pressburg. At the suggestion of Marco d'Aviano, all Austrian military insignia were to bear the image of the Virgin Mary.

The movement of troops dictated the pace of diplomacy. Turkish army reached Osijek on May 19, joined by Thököly and Wallachian troops led by ottoman vassal Prince Şerban Cantacuzino 1678–1688, who was considered the guardian of Orthodoxy against Catholic Austria and Poland. The brother of Thököly 's wife, Count Ivan Antun Zrinski, also joined the army.³¹ The Ottoman army departed from Osijek on June 14, crossing the barely repaired bridge over the Drava River and entering what was referred to as "Sultanate Hungary." Around this time, the Grand Vizier received a letter from Hermann of Baden, President of the Hofkriegsrat, in which he politely stated that Emperor Leopold I had done everything possible to preserve peace but was now forced to acknowledge that a state of war existed. The Grand Vizier responded with an equally measured reply to Caprara, who continued on to Buda, while the envoy Georg Kunitz remained behind—effectively a guest-hostage.³² A council of war was held at Székesfehérvár on June 27, during which the Grand Vizier revealed his true intentions: there was no longer any doubt—he aimed to "pick the Red Apple", a symbolic reference to the conquest of Vienna. Opposition arose from Ibrahim Pasha, the Beylerbey of Buda, and Mehmed Giray, the Tatar Khan, who argued that such a major strategic decision should have been discussed

³¹ Guilleragues : 887, A Colbert de Croissy, Péra, le 7e de juillet 1683.

³² Stoye : 56.

at the Porte a year earlier to properly assess its feasibility. They warned that an attack on Vienna risked uniting all of Christian Europe against the Ottoman Empire. The Grand Vizier, however, dismissed their concerns, rudely calling Ibrahim Pasha a "gray-bearded cowardly old man" and ordered him back to Buda.³³

The Ottoman army entered Habsburg territory on June 29. It became unmistakably clear that Kara Mustafa Pasha was marching on Vienna. In his haste, he bypassed the strategic fortresses of Győr and Komárom without attempting to capture them—key positions between Buda and Vienna. By July 1, Ottoman forces had reached the right bank of the Rába River, near Győr. The siege of Győr was delegated to Prince Apafi of Transylvania, signaling that the fortress was no longer a primary objective. Meanwhile, the Imperial army was forced to retreat to the northern bank of the Danube.³⁴ Faced with an immediate threat, and grappling with moral and political doubts, Leopold I made the difficult decision to withdraw from Vienna with his entire family and court, seeking refuge in Linz. Though necessary, the move damaged his reputation and authority. One major concern among Habsburg advisers was the safety of the Crown of Saint Stephen of Hungary, a powerful symbol of legitimacy. At the time, it was kept in the castle at Pressburg, and there were fears that if Thököly seized the city, the consequences would be severe. To prevent usurpation, Leopold I had the crown transferred to the Hofburg on July 5 and, on the same day, approved preparations for the imperial departure from Vienna. Empress Eleonore Magdalene of Neuburg, Leopold's third wife, was

³³ Cardini : 289-292.

³⁴ Cardini : 293.

nearing childbirth. The imperial entourage took with them the treasury and state archives. Their departure was met with widespread discontent—even public outrage—among the citizens of Vienna. Around 30,000 residents, nearly everyone who could, evacuated the city. Approximately 70,000 to 80,000 remained, while an additional 20,000 people from surrounding villages moved in after the defenders burned and leveled the suburbs in preparation for the siege. Food supplies were stockpiled in anticipation.³⁵

The future of the conflict, as the Austrian leadership rightly believed, would depend on the balance of power in Western Europe—and on the eventual prompt arrival of the Polish army. Louis XIV continued to exert pressure on the Holy Roman Empire following his territorial gains at Nijmegen and subsequent occupations in the Rhineland. In the German states, French emissaries and agents spread the narrative that the Habsburgs posed a threat to the liberties of the “realm of the German nation”. In Vienna, there was growing conviction that Louis XIV’s ultimate ambition was the imperial crown itself. Austria could no longer rely on the Netherlands, which had been exhausted by two successive wars with France. French aggression also reshaped alliances in the Baltic. Denmark moved closer to France, while Sweden aligned with the Netherlands and pledged to uphold the international order established by the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) and Nijmegen (1679). Austria joined this emerging coalition, known as the “Association”.

After the Ottoman invasion was announced in April 1682, Louis XIV made a show of goodwill by withdrawing his forces from Luxembourg—a gesture he widely publicized as an act of generosity. At

³⁵ Stoye : 232.

the same time, however, he secretly instructed his ambassador to the Porte, Guilleragues, to inform the Grand Vizier that France's true intention was to strike at Leopold I when the moment was right. Guilleragues, still uncertain whether the Ottomans would target Poland or Austria, warned the Grand Vizier that France might support Poland if it were attacked. In reality, France was doing everything it could to steer the Ottoman army toward Hungary—and ultimately Vienna.³⁶ In Vienna, preparations for defense intensified. The core of the city's defenders consisted of a regular garrison of approximately 11,000 troops under the command of Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg. A civil militia of around 5,000 was also organized by Caspar Zdenko Graf von Capliers, a veteran of the Thirty Years' War and chairman of the secret College of Deputies. He had been appointed by Leopold I to oversee the administration of the besieged city during the Emperor's absence. The Ottoman army approached Vienna from the southeast in early July. Following the advance of the Tatars, the Turks plundered and devastated Pressburg on July 11, although the citadel held firm. Thököly exploited the pressure exerted by the Turkish advance to strengthen his position in Habsburg Hungary. He claimed to be defending Christians from the "Mohammedans", while his forces served as the vanguard of the Ottoman army. On July 16, Sopron swore allegiance to Thököly, followed shortly by Eisenstadt and Rust. The Turkish commander was housed in the Esterházy Palace overlooking Eisenstadt, while Hungarian Palatine Pál Esterházy remained safely in Austria.

At this point, everything depended on Vienna's continued resistance. Meanwhile, Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, kept the main body of

³⁶ Guilleragues : 771-776, Au marquis de Vitry, Péra, le 23 de novembre 1682.

the Austrian army at a distance, judging that it was not yet strong enough to confront the Ottoman forces directly. He awaited reinforcements before engaging. The German states that felt directly threatened by the Ottoman advance contributed the most—namely Bavaria, Swabia, Franconia, and Saxony. Brandenburg, distant and under French influence, offered only minimal support; Elector Friedrich Wilhelm reluctantly agreed to send just 1,200 men to join the Polish forces. Of the northern princes, only Ernst August I, Duke of Hanover, sent his son with a cavalry unit. Johann George III, Elector of Saxony, personally led an army of 10,000 men. At the end of July, Maximilian Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria, arrived in Passau with a force of about 11,000, where Emperor Leopold I reviewed his troops. On July 14, Kara Mustafa Pasha appeared on the southern slopes overlooking Vienna. The Ottoman camp was laid out in a vast, irregular crescent—an awe-inspiring and terrifying display of force. Kara Mustafa sent a formal summons to surrender: “Accept Islam, and live in peace under the Sultan! Or deliver up the fortress, and live in peace under the Sultan as Christians; and if any man prefer, let him depart peaceably, taking his goods with him! But if you resist, then death, spoliation, or slavery shall be the fate of you all!” Starhemberg dismissed the messenger with a brief and resolute refusal.³⁷

The siege of Vienna progressed gradually, with the Ottoman forces avoiding unnecessary risks. Inside the besieged city, dysentery spread rapidly, claiming lives and weakening the defenders. Between July 24 and August 4, Starhemberg had no contact with Duke of Lorraine, further isolating the city. At the Reichstag summit in Regensburg on July 26,

³⁷ Stoye : 172.

France accused Austria and Spain—along with their allies—of neglecting their duty to defend Europe against the Ottoman threat. France demanded recognition of the status quo in the Rhineland for the next thirty years, which would effectively legitimize its territorial occupations since 1679. France relied on the support of the Electors of the Rhine—Cologne, Mainz, Trier, and the Palatinate—as well as Brandenburg. However, the Netherlands and Spain viewed the proposal as a new threat. Leopold I firmly rejected.³⁸ Contrary to the promises Louis XIV had made to the Pope, he used the distraction of the siege to annex Alsace, Lorraine, Saarland, and Luxembourg. He tasked the renowned military engineer Vauban with fortifying these new borders. The Pope, though disappointed, consoled himself with the thought that French expansion into the Rhineland was a blow to the German Protestants. Yet even in France, the heroic defense of Vienna stirred admiration and awe.

The Christian army was concentrated near Tulln on the Danube. Between late August and early September, torrential rains severely hampered further movement. Nevertheless, Duke of Lorraine managed to prevent Hungarian and Tatar detachments in Lower Austria from crossing the Danube. Alongside Ludwig of Baden, he drove Thököly's and Ottoman troops out of Pressburg, where the Austrian garrison had remained barricaded in the citadel since July 30—marking the first significant victory of the campaign. Pressburg reaffirmed its loyalty to Leopold I on August 3. Thököly retreated into the Little Carpathians (in present-day western Slovakia), taking refuge in the castle of Čeklis near Pressburg, and was effectively halted in his attempt to penetrate Moravia. Meanwhile, Vienna

³⁸ Stoye : 95.

was suffering immense hardship and destruction. As during the first siege a century and a half earlier, the Turkenglocken rang out, calling the faithful to prayer. After nearly two months under siege, the situation inside the city had become critically dire. Most deaths among soldiers and civilians were not due to combat, but to infected wounds, tetanus, and disease. Discipline among the defenders began to deteriorate.³⁹

The commanders of the main allied force—King Jan III Sobieski of Poland, Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, and Count Karl von Waldeck, Field Marshal of the Holy Roman Empire—met at Ober-Hollabrunn on August 31, marking the beginning of a new phase in the war. The urgent task was to agree on a plan for the liberation of Vienna. Messengers from the besieged city, who had managed to slip through the Turkish lines, urged Duke of Lorraine to launch a decisive attack. They reported signs of fatigue and disorder within the Ottoman camp. Still, Duke of Lorraine hesitated. Jan III had brought only about 15,000 troops but assumed the title of commander-in-chief. A solemn review of the now-united Christian forces was held at Tulln on September 8, the Feast of the Nativity of the Virgin Mary. A reconnaissance detachment led by Colonel Heissler of the dragoons—among whose ranks was the young Prince Eugene of Savoy—was sent ahead to scout the route through the Wienerwald. During the night of September 8–9, they reached Kahlenberg, one of the highest hills of the Wienerwald. The main army followed on September 9, choosing a short but difficult route in order to strike the Ottoman camp from the rear. The operation to liberate Vienna began at dawn on September 12.⁴⁰ The total

³⁹ Cardini : 295; 323-357.

⁴⁰ Cardini : 368-379.

Ottoman force engaged in the battle numbered fewer than 30,000 men. Charles of Lorraine commanded approximately 40,000 troops, while the right wing under Jan III Sobieski likely consisted of around 20,000 soldiers. To most eyewitnesses, the great battle appeared as a chaotic series of separate engagements spread across a wide area. Both Duke of Lorraine and Jan III struggled to impose a coherent tactical structure. As one participant observed, “we fought from ridge to valley, and from valley to ridge”. After five or six hours of combat, the Ottomans were forced onto the defensive and began to retreat. Jan III advanced slowly and cautiously—behavior that contrasts with later epic portrayals of the event as a swift and glorious charge. The turning point came around four in the afternoon, when Habsburg and Bavarian troops launched a decisive assault on the final Ottoman stronghold surrounding the Grand Vizier’s tent. Jan III pressed forward, striking the center of the Turkish camp. The final attack was launched around six in the evening. Realizing the battle was lost, Kara Mustafa Pasha gathered his treasury and fled.

Polish troops were the first to enter the Ottoman camp, seizing the most valuable spoils—fine cloth, weapons, furs, cannons, and tents. Among the captured items was the Grand Vizier’s entire archive. Over time, the documents mysteriously disappeared without a trace.⁴¹

Kara Mustafa Pasha wanted Vienna with all its symbols and wealth. The Venetian ambassador Domenico Contarini noted that he was led by a “blind greed for gold”.⁴² The Grand Vizier was convinced that the mere

⁴¹ Kreutel : 198.

⁴² Kocić : 133.

appearance of his army, encircling the city, would be enough to intimidate the defenders to the point of giving up to avoid the worst.⁴³ And his primary mistake was in misjudging the time and effort required to capture Vienna. He underestimated the tenacity of the city's defenders and failed to establish broader control over the surrounding areas. The command made no serious effort to reinforce observation posts on the Wienerwald ridge—the very direction from which the Christian coalition was advancing. Only at the last moment were orders given to dig trenches and position artillery. Ultimately, he remained entrenched in a siege rather than confronting the intervention forces directly—an error that led to his defeat and retreat.⁴⁴ The Grand Vizier's downfall was not solely the result of military failure, but also of Sultan Mehmed IV's earlier reluctance to start a war.⁴⁵ The following day, on September 13, King Jan III Sobieski entered Vienna in triumph. Lorraine and his generals allowed him to bask in the glory of victory. In contrast, the Emperor's arrival was marked by solemnity and a sense of humiliation—though Jan III made no effort to humiliate Leopold I. On September 25, Pope Innocent XI held a solemn *Te Deum* at the Papal Basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore. He declared that the victory day—Sunday, September 12, the thirtieth day after the Feast of the Assumption—would henceforth be celebrated as the Feast of the Holy Name of Mary. In Rome, to commemorate the victory, a new church was built: the Chiesa del Santissimo Nome di Maria at the Foro Traiano.

⁴³ Béranger (1983-1984) : 34.

⁴⁴ Stoye : 304-305.

⁴⁵ Guilleragues : 689, Au Roi, Péra, le 30 de juin 1682.

The Holy League

The liberation of Vienna raised the question of whether the war should continue, as the Ottoman forces were in retreat. Charles of Lorraine urged an immediate pursuit of the demoralized enemy, but Jan III Sobieski initially refused, stating that his troops were exhausted. Emperor Leopold I arrived in Vienna on September 14 and met with Jan III the same day. Their brief conversation on horseback, conducted in Latin, was cordial—the emperor expressed his gratitude, and the king responded with praise.⁴⁶ On the same day, John III invited Venice from Vienna, in a letter personally delivered by his secretary, to join the alliance against the Ottoman Empire. In Venice, the news of the success “served as an occasion for a great, frenzied celebration whose first victims were the Ottoman merchants, located in a part of the city specially set aside for them (*Fondaco dei Turchi*)”.⁴⁷ However, the issue of what would remain of the victorious coalition soon emerged. The Elector of Saxony withdrew on September 15, citing the poor treatment of Protestants and the vulnerability of Saxony, which had been left undefended. His dissatisfaction was likely compounded by the fact that his troops, despite their significant contribution, received little share of the spoils. Waldeck opposed continuing the counter-offensive, arguing that his forces could not advance beyond Vienna without the consent of the Franconian princes. In his view, the immediate crisis had been resolved, and the focus should now shift to defending the Empire and the Netherlands. He was supported in this stance by the Spanish ambassador, Borgomanero. Tensions also surfaced between Lorraine and

⁴⁶ Stoye : 319.

⁴⁷ Kocić : 136.

Max Emanuel, revealing deep-seated mutual distrust. Meanwhile, Leopold I promoted Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg to the rank of field marshal in recognition of his leadership during the siege.⁴⁸

Despite the victory at Vienna, the army soon faced serious challenges. Nearly half the troops were suffering from dysentery, and provisions were running dangerously low. These conditions cast serious doubt on the feasibility of continuing the campaign. Nevertheless, Jan III Sobieski was the first to resume the offensive. On September 17, lured by reports of chaos within the Ottoman ranks, he advanced along the right bank of the Danube. He found himself moving through a devastated landscape—"it is like the Arabian desert," he wrote to the queen. Jan III and Charles of Lorraine soon learned that the terrain around the Ottoman stronghold of Neuhäusel (Hungarian: Érsekújvár) was already flooded. They decided instead to advance toward Párkány in southern Slovakia (Slovak: Štúrovo), where the Ottomans were defending a key bridge over the Danube that connected Neuhäusel with Buda. Near Párkány, on October 6, Jan III and his son Jakub suffered a serious defeat and barely escaped with their lives. As their forces retreated in disarray, a detachment of approximately 16,700 German soldiers arrived and joined forces with 8,000 to 10,000 Poles. Together, they launched a counterattack against an Ottoman force of about 16,000. Jan III and Duke of Lorraine shared command during the battle. Notably, Imre Thököly and the Tatars abstained from participating. The Ottomans were decisively defeated, and the survivors fled along the northern bank of the Danube toward Buda. The

⁴⁸ Stoye : 69.

battlefield was strewn with the bodies of an estimated 9,000 dead.⁴⁹ Following the victory at Párkány, Jan III Sobieski, Duke of Lorraine, and Max Emmanuel captured Esztergom. The Ottomans offered little resistance. As both a strategic and religious center, the archdiocese of Esztergom held significant importance. In response to the loss, Kara Mustafa Pasha ordered the execution of the officers who had abandoned the city. From Istanbul, the French ambassador reported: “I have just learned that the imperialists have occupied Esztergom, and that desertion, terror, disorder, and agitation against the Grand Vizier and even the Sultan himself are increasing daily”.⁵⁰ Amid this string of victories, a new issue emerged: how to deal with the Hungarian rebels. In January 1684, a commission was convened in Pressburg, authorized to grant amnesty to those who pledged loyalty to Leopold I. However, complications were expected. Habsburg officials had already confiscated large portions of rebel lands to supply the army. The Palatine permanently acquired rebel estates, though he himself had suffered significant personal losses. Imre Thököly and his closest allies were explicitly excluded from any pardon.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire faced an urgent need for political consolidation. Kara Mustafa Pasha moved to Győr, where he crushed a rebellion among troops who wanted to retreat directly to the capital. His priority was to secure the Sultan’s position. Although viziers had effectively ruled in Mehmed IV’s name for over two decades, the Sultan still held ultimate authority—and someone had to be held accountable for the catastrophic failures. To preempt blame, Kara Mustafa Pasha ordered

⁴⁹ Stoye : 325-326.

⁵⁰ Guilleragues : 911, Au Roi, Péra, le 10 de décembre 1683.

the execution of Ibrahim Pasha, the beylerbey of Buda, and his supporters in a camp outside Győr. Ibrahim Pasha had consistently opposed the Grand Vizier's decisions and posed a political threat—his wife was the Sultan's sister. Kara Mustafa then retreated to Buda, and shortly after continued on to Belgrade. At that time, Mehmed IV was in Edirne, hunting, as was his custom in that season. On December 14, he received news of the fall of Esztergom. Eleven days later, on December 25, Kara Mustafa Pasha was confronted in Belgrade by the Sultan's emissaries. In solemn silence, they presented him with the Sultan's firman ordering his execution. He was strangled with a silk cord. "The capture of Esztergom and the death of the Grand Vezir, were like milestones in the development of Habsburg international policy".⁵¹ The defense of Vienna underscored the need to formalize the victorious coalition. Papal nuncio Buonvisi worked tirelessly to preserve the alliance between Austria and Poland. Pope Innocent XI also sought to include Venice, particularly for its naval strength. In the evolving relationship between Austria and Venice, Buonvisi recognized the need for balance, aware that both powers were sensitive to issues of prestige and legitimacy. Buonvisi assured Venetian ambassador Domenico Contarini that Leopold I was ready to sign an alliance treaty against the Ottomans. However, Venice remained hesitant, influenced by a strong anti-curial faction. It was Marco d'Aviano, a Capuchin friar and papal envoy, who ultimately overcame this resistance—Venice was, after all, his home state. On January 22, 1684, Venice agreed to join the alliance.

The Treaty of the Holy League (*Sacrum Foedus*) was concluded on March 5, 1684, in Linz. The signatories included the Papal States, Poland,

⁵¹ Stoye : 327.

Venice, and the Order of Malta. The Duchy of Savoy also agreed to join, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany represented the Knights of Saint Stephen. The treaty was ratified on May 24 in Rome. The Tsars of Moscow, Ivan and Pyotr I Alekseyevich (the future Peter the Great), were also invited to participate, but their sister, Princess Sophia, who held real power at the time, chose to remain neutral—for the moment. The outcome of the second siege of Vienna also influenced international relations in Western Europe. While the Ottomans besieged Vienna, Louis XIV of France refrained from attacking the Holy Roman Empire. However, he seized the opportunity to advance into the Spanish Netherlands, bombarding Luxembourg and devastating parts of Hainaut and Flanders. Spain was powerless to respond, and potential Habsburg allies were weak and divided.

William of Orange was unable to assist from the Netherlands. After the victory at Vienna, his envoy Georg Friedrich von Waldeck failed to draw Austria into direct conflict with France. Leopold I, influenced by Marco d'Aviano, remained focused on the anti-Ottoman crusade. A twenty-year truce was eventually signed on August 15, 1684, at the Dominican convent in Ratisbon (modern-day Regensburg, Bavaria), between Louis XIV, Leopold I, and Charles II of Spain, ending the War of the Reunions. The agreement allowed Louis XIV to keep Strasbourg, Luxembourg, and most of his other territorial gains. Although the truce was meant to last two decades, Louis XIV broke it on September 27, 1688, by invading Philippsburg, thus beginning the Nine Years' War (also known as the War of the Augsburg League). The victories of 1683 shaped Austrian politics for the remainder of the century. This time, Austria did not halt its advance. The allied forces were substantial, and their leadership more resolute. Thus

began the Great Turkish War (also known as the War of the Holy League, 1683–1699), fought between the Holy League and the Ottoman Empire. Simultaneously, the Morean War (1684–1699) unfolded between Venice and the Ottomans. Following the fall of Buda in 1686 and the Ottoman defeat at Harsány in 1687, a rebellion among the Ottoman troops led to the overthrow of Sultan Mehmed IV. That same year, Venice captured Novi (Herceg Novi) at the entrance to the Bay of Kotor, seeking to revive its former maritime dominance in the Aegean Sea. Meanwhile, Poland launched a campaign into Moldavia, and Austria continued its occupation of Hungary. Thököly was expelled from Slovakia, and Prince Apafi of Transylvania was forced to submit. In 1688, the Austrians captured Belgrade, and the fall of Slavonia and Belgrade inspired uprisings among Balkan Christians, who became a growing force within Habsburg military and political influence—both in Southeastern Europe and on broader European battlefields. Leopold I was recognized as sovereign by Serbian Patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević and Wallachian Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu (1688–1714), both formerly Ottoman vassals. The deposition of Mehmed IV in 1687 forced the Ottoman Empire to confront a new geopolitical reality. By 1688, France had renewed its alliance with the Ottomans. The balance of power between France and Austria was determined by Habsburg strength in the southeast and vulnerability along the Rhine, the western frontier of the Holy Roman Empire. The Nine Years' War (1688–1697) provided relief to the Ottomans, as Austria was forced to divide its attention. Nevertheless, the war also pushed the Ottomans toward accepting the prospect of an unfavorable and humiliating peace. Leopold I succeeded in occupying large parts of Hungary, Croatia,

and Slavonia, and maintained a strategic balance against both France and Turkey through alliances with Poland, Venice, the Papacy, and eventually Russia. Austrian victories brought Balkan Christians into the Habsburg sphere of influence and significantly reduced Ottoman pressure on Central Europe. By incorporating segments of the Croatian and Serbian populations from newly conquered territories, Austria gained a military force that surpassed the combined support of all its allies in 1683. Austria's border with the Ottoman Empire was consolidated along the major rivers of the Pannonian Plain, allowing the Habsburgs to shift their strategic focus toward their long-term priorities: Italy and the Mediterranean. Challenged by France and the Ottoman Empire, Austria preserved the idea of the Holy Roman Empire by assuming its leadership and identity. Under Leopold I, Austria emerged as a reliable patron of German interests. It was largely thanks to Austria that the political order established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 endured for the next century and a half.

As Austria was also becoming more cosmopolitan, successive victories—first against the Ottomans, then in the coalition against France—were made possible by the brilliance of generals of Italian and French descent: Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609–1680), Charles V, Duke of Lorraine and Bar (1643–1690), and Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663–1736). Austria invested heavily in both military strength and diplomacy, maintaining its role as protector of the Holy Roman Empire. In its dealings with German allies, Austria fostered a partnership rather than one of dominance. It no longer relied on the support of the Spanish Habsburgs, whose priorities often diverged. Austria was now assuming a new leadership role within the Habsburg realm, while Germans were becoming

a minority. By the end of the 17th century, five major national groups lived under Austrian Habsburg rule: Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Croats, and Serbs. This diversity required the development of institutions and careful governance. After years of death, suffering, destruction, and poverty, Vienna stood on the threshold of a great future. Leopold Karl von Kollonitsch, bishop of Wiener Neustadt, took charge of caring for the homeless, feeding them and providing shelter. Vienna remained grateful to the noble prelate, whose compassion was long remembered. In the decade following the second siege, Vienna and its suburbs grew to a population of 80,000, a number that would double within fifty years. Much of Baroque Vienna, built under Leopold I and his successor Joseph I, has since disappeared due to later urban development, especially by the early 20th century.

The sense of divine deliverance was profound—many spoke of apparitions and supernatural interventions. One of the most enduring monuments to the liberation of Vienna is the Church of Mariahilf (“Mary’s Help”), a Baroque parish church and the seat of the Congregation of Saint Michael the Archangel (*Congregatio Sancti Michaëlis Archangeli*), located in Vienna’s 6th district, Mariahilf. Built by Sebastiano Carlone between 1686 and 1689 and later redesigned by Franz Jänggl (1711–1715), it stands as a symbol of faith and resilience. Between 1685 and 1720, Vienna experienced a “miracle of construction”, fueled by a broader financial recovery of the Austrian Monarchy.

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This review emerged from research that led to my study *France and Turkey*, published back in 1992.⁵² The previous year, Professor Slavko Gavrilović, then Editor-in-Chief, accepted my article *The Battle of Slankamen 1691*, on the event's three-hundredth anniversary.⁵³ Remembering Professor Gavrilović, the attentive, dedicated, and most diligent man, I'm still persistently seduced by a belief that the pursuit of scientific knowledge and rational wisdom, though buried in the past, can transcend the darkest voids in humanity, as we should be outlived by our commitments. My gratitude to Vladan Gavrilović, for the friendship and this industrious opportunity.

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AROMANIANS-TRADERS IN THE HABSBURG MONARCHY IN THE 18TH CENTURY

Abstract: The Aromanians (also known as the Cincars) were undoubtedly bearers of the Byzantine (Greek) tradition and civilization. They were skilled in trade and craftsmanship and adeptly exploited the largely unoccupied space in commerce between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Initially, they arrived as individuals and settled within the Monarchy's territory. However, following the destruction of their centers in the regions of Macedonia, Albania, and northern Greece, they began to migrate en masse to the territory of the Monarchy, where they began to settle permanently. The Cincars were exceptionally well-educated and brought up in the Greek-Byzantine spirit and tradition, which they preserved even after settling in the new Habsburg regions. They created closed communities, traditionally maintained their language and customs, invested in Greek institutions, and resisted assimilation until the mid-19th century. Around that time, as traditional values began to erode, they increasingly assimilated into the closest cultural environment — the Orthodox Serbian community — where their strong roots can still be found today.

Keywords: Cincars, Greek civilization, trade, craftsmanship, Habsburg Monarchy.

Even today, the Aromanian spirit lives on, recognizable in many parts of the Serbian people. Unfortunately, we still lack thoroughly grounded historical research on this people, precisely because they were a people—or rather a group—without their own literary language or distinct, recognizable culture. They were also a people inclined toward various forms of assimilation, the most profound of which were Roman and later Greek influences. The former Roman Empire managed to defeat the great and glorious Greek states and imposed not only its political rule upon them but also instilled Roman virtues and a way of life in their memory. As a

result, the Greeks (Hellenes) proudly referred to themselves as Roman citizens and continued to call themselves *Romans*—or *Rhomaioi*—long after the fall of Rome.¹

When the Romans came to dominate the Balkans, all the peoples living in this region—except the Greeks—adopted the Latin language and culture. From Vulgar Latin, distinct Romance dialects developed in certain areas, the most preserved of which to this day is Romanian. In the coastal cities along the Adriatic Sea, the Dalmatian language also emerged but later disappeared. Many still consider Albanian to be a semi-Romance language.²

Despite these successes of the Roman language and, consequently, Latin culture, the Greek spirit managed—after the division of the Roman Empire into Eastern and Western halves in 395 AD—to, under changed circumstances, imprint its essence on the Eastern half and to instill in many ethnic groups in the Balkans a sense of legitimate inheritance of this part of the Roman Empire. This enduring presence of both Roman and Greek cultural influences was especially visible in one ethnic group that referred to themselves as Greco-Vlachs or Aromanians (Tsintsars), who originally lived deep within the Balkan Peninsula, in what is now part of Slavic Macedonia and Albania. After the Roman-Greek period, in the 6th and 7th centuries, Slavs began penetrating the Balkans, breaking the Balkan Romans into several groups—some of which were eventually fully assimilated, while others retreated deeper into Byzantium, into the region of

¹ Душан Ј. Поповић, *О Цинџарима*, Београд 1937, 16-17. (Popović J. Dušan, *On the Cincars*, Belgrade 1937, 16-17.)

² Josip Besendörfer, *Tko su Cincari*, Osječki zbornik, br. II-III, Osijek 1948, 55. (Besendörfer Josip, *Who are the Cincars*, Osječki zbornik, Vol. II-III, Osijek 1948, 55-64.)

Macedonia, which during the 9th and 10th centuries had a high percentage of Romance population. As these Romans came under the political and cultural influence of the Byzantine Greeks—who also referred to themselves as *Romans*—over the following centuries, Greek influence came to dominate over the original Roman one. By the end of the Middle Ages, the Balkan Romans had become almost entirely Hellenized. What nevertheless distinguished and preserved them as a distinct ethnic group was the blend of Latin and Greek in their language, the so-called Greco-Vlach, under which name—following the Ottoman incursions into the Balkans—they appeared in history as the Greco-Vlachs or Aromanians (Tsintsars).³

During the period of Ottoman rule, the Greeks, being excellent merchants, enjoyed significant privileges not only within the Ottoman Empire but also in neighboring Christian countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The Aromanians (Tsintsars), as merchants and craftsmen themselves, also benefited from these privileges. In the liberated parts of the Balkans and Central Europe under Habsburg rule, they, alongside the Greeks, became prominent bearers of Greek spirit and culture—to such an extent that the terms “Greek” and “Greekness” were often used interchangeably with “Tsintsar” and “Tsintsar culture.” Many travelers and statisticians of the 18th century observed that under the names “Greek,” “Modern Greek,” and “Macedonian,” and through the use of a corrupted form of Modern Greek, it was in fact mostly Tsintsars who were being

³ Душан Ј.Поповић, нав.дело, 17-18; Josip Besendörfer, нав.дело, 55-56. (Popović J. Dušan, op.cit, 17-18; Besendörfer Josip, op.cit, 55-56.)

referred to or could be recognized.⁴ They spoke the Aromanian (Tsintsar) language at home but kept their business records in Greek.⁵ As skilled merchants and wealthy bankers, they significantly contributed to the Greek liberation movement during the second half of the 18th and the early decades of the 19th century.⁶

Their main center was the city of Moscopole, which before its destruction in 1769 had nearly 50,000 inhabitants. Precisely because of their support for Greek uprisings, Moscopole was destroyed, and its inhabitants—the Tsintsars—migrated in large numbers, primarily to the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy, especially to Srem, Slavonia, and Croatia.⁷ The people of Moscopole were the most educated among the Tsintsars. Other notable Aromanian settlements include Blatsi, Satishta, Kozani, and Vlahoklisura—places that are still inhabited today in the

⁴ Karl Freiherrn von Czoernig, *Etnographie der Oesterreichischen monarchie*, III band, Wien 1857, 154. (Czoernig von Freiherrn Karl, *Ethnography of the Austrian Monarchy*, Volume III, Vienna 1857, 154.)

⁵ As our writers Stevan Sremac and Jovan Jovanović Zmaj described the Belgrade marketplace in the mid-19th century, "everyone was either a Cincar or a Greek, and neither then nor later could one ever tell who was Greek or Cincar in the marketplace." Similarly, the situation was similar in Novi Sad, where the Cincars advocated for the existence of a Greek school, paid its teachers, and sometimes even engaged in open conflicts with the Serbs. (Васа Стајић, *Цинцари у Новом Саду*, Гласник историјског друштва у Новом Саду, књ. IX, Нови Сад 1936, 257-283.) (Stajić Vasa, *The Cincars in Novi Sad*, *Glasnik Istorijskog društva u Novom Sadu*, Vol. IX, Novi Sad 1936, 257-283.)

⁶ The famous banking houses in Vienna – Sina, Spirta, Dunba – belonged to the Cincars who supported the Greek awakening and uprising. Baron Sina founded the first Philhellenic society in Vienna and was also the first Greek ambassador in Vienna. He donated a library with over 2,000 books to his hometown of Moskopole. (Josip Besendörfer, nav.delo, 56.) (Besendörfer Josip, op.cit, 56.)

⁷ Moskopole, located in present-day southeastern Albania, near the city of Korça, was a major commercial center between Macedonia, Albania, and Epirus. It was one of the main centers of Greek culture and, thus, the Greek national idea. It had a Greek school and a Greek printing press. (Josip Besendörfer, nav.delo, 56-57.) (Besendörfer Josip, op.cit, 56-57.)

territories of present-day North Macedonia and Albania, serving as living witnesses of Aromanian culture and tradition.⁸

However, if we ask ourselves who exactly a Tsintsar is, the answer has not been fully provided, and it is far from simple even to this day. A Tsintsar is most likely of Illyrian or Thracian origin, rarely Slavic, Roman by language, Orthodox Christian by religion, and Greek by culture, at least in larger towns. Their occupation was often as a merchant or craftsman. Everything else related to this ethnic group is quite vague and subject to change.⁹ Among Serbs, merchants and craftsmen from Turkey were often recognized as Tsintsars, even though, as some historians note, "apart from religion, they had almost nothing in common."¹⁰

It has been established that there were two types of Tsintsars: the southern type—dark complexion, short stature, broad shoulders, strong chest, angular face, low forehead, black, often curly hair—and the northern type—light complexion, tall stature, high forehead, brown or blue eyes, sharp features, and dignified movements. Both types had thick, bushy eyebrows, somewhat sunken eyes, from which clarity, prudence, and determination emerged, often accompanied by craftiness. The women were very beautiful, with fair complexions, dark eyes, and dark hair.¹¹ A characteristic trait of Tsintsars is, first and foremost, their exceptional

⁸ Josip Besendörfer, *nav.delo*, 58. (Besendörfer Josip, *op.cit*, 58.)

⁹ Душан Ј.Поповић, *нав.дело*, 26-27. (Popović J. Dušan, *op.cit*, 26-27.)

¹⁰ The differences between the Cincars, Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians were most extensively studied by the German linguist and expert on Balkan languages, Gustav Weigand. (Душан Ј.Поповић, *нав.дело*, 25.) (Popović J. Dušan, *op.cit*, 25.)

¹¹ Josip Besendörfer, *nav.delo*, 58. (Besendörfer Josip, *op.cit*, 58.)

merchant skills and thriftiness, which sometimes surpassed all boundaries.¹² They were not very social, and their homes were strictly closed to strangers. The most positive aspect of every Tsintsar, whether male or female, was that they were all literate. They very often spoke multiple languages, with Greek being mandatory, followed by Albanian, Serbian, and Turkish.¹³

Tsintsars, most often referred to as "Turkish merchants," began migrating into the Habsburg Monarchy in small groups after the Treaty of Karlowitz. Following the Treaty of Pozarevac and the Treaty of Belgrade, their wave of migration towards the Monarchy became unstoppable. Within the Monarchy, particularly in its southern, border regions, they took over almost all trade between Austria and Turkey. According to census data from the 1760s, their numbers were estimated to be around 17,000 - 18,000 families. They brought large quantities of goods from fairs held in major cities of the Monarchy and Germany (Vienna, Pest, Pressburg, Trieste, Leipzig, Nuremberg) and sold them cheaply in accordance with trade agreements between the Monarchy and Turkey, which made it difficult for local merchants, burdened by taxes, to survive.¹⁴

¹² The best description that corresponds to the thriftiness of the Cincars, which bordered on greed, was provided by our writer and playwright Jovan Sterija Popović in his comedy from 1837 titled *The Miser* (Kiril Jaňa).

¹³ Josip Besendörfer, nav.delo, 59. (Besendörfer Josip, op.cit, 59.)

¹⁴ Austria's (Monarchy's) interest in the Turkish market and Turkish products grew significantly after the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, and especially after the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, when the defeated Ottoman Empire was forced to open its market to Austria and the tariff for trade products was set at 3% for both imports and exports. The Monarchy wanted to export its manufactured goods to Turkey, but Turkey was also needed as a raw materials base for the production of these finished goods. Instead of Austrian exports overcoming Turkish imports under the very low tariff of 3%, with the revenue remaining in the Monarchy, due to Turkey's economic backwardness and slow development, Turkish raw materials entered the Monarchy under the same low tariff of 3%, and the profit went to Turkey, particularly its "Turkish traders," who soon took control of all trade between the two empires. With the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, Turkey, as the

According to the provisions of the Treaty of Pozarevac (1718) between the Monarchy and Turkey, Turkish merchants were allowed to trade only Turkish goods "wholesale" throughout the year, and "retail" only during fairs. These provisions aimed to protect local merchants in the Monarchy, allowing them to trade both wholesale and retail at any time. The Monarchy expected this arrangement to result in fewer large Turkish merchants, who would keep their goods in large warehouses and distribute them through local merchants. This would, in turn, allow Austria to easily and efficiently control Turkish merchants, with money remaining within the Monarchy. However, the opposite happened, especially in the southern, border regions of the Monarchy (present-day Vojvodina, Slavonia, Croatia, and Hungary). These areas were flooded with small Turkish merchants, referred to as "Turkish merchants," or Tsintsars of Greek, Albanian, Bulgarian, and Serbian origin, who almost exclusively engaged in retail trade (*alla minuta*), maintaining Turkish citizenship and sending all their earnings back to their families in Turkey. This caused damage to the Austrian economy by draining money out of the Monarchy while posing serious competition to local merchants and craftsmen, who were burdened with taxes and other levies, making them more expensive compared to the "Turkish merchants."¹⁵

victor, raised the tariff to 5%, but trade between the Monarchy and Turkey still favored Turkey and its traders. (Душан Ј.Поповић, нав.дело, 34; Славко Гавриловић, *Прилог историји трговине и миграције Балкан Подунавље XVIII и XIX столећа*, Београд 1969, 9.) (Popović J. Dušan, op.cit, 34; Gavrilović Slavko, *Contributions to the History of Trade and Migration in the Balkan Danube Region in the 18th and 19th Centuries*, Belgrade 1969, 9.)

¹⁵ Душан Ј.Поповић, нав.дело, 88 - 92; Славко Гавриловић, нав.дело, 15-16. (Popović J. Dušan, op.cit, 88-92; Gavrilović Slavko, op.cit, 15-16.)

After the provisions of the Treaty of Belgrade and the imposition of a 5% customs duty, nothing changed because the "Turkish merchants" completely took over all trade, not only in Turkish goods but, to a large extent, also in Austrian goods, at fairs and beyond. As a result, starting in the 1740s, at least on paper, the Monarchy began to implement more serious measures and prohibitions to limit the trade of the "Turkish merchants." The first prohibition related to this issue came from the Hungarian Diet in Pressburg (Bratislava) in 1741, where Article 29 legally prohibited the trade of Turkish subjects, except for that covered by trade agreements with Turkey, i.e., it strictly prohibited trading Turkish goods "retail" outside the fairs. It was also strictly forbidden for them to trade non-Turkish goods, and if such goods were found, they were to be confiscated and sold at auction.¹⁶

These measures did not bring results, which is best confirmed by the constant complaints, primarily from the Srem and Virovitica counties, to Hungarian institutions, concluding that neither in neighboring counties nor in free royal cities (Novi Sad, Sombor) was Article 29 of the Diet adhered to. They reported that "the said Turkish subjects (Turkish merchants) trade almost unhindered both Turkish and domestic goods, including grain and other products." Shortly after this, the Monarchy entered the Seven Years' War with Prussia (1757-1763), during which it sought to maintain the best possible relations with Turkey. As a result, in 1759, an order was issued stating that goods attempted to be smuggled into Austria by "Turkish merchants" should not be confiscated but only taxed at double the rate

¹⁶ Славко Гавриловић, нав.дело, 17, Дејан Микавица, *Српско питање на Угарском сабору*, Нови Сад 2011, 11-65. (Gavrilović Slavko, op.cit, 17; Mikavica Dejan, *The Serbian Question at the Hungarian Assembly*, Novi Sad 2011, 11-65.)

(10%). Confiscation was allowed only as a last resort if the merchants attempted to trade domestic (Austrian) goods instead of Turkish ones.¹⁷

After the Seven Years' War, the situation regarding the "Turkish merchants" remained unchanged. However, as they now attempted to avoid control not only from Austrian but also Turkish authorities, the case of the "Turkish merchants" was addressed by the Porte, which in 1768 issued a firman to its border pashas, urging the need for more efficient prevention of fraud committed by certain merchant groups that presented themselves in Turkey as Austrian merchants, while in the Monarchy they passed as Turkish merchants, thus avoiding the necessary duties on both sides. Based on Turkey's initiative, Austria tightened control over the "Turkish merchants" in 1769 and ordered a census in all counties, instructing census takers to gently ask each of them whether they wished to become Austrian subjects or remain Turkish subjects. Those who did not wish to change their allegiance to Austrian citizenship would be required to have proof from Turkish authorities of paid duties on goods in Turkey within six months. Those who did not present such documentation would no longer be considered "Turkish merchants" and would not be allowed to benefit from the commercial agreements between Turkey and the Monarchy.¹⁸

In that period, in 1769, the Turks destroyed Moscopole, which contributed to an even greater increase in the wave of "Turkish merchants" on the territory of the Monarchy in the following years. However, in accordance with the 1769 decree, they were carefully recorded and strictly monitored. Based on these measures by the Austrian and Hungarian

¹⁷ Славко Гавриловић, нав.дело, 19. (Gavrilović Slavko, op.cit, 19.)

¹⁸ Славко Гавриловић, нав.дело, 20. (Gavrilović Slavko, op.cit, 20.)

authorities, in the 1770s, for the first time, all merchants and craftsmen who had come from Turkey and presented themselves as "Turkish merchants" were recorded. In the Srem County alone, between 1770 and 1775, there were about 150 such individuals. According to the records of their origins, around 20 were from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the rest were from Macedonia, Greece, Albania, and Bulgaria, with the vast majority being Cincars. A certain portion of them replaced their Turkish citizenship with Austrian citizenship and became Austrian merchants or craftsmen who paid all duties and taxes to the Monarchy. Srem County, of course, was a favorable location for their business and permanent settlement due to its proximity to the Turkish border regions of Serbia and Bosnia, and because it was significantly more developed than other southern border areas, primarily Slavonia.¹⁹ Therefore, they were also recorded in Slavonia, although not in such large numbers, even though the merchant class in Slavonia was considerably weaker than in Srem.²⁰ On their way to Vienna, the main destination and hub of the Monarchy's trade, "Turkish merchants" would stop and later settle in the territory of Croatia, particularly in Podravina. According to data from the second half of the 18th century, 55 of them were registered in Croatia, mostly in the Krizevci County.²¹

If we summarize, we can conclude the following: after the Seven Years' War, Austria began to exert increased pressure on the "Turkish merchants" to abandon their Turkish citizenship, or to limit their presence

¹⁹ Славко Гавриловић, нав.дело, 246-292. (Gavrilović Slavko, op.cit, 246-292.)

²⁰ Their total number did not exceed 50, even over several decades of the 18th century.

(Славко Гавриловић, нав.дело, 48-49. (Gavrilović Slavko, op.cit, 48-49.)

²¹ Славко Гавриловић, нав.дело, 73-74. (Gavrilović Slavko, op.cit, 73-74.)

in the Monarchy's market. Year after year, the imperial court issued decrees that restricted the "Turkish merchants," while domestic merchants and craftsmen became increasingly organized, stronger, and further increased their resistance against them. However, due to the extremely complicated situation, and even partial anarchy in Turkey, the position of these "Turkish merchants" became more difficult and uncertain. As a result of deteriorating relations between the Turkish state and the Patriarchate, and generally with the Greeks due to their support for the Greek cause, in the second half of the 18th century, there was plundering and destruction of several Cincar towns, with the suffering of Moscopole leaving the deepest mark. This led to the fact that the Cincars, as the main group of "Turkish merchants," were left without strong support and insufficient protection from Turkey. Therefore, in the 1770s, this merchant class was faced with the dilemma of whether to return to Turkey, under worse conditions than before, or to remain permanently in the Monarchy. Moreover, as they had moved further away from their original bases and found it increasingly difficult to obtain Turkish goods, these merchants were increasingly forced to deal with Austrian domestic goods. Since the provisions primarily targeted them as Turkish subjects and prohibited trading in Austrian goods, the earlier advantage of Turkish citizenship gradually became a hindrance, and they were slowly eliminated from the Austrian market. Considering the disorder and anarchy in Turkey, legal and property security in the Monarchy, as well as the established business connections, many of the "Turkish merchants" began to opt for Austrian citizenship. Given the very close ties with the Serbs, shared religious community, marriage, and other connections, the Cincar element among the "Turkish merchants" began to

assimilate into the Serbian community and actively join the Serbian civil class, which further strengthened the Serbian, Orthodox merchant and artisan class in the Monarchy. The Cincars contributed much to this: through their vitality and business acumen, but also through their social conciliatory nature, which only fostered the newly vibrant trade in the Monarchy, while feudal relations and their constraints were increasingly bypassed and, to a large extent, overcome.²²

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²² Душан Ј.Поповић, нав.дело, 88 - 92; Славко Гавриловић, нав.дело, 15-16. (Porović J. Dušan, op.cit, 88-92; Gavrilović Slavko, op.cit,15-16.)

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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF RAGUSA AND AUSTRIA THROUGHOUT THE SECOND HALF OF THE 18TH CENTURY AND THE ROLE OF SERBS FROM HERZEGOVINA

Abstract: Throughout the period from 14th to 18th century relations of the Republic of Ragusa, aristocratic maritime republic centered on the city of Dubrovnik, with Austrian Habsburgs, who have been rulers of Hungary as well, transitioned through several different dynamic phases. With the expansion of Ottoman Empire, the Republic was forced to signed a treaty with the Ottomans in 1458, which made it a tributary of the Ottoman Emperor in Istanbul. In 1683 the Ottomans were defeated in the front of Vienna which implied the emissaries from Dubrovnik to visit Austrians already in 1684 and to renew an agreement made in 1358 and so to accept the sovereignty of Habsburg as Hungarian Kings over Ragusa. Nevertheless, at the same time Ragusa continued to recognize the sovereignty of the Ottomans. This system of double dependence forced the Ragusan side to organize the relations with Austria through 18th century mostly under the veil of strict secrecy, although the supremacy of Ottomans vanished throughout upcoming decades after the defeat at Vienna. Levels of secrecy have not been limited only on official and unofficial communication between Dubrovnik and Vienna, but also on the political fractions who used to deal in their own name and interest. In this matter the position of Serbs from Herzegovina was especially important.

Keywords: Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik), Austria, secret diplomacy, Serbs, Herzegovina.

In the late 18th century the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) was the only territory in the Western Balkans that was not part of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, or the Venetian Republic. After the fall of Dubrovnik's centuries-old rival, Venice, in 1797, the uniqueness of its position became even more pronounced. Austria's relationship with the

Republic of Dubrovnik varied in accordance with changes in European geopolitical relations.

For the whole period of its existence, fundamental constitution of Ragusa was strictly aristocratic, without regard at its republican prefix.¹ System of administrative bodies and the government were based mainly on the model of Venice, although the maritime republic on the other side of Adriatic Sea was archenemy of Ragusans. Institutions like the Major Council, the Minor Council and the Senate (*Consilium rogatorum*) held extant and intensive relations with Vienna in 18th century, and archive series from Dubrovnik, like *Secreta Rogatorum* are hard testimony about the efficiency of secrecy in the approach from both sides. The secretaries strictly oversaw the process of taking minutes during the sessions of the Senate and other institutions. They also created special diplomatic codes and deciphered diplomatic mail, which was crucial for successful traffic of ideas and projects between the two states. Role of Serbs from Herzegovina and from other areas in surrounding, like Venetian Dalmatia, was very significant in the transfer of messages, especially in the last few decades of 18th century. Because Dubrovnik was not in position to have direct border with Habsburgs (until 1797), lines of communications over the territories of Ottoman Empire and Venetian Republic were complicated and the Serbs who lived there were efficiently used to foster communication from both sides.

With the passing of time, main power of Dubrovnik was increasingly focused inside of the Senate, which had 45 members over 40 years of age. Every member was elected for one year by the Major Council.

¹ Janeković Römer 2018: 90-92.

Senators, called "nobles of the nobility", have been among main perpetrators in the making of plans to deepen relations with the Austrians, although many of them have been aware of the fact that Austria in perspective could "swallow" both Venice and Dubrovnik, which eventually took place in 1797 and 1815 respectively.

At the beginning of the 1780's, in the European and Mediterranean framework the Republic of Ragusa did not represent the kind of maritime and trading power in the extent present mostly throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. Nevertheless, Dubrovnik's power was largely restored after the crisis the city experienced due to the 1667 earthquake. In the middle of the 18th century, Dubrovnik merchant ships were once again extremely competitive in the Mediterranean area, and especially in the Levant, and became serious rivals to the great trading powers. On some occasions (e.g. in 1764), France resorted to a demonstration of armed force in front of the walls of Dubrovnik in order to "force the leadership of the Republic to treat French interests with more respect."²

At the same time, Dubrovnik's trade represented competition for Austria, whose interests in the Levant became increasingly important during the 18th century, primarily through the ports of Trieste and Rijeka (Fiume). However, Austria did not perceive the Republic of Dubrovnik as a significant political competitor that should be wiped out from the eastern Adriatic coast, as was the case with Venice, whose possessions in Dalmatia were one of the key goals of Emperor Joseph II's offensive policy.³

² Krizman 1957: 124.

³ Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Abteilung Kriegsarchiv (further KA), HKR (Hofkriegsrat) 1782-7-13

The level of development of Austrian maritime trade with the Ottomans was clearly illustrated by the statistics of maritime transport in Ottoman ports during the 18th century. In the period 1756 to 1776, French ships accounted for 54.4 percent of all European ships that docked in Izmir, one of the largest commercial ports in the entire Ottoman Levant. This was a clear indication of absolute French dominance in European trade with the Ottomans, and of the political position France held at the Porte. In the same period, 15.4 percent of all European ships were Venetian. This meant that the Venetian Republic still retained considerable influence in Levantine trade, despite the general economic and political decline. Third on the maritime trade routes was a Dubrovnik Republic (Ragusa) with 11.8 percent, followed by the Netherlands with 8.0 percent and so on. Austria did not even exist in the statistics of ships that docked in Izmir, during that entire twenty-year period.⁴ The old alliance between Austria and Venice from the wars against Ottomans of 1683-1699 and 1716-1718, was a thing of the past during the reign of Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790). The weakness of Venice, which was already very evident during the war of 1716-1718, continued and deepened throughout the 18th century. Venice did not experience a new significant increase in its naval power and increased competitiveness on the European and world seas, but it still had a much larger land area and military power, than the Republic of Ragusa.

Apart from Venice itself and its hinterland in northern Italy, the Republic of Venice also owned a large part of Istria, and almost the entire Dalmatian coast, as well as all the islands on the eastern side of the Adriatic. These territories were a big lure for Austria, and in all Austrian

⁴ Panzac 1985: 136.

calculations, including the interpretations of the "Greek plan" of Russian Empress Catherine II from 1782,⁵ they represented one of Austria's key territorial demands as part of plans to expand into the Western Balkans.⁶ It can be said that those territories were a priority for Austria, even in relation to securing the Danube, as the most important trade route, and especially in relation to the hilly interior of the Balkan Peninsula.

Relations between Austria and Dubrovnik were mostly fair throughout the 18th century. This, however, did not prevent the Habsburgs from occasionally carrying out spy missions on the territory of the Republic of Dubrovnik. One of the most illustrative spy reports, written in Italian, arrived in Vienna in January 1785 under the title "Relatione militare".⁷ Although the Republic of Dubrovnik was under the formal protectorate of the Ottoman Empire, an old Habsburg opponent, since the beginning of the 16th century, thanks to very skillful diplomacy, the people of Dubrovnik successfully maintained good relations with Austria, as well as with some other European countries that, if not in immediate political conflict, were in constant ideological confrontation with the Ottoman Empire. First of all, this was the case with the Spain, which had the unofficial role of Dubrovnik's patron in the Catholic West.⁸ In such contacts, the Republic of Dubrovnik most often presented itself as the "easternmost bulwark of

⁵ Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Abteilung Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (further HHStA), Staatenabteilungen, Türkei III, Kart. 15: Grenzverhältnisse 1718-1795, Fasz. Projekte einer Teilung des Osman. Reichs, Fol. 287-329.

⁶ Bronza 2010: 56-57.

⁷ KA AFA (Alte Feldakten) 1785-13-1

⁸ Krizman 1951: 12.

Catholicism", which needed the help of Western Catholic countries to ensure its survival.⁹

The importance of Austria in the complex network of Dubrovnik diplomacy at the end of the 18th century also stemmed from the fact that Vienna was the only European center where the Republic had its resident plenipotentiary minister, while in other political centers (Paris, Rome, Naples...) the Republic had usual consular agents. Dubrovnik's consular agents in Vienna regularly went through the process of re-credentialization. Emperor Joseph II sent "Recrendentiales" for „Ablegato Senatore Luca de Sorgo“, on December 26, 1781.¹⁰

On the other hand, Austria has not had a consular representative in the Republic of Dubrovnik since the end of the 17th century.¹¹ Only with the increase of French and Russian influence in the political topicality of the area of the southeastern Adriatic, after the fall of the Venetian Republic in 1797, Austria was forced to strengthen its diplomatic activities, so in 1805 it opened a consulate in Dubrovnik.¹² From 1766, Abbot Mihajlo Milišić (Michele Millischich) served as consular agent of Austria in Dubrovnik.¹³

In situations where it got into diplomatic conflicts with some European states, the Republic of Dubrovnik sought the mediation of Austria. Such was the case in 1783, when the people of Dubrovnik found

⁹ Ibid: 13.

¹⁰ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 3: 1721-1807, Fasz. 3 A a) Concepte 1721-1804, Copien 1784-1802, Fol. 30.

¹¹ Bersa 1941: 120.

¹² KA HKR 1797-11-23

¹³ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 2: 1764-1806, Fasz. 2. Conv. A, Orig. Relationen des Kaiserl. Consuls in Ragusa, Abbate Michele Millischich 1766-1795, 1-61. Fol. 1.

themselves under pressure from the Kingdom of Naples.¹⁴ The situation surrounding the tightening of relations between Dubrovnik and Naples escalated already in October 1782, when the Dubrovnik deputy in Vienna, Sebastian Ayala, wrote to powerful Austrian Chancellor Wenzel Anton, Prince of Kaunitz-Rietberg, and asked for help.¹⁵ In order to strengthen ties with Austria, and more effectively use its help in mediating the crisis with the Kingdom of Naples, as well as in possible future conflicts, the Senate of the Republic of Dubrovnik decided on March 8, 1783, to establish a direct postal line with the Austrian port of Rijeka (Fiume). The people of Dubrovnik used a fast boat that ran every 15 days.¹⁶ Since the Republic of Dubrovnik really received the requested help from Austria, this decision proved to be very useful, but also significant for the fate of the Republic in the following years. The successful cooperation between Austria and Dubrovnik was also reflected in efficient economic ties. Austrian officials were often able to obtain favorable loans from members of the Dubrovnik nobility. Austrian baron, Josephus Pavlovich, was thus able to borrow money from a "Ragusian lord", Luce de Pocza, in Dubrovnik, in February 1786, without any interest.¹⁷ Such actions further deepened the perspective of cooperation.

¹⁴ Krizman 1951: 13.

¹⁵ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 4: 1775-1814, Fasz. d'Ayala 1778-1800, Fol. 7-16.

¹⁶ Živojinović 1976: 162.

¹⁷ „Baron Josephus Paulich... Prima od Gosp. Grafa Luce de Pocza Vlastelina Dubrovachkog ugotovoy Moneti 30 Cekina koe Obligiramse nay berxe povratiti bez svakoga interesa. Zato navlastitom svojom rukom pissem ipechatom potverdiuem udubrovniku Februara 18, 786.“, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 2: 1764-1806, Fasz. 2. Conv. A, Orig. Relationen des Kaiserl. Consuls in Ragusa, Abbate Michele Millischich 1766-1795, 1-61. Fol. 41.

Sebastian d'Ayala, the Dubrovnik deputy in Vienna, played a key role in the close ties between Austrian and Dubrovnik diplomacy in the last decades of the 18th century. Ayala was elected consular agent in Vienna by the Republic of Dubrovnik on May 22, 1775.¹⁸ Considering that he was in close relations with the sister of Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz, Ayala had the opportunity to closely observe and actively participate in the political events that took place in Vienna. Among other things, he very actively followed the events surrounding the delegation of the United States of America led by William Lee in Vienna in 1778, when Maria Theresa refused to recognize the newly created state. Ayala zealously informed the Dubrovnik Senate about Anglo-Austrian relations and the outcome of the war in North America.¹⁹ Because of his high merits, he continuously advanced in the service - on November 19, 1782, he was appointed chargé d'affaires of the Republic of Dubrovnik, and, finally, on August 25, 1797, he became the only external minister of Dubrovnik. Ayala was recalled from his post in Vienna only on January 6, 1804, when he was succeeded by Baron Johann Baptist von Puthon. On that occasion, the Austrian emperor Francis II, with the mediation of the current Chancellor and minister Ludwig Kobenzl, praised Ayala for his long and dedicated service, which greatly contributed to the development of relations between Austria and Dubrovnik.²⁰ Von Puthon held the position of Dubrovnik's chargé d'affaires until the end of the existence of the Republic of Dubrovnik.

¹⁸ Krizman 1957: 189.

¹⁹ Živojinović 1976: 62.

²⁰ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 3: 1721-1807, Fasz. 3 A a) Concepte 1721-1804, Copien 1784-1802, Fol. 37.

Both Austria and the two Adriatic republics remained neutral in the great conflict between Britain and its colonies in North America 1775-1783, in which France, Spain and the Netherlands later joined the American rebellion against British imperial power. That mutual neutrality remained constant until the moment when Austria entered a new war against Turkey in 1788. It was at that time that the relations between Vienna and Dubrovnik were particularly cordial, as witnessed by the visit of the Austrian envoy, Count Ludwig von Starhemberg (1762-1833), to Dubrovnik in 1788.²¹ During his stay in Dubrovnik, Starhemberg regularly reported to Chancellor Kaunitz about the exchange of information within the Austrian diplomatic network in the eastern part of the Adriatic, and especially about his correspondence with the Austrian governor of Trieste, Count Pompejus Brigido von Bresowitz (1729-1811). The report of February 7, 1789, concentrated on the description of the development of war information in the Balkans and generally illustrates the importance of Dubrovnik as the Austrian center for collecting logistical information.²²

At the very beginning of the war, Austria sent an expedition to Montenegro, with the aim of helping to raise the uprising of the Serbian population in Herzegovina, and eventually to win the Ottoman Albanian governor of the Pashalik of Scutari (Shkodra), Kara Mahmud Pasha (1749-1796), as an ally in the fight against Turkey. During the trip to Montenegro, the Austrian captains Vukasović and Pernet came into contact with one of the members of the Dubrovnik government. They sent him a questionnaire

²¹ Muljačić 1952: 277.

²² HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 2: 1764-1806, Fasz. 2. Conv. A, Orig. Relationen des Kaiserl. Consuls in Ragusa, Abbate Michele Millischich 1766-1795, 1-61. Fol. 144-145.

in which there were 19 questions about the situation in the Republic of Ragusa, but also in Montenegro, Albania and most of all in Herzegovina, where the Serbs have been at the brink of the insurrection. A very detailed reply was sent to them on March 14.²³ In all the answers given to Austrian interlocutors, the situation in Herzegovina and the surrounding territories was discussed in a confidential manner. At the very beginning, it was announced that a way had been found to transmit Austrian mail via Dubrovnik, which Vukasović would send to Vienna. The persons who would carry the mail to Dubrovnik would be Joko Katić and Ivo Desin. From there, the mail would be transferred by sea (fast ship) to Habsburg port of Rijeka (Fiume).

After the interruption of regular postal relations between Istanbul and Vienna due to the outbreak of war (in fact already in January 1788), Austria managed to find several ways to maintain postal connections with the Internuncio in Istanbul, Baron Peter Philipp von Herbert-Rathkeal (1735-1802). First, mail for Austria was sent by the French ambassador in Istanbul, through Dubrovnik and Naples, and then a joint venture was established with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The postal route went

²³ Muljačić 1952: 278. Muljačić provides the complete text in Italian, as well as a translation. Muljačić found the document in the archives in Dubrovnik, in the series "Acta Sanctae Mariae Maioris". In the introduction, Muljačić says that the text is actually a report that "the Dubrovnik government sent to an Austrian authority", because from the title "Answers to questions presented in a separate sheet" ("Risposta ai quesiti presentatimi in foglio separato"), i.e. from the text itself, it is not obvious to whom the report was sent. Admittedly, Muljačić mentions in one place the possibility that the report was sent to Captains Vukasović and Pernet. That this report was definitely sent to Vukasović and Pernet is proven by the following fact - in the War Archives in Vienna, in the Alte Feldakten series, marked 1788-3-46e, there is a document with the title "Copy of answers given to the questions of captains Vukasović and Pernet" ("Copia delle Risposte date ai Quesiti dei Ssigni. Capitani Vukassovich, e Pernet"). It is about the exact same text brought by Muljačić, and the version in the War Archive is the one that Vukasović himself sent via Dubrovnik to Field Marshal De Vins, who forwarded it further to Vienna.

from Istanbul via Plovdiv, Pazardzhik, Kriva Palanka, Kumanovo, Skopje, Kosovska Mitrovica, Novi Pazar, Foča, Trebinje and Dubrovnik, and crossed into Habsburg territory at the port of Karlobag.²⁴

In the further text of the answer, it was discussed about the impossibility of transferring the money from Austria to Montenegro through Dubrovnik, and about how there are no weapons in Dubrovnik that could help the Austrian expedition and other Dubrovnik specificities. The greatest attention was devoted to communicating the situation in Herzegovina, that is, the Duchy of Saint Sava (Il Ducato di Sancti Saba). Herzegovina was said to be in a very poor condition as far as grain and other foodstuffs are concerned, primarily due to the outbreak of war. The Austrians apparently also considered the possibility of sending grain to Herzegovina in order to win over the local Serbian population. The people of Dubrovnik replied that this could only be done through the small Turkish enclave of Klek, northwest of Dubrovnik. It was reported that there are about 6,000 Serbs capable for war in Herzegovina. As the main centers in Herzegovina in answers are mentioned cities of Ljubinje, Stolac, Blagaj, Nevesinje and especially Mostar, which is said to have around 12,000 inhabitants, mostly Muslims. It is estimated that the Herzegovinian Serbs are in excellent relations with Montenegro and they are disposed to rise up against the Turks and free themselves from their rule, but that they have no weapons and would not do anything on their own until the arrival of strong Austrian troops. The answer also shows that Turkish ships often sail near Dubrovnik itself (at that time there were two Turkish frigates near Koločep), as well as to Kotor (Cattaro) and other cities of the Venetian Bay

²⁴ Patera 1996: 43.

of Kotor (Boka kotorska or Bocche di Cattaro).²⁵ Attitude of the Republic of Venice and Dubrovnik was very important for the accomplishment of the expedition, because the Austrian army had to pass through their territories. At the beginning of the war, both maritime republics declared strict neutrality. For Venice, the general procurator Angelo Emo (1731-1792) made an official proclamation about neutrality already on January 30, 1788. In addition, both republics did not miss the opportunity to take advantage of the financial gains from cooperation with both the Austrians and the Ottomans. Ships loaded with the provisions and even carrying parts of the army, for the needs of the Ottoman Empire, most often docked in the Venetian ports, as well as in Dubrovnik. In addition, the Turks asked the people of Dubrovnik for the possibility to import ammunition for the territory of the Bosnian Pashaluk through the territory of Dubrovnik. And in this sense, the people of Dubrovnik complained to Vienna that it had become almost impossible for them to preserve their neutrality.²⁶

Both Venice and Dubrovnik preferred Austria's victory, but the maritime republics did not want to risk a conflict with Turkey by proclaiming open cooperation with Austria. After the invasion of the Austrian army, led by Field Marshal Wallis, into the Bosnian Pashaluk and the penetration in the direction of Glamoč and Grahovo, from May to June 1788, many Serbs who lived in the Venetian territory, near the triple border, joined the Habsburg ranks. Venice was aware of this violation of neutrality by its subjects, but did nothing about it. In that situation, the representatives of the Republic of Dubrovnik directly informed Austria about their

²⁵ KA AFA 1788-3-46e

²⁶ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 3: 1721-1807, Fasz. 3 A b) Original Schreiben der Republik Ragusa an die Kaiser 1722-1803, Fol. 203-206.

information regarding the movement of the main body of the Turkish army led by the Grand Vizier. Already on April 21, 1788, a detailed report arrived in Vienna about the movements of the army of Suleiman Pasha, Beglerbey of Rumelia, towards Edirne (Adrianople), and then further towards Sofia and Belgrade.²⁷

The Republic of Dubrovnik still managed to remain neutral in the complex conditions of the Austrian-Turkish war. The people of Dubrovnik enabled the flow of information towards Herzegovina and the Austrian officers in Montenegro, and even helped transport Habsburg troops, but at the same time they allowed the concentration of Turkish ships in their territorial waters, earning money from cooperation with both warring parties. Objectively, the people of Dubrovnik wished for Austria's victory, but only to the extent that it would reduce the ever-present pressure of Turkey, and also Venice, on the Republic of St. Blaise. The people of Dubrovnik did not want Austria to become a new and even greater threat to them than the Turkey and Venice have been already for centuries. The geopolitical situation in Europe in 1788 was developing to the detriment of Austria. When Austria refused its mediation at the beginning of the war, Prussia made it clear to its southern rival that it would not peacefully accept its expansion to the southeast. An alliance between Prussia, the Netherlands and a recovered Great Britain was established pretty fast. The treaty was concluded in Berlin on August 13, 1788, with the clear aim of preventing Austrian and Russian aspirations in the Balkans. The English foreign

²⁷ „Armata a Daut Passa li 26., o 27. Dello stesso dovea mettersi in marcia verso Adrianopoli, e Sofia; e che il Suleiman Passa Beglierbei di Romelia sia ora in marcia colla propria Armata verso Belgrado. “, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 3: 1721-1807, Fasz. 3 A b) Original Schreiben der Republik Ragusa an die Kaiser 1722-1803, Fol. 199.

minister, Francis Godolphin Osborne, 5th Duke of Leeds, Marquess of Carmarthen (1751-1799), characterized the alliance with Prussia as "an alliance of enormous importance for common interests."²⁸ Through the new alliance with Prussia, Britain further emphasized its dissatisfaction with Austrian policy towards British offers for an alliance in the early 1780's.

The problems that have been accumulated during 1788 led to the fact that at the end of that year, Austria started to think about concluding peace with Ottomans and to break the alliance with Russia. At the beginning of 1789, it was quite clear to Joseph II that the maximal Austrian goals from the beginning of the war, when the conquest of the entire western part of the Balkan Peninsula was planned, were completely unachievable. The Austrian leadership was forced to try to achieve much smaller territorial gains, and there was increasing talk of an attempt to return to the line established by the Peace in Požarevac in 1718. In the spring of 1789, the French ambassador tried to mediate with the Ottoman Porte. However, after the death of Sultan Abdul-Hamid I (ruled since 1774) on April 7, 1789, the warlike successor Sultan Selim III (ruled until 1807) came to power, and the peace efforts failed completely.

Immediately after Austrian conquest of Belgrade, on November 2, 1789, the people of Dubrovnik sent a congratulatory message to Vienna, once again expressing their admiration for the Austrian military genius, as well as their hopes for the liberation of Christians from "Saracenic slavery". Since Austria achieved significant successes and territorial gains in Serbia, Bosnia and Wallachia by the end of 1789, negotiations began again, which

²⁸ „...an Alliance of so much importance to the mutual interests of both countries, and which at present so unhappily exist from extending themselves more generally into other parts of Europe.“ Black 1994: 209.

ended with the signing of Peace in Svishtov (Sistova) in August 1791. During all that time, there were no more war actions on the territory of the Republic of Dubrovnik or Venetian Dalmatia. The very death of Joseph II in February 1790 was the reason for the new ruler, Leopold II (ruled until 1792), to officially inform the Republic of Dubrovnik on March 15, 1790, about the replacement on the throne in Vienna, and to further confirm Austria's "eternal intention" for the protection of Dubrovnik.²⁹ The Republic of Dubrovnik responded by expressing its condolences, as well as the hope that the Austrian "protection" will really last forever.³⁰

The end of the war in August 1791 brought the restoration of the pre-war situation, so the people of Dubrovnik continued to regularly send emissaries to the Bosnian Pasha with the intention of swearing their continued loyalty, that is, to enable the further development of their Levantine trade. The visit of the envoy Francesco Mateo di Zamonja to the new Bosnian Pasha, Husamedin Pasha, in Travnik in 1793 was particularly significant.³¹ While at the same time, in Vienna, representatives of Ragusa expressed their hope for future cooperation and the final Austrian victory in the Balkans. However, such perfidious behavior during the war from 1788 to 1791 did not go unnoticed by both Austria and Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were particularly annoyed by the fact that the people of Dubrovnik did not deliver the requested foodstuffs (rice and coffee) at the

²⁹ „...et Vobis Gratiam Protectionem Nostram Regiam in omne tempus perbenigne confirmamus“, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 3: 1721-1807, Fasz. 3 A a) Concepte 1721-1804, Copien 1784-1802, Fol. 38.

³⁰ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 3: 1721-1807, Fasz. 3 A b) Original Schreiben der Republik Ragusa an die Kaiser 1722-1803, Fol. 215.

³¹ Šljivo 1992: 184-197.

end of 1787, while Turkey was still at war only against Russia. Already then, the Bosnian Pasha, Abdullah Pasha Teftedari, harshly attacked the Dubrovnik envoy Mihail Bošković.

Austrian also reformed its attitude towards the Republic of Ragusa. Apart from all activities in Dubrovnik, the possession of ports in the northeast was especially important for the positioning of Austria on the eastern Adriatic, of which Trieste was definitely the main stronghold. Especially with the development of trade in the 1780's, Trieste grew into a dominant place on the northern Adriatic, and increasingly threatened Venice, and even the much more southern Dubrovnik. Count Pompeyus Brigido von Bresowitz, scion of an Italian aristocratic family from Capua, had special merits for the efficient organization of the Austrian positions. Brigido, after holding positions in Gorica, Galicia and Timișoara for the previous few decades, was the governor of Trieste from 1785, and remained in that position until his retirement in 1803. In cooperation with other Austrian agents, over time, Brigido formed an efficient logistics network, which economically and politically pressed the interests of Venice and Dubrovnik, and the patrician republics were increasingly behind the Habsburg territories on the economic front.³² In general, in its conceptions of the Western Balkans, Austria took a more rigid stance towards the fate of the Republic of Venice and Dubrovnik, but from 1792 its attention was completely occupied by conflicts with revolutionary France. Due to the new general European war, both the Republic of Venice and the Republic of Dubrovnik were given the opportunity to respite, i.e. the political pressure

³² HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 2: 1764-1806, Fasz. 2. Conv. A, Orig. Relationen des Kaiserl. Consuls in Ragusa, Abbate Michele Millischich 1766-1795, 1-61. Fol. 144-145.

on the patrician republics on the shores of the Adriatic eased to a certain extent. However, the opportunity to provide long-term internal stability and unity within these states with certain political reforms was missed, which was one of the key factors in the destruction of their independence in the following decade.

Since 1793, the arrival of diplomats of the French Republic on the territory of the Bosnian Pashaluk significantly rose into frequency. Passing through Travnik that year, Marie Louis Henri Descorches (1749-1830), who was French representative in Poland (1791-1792) and Ottoman Empire (1793-1795), noticed that the Bosnian Pashaluk abounded in opportunities for the development of trade with France, according to the classic mercantilist-colonial principle of the time - raw materials from Turkey to France, finished products from France to Turkey. On August 9, 1793, Descorches wrote to Paris that he had appointed Marc Bruère (1770-1823) as consular officer in Travnik. Marc Bruère was the son of the long-time French consul in Dubrovnik, René Bruère-Desrivaux (1736-1817).³³ His main mission was to implement the interests of French politics and trade, and postal correspondence on the route Šibenik-Travnik-Istanbul. Bruère stayed in Travnik for more than four years (1793-1797). The Austrian Internuncio in Istanbul, Herbert-Rathkeal, warned the headquarters in Vienna of the actions of Descorches and other French diplomats. Napoleon's invasion of Venice in May 1797 destroyed the centuries-old independence of the Venetian Republic. This completely changed the position of the Dubrovnik Republic. The old commercial and political rival Venice disappeared, but the much more powerful Austria approached the

³³ Bersa 1941: 14.

Dubrovnik borders from both the north (from Dalmatia) and the south (from the Bay of Kotor). The small Turkish enclaves of Klek and Sutorina, which still physically separated the territory of the Dubrovnik Republic from Dalmatia and the Bay, could not prevent the ever-increasing expansion of Austrian influence in the southeastern Adriatic. On December 15, 1797, Austrian Chancellor, Baron Thugut, reported from Vienna to the people of Dubrovnik that Austria had ratified the peace treaty of Campoformio, which also meant the beginning of the deployment of Austrian troops north and south of the Dubrovnik Republic.³⁴

After the peace treaty of Campoformio, Austria sought to stabilize the political situation in the European southeast, so that it could use the new resources and advantages offered by the possession of the former Venetian territories as early and as intensively as possible. At that time, the Dubrovnik Republic represented a hindrance for Austria that needed to be isolated by a strong ideological ring.

In his reports from Istanbul to Vienna, Herbert-Rathkeal often stated that Dubrovnik was the "centre of the Slavic plague" ("pestilentiel"),³⁵ and that care must be taken that libertarian traditions of Dubrovnik do not spread to the surrounding regions, where the Serbs have been in the process of preparations for the huge national insurrection. In principle, after the occupation of the former Venetian possessions, Austria began to think about the elimination of the Republic of Dubrovnik as an independent state. After the capture of Venice, the Senate of the Republic of Dubrovnik sent

³⁴ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 3: 1721-1807, Fasz. 3 A 2 a 1772-1804, Concepte, Fol. 311.

³⁵ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Türkei II, Kart. 115: Berichte, 1797 IV-IX, Fasz. Berichte 1797 Juli-Septer 1-343, Fol. 94-96.

congratulations to Vienna on October 14, 1797, although it was clear how much danger threatened Dubrovnik after the Austrian conquest.³⁶ Almost at the same time, Herbert-Rathkeal sent dispatches to Vienna in which he called Dubrovnik the centre of the "Illyrian language" ("langue illirique") and the main propaganda base of the French.³⁷

French consul in Dubrovnik, René Bruère-Desrivaux, was in the position of key representative of France in Dubrovnik all the way since 1772. After the outbreak of the revolution in 1789, and the proclamation of the republic in France three years later, Bruère-Desrivaux relatively easily transitioned from the old to the new system, and unlike other diplomats previously loyal to the monarchy, he remained in his position, advocating the ideas of a new democratic France. In addition, from the 1780's, liberal ideas began to appear in the Dubrovnik also under the influence of events in North America, and relatively more liberal newspapers that came to Dubrovnik from the West and circulated among senators, first of all Italian „Gazetta di Toscana“ and Dutch „Gazetta di Leyden“.³⁸

Under the pressure of new events and influences, some layers of the basically autocratic patrician Republic became more liberal and open to the possibilities of reform, and therefore much closer to the new revolutionary France, than to Austria, which under Francis II (1792-1835) had once again become a solid conservative bulwark, after some liberal attempts by Joseph II and Leopold II in the period from 1780 to 1792. Throughout the 18th century, the number of noble families participating in the governance of the

³⁶ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ragusa, Kart. 3: 1721-1807, Fasz. 3, A1b Die Republik Ragusa an der Kaiser 1797-1799, Fol. 55.

³⁷ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Türkei II, Kart. 115: Berichte, 1797 IV-IX, Fasz. Berichte 1797 Juli-Septer 1-343, Fol. 103-105.

³⁸ Živojinović 1976: 172.

state in the Dubrovnik Republic decreased. Thus, in 1800, only about twenty remained.³⁹

Position of Dubrovnik and of the Serbs in the surrounding area became even more important for Austria with the deepening of the war with the Revolutionary France. Throughout the invasion of Napoleon towards Egypt and Syria, in 1798-1799, Austrian side used all possible resources to assemble huge coalition against France. The Austrian Internunciature in Istanbul worked diligently to intercept French written items, in order to penetrate as much as possible into the plans of the conquerors of Egypt. Ambassador Herbert-Rathkeal had been sending copies of Napoleon's letters to Vienna since August 1798.⁴⁰ The Internuncio in Istanbul, made a great contribution to the conclusion of a new alliance between Austria and Russia, in the autumn of 1798.⁴¹ He sent a detailed report to Vienna about growing relations with Russians on November 3.⁴² Although Austria was not yet openly entered into the war with France again, its diplomacy was already cooperating in full swing with the Russian-Turkish coalition,⁴³ so the logistical monitoring of the actions of Ushakov's Russian fleet by the Austrians was very efficient. Herbert-Rathkeal was pleased to report on Russia's advance against the French.⁴⁴ The Russian-Turkish fleet conquered

³⁹ Bersa 1941: 12.

⁴⁰ For example, letter dated 21 August, ie "4. fructidor of the 6th year of the [Republic]" - "Le 4. Fructidor au 6, Au quartier General du Caire". HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Türkei II, Kart. 119: Berichte, Weisungen 1798 XI-XII, Fasz. Türkei II Berichte 1798 XI-XII, fol. 151-489, Fol. 180.

⁴¹ Do Paço 2014: 8.

⁴² HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Türkei II, Kart. 119: Berichte, Weisungen 1798 XI-XII, Fasz. Türkei II Berichte 1798 XI-XII, fol. 151-489, Fol. 193.

⁴³ Saul 1970: 72.

⁴⁴ Report of November 17, 1798 - HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Türkei II, Kart. 119: Berichte, Weisungen 1798 XI-XII, Fasz. Türkei II Berichte 1798 XI-XII, fol. 151-489, Fol. 240-261.

most of the islands in the Ionian archipelago quite quickly and easily. By the end of October, the French had already been defeated at Kythera, Zakynthos, Kefalonia and Lefkada.⁴⁵ In its report to Vienna on December 3, the Austrian Internuncio sent detailed description on the development of Russian-Turkish operations and the prospects of cooperation between Austria, Russia and Turkey with Great Britain on capturing French bases in the Ionian Islands and Malta.⁴⁶ This coalition was efficient in the complete defeating of French expedition in Syria and Egypt in the end.

Republic of Ragusa was only a silent overlooker of the developments that actually led to its ultimate demise in the next decade. Serbs in the surrounding regions have been carried by the new wave of political and social streams that finally erupted into huge Serbian insurrection of 1804.

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⁴⁵ Leontsinis 2014: 134.

⁴⁶ HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Türkei II, Kart. 119: Berichte, Weisungen 1798 XI-XII, Fasz. Türkei II Berichte 1798 XI-XII, fol. 151-489, Fol. 351.

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SUMMARY

Throughout last several decades of 18th century Austria was torn between the desire to create its own overseas colonial empire and of expanding its territory at the expense of the weakened Ottoman Empire, and even of its former ally Venice. Austrian inability to articulate itself clearly at the outset in this regard reflected the lack of a traditional clear understanding of its early origins and development. This inability became the starting point of many later problems in its state functions. Under Maria Theresa and Joseph II almost all Habsburg lands were able to sustain an upswing in the trade of Imperial subjects across the Mediterranean. This was mainly related to increased efforts to promote trade in the Littorale and particularly in the port-city of Trieste. The years 1780-1790 marking the decade of independent rule of Joseph II (1741-1790) also represented the most illustrative decade of Austrian history in the 18th century. With Joseph II's death, in February 1790, the era of liberal experiments in the Austrian state system ended abruptly. Almost in parallel to that many aspects in the newly formed Austrian experience of expansionism also began to fade. The ascendancy to the throne and reign of the new and young Emperor, Francis II (1768-1835), Joseph's nephew, saw Austria's social development completely immersed in conservatism and Catholic supremacy. Republic of Ragusa mainly faded throughout 18th century. Its inability to transform from ancient patrician maritime republic standards into new world of political and economic powers was more than obvious for Austrians, who increasingly put the pressure on independent position of Dubrovnik. Use of Serbian population at the space in and around Republic of Ragusa was one the main tactics of Austrian approach even in the case on maintaining of contacts and passing of the messages to allies.

With the development of Austrian wars against Ottoman Empire (1788-1791) and later on against Revolutionary France, maneuvering space for Dubrovnik became more and more sparse. On the other hand, Serbs in Herzegovina were more open to embrace influences from different sources and to further cooperate with Montenegro and Serbia. In this way, the general scene was set for the beginning of Serbian revolution in 1804.

Although the Austrian setting against the French offensive was ultimately only one episode in the long-running confrontation between the two countries (1792-1815), it was in a way

still a turning point of the era for Austria. Austrian leadership took a permanent policy of conservatism and legalism towards the Ottoman Empire.

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THE ILLYRIAN COURT DEPUTATION AND THE STATUS OF SERBS IN THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

Abstract: The **Illyrian Court Deputation** was the only central institution that, for three decades (1747–1777), exercised jurisdiction specifically over the Serbian population within the Habsburg Monarchy. Before its establishment and after its dissolution, these competences were shared among other imperial bodies—most notably the Hungarian Court Chancellery and the Court War Council—in the same way as they exercised authority over other subjects of the Monarchy. This made the role of the Illyrian Court Deputation particularly significant for the development of the Serbian community under the reign of Maria Theresa. The Deputation was established to introduce a stable framework for administering Orthodox subjects gathered under the spiritual authority of the archbishops and metropolitans of Karlovci. Its members initiated reforms within the Orthodox Church, while the adoption of the final legislative measure—the **Declaratory of 1779**—took place after the Deputation’s abolition, based on its two earlier enactments, the **Regulamenta of 1770 and 1777**.

Keywords: Illyrian Court Deputation, Habsburg Monarchy, Serbian population, Archbishopric of Karlovci, Reforms.

The basics and the beginning. Before the Austro-Turkish War (1683-1699), the number of Serbs living in the Habsburg Monarchy was not significant enough to give them any special political rights. This war changed the situation. Not only did numerous Serbs find themselves under the rule of Vienna, but they also included the national elite, with Patriarch of Peć Arsenije III Crnojević (1673-1706) at the helm. It was while the battles were still ongoing that he, together with other national leaders, began to understand all the shortcomings of the Serbian position. The fact

was that although his compatriots were protected in the religious domain by the Privileges of Emperor Leopold I (from 1690, 1691 and 1695), these were insufficient support for political organizing. For this, they needed a territory that the Court would consider Serbian and where the Serbs would have their own political institutions. As the Serbian elite saw it, the territory conquered from the Ottoman Empire could have been suitable for this. For this reason, in the Assembly in Baja, in January 1694, they asked from Emperor Leopold I for Slavonija to be assigned as a Serbian territory. On that territory, they would organize their own government and they would only be subject to the ruler, outside Hungarian institutions.¹ To them, Slavonija seemed to provide a good framework, since it was not densely populated, so the Serbs from other parts of the Habsburg Monarchy could move there. Besides, it already had a Serbian population, i.e. Serbs had been living there from the period of the Ottoman rule. The Emperor was willing to partly fulfill their wish and to allow the Serbs to concentrate in the narrow strip along the border with the Ottoman Empire. However, he wanted this not only in Slavonija, but also in the entire area which was to be turned into the Military Border after the war was over. This was not in accordance with the Serbian request. In spite of later modifications, the request was never met and the Serbs never got their political region in the Habsburg Monarchy. The request was repeated in 1706 and 1708, with no success, and it became the foundation of Serbian politics in the Habsburg

¹ Дејан Микавица, Ненад Лемајић, Горан Васин, Ненад Нинковић, *Срби у Хабзбуршкој монархији од 1526. до 1918.*, књ. 1. Нови Сад 2016, 129.

Monarchy until its very end, although the territory and the political form requested changed (in 1790, 1848, 1849 and 1861).²

Unable to acquire a territory for their people, Serbian leaders thought it inevitable to have their own representatives in the institutions which made decisions related to Serbs, and also that the Privileges should become incorporated into Hungarian legislation. As for the presence of the Serbs in the institutions deciding about them, there was significant progress after the Assembly of 1744. Even though it was convened for the publication of the confirmation of the Privileges, given by Maria Theresa in 1743, it turned into a manifestation of political requests. These requests continued the politics presented by the Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović Šakabenta, in 1737. That year, prior to the outbreak of the Austro-Turkish War (1737-1739), the Patriarch was invited to support Vienna's military efforts, which he accepted, but in return he asked that Serbia, as a Habsburg Province, should have jurisdiction over the newly conquered areas, with no influence from any other Hungarian institutions. As such, Serbia would only be subject to the Ruler, and it would be represented through a special court office in Vienna. Since the Habsburg Monarchy lost this war, Patriarch's request was not realized. However, the request was modified in the Assembly in 1744. Since the members of the Assembly concluded that Serbian people were not serfs, but a free people, they asked for incorporation of the Privileges into Hungarian legislation. In addition, they asked for one or two ministers for the Serbs to be appointed and Serbian

² Владан Гавриловић, *Темишварски сабор и Илirsка дворска канцеларија (1790-1792)*, Нови Сад 2005; Славко Гавриловић, *Исаија Баковић, архимандрит гргетешки, епископ јенопољски и митрополит крушедолски*, ЗМСИ, 74, Нови Сад 2006, 32-33.

administration to be organized in the Habsburg Monarchy, which would include 12 persons (a Magistrate), 3 of whom would live in Vienna and represent Serbian interests there.³

With regard to the requests from the Assembly of 1744, several meetings were held between the representatives of the Hungarian Court Office, the Court Chamber and the Court War Council. Hungarian institutions often proved to be strict and even discriminatory towards the Serbs, while the Court War Council was lenient, since the Serbs at the time constituted majority of the population of the Military Frontier.⁴ These sharply opposed opinions between the Court War Council and the Hungarian Court Office made Maria Theresa put a stop on the disagreements and provide a response to the Assembly's requests. On 24th July 1745, the ruler abolished the Neoactivist committee and founded *Hofkommission in Banaticis et Illyricis* (the Illyrian Court Commission). Count Ferdinand Alois Kolowrat Krakowsky (1682-1751) was appointed to take the helm of this institution. At the time, he was conducting reorganization of the administration in Banat. Thus, he was well acquainted with the local circumstances and the position of the Serbs and this recommended him for the new duty.⁵

The Illyrian Court Commission first received jurisdiction in the Banat region, and then also in the Illyrica 'district', i.e. over the Serbs and other Orthodox believers within the Archbishopric of Karlovci. As of 2nd

³ Димитрије Руварац, *Народни сабор од 1744. Прилог за историју српских сабора*, Српски Сион, Сремски Карловци 1903, 375-378; Дејан Микавица, Ненад Лемајић, Горан Васин, Ненад Нинковић, *Срби...*, 163-164.

⁴ Димитрије Руварац, *Мњење угарске Дворске канцеларије о закључцима народног Сабора од 1744. године.*, АИСПКМ, Сремски Карловци 1912, 362-370.

⁵ Isidora Тоџанас Radović, *Krakovski Kolovrat Ferdinand Alojs*, SBR, 5, Novi Sad 2011, 184.

December 1745, its jurisdiction was partly extended to Transylvania where it also got control over financial transactions, excluding money minting and mining, which remained under the jurisdiction of another institution, headed by Count Karl Ferdinand von Königsegg-Erps (1696-1759). In other areas, such as tax collection, trade, administration and religious issues, the Illyrian Court Commission was obliged to consult the representatives of the Transylvanian Court Chancellery (Siebenbürgischen Hofkanzlei).⁶

The basic task of the Illyrian Court Commission was to introduce a stable and permanent system in the interpretation of the Privileges. The first step for its president was emphasizing the authority of the ruler over that of the Archbishop of Karlovci. This was done through several Resolutions issued on 21st December 1746. The Resolutions repeated that the ruler had secular power, while the Archbishop of Karlovci had ecclesiastic power, he was head of the church, not head of the people. Serbian Assemblies were forbidden to be held without the ruler's permission, and the recommendation was not to convene them often. It was also forbidden for Serbian deputations to come to Vienna without announcing their visit to the Illyrian Court Commission prior to their arrival. This was to be done by announcing the reason for their visit and if the Commission agreed with it, they were allowed to come.⁷

⁶ János Kalmár, Michael Hochedlinger, Die Hofkommission (Hofdeputation) in Transylvanicis, Banaticis, et Illyricis und di Illyrische Hofkanzlei, In: Michael Hochedlinger, Petr Matá, Thomas Winkelbauer (eds), *Verwaltungsgeschichte der Habsburgermonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Bd. 1, Böhlau 2019, 517.

⁷ Archive of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Metropolitan–Patriarchal Archive, Fonds "A" (hereinafter ASANUK, MPA „A“) 75/1746.

Organisation. Through a decision of Maria Theresa from the 5th August 1747, the Illyrian Court Commission was turned into a separate and independent court institution in the rank of other state offices and it was named Illyrian Court Deputation (Hofdeputation in Transylvanicis, Banaticis et Illyricis). Its independence from other Court institutions and its subordination exclusively to the ruler was emphasized. The same status was given to the new institutions created during the reforms of Count Friedrich Wilhelm von Haugwitz (1702-1765). Soon after it was founded, the Deputation started defining the position of the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy, but also its own position in relation to the other institutions. The cause for this was the death of Patriarch Arsenije IV in January 1748. When a Serbian delegation showed up in Vienna unannounced in order to ask for permission to convene an Assembly in which a successor to the Patriarch would be elected, Count Kolowrat reprimanded them for coming without his permission, but he quickly provided the authorization for the Assembly to be convened. This initiated a conflict with the president of the Hungarian Court Office, Count Leopold von Nádasdy (1697-1758), who complained that he had not been consulted regarding the Assembly even though Serbs lived in Hungary. Due to the fact that his institution had also appointed a commissioner in the Assembly in 1744, he expected this to happen again. One more reason why this would have made more sense for him was that Court commissioner Count Franz von Engelshofen (1692-1761), one of the two commissioners in 1744, was also appointed as the ruler's commissioner for the Assembly of 1748. Besides that, the president of the Hungarian Court Office pointed out that in the Assembly in 1748 a new Archbishop was going to be elected who would have his ecclesiastic power in Hungary.

Count Kolowrat rejected all these arguments pointing out that the Serbs were not *Provinciale Hungaricum*, but *Austriaco Politicum ac Domesticum*, and that Hungarian institutions had no jurisdiction over them, since they were *patrimonium domus Austriacae*, rather than *regni Hungarie*. In this way, he took on a decisive stance in defending the institution which he was head of, but also the position of the Serbs and their Privileges.⁸

In 1749, the Illyrian Court Deputation was allocated its own rooms within the Hofkammer, and in 1751, following the death of its first president, Count Königsegg-Erps was appointed to take the helm. On that occasion, the Deputation lost most of its jurisdiction in Transylvania, except partly over religious matters, on which it took decisions in agreement with other institutions in Transylvania. Accordingly, its name was changed to *Hofdeputation in Banaticis et Illyricis*.⁹ This did not reduce clashes between institutions with regard to their jurisdiction, which is why in 1753 Count Königsegg-Erps introduced the principle of meetings between councilors of *Direktorium in publicis et cameralibus*, *Hofkriegsrat*, *Hofkammer*, *Ungarische Hofkanzlei* and *Deputation* representatives. The confessor of the ruling family also attended these meetings. In the same year, Baron Johann Christoph von Bartenstein (1689-1767) was appointed vice president of the Deputation, and in 1755 he took the helm. He was the most influential statesman who ran this institution, and this made a significant impact on it. As he took the reins, the jurisdiction of the Deputation was finally defined to be solely over religious matters, regardless of whether the territory was under civilian or military

⁸ Горан Васин, Ненад Нинковић, *Историја Карловачке митрополије*, Нови Сад: Прометеј, 2022, 82.

⁹ János Kalmár, Michael Hochedlinger, *Die Hofkommission (Hofdeputation)...*, 517-518.

authorities. Thus, all that was left under its jurisdiction was marked with the term Illyricis, and accordingly, the name was changed to Hofdeputation in Illyricis – the Illyrian Court Deputation.¹⁰

The seat of the Illyrian Court Deputation was in Wildwerckerstraße 290 (nowadays: Wipplingerstraße 7) in a block of buildings also home to the Czech-Austrian Court Office and several other institutions (the Oberste Justizstelle, Stiftungs und Städtische Hofbuchhaltere).¹¹ At the time when Baron Bartenstein assumed presidency over the Deputation, his oldest son Franz von Bartenstein and Count Ludwig Friedrich von Zinzendorf und Pottendorf would come for counselling on behalf of the *Directorium in publicis et cameralibus*, and on behalf of the *Hofkriegsrat* came baron Johann Ferdinand von der Marck. Furthermore, two confessors of the ruling family also came – Ignatius Kampmüller and Ignatius Bittermann. On behalf of the *Oberste Justizstelle* came Johann was Gottwill Hütner, and on behalf of the *Directorium in Commercialibus*, it was Count Franciscus Xaverius Koller von Nagy-Many, the future president of the Illyrian Court Deputation. In addition to the persons mentioned, in 1756, four secretaries were hired in the Deputation – Jacob Otto, Ferdinand Ernst von Zalheim, Balduinus Labeye, Peter Heinzberger, and twelve sworn agents (*agentes jurati*): Jacob Anton Gregoriis von Romerdorf, Johann Baptist Majon, Johann Heinrich Frölich, Joseph Vogl, Franz Anton Zeschenauer, Johann Matolai, Joseph Techterler von Hochentahl, Stephan Fabsics, Johann Adam Derry, Benedict Mandel, Johann Mihael Koller, Franz Joseph Großpitsch.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid., 518-519.

¹¹ *Hof und Staats Schematismus*, Joseph Gerold, Wien 1776, 8, 13, 14, 50, 95.

¹² *Staats und Standes Calender*, Leopold Johann Kalivoda, Wien 1756, 90-94.

Less than two decades later (in 1775) the Illyrian Court Deputation had a different composition because some of the Court agents and servants had moved on to new positions, others had left the service, and some had passed away. Besides the president, count Franciscus Xaverius Koller von Nagy-Manya, others who attended the meetings included councilor with the Court Chamber baron Ottocar Ernest Stupan Freyherr von Ehrenstein and Joseph Mailath von Szekhely, councilors of the Hungarian Court Council count Ludvig Erdödy von Manyorökerek and Franz von Györy, and for the *Oberste Justizstelle* there was still Johann Gottwill Hütner. On behalf of the *Ministerial Banzo Deputations*, Joachim Karl von Ziegler attended the meetings. There were also some councilors who were only employed with the Illyrian Court Deputation: Theodor von Thoren, Johann Bernhard von Pelser, Joseph Razesperger and as a referent there was young Franz Georg von Keeß. Lorenz Krepel was the secretary, Balduinus Labeye was the registrant and expeditor, Joseph Jaszviz was a concipient, Karl Robert Pirckert was a registrant, and there were three cancelarists Johannes von Muralto, Carl Scheiderpauer and Ignaz von Doneck. The lowest positions were occupied by three Serbian men, Aleksandar Lazarević and Adam Blagojević as assistants and Sava Lazarević as interpreter. Court agent Wilhelm Scherer was also registered as part of the Deputation and he was agent for Serbian questions. A year later, Ottocar Ernest Stupan von Ehrenstein and Joseph Mailath von Szekhely were no longer part of the Deputation. Three councilors who entered the Deputation instead were Gottfried von Koch, Karl von Fritz von Rustenfeld and Adam von Weingarten. Johann Kisler appears as the fourth cancelarist, and Joseph

Bencko appears as the new concipient. This was the composition of the Illyrian Court Deputation in 1777 when it was abolished.¹³

Work of the Deputation prior to Koller. The activity of the Illyrian Court Deputation is clearly divided into two periods. The first covers the time from its establishment up until 1769, while the second period encompasses the time from 1769 to its abolition in 1777. While the first period was marked by the passing of various Resolutions on individual issues, the second period was marked by attempts to systematically define the position of the Serbs through one legal act. In the period until 1769, the most prominent figure in the history of the Deputation was baron Bartenstein, while the most prominent figure in the history of the Serbs was Archbishop Pavle Nenadović (1749-1768). During their time in the Illyrian Court Deputation, various Resolutions were written under the watchful eye of baron Bartenstein, one of the best experts in the legal tradition of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The core of the activities of the Illyrian Court Deputation was the question of the Privileges, i.e. the interpretation of the Privileges by Emperor Leopold I (from 1690, 1691 and 1695) and their confirmations (from 1706, 1713, 1715 and 1743). The Deputation examined who the Privileges should apply to – if they applied to all Serbs or only those who had moved to the Habsburg Monarchy in 1690. This was an old issue which would become topical every now and then. Count Kolowrat concluded that the Privileges had to apply to all Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy

¹³ *Schematismus der Kaiserlich-Königlich wie auch Erzherzoglichen Instanzen*, Leopold Johann Kalivoda 1775, 97-99; *Hof und Staats Schematismus der röm. kais. auch kais. königlich und erzherzoglichen Haupt und Residenzstadt Wien*, Joseph Gerold, Wien 1776, 95-96.

regardless of when they had settled there or what authority they were under – civilian or military. The hierarchy of the Archbishopric of Karlovci had an identical attitude, while Pavle Nenadović went a step further in claiming that the Privileges should also apply to all the Orthodox in the Habsburg Monarchy. The goal of this interpretation was to gain ecclesiastic authority over the Orthodox in Transylvania. However, the application of the Privileges did not extend to all the Orthodox, not even in 1761, when Dionisije Novaković, at the time the Bishop of Buda, was sent by the Court to Transylvania as Orthodox bishop. The Privileges remained a law for all the Orthodox, but within the Archbishopric of Karlovci, while in the Privileges it was actually stated that they only applied to the Serbs.¹⁴

The question of the rights of the Orthodox in Transylvania was just one in a series of questions being resolved between the Illyrian Court Deputation and Archbishop Pavle. He was more talented as a diplomat than his predecessors at the helm of the Orthodox Church in the Habsburg Monarchy, and he used this talent whenever the circumstances made it possible. In moments which were critical for society and the state (such as uprisings, migration movements or wars), Nenadović always stood with the Court, thus earning the Court's trust. At the same time, through his fight for the Privilege rights, he became an inviolable authority in the Orthodox community of the Habsburg Monarchy. Out of the 19 years in which he was head of the church, he spent 4 years in the capital, very often in conversations with the presidents of the Illyrian Court Deputation.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ненад Нинковић, *Митрополит Павле Ненадовић*, Нови Сад: Филозофски факултет 2017, 235-252.

¹⁵ Ibid, 81-82, 168-169.

In the Illyrian Court Deputation, Nenadovic's inclinations and his political talent were well known, which is why he, more than any of his predecessors was warned against acting as if he was *caput nationis* and against interfering in secular questions. On the other hand, the Illyrian Court Deputation often demanded him to use his authority to influence resolution of problems exactly in the secular domain. That only strengthened Nenadovic's decision to stand not only as the head of the Orthodox Church, but also as the head of his people. For this reason, he tried to have a decisive influence on the work and the election of the Serbian agent in Vienna. This ambition was also demonstrated by the president of the Illyrian Court Deputation. In 1753, Nenadović tried to independently elect Wenzel Franz von Heimerle for this position, but the ruler annulled the election at the request of the Illyrian Court Deputation and ordered that she should first be presented the agent candidate through this institution. Only if she agreed with the choice, could the candidate be engaged. According to this procedure, Johann Wilhelm Scherer was hired.¹⁶

This kind of attempt was nothing new on Nenadović's part. Due to his interference in the domain of secular authority, the Illyrian Court Deputation had passed a Resolution on 21st October 1750 prohibiting such activities to him. Count Kolowrat expressed an attitude saying that relations between the Deputation and the Archbishop of Karlovci had been arranged through the Resolution from 21st December 1746. On that occasion, it was determined that an offence of secular rights could be reported to the Deputation, as an individual issue, while issues from the domain of

¹⁶ ASANUK, MPA „A“ 592, 617. and 622/1753.

ecclesiastic life could be reported collectively or through the Archbishop. Since Nenadović did not stop complaining about problems from both secular and ecclesiastic life, count Kolowrat warned him on 23rd March 1751 that by continuing in that manner, he would become *persona non grata*. Even after that, Nenadović still insisted on always being consulted by the Deputation on any issues regarding the Serbs, especially since, in response to a request from the Deputation, he had used his influence to stop Kijug's uprising as well as to prevent migrations of Serbs to Russia. Therefore, on 29th August 1752, Maria Theresa issued a Letter of Protection through the Deputation, demanding the Privilege rights to be respected. The following year, on 2nd May 1753, the Illyrian Court Deputation confirmed the old Privilege right to build churches freely through a Resolution which allowed the Serbs to build churches in every settlement which had 30 or more Serbian houses. In case they wanted to have two churches in mixed religious environments, they needed permission from the ruler, which would be granted to them through the Deputation. The resolution changed the right to freedom to establish monasteries – it forbade this, while at the same time prohibiting acquisition of new land to the existing monasteries.¹⁷

With baron Bartenstein becoming head of the Illyrian Court Deputation, the intensity of the relation with Archbishop Pavle was changed. When he took over this institution during the Severin uprising in 1755, the situation required that the circumstances of the uprising should be investigated. Baron Bartenstein concluded that the position of the Serbs had to be alleviated, that religious freedom was to be respected and that the

¹⁷ Ненад Нинковић, *Митрополит Павле Ненадовић*, 83-106.

Court could only benefit from the Serbs.¹⁸ Soon, new talks were initiated about the Serbian position in the Illyrian Court Deputation, during which it was concluded (in 1755) that from that moment on anything related to the Archbishopric and to the offences against the Privileges would be under the jurisdiction of the Illyrian Court Deputation, while other issues would be resolved by civilian and military courts in which the hierarchy could not represent believers. After several meetings between the representatives of the institutions interested and Baron Bartenstein in 1756, it was decided that as regards interpretation of the Privileges, three old acts were to be followed – Rescripts for the Archbishopric of Belgrade by Emperor Carl VI from 1734, his Letter of Protection from 1735 through which he abolished the Rescript and the confirmation of the Privileges from 1743. This solution was absurd since the three acts excluded one another, and Archbishop Pavle pointed this out to Bartenstein. The president of the Illyrian Court Deputation agreed with him and on 21st November 1757, a new Resolution was issued, annulling the previous decision and announcing that the Privileges could only be interpreted based on the confirmation from 1743. However, in 1759, two concepts clashed again, this time with regard to trials to ecclesiastics. The Deputation pointed out that this right was held by secular courts, based on the type of offence, while Nenadović claimed that only ecclesiastic courts had this right, regardless of the type of offence. This resulted in the ruler's prohibition against convening a Synod of the Archbishopric of Karlovci unless the ruler had granted permission for it through the Illyrian Court Deputation and sent her commissioner to attend

¹⁸ С. Гавриловић, *Грађа за историју Војне границе у XVIII веку*. Књ. 4, Вараждински генералат. Књ. 2, Београд 2008, 17–22, 56–70, 75–80, 84–92.

the Synod. She would only do that after the Archbishop informed the Deputation what was to be discussed in the Synod, in order to avoid topics which were outside the sphere of ecclesiastic life. Nenadović refused to comply with this and to his death, he never convened another Synod.¹⁹

Since the number of disagreements between the Ruler and Archbishop Pavle increased, he was urgently summoned to come to Vienna in mid-1762. Nenadović was ready. He brought with him lawsuits related to violation of the Privileges. He particularly pointed out the problem of religious discrimination in Croatia, infringement of clerical immunity, challenging the church's right of escheat, as well as a series of individual problems. The Ruler's response to this was her dissatisfaction that he was even commenting on the Privileges, since she was their supreme interpreter. However, baron Bartenstein took Nenadović's side. Previous decisions and interpretations were repeated – that the Ruler was to take care of the Privileges, that the Serbs could address secular courts if the violation of rights was beyond the jurisdiction of the church, that the Serbs could complain to the Illyrian Court Deputation if their religious rights were violated, that the Archbishop was not *caput nationis* and that the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church would not be threatened in Croatia and Slavonia.²⁰

The Ruler's solutions from 1763 were not the final answer to the problems. In 1764, Nenadović appeared in Vienna with new lawsuits and then he visited Vienna again from May 1765 to January 1766. He talked to Maria Theresa and baron Bartenstein, not just about the Privilege rights, but

¹⁹ Ненад Нинковић, *Митрополит Павле Ненадовић*, 119-130.

²⁰ Ненад Нинковић, Ана Митревски, *Три жалбе митрополита Павла Ненадовића из 1762. године*, Мешовита грађа, XXXVIII, Београд 2017, 36-38, 41-43, 48-53.

also about the lawsuits against Serbs which appeared in the Hungarian dieta in 1764. Nenadović had to provide answers about the organization of the Orthodox Church, the number of priests, the number of believers, the number of monasteries and monks and the material status of the clergy. Just two weeks after the first meeting with Nenadović (in May 1765), the Ruler modified the Privilege right regarding the freedom to build churches. She did this through the Illyrian Court Deputation and the modification specified that her approval was needed prior to building. This would be granted through the Illyrian Court Deputation after the Archbishop submitted the construction plan and a plan of expenses.²¹

In the autumn of 1765, all Serbian demands were put together under 22 articles, and Nenadović singled out five of these - escheat, immunity and court authority over ecclesiastics, limitations in convening the Synod and the need to pass a Resolution on religious freedom. With regard to these articles, in January 1766, Emperor Joseph II gave his promise to Nenadović that solutions would be found. During their conversation, the Ruler informed the Archbishop that the Illyrian Court Deputation had been reconstructed, that count Franz Koller von Nagy-Manya had joined that institution since baron Bartenstein was now too old to run the jobs on his own. Not even after that were all problems resolved, which is why in July 1768, Maria Theresa granted permission for the Serbian Assembly to be convened. Just one month later, on 26th August 1768, Archbishop Pavle passed away and due to this the Assembly was postponed until the following year.²²

²¹ Ненад Нинковић, *Аудијенције митрополита Павла Ненадовића у Бечу 1765-1766. године*, Мешовита грађа, 44, Београд 2023, 125-138.

²² Ненад Нинковић, *Митрополит Павле Ненадовић*, 167, 484-485.

The time of Koller. Up until Count Koller, the Illyrian Court Deputation attempted to define Serbian position and interpret Privilege articles by passing individual Resolutions. In the process, some of the Privilege rights were degraded or modified, such as the freedom to build churches and establish monasteries. Nevertheless, this was insufficient. A special law was to be passed through which the Privileges would be interpreted and also numerous other problems solved, particularly in the domain of financial relations. Ever since its establishment, the task of the Illyrian Court Deputation was to introduce a stable system in resolving the ‘Serbian issue’. At the same time, Theresian-Josephinist reforms were underway on a large scale in the Habsburg Monarchy. Following the deaths of the two main figures previously involved in considering and defining the position of the Serbs, baron Bartenstein and Archbishop Pavle, a new possibility arose to carry out reforms in the Orthodox society of the Archbishopric of Karlovci by introducing a unified legal system.

The reforms in the Orthodox society of the Archbishopric of Karlovci were supposed to be implemented by the new president of the Illyrian Court Deputation, a determined Josephinist, Count Koller. They meant centralization and prevalence of the state over the church, as well as a series of changes ensuring a safer and better life for the subjects (abolishing unnecessary holidays, education reforms, parish reforms, abolishing monasteries, defining financial relations). Therefore, count Koller prepared Commissioner Andreas Hadik von Futak (1710-1790) in the Assembly of 1769 to not only collect necessary data, but also present ready solutions to the Synod and the Assembly, which were written within the Illyrian Court Deputation, under Koller’s supervision. The epilogue to

this was passing the first Regulament in 1770 as a collection of legal norms which incorporated some of the resolutions from the time of Archbishop Pavle, but also some completely new legal solutions. The reforms defined by this law (reducing the number of priests, abolishing monasteries, abolishing holidays, new financial relations) were to be put into action by the new Archbishop of Karlovci Jovan Georgijević (1769-1773) who had neither the strength, nor the authority to do that. Besides that, the hierarchy's resistance to reforms was getting stronger and stronger, which also became clear to the Illyrian Court Deputation during the Assembly and the Synod in 1774. In the Assembly, the successor of Archbishop Jovan was elected. This was Archbishop Vikentije Jovanović Vidak (1774-1780) who was entrusted with the task of implementing the reforms. In that respect, the Synod of 1776 was also important, as the Second Regulament was passed the following year, in 1777. It specified the provisions of the First Regulament, but due to resistance, it was replaced with the Declaratory from 16th July 1779. The three acts were not essentially different, and although each one was more precise than the preceding one, they did not disrupt the concept of the reforms. The Declaratory was not written in the Illyrian Court Deputation, but it took over solutions from the Second Regulament (1777), which had been written within this institution. Therefore, the Declaratory can also be considered a product of the actions of Count Koller and his associates.²³

Through a number of legal paragraphs in these acts, financial relations were defined - between believers and priests, priests and bishops,

²³ Горан Васин, Ненад Нинковић, *Историја Карловачке митрополије*, 119-121, 128-129.

bishops and archbishops, as well as those of monasteries towards the hierarchy. This was one of the most important changes, because the Illyrian Court Deputation not only abolished a certain number of fees and taxes, but also reduced and evened out the existing ones. In addition, the property status of the parishioners was also taken into consideration when determining the amount to be given. Thus, the poor gave less to the church than the rich and the clergy was obliged to provide free services to the poorest layer of the population. These financial modifications were then made public by the Deputation. This was done by making it obligatory to publish this information and to make it easy to access in the future, both at ecclesiastics and at secular authority representatives. In this way, things were finally brought under control and that prevented abuses.²⁴

Among the first reforms, starting in 1769, was the abolition of excessive obligatory holidays with the aim of getting more days for work and improving the material situation of the citizens of the Habsburg Monarchy. There was no resistance to this process in the Assembly and the Synod of 1769, since the abolished holidays were mostly either those with no tradition in Serbian society, or those rarely celebrated as non-working holidays. The second stage of the calendar reforms led to strong opposition. Based on the holiday reform in the Roman Catholic Church, after which in 1771, apart from the 52 Sundays there were only 16 holidays left, count Koller asked that holidays in the Orthodox Church should also be abolished. On this issue he asked for the opinion of Atanasije Dimitrijević Sekereš (1738-1794), who was at the time an Orthodox priest and censor

²⁴ Дејан Микавица, Владан Гавриловић, Горан Васин, *Знаменита документа за историју српског народа 1538-1918*, Нови Сад: Филозофски факултет 2007, 94-116.

for Orthodox books at the printing house owned by Joseph von Kurzböck (1735-1792). Sekereš was very inclined to reforms and before he converted to Catholicism in 1776, he had the trust of the Serbian hierarchy. He expressed the opinion that radical reforms, which Uniate bishops intended to impose on the Orthodox Church, should be given up, suggesting that 36 holidays should stay in the Orthodox Calendar. Nevertheless, Count Keller requested that more holidays should be abolished and because of that, the commissioner handed a completed new calendar to the Synod in 1774. The new calendar had only 17 holidays in it. The fact that additionally stirred up discontent was that except for Saint Sava, the calendar contained no other national holidays. The request was not adopted by the Synod, and in the end, a solution close to Sekereš' proposal was adopted, so that the calendar included 36 holidays. The ruler accepted this in 1776. The Illyrian Court Deputation did not participate in the final reduction that came in 1786, at the request of Emperor Joseph II. After this final reduction, there were 21 holidays in the Orthodox Calendar, as well as one national holiday for each Orthodox nation – St. Sava for the Serbs, St. Petka for the Romanians and St. Emperor Konstantin and Empress Helen for the Greeks.²⁵

One of the most important reforms implemented by the Illyrian Court Deputation in the Orthodox society of the Archbishopric of Karlovci was related to parishes, clergy and monasteries. It was already in the Synod of 1769 that appointing new priests was forbidden and the decision on prohibition of establishing new monasteries was repeated. The hierarchy

²⁵ Isidora Točanac Radović, *The Influence of the Centre on the Provinces in the 18th Century: The Abolition of the Orthodox Holidays in the Habsburg Monarchy*, The Habsburg State-wide and the regions in the Southern Danube basin (16th – 20th centuries), Wien 2020, 92-93.

was asked to equalize parish sizes and to reduce the number of priests and make it reasonable. The First Regulament prescribed that settlements with 100 Orthodox houses could appoint one priest, if the number of houses was 200, they could have 2 priests and 3 priests if there were over 200 houses. To have 4 or more priests, a permission from the ruler was required and it was granted through the jurisdiction of the Illyrian Court Deputation. Bishops were to make records of the eparchies and decide which priests would be removed from service, and as long as there was an excess of priests who were out of work, they were not allowed to ordain new priests. It was also ordered that protopresbyterates should be consolidated. The resistance to these reforms which was present in the Assembly of 1774 and the Synod of 1776 did not waver Count Koller. On the contrary, the Second Regulament increased the number of homes which were meant to be under religious guidance of one priest. In the areas under civilian authority one priest was in charge of 130 homes and in the Military Frontier the number was 150. In settlements which had 250 homes there were two priests, and there were three priests if the number of houses was greater than 250. The ruler's permission was necessary to have more than 3 priests. The same provisions were stated again in the Declaratory, and with that the reform was finalized in accordance with the previously stated attitudes of the Illyrian Court Deputation.²⁶

In parallel with the parish reform, measures towards abolishing monasteries and disciplining monks were carried out. There were few Orthodox monasteries and they were not as powerful economically as were

²⁶ Исидора Точанац Радовић, *Реформа српске православне цркве у Хабзбуршкој монархији за време владавине Марије Терезије и Јосифа II (1740-1790)*, рукопис докторске дисертације, Београд 2014, 184-188, 193-197.

Catholic monasteries. Also, very few monks lived in them. This in particular was a problem, since the hierarchy made widowed priests become monks, so in reality, the number of people who wanted to lead a monastic life was even smaller. The First Regulament announced the abolition of monasteries. In 1770, an order was issued to abolish 3 monasteries, and 3 more in 1772. In 1775, the Illyrian Court Deputation composed a list of monasteries which were to be abolished and sent it to Archbishop Vikentije. However, he postponed dealing with this until the meeting he had in the Illyrian Court Deputation in 1776. On that occasion, it was agreed that monasteries which had less than 40 acres of land per monk and fewer than 8 monks were to be abolished. Persons under 24 were not allowed to enter monasteries and persons under 25 could not be ordained as monks. In the course of 1777 and 1778, the whole process of abolishing monasteries was finished and the transition of monks to the monasteries that were still functioning was completed. Out of 42 monasteries, which had been there before 1770, 16 were abolished. Unlike this reform, which was successful, introducing disciplinary rules among monks was unsuccessful. Although they were written by Atanasije Dimitrijević Sekereš (in 1776) and Jovan Rajić (in 1779), the rules were all abolished and monastic life continued to be governed by monastic typicons. This was possible because part of the rules on monastic life were adopted through both Regulaments and the Declaratory.²⁷

The Illyrian Court Deputation was involved in legal organization as well as practical operation of church courts called Consistory courts. A finalized order about their organization was presented to the Assembly in

²⁷ Горан Васин, Ненад Нинковић, *Историја Карловачке митрополије*, 131-136.

1769. The First Regulament also defined Consistory courts which could only discuss offences related to canon law, but they could not impose corporal punishment or shackling, and their right to impose suspension and excommunication was limited as they needed to get the ruler's consent for this through the Illyrian Court Deputation. In 1774, the Assembly and the Synod again discussed the Consistory courts, and in 1775, the Illyrian Court Deputation passed a new law – *Sistema neunitskih konzistorijalnih sudeh*. It introduced two types of Consistory courts, one for all eparchies which convened once a week and the other that convened periodically. Archbishop Vikentije was not satisfied with this entire process, so in 1778 Maria Theresa abolished this law and allowed him to write his own proposal. Death prevented him from doing this, so it was all completed by his successor archbishop Mojsije, who in 1782 wrote the new *Konzistorijalna sistema* which did not differ much from the previous one, but it simplified the organization and the processes.²⁸

One of the most important reforms carried out by the Illyrian Court Deputation was school reform. In this undertaking, Count Koller not only met with no resistance from the hierarchy, but he actually had their support. Part of the schools, also attended by the Serbs, were reformed through the *Allgemeineschulordnung* from 1774, since this law also pertained to the Military Frontier. After that, a special law was passed for Orthodox believers in Banat, called the School Constitution (on 2nd November 1776). As early as 1773, a special School Principal Todor Janković Mirjevski was appointed to Banat. He had previously graduated from Norma with Ignaz von Felbiger (1724-1788), the main creator of primary school reforms in

²⁸ Исидора Точанац Радовић, *Реформа српске православне цркве*, 303-318.

the Habsburg Monarchy. Mirjevski immediately translated Felbiger's Handbuch (*Ručnaja knjiga*) and adapted it to the Orthodox environment, and after that he worked on the text of the School Constitution for Banat. In 1777, this Act became part of the law reforming schools in Hungary - *Ratio educationis*, of course, for the schools which were Orthodox in character. Serbs got three school districts and three Principals in them – *Banatsko-Velikovarski*, where Teodor Janković Mirijevski was Principal, *Ugarski*, where Avram Mrazović was the Principal and *Hrvatsko-slavonski* district with Stefan Vujanovski at the helm. As in other areas, here also there were *trivial* schools, *city* schools and schools called *Normas* which educated teachers. The church kept the role of a lower supervisory body in these schools, and priests who graduated from a *Norma* could have a job in education. In addition to that, they were in charge of catechization in the cases when teachers were laics.²⁹

One of the novelties in society for which the credit goes to the Illyrian Court Deputation was the possibility to print books in Cyrillic in the Habsburg Monarchy. Serbs had strived for this since the end of the 17th century, but they could not get approval from the authorities to open such a printing house as it was feared that they would print something that was not in accordance with the state interests. Due to that, they had to import liturgical books from Russia and Venice. Archbishop Pavle tried to establish a printing house in Karlovci, but this attempt also fell through due to the issue of control. Since count Koller thought the funds leaving the

²⁹ Ненад Нинковић, *Реформа српског школства у Хабзбуршкој монархији 1769-1777*. Истраживања 22, Нови Сад 2011, 167-183; Ненад Нинковић, *Српско основно школство у Хабзбуршкој монархији од 1774-1811*. Годишњак Филозофског факултета у Новом Саду, књига 36, Нови Сад 2011, 59-73.

state for the purpose of acquiring books abroad were large, as well as that acquiring the books from Russia meant spreading Russian influence over the Orthodox subjects of Vienna, he proposed in 1770 that the Viennese printer Joseph von Kurzböck should be entrusted with the monopoly over printing Orthodox books. Maria Theresa immediately accepted this proposal. From that moment on, everything that was published for the Orthodox in the Habsburg Monarchy was printed in that printing house. Its activities were closely connected with the reform process led by count Koller, which is why problems occasionally arose. This was the case when the Calendar of holidays was printed for the Orthodox based on the model of the Catholic Calendar, or when the catechesis by Jovan Rajić was to be printed in 1774. The Catechesis was printed, but then changes were required in line with the teachings of the Catholic Church and this was insisted on by the confessor of the Imperial family. Even though this change was not accepted, some pages of the Catechesis had to be replaced by new ones, and the paper clearly showed this, which resulted in resistance to the printed material and the printing house alike. The changes were prevented by count Koller himself requesting religious rights of the Orthodox to be protected, but the news about the problematic Catechesis was already among the people.³⁰

The problem related to publishing the Catechesis was just one of many misunderstandings. Dissatisfaction culminated in the autumn of 1777, when orders containing bans on certain burial rituals were published. Such were the rituals of carrying the deceased in an open coffin through a settlement and burying the dead around churches. In October and

³⁰ Исидора Точанац Радовић, *Реформа српске цркве*, 266-270.

November 1777, believers physically assaulted the bishop of Bačka Arsenije Radivojević and the bishop of Vršac Vikentije Popović, while they also verbally assaulted Archbishop Vikentije. After these incidents, it could be seen that the Illyrian Court Deputation had not succeeded in implementing all reforms, contrary to what its president claimed, and that people were not going to accept those without resistance. Confident that the Second Regulament had been accepted quite well, Count Koller even suggested that Maria Theresa should abolish the Illyrian Court Deputation, since it had brought a stable legal framework, so there was no longer any need for its existence. The unrest in Novi Sad and Vršac led to accusations between the Illyrian Court Deputation and Hungarian Court Office related to the challenges in implementing the reforms. Archbishop Vikentije also joined in the attacks on Count Koller and his habit to impose solutions. Finally, Maria Theresa ended this conflict on 2nd December 1777 by abolishing the Illyrian Court Deputation. Its jurisdiction was passed to the Court War Council, the Land Administration of Banat and the Hungarian Court Office.³¹

³¹ Мита Костић, *Гроф Колер као културно-просветни реформатор код Срба у Угарској у XVIII веку*, Загреб 2010, 125-136.

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THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SETTLEMENT OF 1867 AND THE QUESTION OF ITS REVISION IN VIENNESE POLITICAL PUBLIC

Abstract: The Austro-Hungarian Settlement of 1867 predetermined not only the history of Austria-Hungary, but also history of the wider Central Europe and the Balkans. Dualism created a balance between Vienna and Budapest, but it also triggered constant debates about its legitimacy and sustainability. The paper explores not only the conditions that led to the Settlement and the question of its revision, but also how Viennese political circles debated these issues, that is, when they considered them and when they contested them. This particularly clarifies the influential Viennese newspaper *Neue Freie Presse*, which debated these issues until the end of the Monarchy. *Pester Lloyd*, a Pest newspaper, provides insight into the views of the Hungarian elites and how they understood their position in relation to Vienna. Vienna remained a place where various political factions operated, from those defending Dualism to those advocating federalization or even centralization. We will try to explain how these different perceptions developed under the influence of political and social circumstances, including the national question, the economy, and the influence of external factors, primarily Russia and Germany.

Keywords: October Diploma, February Patent, Settlement, revision of Dualism, Franz Joseph, Viennese elites, Hungarian elites, Svetozar Miletić, Zastava, Neue Freie Presse, Pester Lloyd.

When the Habsburg Monarchy suffered a defeat in 1859 during the War of Italian Unification, Vienna found itself faced with the now open question of its internal organization, which in its essence implied the reopening of the national question. The Habsburgs succeeded in the Revolution of 1848/49 in defeating the Hungarian movement by using their previous alliances, such as the alliance with Russia. Petrograd accelerated

the collapse of the Hungarian revolution, suppressing it in 1849, after which Hungary was pacified. The neo-absolutism that followed was not aimed at absolutism per se, but at re-presenting the dynasty as a cohesive and supranational element. However, it turned out that Vienna, with this approach that was present in the pre-revolutionary period, would not be able to satisfy the desires of the elites of other nationalities, primarily the Hungarians and the Czechs. The sustainability of this system became unrealistic after the defeat in 1859 because Vienna, this time, failed to win victory over a single national movement and thereby consolidate the system that it had supported for an entire decade. The defeat interested the elites of the nationalities in the Monarchy in broader political and cultural integration and recognition of their political rights and autonomy. In the efforts to maintain the stability of the Monarchy, the Emperor and his advisors decided to focus on negotiations specifically with the Hungarians. Their aim was to solidify the internal structure of the Monarchy while ensuring its status as a great power on the European stage.

By 1860, the outdated absolutist system was no longer sustainable, prompting the Emperor to seek alternatives to redistribute power and reform the governing structure. The constitution set forth in the Sylvester Patent of 1851 was to be superseded by a more comprehensive constitutional program. The aristocracy advocated for a federal reorganization of governance, which would replace the previous bureaucratic model with crown diets to express their rights. Although they were open to having a joint parliament, they wished to restrict its functions primarily to budgetary matters. In contrast, the middle class and industrialists viewed an elected and centralized parliament as not merely

beneficial but essential. Amid these discussions, the Emperor's focus shifted towards federalist perspectives. The appointment of Agenor Gołuchowski, a Polish noble from Galicia, as Minister of the Interior hinted at the impending adoption of the October Diploma. Negotiations with Hungarian conservative leaders such as Emil Dessewffy, György Apponyi, and Count Antal Széchenyi were ongoing. Meanwhile, public dissent in Hungary was palpable, illustrated by a university protest in Pest in March 1860, where a student was killed by police. His funeral turned into a demonstration against the Vienna government, further fueling dissatisfaction, especially following the death of Count István Széchenyi. In response to mounting pressure, Vienna began to modify its absolutist practices. In March 1860, the Crown Council was allied with representatives from Hungarian provinces—three elected from Transylvania, two from Croatia and Slavonia, and two from the Serbian Vojvodina and Banat of Timisoara. Apponyi and Széchenyi accepted these developments, with hopes that they would foster a more harmonious political environment in Hungary. The debate then arose whether to keep the five districts established post-1849 or to restore political authority to the Hungarian Diet. By August, the foundational ideas of the October Diploma were settled during private meetings in Schönbrunn. Presented on October 20, the Diploma established Crown Diets based on historical provinces and federal principles, empowered to elect representatives to parliament. The Hungarians regained certain administrative institutions from the pre-revolutionary era, such as the Hungarian Royal Court Chancellery in Vienna and the Hungarian Royal Council of Regency in Buda. This restoration granted Hungary a unique status within the Monarchy.

Nevertheless, the October Diploma ultimately fell short of Hungarian expectations, as it failed to secure the guaranteed rights established under the April Laws of 1848. The reintegration of Croatia and Slavonia and the dissolution of the Serbian Vojvodina and Banat of Timisoara on December 27, 1860, did little to appease widespread discontent. The Hungarian conservatives struggled to unify the political spectrum, particularly against the backdrop of opposition led by liberal Ferenc Deák. Most Hungarians perceived the Diploma as a limited concession to their constitutional rights.¹

Franz Joseph distanced himself from Hungarian conservatives, who had previously posited that the diploma would secure Hungarian support for federalism. Consequently, these conservatives would not be consulted regarding the February Patent. At the Diet in April 1861, a few remaining conservatives continued to advocate for the October Diploma, however, none of them supported the Patent. In response to this political climate, Deák assembled liberal aristocrats into his party, which became known as the Address Party or simply Deák's Party. This faction emphasized that national demands must be articulated to the ruler through the traditional and

¹ Kann 1974: 320-321; Judson 2016: 252-253; Rokai, Djere, Pal, Kasaš 2002: 457-460; Beller 2018: 109-110; Deak 2009: 453, 457, 464, 465, 473, 481; Mikavica, Lemajić, Vasin, Ninković 2016a: 469; Gyani 2022: 119, 123; Vocolka 2015: 181-182.

The Diploma proved inadequate in enhancing the financial stability of the Monarchy, as evidenced by a 50% decline in the value of paper money from October 1860 to January 1861. This situation prompted discussions regarding the financing of the army and the necessity of raising loans. Concurrently, banking institutions underscored the advantages of a centralized parliament in effectively managing financial affairs. Although federalism appeared to serve the interests of the nobility and various nationalities, it was unable to adequately address pressing economic issues. Furthermore, Vienna could not expect to secure support from international creditors until a definitive political stability was achieved. Deak 2015: 139, 146, 147.

See: Armour 2012: 146-147.

constitutional channels, specifically through the Diet.² It became evident that the liberals within Deák's party harbored a clear objective - they aspired to achieve a personal union whereby Hungary would gain internal autonomy. They were aware of the favorable political circumstances within the Monarchy that could support their aspirations. Consequently, their strategy entailed maintaining an opposition stance until the emperor directly sought them out for a final solution to the ongoing political issues. However, this process would require several years, given that the Viennese elites still possessed the will and authority to impose new solutions on the Hungarian populace.

Pester Lloyd echoed the sentiments of the Hungarian liberals regarding the diploma, asserting: "Based on the information we have gathered, we conclude that the diploma will define the principle of unity through the Reichsrat. Although it will retain certain powers and rights, it will also be enhanced by an increased number of deputies." The Reichsrat was indeed filled with representatives, yet the emperor retained significant executive prerogatives throughout this period. Parliament, by definition, held the authority to decide on matters pertaining to taxes, trade, and the military, while issues beyond these domains remained under the jurisdiction of the crown.³ In subsequent discussions, the writings from the Vienna papers were reiterated. *Wanderer* articulated the following perspective:

² Gottas 2006: 1146; Vocolka 2015: 183.

The October Diploma invoked the Pragmatic Sanction, reflecting its foundation in historical and constitutional law. It asserted that the preservation of the Monarchy's unity was contingent upon the alignment of its institutions and legal framework with the historical context and legacy. This emphasizes the importance of historical continuity in maintaining the stability of the Monarchical system. Brauneder 2000: 148; Laszlo 2000: 303.

³ *Pester Lloyd*, Nr. 242, 20. Oktober 1860; Deak 2015: 146-147.

"We have supported the conservatives in their demands for the restoration of historical institutions. However, from this point forward, we shall also extend our support to the liberals in their pursuits. The liberals seek to safeguard existing institutions from decay, enabling them to effectively respond to emerging constitutional needs. There is no doubt that this embodies the spirit of true freedom, and we are confident that the Hungarian leaders, in their initial speeches, will refute the accusations that they harbor reactionary ideas or oligarchic tendencies. We will reiterate our position from the Reichsrat session, namely that we believe in the power of public opinion and the intellectual capability of the Hungarian aristocracy. It is our hope that, as in the past, a singular party will emerge in Hungary that will protect historical rights and unite all patriots under its banner."⁴ On October 30, *Pester Lloyd* asserted that the graduation would coincide with the opening of the Hungarian Diet. "The call for this opening is inevitable, and the Diet should be accorded the status of a constituent assembly. We undoubtedly reserve the right to engage in debate on these matters."⁵ In subsequent publications, *Pester Lloyd* referred to historical law, tracing back from the Pragmatic Sanction to the April Laws of 1848. "The principles of historical continuity and our connection to the past hold such significance for us (Hungarians) that we would willingly sacrifice ourselves in their defense. Thus, we will not tolerate any centralism that infringes upon the rights of other peoples, as all groups have come together in a collective struggle for constitutional governance. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the need for cooperation that once united the entire nation

⁴ PL, Nr. 245, 24. Oktober 1860.

⁵ PL, Nr. 250, 30. Oktober 1860.

may not endure beyond the struggle for constitutional reform".⁶ This prediction proved to be accurate. For the time being, the Hungarians were prioritizing the resolution of their own issues.

In subsequent issues, the paper scrutinized Deák's stance regarding the October Diploma. He had declined the leadership position offered by supporters of independence, stating, "I would consider adopting such a policy to be national suicide." The publication elaborated that "one only needs to examine the unfortunate historical examples of the divisions that have transpired between Austria and Hungary in recent centuries to understand that the root cause lies in the contradiction between 'independence on paper' and de facto independence from Vienna".⁷ The authors argued that with the laws of 1848, a concerted effort was made to resolve these contradictions definitively. "While the future would determine whether the complete implementation of these laws could ultimately lead to the downfall of the Monarchy, it was imperative that the next session of the Diet deliberate on potential modifications in alignment with the prevailing political context". The publication asserted, "We assure you that there is absolutely no difference between Eötvös and Deák in terms of their evaluation of the laws of 1848. It is, in fact, Ferenc Deák who regards these laws as the only legitimate basis for the continued development of our constitutional framework."⁸ The subsequent issues maintained a focus on

⁶ PL, Nr. 252, 1. November 1860.

⁷ PL, Nr. 268, 21. November 1860.

⁸ *Ibid.* The April Laws of 1848, regarded by Hungarians as a restoration of their historical rights under the Crown of Saint Stephen, marked a significant turning point in the political landscape of Hungary. Under these laws, while the Habsburg king maintained the authority to appoint and dismiss individuals from the highest offices, dictate matters of war and peace, convene and dissolve parliament, and exercise the power of veto, Hungary was granted considerable autonomy through the establishment of its own government, which

the prevailing dissatisfaction, stating, "The Diploma did not instill confidence in a free constitutional life. The non-Hungarian regions of the Monarchy are also pursuing constitutional guarantees for their own freedoms. What we articulated following its adoption, we reiterate now - it is incumbent upon the Diet itself to seek and develop a solution to the problem at hand. The revitalization of municipal life must yield to the authority of the state parliament."⁹ The Hungarian representatives refused to accept what they perceived as imposed solutions, insisting that their situation could not be resolved without their active participation.

Following the failure of the October Diploma, Franz Joseph and the court faced the necessity of determining an alternative form of constitutionalism. Anton von Schmerling replaced Gołuchowski, and on

was accountable to a parliament elected for three-year terms. Moreover, the laws stipulated that Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia were also recognized as part of the territory under the Crown of Saint Stephen. A key aspect of these reforms was the abolition of feudalism, which liberated the peasantry from the obligation of paying dues. As a result, Hungary achieved internal autonomy while existing in a personal union with other regions of the Habsburg Monarchy. Significantly, the April Laws enshrined freedom of the press, albeit with restrictions that prohibited the insult of the ruler's personality. The laws proclaimed the equality of all citizens before the law and established religious freedom, fostering greater social inclusion for individuals lacking noble titles who earned comparably to the nobility. Citizens were also granted the freedom of movement. Furthermore, the university system was placed under state control, thus distancing it from the influence of the Roman Catholic Church. Proclamations concerning the protection of individuals and the right to private property were articulated within this legislative framework. In the context of Croatia, the ban was made accountable to the Hungarian government. Emperor Ferdinand officially recognized the April Laws on April 11, 1848. However, these laws are often referred to in historiography as the March Laws due to the Diet's voting on them on March 18 of the same year. Importantly, approximately 25% of the male population was granted the right to vote, a figure that represented the highest electoral participation rate in Europe at that time. Deak 2001: 99-100; Djere 2009: 428-429; Clark 2023: 404-405; Kann 1974: 302; Judson 2016: 189-190. The liberation of the serfs played a significant role in improving agriculture. It was Austrian capital, however, that was primarily responsible for the profitable production of cereals beginning in the 1870s. The revolution greatly contributed to the alignment of political and property relations with economic realities. Djere 2023: 335.

⁹ PL, Nr. 19, 22. Jänner 1861.

February 26, 1861, the February Patent was enacted. Schmerling, a liberal by political conviction, championed centralism and declined to participate in Bach's system of governance, which enhanced his popularity among liberal factions. Although Schmerling did not devise the new system himself, his ideas were translated into a concrete proposal by Hans von Perthaler, a lawyer from Tyrol. The emperor sought to address the ongoing political crisis through the implementation of centralism. While the crowns were not eradicated, Schmerling delineated the Reichsrat as a central parliament endowed with legislative authority and the capacity to approve a budget. The Crown lands maintained their autonomy, yet all institutions were required to function from Vienna, thereby consolidating centralism. It was intended that all governmental business be conducted through the Reichsrat, which would consist of deputies selected based on a high property census. This strategy aimed to secure a majority representation from the German citizenry, who were generally discontented with the division within the Monarchy due to their economic interests. Ultimately, however, the Patent incited resistance similar to that prompted by the Diploma, as it predominantly favored German liberals and the financial sector. The Hungarian Diet did not send delegates to the inaugural session of the Reichsrat in May 1861, a decision mirrored by the Croatian Parliament. During this session, significant disagreements emerged between the German liberals and the deputies representing the Slavic populations, who were opposed to centralist proposals. Nevertheless, the court exhibited an unwillingness to negotiate. In August 1861, Schmerling instituted a provisional government in Hungary in an effort to overcome Hungarian resistance, despite the fact that the Hungarians were actively boycotting tax

payments. Schmerling believed that this opposition would be ephemeral and that the Hungarians would ultimately agree to send representatives. However, this decision inadvertently unified various Hungarian factions, resulting in a recognition of Deák's leadership even among conservative elements. Over time, this passive form of resistance proved effective, as the Poles withdrew from the Reichsrat, followed by the Czechs and even the Tyrolean Germans. It became increasingly evident to the Viennese elites that a resolution would necessitate an agreement with the Hungarian leadership.¹⁰

It was clear to politicians in Vienna, who had a good view of the situation, that the solution would need to be some form of Dualism. The pressing questions revolved around the method of implementation, the implications for the internal organization of the Monarchy, and the timeline for a final agreement. Unlike the October Diploma, which had a shorter validity, the new Patent would extend for four years. However, Vienna was not in a position to compel the Hungarians to acquiesce. This situation

¹⁰ Judson 2016: 276-277; Laszlo 2000: 307; Rokai, Djere, Pal, Kasaš 2002: 457-460; Deak 2015: 150, 152, 153; Vocelka 2015: 162, 183. The February Patent preserved the Upper House for male deputies, while establishing the Lower House with 343 deputies elected from the provinces. Legislative authority remained under the purview of the Reichsrat, which was in accordance with the aspirations of the German liberals. By appointing delegates, the provinces would only serve to legitimize this political framework. Beller 2018: 110, 111, 112, 115. The distribution of deputies in the Reichsrat was as follows: the Kingdom of Hungary sent 85 deputies, the Kingdom of Bohemia sent 54, the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia sent 20, the Kingdom of Dalmatia sent 5, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia sent 9, the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria with Auschwitz and the Grand Duchy of Krakow sent 38, the Archduchy of Austria sent 28, Salzburg sent 3, Styria sent 30, Carinthia sent 5, Carniola sent 6, Bukovina sent 5, Transylvania sent 26, the Margraviate sent 22, Tyrol and Vorarlberg sent 12, and Upper and Lower Silesia sent 6. Istria, Gorizia, Gradiška, as well as the city of Trieste also sent 6. PL, Nr. 50, 28. Feber 1861.

The Patent maintained the principle of sending representatives from the crown lands to the Reichsrat, but unlike the October Diploma, it was more welcoming to middle-class participation in parliamentary work. Kann 1974: 329-330.

echoed historical precedents, where the dynasty and the court had previously sought consensus with the Hungarians—events of 1867 would reiterate this pattern, albeit with the political circles in Vienna being sidelined.

During the period of the February Patent's implementation, the Hungarians and other ethnic groups actively boycotted its provisions. In contrast, the liberals in the Reichsrat continued to endorse the Patent, making it the foundation of their political strategy. By 1865, the liberal factions had successfully passed legislation addressing communal autonomy, financial governance, economic regulation, judicial reform, and freedom of the press, albeit with varying degrees of success. They sought to unify the disparate factions within their ranks under the banner of the Constitutional Party. However, this effort ultimately proved to have limited influence on actual political relations. A faction within the movement resisted making concrete political concessions to Hungary. Nonetheless, in the initial months following the adoption of the Patent, it became increasingly clear that it had fundamentally divided the political elites within the Monarchy. Various legislative programs remained active while the German liberals attempted to present the situation as a settled affair. Alongside the support from the liberals in the Reichsrat, the Patent also found backing among the German population in Bohemia. Their leader, Eduard Herbst, articulated opposition to both federalism and absolutism. He argued that such concessions would strengthen the position of the Czechs in Bohemia, leading him to advocate for a centralist and constitutional Monarchy. Critics of the policy supporting the Patent cautioned that the liberals should not impose its provisions uniformly throughout the

Monarchy, but rather limit its application to regions where Germans constituted a majority. This faction contended that the lack of sufficient political strength would hamper the sustainability of the Patent in the long term, as the constitutional questions regarding other regions of the state remained unresolved. It soon became clear that these political groups maintained a sense of isolation among the German population. Furthermore, the Slavic representatives in parliament, including the Czechs and Poles, refused to collaborate with the liberals, particularly in their approach toward the Hungarians. The Czechs, in particular, expressed solidarity with Hungary, driven by their own aspirations for increased internal autonomy.¹¹

Pester Lloyd reports on the divergent opinions expressed by the Viennese press regarding the February Patent. The centralist newspaper *Presse* analyzes the Patent in temperate terms, considering it a manifestation of a "unitary state." The publication asserts, "Finally! The constitutional laws have been published. The entire population displays signs of satisfaction and enthusiasm. Anyone who has not completely relinquished hope for Austria must feel reassured, as the protracted state of disarray afflicting our Monarchy is finally being resolved, and the remaining uncertainties are being alleviated. This reflects a sense of loyalty, as the Patent not only builds upon certain decisions made in the October Diploma but also charts a course for our Monarchy toward a more institutional framework." In contrast, other publications, notably the *Ostdeutsche Presse*, express more critical perspectives. They contend, "The

¹¹ Kwan 2013: 64-65; Evans 2006: 259-260; Deak 2015: 166.

structure of the new constitution is profoundly confusing and, in many respects, superficial. Numerous obstacles hinder its interpretation, arising from conflicting viewpoints, tendencies, and interests that have culminated in numerous compromises clearly visible in various legal articles. However, this is not the moment to focus on trivialities. We must instead consider the overarching implications. It is crucial to address whether the constitution is aligned with contemporary values. Consequently, we must observe Berlin as a guiding influence. The ideals of justice, enlightenment, and moral freedom must also find expression in our parliament." While the *Österreichische Zeitungen* predominantly welcomed the new constitution, they did not shy away from criticism. They noted, "Much has transformed over the past twelve years, and we must avoid the repetition of past errors. The Patent represents the only legitimate avenue toward Hungary, and Pest cannot afford to relinquish it. Therefore, this constitution incorporates all defects stemming from such constraints. Rectifying these issues will require time, and we, as the press, must play a role in facilitating this process. The government has already articulated its stance toward Hungary, indicating that the unity of the state will not be forsaken and that any separatist tendencies will be actively discouraged. Should the Hungarians express contentment, they may permit the Reichsrat to collect taxes and implement conscription—prerogatives they believe to be reserved for their parliament. They do not wish to see themselves equated with other crowns in this regard. The answers to these questions, along with the responses from the Hungarians themselves, warrant considerable attention."¹² The commentary from the Viennese newspapers underscores the significance attributed by

¹² PL, Nr. 50, 28. Feber 1861.

the court and the politicians who contributed to the formulation of both the October Diploma and the February Patent to the Hungarian response, which was considered essential and decisive. Pest held a position capable of mounting substantial opposition to such constitutional frameworks, and it is largely the resistance from Hungarian politicians that elucidates why neither the Diploma nor the Patent can be viewed as final. This perspective was also apparent to the elites of other nations, who looked to the Hungarians, hoping they would champion a broader and more integrated interpretation of the constitution.

The open stance of the Hungarians indicated that they would not accept the February Patent. Nevertheless, Vienna found itself in a position where it could not abandon the new constitutional framework so soon after the adoption of the October Diploma. This situation was significant due to its implications for the internal legitimacy of the crown and, by extension, the international standing of the Monarchy. Deák, who had previously served as Minister of Justice under Lajos Batthyány during the Revolution of 1848/49, was actively involved in the drafting of the April Laws. From the beginning of the negotiations regarding the new internal order, he had a clear understanding of his objectives and the principles upon which he intended to base them. Deák emphasized that he regarded the April Laws as the only legal foundation for the agreement with Vienna. He articulated that the relationship between Hungary and the Monarchy, established by the Pragmatic Sanction of 1723, was characterized as personal union. This definition allowed the Hungarians to maintain a fully independent administration, devoid of common state institutions. Deák stressed that while Hungary was a hereditary territory of the Habsburg dynasty and

therefore part of the Habsburg Monarchy, it had never constituted a genuine political union with Austria, a concept not recognized by the Hungarian law. He upheld his position that a mere personal union existed between the two entities, which meant that the Hungarians were not obligated to send representatives to the Reichsrat. However, Deák did not insist on a role in foreign policy, viewing it as inherently the prerogative of the emperor. He expressed a willingness to negotiate the sharing of the national debt and to amend certain provisions of the 1848 laws, but insisted that these laws be accepted as the initial basis for any agreement.¹³ Through this approach, Deák indirectly conveyed to Vienna's political circles his readiness for a compromise, indicating a pragmatic stance in the pursuit of Hungarian self-governance.

The Patent failed to unify the territories of the Crown of Saint Stephen, as regions such as Transylvania, Croatia, and Slavonia remained separate entities. This division was met with opposition from Hungarian liberals. Schmerling posited that, in time, the necessity for a centralized state would become apparent, famously addressing politicians in Pest with the slogan, "We can wait" (*Wir können warten*). On the other hand, Deák favored a more passive approach, advocating for a policy of strategic inaction while patiently anticipating a change in circumstances, which ultimately transpired. In 1863, the Czechs from Bohemia were the first to withdraw from the Reichsrat, and this withdrawal was followed the next year by their counterparts from Moravia as well as the Poles, all engaging in a boycott against the imperial assembly. Concurrently, Austria was experiencing escalating tensions with Prussia, although both governments

¹³ Kann 1974: 122; Laszlo 2000: 312; Gyani 2022: 122-123; Laszlo 2012: 239.

managed to collaborate on issues concerning Schleswig and Holstein in 1864. This year was particularly significant for Deák as he finalized his program for the Settlement with Vienna. In December of that same year, Deák initiated correspondence regarding a final agreement with Antal Auguszt, who had been associated with him since before the revolution of 1848 and who held the position of president of the Council of Governors. Auguszt articulated Deák's vision for a new constitution in writing, which was subsequently revised and expanded upon, enabling Deák to have a detailed program ready three years prior to the eventual Settlement. The initiation of contact with Deák remains ambiguous. It is unclear whether it was prompted by someone within Franz Joseph's circle, such as Mol Esterházy or Archduke Albrecht, or whether the emperor himself took the initiative. Following their initial meeting, they convened two additional times in Pest, in February and April (he reportedly harboured a disdain for Vienna and travelled to the capital exclusively under the cover of night.). After these discussions, Deák was encouraged to publish his *Easter article* in his newspaper, *Pesti Napló*, on April 16, 1865.¹⁴ Importantly, Schmerling was circumvented during this process, and the court directly engaged with Hungarian liberals, thereby excluding Austrian politicians from the negotiations.

In the *Easter article*, Deák underscored that Hungary had historically resisted total incorporation into the Monarchy and its governing system, even in previous centuries. He emphasized the necessity of reconciling the Hungarian constitution with the broader interests of the

¹⁴ Laszlo 2000: 313; Deak 2009: 484, 558, 559, 560; Judson 2016: 259; Evans 2006: 262; Vocolka 2015: 184.

entire state. According to Deák, "The goal is to ensure the survival of the Monarchy, and we do not wish to subordinate this objective to any other." Additionally, he articulated a second goal - to secure a constitutional order for Hungary, whose rights and obligations are already safeguarded by the Pragmatic Sanction. He affirmed that the two components of the Monarchy would not be set against one another, ensuring the maintenance of their equality. The Viennese press provided commentary on Deák's article. The *Neue Freie Presse* highlighted, "that the authorship of an article is reliably attributed to Mr. Deák." The publication further noted that "the Viennese newspapers observed that the Hungarian constitutional struggle is rendered impossible by the Hungarian constitution, which will continue to conflict with the interests of the people until the imperial constitution is recognized as the sole legal framework." The role of the Hungarians in the formation of the Monarchy was acknowledged, along with their sacrifices during the wars against Frederick II and Napoleon. *Neue Freie Presse* remarked, "Many of our politicians view Deák's program for a potential revision of the Hungarian constitution as a pathway toward reconciliation. Aren't these gentlemen overly optimistic?" It was noted that while there is no doubt regarding the willingness of Hungarians to consider certain amendments to their constitution, the pressing question remains whether such modifications will indeed facilitate reconciliation with the western part of the Monarchy and whether a parliament for common affairs will be effectively established.¹⁵ Despite the criticism from the *Neue Freie Presse*, Deák crafted his article in a conciliatory tone, aiming to convey to the public of

¹⁵ Deak 2009: 588; Gottas 2006: 1148; Laszlo 2000: 314; Neue Freie Presse, Nr. 228, 19. April 1865.

the Monarchy that the Hungarians were not in opposition to Vienna, rather, they sought guaranteed and independent internal development within the framework of the Monarchy.

When Deák's proposed program garnered a favorable reception both at the imperial court and among the Hungarian elites, he resolved to publish it as an official document. This initiative became known as the *May Program*, which was disseminated between May 7 and May 9, 1865, in the newspaper *Die Debatte und Wiener Lloyd*. In this program, Deák articulated the fundamental principles aimed at establishing a constructive agreement with Vienna. He underscored the dynasty as a cohesive factor within the Monarchy and asserted that foreign policy should be treated as a common endeavor. While recognizing the need for a unified military force, Deák maintained that decisions regarding the number of military recruits, the duration of service, and the deployment of troops in Hungary should be the prerogative of the Hungarian Parliament. To enhance the management of shared affairs, he proposed that both the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments should designate delegations to address pending issues collaboratively. Moreover, Deák informed the emperor that the institution of the Palatinate had been abolished, indicating that its associated rights would no longer be recognized.¹⁶ Through the publication of this program, Deák sought to direct the attentions of the Pest elites toward achieving a tangible and mutually satisfactory agreement with Vienna, fully aware of the risks inherent in revolutionary ideologies and aspirations for independence. The experiences of the Revolution of 1848/49 profoundly

¹⁶ Laszlo 2000: 314, 316; Deak 2009: 562-563.

demonstrated to the Hungarian people their international isolation, further informing Deák's pragmatic approach to governance.

The court made the determination to seek a consensus with the Hungarians this time. Following the resignation of Schmerling's cabinet on July 27, 1865, Richard Belcredi assumed leadership, advocating for a more limited federal solution that predominantly attracted support from the aristocracy. In a significant political maneuver, Franz Joseph suspended the February Patent, thereby reactivating certain provisions of the October Diploma. As a gesture of goodwill, he visited Pest during the summer of 1865 and sanctioned the reunification of Transylvania with Hungary. This act facilitated ongoing negotiations between the Hungarians and the court. In December of the same year, the Diet, which had been dissolved in November 1861, resumed its activities. Ferenc Deák and Gyula Andrássy were elected as the primary representatives for the Hungarian side in the negotiations. However, the court refrained from presenting concrete proposals at that time, as it anticipated that a forthcoming conflict with Prussia, in which it hoped to emerge victorious, would enhance its negotiating power against the Hungarians. This expectation aimed to provide a stronger foundation for negotiation. The Austro-Prussian War, initiated by the battle for influence within the German Confederation, concluded with a decisive Prussian victory at Sadova on July 3, 1866. In the aftermath of this defeat, Franz Joseph recognized Austria's loss of its dominant position in Germany. Belcredi, acutely aware of the complexities of his responsibilities, confronted the intricate issues surrounding relations among Germans and Slavic peoples in the Austrian portion of the Monarchy, as well as the relationship between Hungarians, Slavs,

Romanians in the Hungarian part, and the overarching German-Hungarian tensions—issues that constituted significant sources of systemic crises within the Monarchy. Consequently, Belcredi resigned on February 7, 1867. He was succeeded by Baron Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, who held position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Interior. On February 17, 1867, Gyula Andrassy was appointed Prime Minister of Hungary. During the subsequent spring, the Emperor negotiated with the liberal faction, led by Deák, to reinstate the April Laws of 1848. After seven years characterized by various unsuccessful proposals, the principle of dualism was swiftly agreed upon and implemented. Notably, the Hungarian Diet had commenced its session on December 14, 1865, with the primary objective of preparing for the Austro-Hungarian Settlement. Although the Diet's sessions experienced a brief interruption during the Austro-Prussian War, they gathered regularly following the conclusion of peace. One of the foremost tasks for Andrassy and his newly formed government was to articulate the details of the Settlement.¹⁷ Due to its defeat, Vienna found it challenging to secure any significant concessions in negotiations with the Hungarians. Nevertheless, the Hungarian representatives refrained from issuing additional demands, adhering instead to the framework initially established by Deák between 1861 and 1865. This consistency in position contributed to the facilitation of concluding the negotiations successfully.

The settlement, known as the *Ausgleich*, was negotiated among Franz Joseph, Deák and Andrassy on February 18, 1867, but it had to be

¹⁷ Kann 1974: 331, 332; Clark 2006: 531, 532, 542, 544; Beller 2018: 115, 121; Judson 2016: 285; Deak 2015: 167; Rokai, Djere, Pal, Kasaš 2002: 463-464;

ratified by the respective parliaments. The Hungarian Diet ratified the agreement on May 29, 1867, with a sizeable majority, by passing the Law XII (Lex XII), which defined the future relations between Austria and Hungary within the Monarchy. This law recognized common affairs and established general principles for their administration. Notably, the primary interpreters of this legal framework were the Monarch and the Crown of St. Stephen, rather than the Austrian or Hungarian entities. Historiography has often analyzed this dualistic arrangement within the context of whether it constituted a unitary state or entailed a clear legal sovereignty division. The Monarchy was divided into two entities, each governed by its own administration and parliament, one based in Vienna and the other in Budapest. Hungary was formally defined as the Kingdom of Hungary, while the Austrian segment of the Monarchy was referred to as the "Kingdoms and the States represented in the Reichsrat." From legal aspect, dualism did not define Hungary as an autonomous state separate from Austria. The 69 articles of 1867 reaffirmed the agreement between Hungary as an integral part of the Monarchy's territory (ország) and its sovereign (the Habsburg dynasty). Deák anchored this dualism in mutual rights and obligations binding both parties. This solution was perceived by the Hungarians not only as legal but also as something that derives from historical law. In the discourse of the 19th century concerning law and liberalism, modern political ideas and historical traditions were seen as harmonious rather than mutually exclusive. Within this legal framework, Deák also outlined several common responsibilities under the dualistic system, particularly in the domain of foreign policy. Consequently, Franz Joseph adapted his regal self-representation as "Emperor of Austria and

Apostolic King of Hungary," viewing the two entities as constitutionally united under his authority, henceforth collectively termed Austria-Hungary. Divided governance structure afforded both entities autonomy in internal matters, with each electing its own representatives and establishing joint ministries. These ministries were responsible to the Emperor (King) and comprised delegations of 60 members from each side. Joint Ministers, including the presidents of the Austrian and Hungarian governments, oversaw the collaborative governance, with sessions presided over by the Emperor and, in his absence, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This arrangement was critically opposed by Kossuth, who, in his *Cassandra Letter*, which he wrote during his exile in Turin, argued that Deák's approach ultimately detracted from Hungary's potential for independence, a condition that could have been realized following Austria's defeat in 1866. He voiced concerns that this settlement could jeopardize national interests, as Hungarian foreign policy became inextricably linked to that of Austria, risking potential conflicts with other powers that might not have been alienated had Hungary been permitted to maintain its independence.¹⁸

¹⁸ Kann 1974: 333; Judson 2016: 259-261; Beller 2018: 122; Laszlo 2012: 214, 215, 218, 242, 251; Laszlo 2000: 322; Rokai, Djere, Pal, Kasaš 2002: 459, 464, 467; Deak 2009: 589-591; Wheatley 2023: 57; Deak 2015: 167, 169; Evans 2006: 262-263; Kontler 2007: 283.

Kossuth's letter was printed in 50,000 copies in Hungarian and 10,000 copies in German language. It was published in the Pest newspaper *Magyar Ujsag* on May 26, 1867. Vocolka 2015: 174, 178, 185.

After the Great Turkish War (1683-1699), the Habsburgs recognized Hungary as an integral part of the Monarchy rather than as a conquered territory, even though it had been liberated from the Ottomans by the imperial army. Following nearly two centuries of continuous conflict between the Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire in the Danube region, Hungary gained a significant role in the future history of the Central Europe. The estates of Hungary grew in strength and self-confidence, to the extent that they began to challenge the policies of the Viennese court, drawing on the traditions of the Medieval Hungarian state. In response, the Habsburgs significantly diminished the influence of these estates

Unlike Kossuth, Deák did not want to leave the fate of the Hungarians to chance and saw Vienna as the guarantor of Hungary's integrity. With their restored historical rights, Hungarians became an equal partner alongside the Germans in the Monarchy. Their right to determine the status of other nationalities remained unchanged, validating the warnings issued by *Pester Lloyd*. The collaboration between the Hungarians and other nationalities continued until their specific agreement with Franz Joseph was established.

Vienna understood well that the Settlement was the only way to maintain the Monarchy's status as a great power, and the elites in Pest recognized they would play a role in maintaining that status. Political power remained largely in the hands of the aristocracy, with approximately 80% of the representatives in the Diet representing that class. However, the dualistic system made Hungary more parliamentary than any other state in Eastern Europe or the Balkans for a considerable time. The settlement was not merely personal. It constituted a genuine union and did not devolve into a confederation or federation. The common areas of concern included foreign policy, defense, and finance. Hungary was obligated to cover 30% of all expenses, a percentage that would remain relatively unchanged until the end of the Monarchy. Every ten years, two delegations were to convene to discuss matters that required separate administration, such as railways and the customs union. These delegations met annually in either Vienna or Budapest, indicating Hungary's reluctance to acknowledge any form of Reichsrat. Franz Joseph agreed to be crowned King of Hungary on June 8,

over military affairs as the Habsburg Monarchy prepared for new wars with the Ottomans in the 18th century. Palffy 2021: 345, 356, 357.

1867, alongside his wife, Elisabeth. The ceremony took place in the Matthias Corvinus Church, where he was crowned with the crown of St. Stephen in the absence of Deák.¹⁹ After ceding the position of Prime Minister to his party colleague Andrassy, he began to withdraw from politics. It is likely that he wanted his legacy to be associated solely with the Settlement with Vienna, thus downplaying the significance of this symbolic ceremony.

Dualism faced criticism from its inception. Supporters of this approach believed that the Settlement in the Monarchy created orderly relations and, through political stability, fostered the development of the economy and society. Austria-Hungary enjoyed a period of peace between 1867 and 1914 as a result. This arrangement was beneficial to Bismarck, who understood that Russia would gain the most from a potential collapse of the state. Consequently, he endorsed the German-Hungarian solution, which ensured the survival of Austria-Hungary and strengthened its ties to Germany. Pan-Slavism was one of the external factors that ultimately led the Ballhausplatz to adopt Dualism. Still, this new system was fraught with

¹⁹ In Hungary, the presence of a joint imperial army, which operated under the dynasty's symbols and used German as the official language, led to dissatisfaction among the Hungarian population. They only tolerated this arrangement because, alongside the Austrian *Landwehr*, there was also the Hungarian *Honvéd*. Kontler 2007: 283, 285, 286. Empress Elisabeth played a significant role in fostering an agreement with the Hungarians, albeit one of a more modest nature. She advised Emperor Franz Joseph, who had harbored negative sentiments toward the Hungarians since the Revolution of 1848/49, to reach out to leaders Deák and Andrassy to initiate discussions aimed at resolving the crisis. Elisabeth was respected among the Hungarians for her knowledge of the Hungarian language and her appreciation for their culture, which encouraged them to maintain communication with the emperor. This approach bought valuable time for negotiations. However, in 1853, tensions arose again when an assassination attempt was made on Franz Joseph in Vienna by János Libenyi, a Hungarian tailor. The emperor's life was saved by the quick actions of his guards. Following the incident, there were suspicions in Vienna that the assassin might have connections to Hungarian circles. Rady 2020: 280; Vocolka 2015: 97, 100. Kann 1974: 333-334; Judson 2016: 285; Laszlo 2012: 255; Deak 2009: 574.

serious contradictions, which would become apparent before and during the First World War. Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, and Ruthenians lived in both parts of the Monarchy, and Dualism complicated efforts to resolve their national issues. The Settlement failed to eliminate German dominance in the Austrian part of the Monarchy or Hungarian dominance in the Hungarian part. It did not successfully adapt previous laws into modern constitutional norms. Some circles around Deák advocated for a more liberal and less independent concept, supported by figures like Eötvös and other liberals. However, such a version of Dualism would likely not have been approved by the Diet, which was composed primarily by the nobility. The Diet reconvened on December 11, based on the electoral order established in 1848. Out of the 318 deputies, 180 supported Deák, whose party held a majority. Three days later, Franz Joseph delivered a throne speech in which he recognized the Pragmatic Sanction as the foundation of the agreement and declared his intent to rule the entire Monarchy in a constitutional manner. In his address, Deák officially rejected the October Diploma and the February Patent, asserting that the recognition of Hungarian laws was a prerequisite for the legitimacy of Franz Joseph's coronation. The Hungarians now faced significant challenges, including the organization of state administration, education, and addressing the national question.²⁰ The

²⁰ Rokai, Djere, Pal, Kasaš 2002: 466; Kann 1974: 335, 336, 337; Judson 2016: 293; Laszlo 2012: 60, 261; Vocolka 2015: 186; Sked 2001: 244-245.

The status of nationalities in Hungary was addressed by the Nationalities Law of 1868. This legal framework was largely influenced by József Eötvös, a member of Deák's party. The introduction of the act emphasized that there was only one political nation within Hungary, namely the Hungarian nation. While Serbs, Slovaks, and Romanians were granted autonomy for their church and school affairs, it was underscored that the administration of the state must always be led by the Hungarians. The use of national languages in various counties was subject to the will of city and county authorities, who

elites in Vienna and Pest gained the confidence to pursue policies toward the Slavic nationalities that they believed were in the best interests of the Monarchy. Although the Slavic nationalities were included in this system, they did not achieve full political emancipation.

Beust understood that in order to reach an agreement with the Hungarians, he needed the approval of the Austrian liberals. The populations of Lower and Upper Austria, along with those in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, could pose significant resistance if their demands were not met. Consequently, Franz Joseph decided to restore the constitutional status of the Austrian part of the Monarchy based on the February Patent and to reinstate the Reichsrat, which had been suspended in September 1865, along with all of its prerogatives. When the Reichsrat convened in May 1867, the Austrian liberals held a convincing two-thirds majority, with 118 deputies out of 160 seats (the Czechs chose not to participate). In June, the House of Representatives elected members to a constitutional committee tasked with revising the constitution. The new constitutional solutions would integrate a division into several basic legal groups that would supplement the February Patent. Ultimately, the parliament was granted broader powers than those outlined in 1861. The independence of the judiciary was guaranteed, the emperor's role in the executive branch was clearly defined, the imperial supreme court (Reichsgericht) was established, and both civil and national rights were acknowledged (Article 19). This article primarily favored the Germans but also recognized the cultural and linguistic rights of other nationalities. In

often, with the backing of the Pest government, found ways to bypass the provisions of this law. Ekmečić 2021: 190; Djere 1992: 68, 74.

schools, children from different nationalities were allowed to learn their native languages. However, knowledge of German was still required for advancement in public service. The Emperor accepted and signed the new laws on December 21, 1867, which established the final constitutional framework for the Austrian part of the Monarchy. Unlike in 1861, the December Constitution was the product of joint parliamentary efforts rather than an octroi from the Emperor.²¹ This outcome was satisfactory to the political elites in Vienna.

Neue Freie Presse stated that the eastern half of the Monarchy has regained its constitutionality. It argues that there is no longer a good reason for the Reichsrat to be maintained, making the revision of the February Constitution (Patent) the first necessity. "This revision implies the organization of a parliament for this (Austrian) half of the Monarchy through indirect elections. The idea of equality between the eastern and western halves has replaced the centralist perspective, requiring Germans to accept this shift and renounce their earlier aspirations for unity". The critique observes that a representative body, referred to unfavorably as a "shortened" Reichsrat, which operates separately from Hungary, cannot embody the notion of parity. "A population of about 18 or 19 million people would be representing dwarfed parliament by a mere 194 deputies, while Hungary—with Croatia without Transylvania—would have significantly more deputies, 367 or up to 446 with Transylvania. The Diet in Pest represents the population of the countries united under the Hungarian

²¹ Brauneder 2000: 175, 176; Boyer 2022: 93-102; Kann 1974: 339-341.

In addition to the prerogatives established by the Compromise, Franz Joseph was granted the final decision in choosing the Prime Minister by the December Constitution. Vocolka 2015: 214.

crown, unlike the distinct crowns in the Austrian context". The text also metaphorically illustrates "Austria" as carrying "a dead child of Saint Wenceslaus," referencing Bohemia and suggesting the complex and uncertain relationships that Vienna must now manage with the Czechs.²² There is an underlying sentiment that dualism has favored the Hungarians more than the Germans within the Monarchy.

Pester Lloyd expressed a different view in February issue when he wrote, "Words seem superfluous to describe this day as Hungary celebrates the resurrection of its legal rights and the Monarchy its rebirth. The demands of the nation have been fulfilled. Although the principle of legal continuity was violated, the days of difficult struggles and a dark period are now giving way to a bright future. The nation, the Diet, and the king are responsible for the changes in the Hungarian constitution. The nation, based on its free will, has recognized the historical heritage of previous centuries and incorporated it into the demands of the parliamentary system. We do not wish to remember the sad period that followed 1848. Today, the banner of our freedoms proudly flies. With the renewed constitution, the parliamentary form of government has also been revitalized. This is a triumph of constitutional and liberal principles, and wherever there is a feeling of freedom around the world, Hungary will be welcomed. However, this is a significant moment for other areas of the Monarchy as well. Austria did not voluntarily open the door to progress. It had to suffer serious blows of fate before it agreed to change and find the right path. The right path was dualism, which secured freedom for the Monarchy. Every person of goodwill must accept the truth and admit that the settlement with

²² NFP, Nr. 877, 8. Februar 1867.

Hungary means nothing other than the preservation of the Monarchy. Dualism is not an arbitrary measure or an experiment like many others, but a necessity. It must be acknowledged that there was no alternative way to harmonize the existence of the Monarchy with the constitutional order. In the annals of history, the work of our parliament and its leaders will be written in golden letters".²³ After almost seven years of constitutional struggle and opposition, the Hungarians have finally achieved their program. Based on what is presented in *Pester Lloyd*, it can be concluded that they considered dualism to be the final arrangement and the basis for further political development.

The Settlement sparked negative reactions among various groups within the Monarchy. Shortly after the Sadova, Svetozar Miletić noted that the Vienna-Pest agreement would soon follow, leading to the Germans and Hungarians gaining the status of privileged nations. He argued that Dualism represented two central authorities that denied the Slavs equality and full emancipation within the Monarchy. At the same time, the police closely monitored his activities, and reports from 1866-1867 labeled him as a figure whose ideas could potentially harm Hungarian politics. Authorities were particularly concerned about his involvement in the United Serb Youth, founded in 1866, which aimed to enhance Serbian national consciousness through education and improve the material status of its citizens. Additionally, in Miletić's newspaper *Zastava* (1866), Mihailo Polit Desančić highlighted Austria's defeat in the war against Prussia as a pivotal moment for resolving the Eastern Question and criticized Mihailo Obrenović for his passive stance on Serbian national unification. It was

²³ PL, Nr. 42, 19. Feber 1867.

evident that the Monarchy quickly re-engaged in international relations following the Settlement. At a session of the Diet, Andrassy stated that the principal aim of Ballhausplatz's foreign policy regarding the Eastern Question would be to prevent Russian influence from extending into Vienna's interests in the Balkans. Domestically, dissatisfaction was widespread and became particularly pronounced with the adoption of the Nationalities Law in September 1868.²⁴ Miletić believed that this situation could not last long, asserting that two privileged peoples could not sustain the Monarchy amid rising demands for political emancipation from other groups.

Miletić explained his views in *Zastava*, believing that the historical provinces of the Monarchy must be guaranteed autonomy. He noted that the internal autonomy of the Triune Kingdom was defined by Article 42 of 1861. He pointed out that the Czechs requested the same status that had been recognized for the Hungarians, specifically for Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. By respecting this principle, the Monarchy could maintain a dualistic framework, while actually being organized according to federalist principles. Miletić highlighted the differing views between the Czechs and the Poles regarding autonomy. "The Czechs desired independence similar to that of Hungary and wished to meet with representatives from Vienna in delegations. In contrast, the Poles sought to share legislative and executive power with the Germans". Yet, since Beust would not consider either the Czech demands or the Polish proposals for autonomy, Miletić believed that a real settlement was unlikely. He questioned how Beust could think that

²⁴ Mikavica, Lemajić, Vasin, Ninković 2016b: 51, 59, 65; Tibor 2001: 94-95; Mikavica 2007: 139; Ekmečić 2021: 269; Vasin 2015: 158, 177; Kann 1950: 287.

wars or defense could be conducted solely with satisfied Germans and Hungarians, considering that the needs of foreign policy had led to the Settlement with the Hungarians. Miletić pointed out that in Hungary, any Slav who did not politically identify as a Hungarian was accused of being a Pan-Slavist. Despite these attacks, he emphasized the importance of maintaining confidence and hope. He urged a conscious approach to action, beginning first among the Czechs, Poles, and other Slavs, and then spreading throughout the Triune Kingdom, including among the Serbs in southern Hungary. He asserted that the Slavs in the Austrian part of the Monarchy must first defeat German centralism to mobilize other nations. He reasoned that if centralism in Austria could be broken and the Hungarians lost their support from the Germans, they might become more open to the demands for autonomy from the various groups in Hungary—"though it might be too late".²⁵ Miletić called for solidarity among the Slavs in the Monarchy, asserting that the isolated reactions of individual nation could not lead to a revision of the decisions made in 1867. He hoped that a joint political struggle would bring concrete results, which would mean

²⁵ Zastava, Nr. 14, February 15 1867.

In 1861, the Croatian Sabor enacted Article XLII of Law, which obligated Franz Joseph to acknowledge all territories that Croatia historically claimed rights to. These autonomous regions included not only Dalmatia and Slavonia but also part of Bosnia, extending up to the Vrbas River. Additionally, relations with Hungary were to be governed by the principle of a real union. This law laid the foundation for the Croatian national movement. Mikavica, Lemajić, Vasin, Ninković 2016b: 139; Ekmečić 2021: 263; Vasin 2015: 144-145. In 1868, Hungary reached Compromise with Croatia. As part of this agreement, the Croatian Sabor was allowed to send 40 delegates to the Diet, and the Croatian language was recognized as an official language in Croatia and Slavonia for use in the legislature, judiciary, and administration. This granted Croatia and Slavonia the status of a political nation, along with a separate territory and recognized autonomy. Joint responsibilities included finance, railways, and the economy, while Home Guard units were also permitted to use the Croatian language. However, control over finances remained largely in the hands of Pest until the end of the Monarchy. Ultimately, an inseparable state union was established only between Vienna and Pest. Ekmečić 2021: 271; Gross 2000: 2295-2296.

greater integration of the Serbs into Austria-Hungary. However, the elites in Vienna and Pest viewed this call for unity as a potential danger of Pan-Slavism that could threaten the integrity of the Monarchy.

In the article titled "Slavs in Austria" published on February 7, the *Neue Freie Presse* also discussed Budapest's policy toward the Slavs in Hungary. It noted, "The Slavic peasant has never had a sense of politics. He still does not. However, the terrorism of a few national agitators has gained a wider audience. This terrorism would not have been so successful if these agitators were not from the nobility and clergy of the Slavic nations. Everything that Slavism has achieved so far in Austria is a consequence of these two factors, which have always strived for greater political influence—something the Germans will never be able to admit. In Hungary, we see that the authorities in Pest do not care about the opinions of the Croatian deputies. They disregard the resistance of the Romanians, who hide behind their rights to Transylvania, similarly to the Czechs in Bohemia and the Slovenes in Carniola. The gentlemen in Pest have clearly determined their path and are sticking to it firmly. No Slavic element can divert them from it. Are we Germans, on this side of the Leitha River, worse than the Hungarians on the other side? Is it possible that eight million Germans have fewer capacities and qualifications than four million Hungarians? Therefore, we must set aside political comfort and seriously engage in politics. We demand that the government formed by the Germans should serve our interests, and that an experiment aiming to fulfill everyone's interests should not be allowed. This is what the Hungarians on the other side of the Leitha did".²⁶ The Viennese political public believed

²⁶ NFP, Nr. 876, 7. Februar 1867.

that the Settlement with the Hungarians had already sufficiently damaged their interests and position within the Monarchy. For this reason, they argued that granting similar concessions to the peoples in the Austrian part would only lead to a further deterioration of the German position. The elites of the Slavs, on one hand, and the Germans and Hungarians, on the other, held diametrically opposed views on the issue of dualism, which is evident in the opinions expressed in the press.

The Settlement with Vienna allowed the Hungarian elites to achieve most of the goals of the Revolution of 1848/49, except for *de facto* independence. Franz Joseph, who opposed the parliamentary system and viewed absolutism as an acceptable form of government, nevertheless elevated the prestige and status of his dynasty into Dualism in the following decades. This resulted in the creation of two equal sovereign halves, known as the "k. u. k. Monarchie" (kaiserliche und königliche), each with its own separate citizenship. This was the first occurrence of such a system in the world. Hungary gained more than just internal independence, and its status was different from that of federal states in the USA.²⁷ The emperor retained broader rights than those originally determined by the revolutionary laws. While Hungarians achieved internal independence, their governments were not responsible to the Austrian parliament, but to the emperor personally. Through modern parliamentarism, society and the economy did develop, and Hungary maintained its status as a great power, which position the Hungarians now shared with Vienna.

²⁷ Judson 2016: 265, 268; Wheatly 2023: 56-57; Gyani 2022: 138; Deak 2009: 577; Balint 2021: 130; Vocolka 2015: 226. Vienna maintained its reputation as a cultural capital, particularly at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Sabotič 2013: 162. See: Connelly 2023: 11.

Until the end of the Monarchy's existence, Dualism served as the political and legal framework for the national activities of all its peoples. Even those who were excluded from this system were compelled to adapt to the new circumstances. While the Hungarians were generally satisfied with what had been achieved, the question of revising the Settlement of 1867 arose at the beginning of the 20th century. This primarily concerned the military prerogatives of the Hungarian Parliament and the Emperor. The demand for a separate national Hungarian army was the only significant crisis in relations between Vienna and Budapest from 1867 to 1914. Even regarding the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two regions came to a mutual agreement, placing these territories under the administration of a joint Ministry of Finance.

According to the Defense law of 1868 (amended in 1889), the Hungarian government established the quota for military conscripts for the Hungarian part of the Monarchy. As the positive natural increase since 1867 rose, the need for new defense laws became essential. Military authorities requested that Budapest expand the quotas for compulsory military service. According to the 1900 census, 51.4% of Hungarians lived in Hungary (excluding Croatia and Slavonia). These demographic figures, along with the political position of the Hungarians, enabled them to demand political concessions from Vienna. The crisis began to develop when Kálmán Széll of the Liberal Party became Prime Minister from 1899 to 1903. The political parties split into three groups: the liberals led by Kálmán Tisza and his son István Tisza, the National Party of Count Albert

Aponyi (which attracted voters among businessmen), and a group of aristocrats gathered around Count Gyula Andrásy the Younger. In November 1902, Széll tried to pass two new defense laws through parliament, which concerned increasing the number of conscripts for the joint army and the Hungarian Honvéd by 22,000 men. However, the opposition, led by the Independence and Forty-eighters Party under Ferenc Kossuth (the son of Lajos Kossuth), demanded that concrete political gains be secured from the Emperor. They insisted that the command language in the joint army in Hungary be changed to Hungarian—implying the use of about 70 command words—and that all regiments stationed in that part of the Monarchy specifically use that language. This was a clear demand for an independent Hungarian army, and Vienna had no intention of acquiescing to this request. As the 20th century approached, this party entered a weakened state without a concrete program. This situation did not improve even when Aponyi decided to merge his party with the Independence Party in 1905, hoping that his reputation and the support from voters of the former National Party would lead to success for this new alignment. By doing so, he aimed to ensure victory in the elections and to form a government.²⁸ It became clear that each party was trying to secure the best possible political position out of this crisis, which is why the parties were regrouping.

²⁸ Kann 1974: 423, 455; Rumpler, Seger 2010: 66; Gottas 2006: 1157-1158; Boyer 2022: 342; Katus 2008: 408-410; Laszlo 2012: 374-375.

In the early 20th century, the public in Austria-Hungary held a strong anti-militaristic sentiment. This attitude was especially noticeable in the Hungarian part of the Monarchy. Many Hungarians believed that the army lacked a national character and instead viewed it as a common institution controlled by Vienna, specifically by Franz Joseph. Tibor 2012: 27.

Between 1902 and 1904, the Austrian Prime Minister Ernest von Koerber (1900-1904) attempted to address the Czech question alongside other issues. In early 1903, he successfully convinced the major political parties of the necessity of implementing defense laws. Still, for these laws to be adopted, Budapest needed to approve them simultaneously. Since Hungarian Prime Minister Széll could not pass these laws due to opposition resistance, Vienna decided to dismiss him. This decision was made by Emperor Franz Joseph and Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who then entrusted the formation of the government to István Tisza. Tisza clumsily declared that he was even willing to use the army to restore order in Parliament. Therefore, no party wanted to enter into a coalition with Tisza, so in June, the mandate to form a government was handed over to Khuen Hederváry, the former Ban of Croatia. Hederváry managed to hold his position briefly, until August of the same year, but failed to secure support for two defense bills. The Emperor then decided that Hederváry should withdraw these bills from parliamentary sessions without first consulting Koerber. The prime minister protested and demanded that the Austrian government should also be consulted on matters concerning the army. As a result, the Hungarian question remained unresolved. The crisis deepened when the Emperor delivered a speech in Chłopy, Galicia, during military maneuvers, in which he emphasized that "the army is common and united and will remain so." This statement incited outrage in Budapest, leading to Hederváry's resignation.²⁹

²⁹ Boyer 2022: 342; Judson 2016: 405; Kann 1974: 424; Laszlo 2012: 375-376; Katus 2008: 410; Vocolka 2015: 328.

Franz Joseph and his advisors once again turned to István Tisza, who would lead the government for the first time from 1903 to 1905. Tisza believed that Dualism was the foundation of Hungary's security, and he was worried that Vienna, as it had done many times throughout history, might turn the nationalities against the Hungarians once again. He began to forcefully enforce military laws in parliament, which caused the opposition to regroup against him. Kossuth's Independence Party was joined by Andrásy's liberals, the Catholic People's Party, and the newly founded New Party, led by former Prime Minister Dezső Bánffy. In response to Tisza's policies, opposition representatives vandalized the new parliament building in Budapest during one of its sessions in early 1905, tearing down new installations. The parliament was dissolved in January 1905, and Tisza suffered a crushing defeat in the elections. The Independence Party emerged victorious, securing a majority of seats in parliament.³⁰ Tisza's departure also marked the end of the thirty-year dominance of the Liberal Party, which withdrew and awaited the support of the Crown and more favorable political circumstances to return to power.

In Austria, Koerber was succeeded by Paul von Gautsch (1904–1906), who needed to address the issue of electoral reform. However, during 1905, the Viennese public was more interested in events occurring in Hungary. Franz Joseph attempted to resolve the parliamentary crisis by offering the Independence Party a government role on the condition that they accept Dualism, which would involve joint command of the army. This proposal meant the Party would have to abandon its earlier demands. Since the opposition refused to comply, the Emperor decided to appoint

³⁰ Kann 1974: 455–456; Katus 2008: 410–411;

former Minister of Defense Géza Fejérváry as the head of a civilian government in Hungary on June 18, 1905 (to the satisfaction of Franz Ferdinand). This unilateral action faced opposition from both the Independence Party and the liberals, resulting in large protests in Budapest and other cities. At the same time, in Vienna, the Social Democrats were demanding universal suffrage, leading to a political crisis in both parts of the Monarchy during 1905 and 1906. The Hungarians had alienated many in Vienna due to the Settlement, and at the start of the 20th century, it seemed they had even more enemies—particularly among certain aristocrats, politicians, and military figures gathered around Franz Ferdinand. Opponents of Dualism wanted the Germans to regain full control in the Monarchy, excluding the Hungarians, and they were waiting for Franz Joseph to die to push their agenda.³¹ The events in Budapest were characterized by the Viennese press as a forced procedure, while the Pest newspapers believed that Fejérváry would not be able to maintain his position for too long.

³¹ Vocolka 2015: 326-327; Kann 1974: 424; Boyer 2022: 358; Katus 2008: 411-412.

The circle surrounding Franz Ferdinand included German aristocrats from the Bohemia, such as the Ottokar Czernin, as well as influential figures like Karl Lueger, president of the anti-Semitic Christian Social Party and the Mayor of Vienna. In a wider circle, there were also individuals like Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of General Staff, Max Wladimir von Beck, Prime Minister of the Austrian government and Alois von Aehrenthal, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Annexation crisis. However, the heir to the throne had a complicated relationship with them, as their appointments were directly accountable to Franz Joseph, rather than to him personally. While Franz Ferdinand was publicly seen as a supporter of the idea of a trialistic restructuring of the Monarchy, it was commonly known that he privately held entirely opposite views. Dedijer 2014: 165, 189, 201, 253.

The Austrian liberals lost much of their previous influence in Vienna but retained it in other provinces. Judson 2001: 57, 58, 75, 76.

See: Boyer 1995; Boyer 1998; Boyer 2010: 249.

The *Neue Freie Presse* reports on the situation in Hungary in the article titled "Imperial Decision on the Hungarian Crisis." "The Emperor sent an address to Hungarian Prime Minister Baron Fejérváry, which serves as a manifesto to the Hungarian nation, defining the Crown's position in relation to the demands of the majority opposition coalition. This address not only outlines the program of the new government but also defines the policy of the Crown along with the personal rights and obligations of the Emperor in a serious format. It is uncommon for the Emperor to publicly justify the appointment of a government and to explain its tasks and limitations in such a manner. This approach was chosen because the Emperor aimed to inform the entire Hungarian public, not just the opposition coalition, about the motives that compelled the Crown to appoint a ministry independent of the Hungarian parties. Both the form and content of this address are significant. If the Hungarians are seeking a means to achieve agreement, they will likely find it there. This indicates that the Crown has made—and will continue to make—efforts to circumvent conflict. The Crown holds that the new government must be composed primarily of deputies from the Hungarian Parliament. Yet, the force of circumstances has led to the abandonment of principles that are typically followed in the formation of new governments. The address emphasizes that the majority coalition has not proposed a government to which the Crown could entrust Hungary with a clear conscience. The reasons for the disagreement are openly discussed in the Emperor's letter. The Crown believes that military demands are necessary. Without them, military readiness—essential for both parts of the state—could be compromised".³²

³² NFP, Nr. 14662, 19. Juni 1905.

Gautsch's government is not mentioned in this context because the army was under the direct authority of Franz Joseph and was therefore responsible to him.

The address was carefully composed, emphasizing the unity of the army and the necessity of maintaining this unity. It is mentioned that this is "important for both parts of the state," with Austria referenced only in this context. It is evident that at no point does the address attempt to question Hungarian constitutional sovereignty. "Even more significant is the goal that Franz Joseph set for the new government. The Fejérváry ministry is tasked with resolving all outstanding issues on behalf of the Emperor. His election illustrates the ruler's readiness to ensure the military security of the Monarchy, as far as his rights allow. Anyone reading the manifesto could maliciously conclude that the Emperor sought to oppose existing laws and appoint a ministry outside the established party system. Therefore, Fejérváry must prioritize administrative and national politics. His only task is to secure a majority for his ministry. If the parliament acknowledges the rights of the Crown, it can certainly help spare Hungary from political violence and future uncertainties. There is a justified fear that future events will not be influenced by the carefully chosen words in the address but will instead be driven by various agitations pushing the country in a dangerous direction. The opposition in parliament will likely seek to prevent the convening of this ministry, arguing that it is imposed and illegal. However, it is encouraging that the crown has approached this issue in a conciliatory manner, and we hope that politicians in Hungary will remember this.³³ It is noticeable that there is no expressed fear about the situation in Budapest

³³ *Ibid.*

throughout the sentences of this Viennese newspaper, and on a couple of occasions, they even openly threatened the Hungarians. Vienna has started to use both constitutional and unconstitutional measures, and the effects of this will become evident in the coming years.

Pester Lloyd, on the other hand, states, "The conflict between the Crown and the representatives of the parliamentary majority was brought to the forefront this morning by the royal rescript addressed to Baron Fejérváry. The ruler himself confirmed this through his actions. It is important to reassure everyone that the story about the king refusing to form a cabinet from a party coalition is not true. On the contrary, His Majesty expresses his belief that organizing a government outside the party system will enable representatives of the opposition, the majority, to join it. At the same time, the King draws attention to the fact that the conflict does not only concern military issues but also internal reforms and economic problems. "I will be ready to accept all solutions in the field of administrative reforms and the national economy that the representatives of parliament will submit to me". However, it is precisely on the basis of this statement that it is clear that the conflict is limited exclusively to military issues. We would like to think that we misunderstood that part of the rescript. The government had already drawn up declarations on the disputed laws in 1903, not on its own initiative, but in agreement with the Crown. Therefore, it is impossible for their implementation to bypass these earlier declarations. If they were to be set aside, it would be worse than opportunistic politics. It would be a mistake and a crime. Consequently, the Party leaders should stick to this issue and not open new problems. However, the critical question of the command language in the army

remains unresolved, and therefore the crisis continues".³⁴ This communicated once again that the Hungarians would resolve the crisis, that is accept the defense laws, if their request for an independent Hungarian army was fulfilled first.

"The appointment of Fejérváry's cabinet cannot be a solution to the crisis. However, the rescript does have a calming effect. It should not be equated with the Tatar invasion, and Baron Fejérváry should not be compared to Genghis Khan. Such comparisons would be ridiculous. Fejérváry, who has faithfully served his fatherland for many years, cannot be expected to propose unconstitutional solutions. We recognize his merits, and he will always be respected for them. Likewise, his colleagues, who have already proven themselves to be capable and talented experts, cannot be expected to burn the constitution or demolish the parliament building. It is now clear that this ministry will not have a military character, and the rescript directs Fejérváry to find a way to reconcile with the coalition. Of course, it remains an open question whether Baron possesses the necessary diplomatic qualities to achieve this. Whether he will manage to accomplish something significant, especially since he seems abandoned by the whole world and lacks the support of any party, remains to be seen. Now, the coalition leaders must take the initiative. The King's call should only support them in such a decision. Let us work towards finding a compromise that aligns with public opinion's hopes. We will not open the door to anarchy".³⁵ *Pester Lloyd* concluded the text with a conciliatory note.

³⁴ PL, Nr. 154, 20. Juni 1905.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

The Hungarians began their resistance by refusing to pay taxes and avoiding conscription for military service. Meanwhile, rumors circulated in Vienna, particularly in the circle around Archduke Ferdinand, regarding a potential military intervention in Hungary. Despite this, the Emperor accepted Fejérváry's plan for electoral reform, which aimed to expand voting rights and introduce social reforms. These seemingly positive measures from the Fejérváry's government, however, were directed against the Hungarian parties and the political influence of the Hungarian aristocracy. Expanding voting franchise threatened to undermine their position relative to the nationalists and socialists. The crisis was ultimately resolved in April 1906 when Ferenc Kossuth and his coalition partners chose to abandon their demands concerning the army and voted in favor of a new budget. A government was then formed under Sándor Wekerle (1906-1910), based on the terms defined by the Settlement of 1867. In this instance, Franz Joseph and the Dualism triumphed over the Hungarians. The agreement reached in April had more the character of a truce than a final solution to the crisis. Wekerle did not decide to vote for the defense laws, nor did parliament reject the demand for the use of the Hungarian language in the army. This situation resulted in a stalemate that lasted several years, but it was clear that the Hungarian elites had been reinstated within the framework of the constitution. By the beginning of the 20th century, it became evident that the development of democratic institutions, which had been initiated in 1867, was not fully realized. This shortfall led to the weakening of both the parliament and the Monarchy itself.³⁶ Ferenc

³⁶ Boyer 2022: 364; Katus 2008: 412, 413, 416; Kann 1974: 456-457; Laszlo 2000: 528; Vöcelka 2015: 327.

Kossuth lost his political significance, and the Hungarian elites turned once again to Dualism to protect their political rights. Given that the aristocracy still played a significant political and social role, a broader electoral reform could not be tolerated.

Following the *Ausgleich*, in which the conservatives played a minor role, the high nobility began to regain importance under Kálmán Tisza. By 1887, 69 representatives of the aristocracy had been elected to the Upper House of the Diet, making up 14% of the total representatives. Due to their high status, they also held significant positions within the political hierarchy. Between 1867 and 1918, of the sixteen Hungarian prime ministers appointed by Emperors Franz Joseph and Charles, ten were aristocrats and four belonged to the lower nobility (gentry). The remaining two, László Lukács and Sándor Wekerle, had connections to nobility. Lukács came from a family that controlled several mines and had received noble status from Maria Theresa, while Wekerle was married to a noblewoman. Wekerle formed his first government in 1892, having utilized his family connections to lead a club of influential aristocrats. However, the Hungarian gentry, along with the Polish gentry, were among the poorest in Europe unless they had ties to the aristocracy. Many were involved in business, particularly in banking and industry, where they held key positions. During Franz Joseph's reign, the number of aristocrats increased, and access to noble titles was also extended to Jews, allowing them to gain the right to vote in parliament. Moreover, the aristocracy controlled a quarter of all property in Hungary, which contributed to their lack of interest in broad social reforms. Their resistance was particularly strong after 1907, when electoral reform in the Austrian part of the Monarchy

weakened position of aristocracy. The curial voting system, which guaranteed aristocratic privileges, was abolished in favor of universal male suffrage. Although they lost some influence, aristocrats still retained a level of authority in crown diets and municipalities. The reform enabled the Social Democrats to become the largest party in parliament during the elections in May of that year, securing over a million votes and winning 87 seats out of 516 in the legislature.³⁷

The Hungarian political elite, despite their differing views, were united against the Social Democrat's success in the Reichsrat and opposed any similar electoral reform in Hungary. When considering the issue of nationalities, it becomes clear why discussions about universal suffrage were not possible. Vienna recognized this challenge and decided to use it as a means of pressure in 1906.

The crisis that began in 1903 was partially resolved by 1913. By 1910, István Tisza's liberals had regained a majority in parliament, and he united them into a new party called the National Party of Work. He chose this name because he recognized that the liberals had lost some of their popular support over the previous decade. However, parliament was still reluctant to nominate Tisza as prime minister. This led to a brief period during which the government was formed by Khuen Hederváry (1910-1912) for a second time, followed by László Lukács (1912-1913). They,

³⁷ Harmat 2010: 1071, 1072, 1074, 1075; Tibor 2012: 41, 43; Judson 2016: 375-376; Judson 2006: 12; Boyer 2022: 368.

Universal male suffrage was introduced by the 1896 reform, but the curial system was not abolished at that time. It was only abolished with the reform of 1907. Even then, full equality in elections was not achieved. The national conflict within the Austrian part of the Monarchy persisted, although the reforms did help alleviate some national tensions during the last decade of Austria-Hungary's existence. However, certain exaggerated expectations for national consensus were not realized. Malfer 2000: 51-52.

along with Sándor Wekerle, dealt with the consequences of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 and the accusations stemming from the staged Agram Trial against the Serbs in Zagreb. In May 1911, the defense laws were again presented to parliament, and this time the Emperor threatened to abdicate if they were not accepted. The prospect of Franz Ferdinand ascending to the throne led many Hungarians to abandon their resistance. In April 1912, Khuen resigned, and the Emperor appointed László Lukács—who was popular in the National Party of Work — as the new prime minister. However, his tenure was short-lived, lasting only until June 1913. Schönbrunn then turned to Tisza, who became Hungary's last peacetime prime minister in the Monarchy. Initially, Tisza had failed to push the defense laws through parliament, but in June 1912 he succeeded. This time, he faced no significant opposition, which strengthened his position and ultimately led to him becoming prime minister the following year. However, by the onset of World War I, the political crisis in Hungary had not been fully resolved. This issue only became secondary due to the newly emerging circumstances.³⁸

³⁸ Kann 1974: 457-458; Laszlo 2000: 411, 412, 528; Vocolka 2015: 327. The Agram Trial sought to dismantle the Croat-Serb Coalition. In 1905, the Croats supported the Hungarian opposition in its struggle against Vienna through the Rijeka Resolution, which was contingent on Croatia being granted greater autonomy and the unification of Dalmatia with Croatia. The Serbs backed the Croats in this initiative with the Zadar Resolution. However, when it became clear that the Hungarians would not succeed in obtaining concessions from Vienna, political attitudes in Budapest began to shift away from the Coalition's demands. Following the proclamation of annexation, the relationship between the Serbs and Croats, on one side, and the Hungarians on the other, started to deteriorate. This tension escalated when prominent members of the Croat-Serb Coalition were arrested. In 1909, political prisoners were put on trial, known as Agram and Friedjung Trials, which aimed to discredit the key figures of the Coalition and expose their connections with Serbia. The Hungarians sought to demonstrate that the Coalition was involved in promoting Serbian nationalism, thereby justifying the annexation. Ultimately, Trials did not achieve their intended outcome and concluded in 1911 without a verdict. In contrast to the Pig War, the

Ballhausplatz urged the Hungarians to accept these laws, not only to ensure that the Monarchy could compete with other great powers in terms of military strength but also because they recognized the escalating tensions in the Balkans. By the time Tisza became Prime Minister, the Balkan Wars had concluded successfully, with the Kingdom of Serbia emerging victorious. As conflict between Vienna and Belgrade became increasingly inevitable, Hungarians realized it was in their best interest to accept these laws.

In 1911, Karl Stürgkh became the new Prime Minister of Austria. In June 1912, he passed a military law in the Reichsrat, while simultaneously, Tisza enacted a similar law in Budapest. This legislation reduced military service from three years to two, but increased the recruitment quotas from 139,000 to 181,000 conscripts. By adopting these laws, both parliaments relinquished control over conscription for twelve years, transferring authority to the military.³⁹ Following this, the elites in Vienna and Budapest claimed that they had overcome the crisis and preserved internal stability, indicating that the 1867 settlement had withstood this challenge. Tisza expressed this conclusion in his speech upon taking office, a point also highlighted by the *Neue Freie Presse*. On June 12, 1913, the newspaper published an article titled "Tisza's Speech," which quoted the newly elected Prime Minister's remarks delivered in parliament that same day. He emphasized that the strength of the Hungarian people was closely tied to the Monarchy and its status as a great power. Tisza stated, "We should not

annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina received support from nearly the entire Hungarian political establishment. Ekmečić 2021: 724, 725, 758, 759; Mikavica, Lemajić, Vasin, Ninković 2016b: 422-423; Tibor 2012: 137, 138, 143; Djordjević 2017: 331-332.

³⁹ Boyer 2022: 384, 387.

view the events on our borders with pessimism," referring to the Balkan Wars. He warned that the fate of the Hungarian nation would be bleak if they could not harmonize their interests with the evolving situation. Tisza expressed his conviction that the Hungarians and the Monarchy would shine with new brilliance if they relied on their political maturity and moral readiness. "The balance of power in Europe depends on us and on whether our actions will destroy or enhance that balance. Above all, we must maintain the stability of the Monarchy," he concluded.⁴⁰

Pester Lloyd pointed out that Tisza had emphasized the need to uphold the policies established by the old constitution. "Didn't the Settlement of 1867 determine this course?" he asked. The National fully supports this constitutional foundation. In his speech, he praised the political work of Ferenc Deák, which has proven brilliant time and again, and each new day confirms the excellence of his political genius.⁴¹ The speech suggested that the political situation in Hungary had stabilized and that the activities of the parties were returning to the traditional approaches defined by the constitution.

The 1867 Settlement, which aimed to resolve the crisis in relations between Vienna and Budapest, established a system that was both innovative and unstable. Following the *Ausgleich*, it became evident to many politicians, not only in Vienna and Budapest, but also among leaders

⁴⁰ NFP, Nr. 17529, 13. Juni 1913.

⁴¹ PL, Nr. 133, 12. Juni 1913.

of nationalities, including Svetozar Miletić, that Austria-Hungary's foreign policy was largely influenced by its internal political dynamics and national relations.

The Monarchy failed to adjust its political system in a way that would have allowed other ethnic groups to emancipate themselves, missing an opportunity to integrate them into the state and its institutions. This was precisely where the initiative of the Viennese and Pest elites to guide the national movements and promote loyalty was lost. The Dualism established was not even a compromise, particularly considering that around 3 million Slavs lived in Hungary alone. In 1900, Germans made up 35.8% of the population in the Austrian region, while Hungarians, including those in Croatia and Slavonia, comprised 45.4% in the Hungarian part of the Monarchy. An agreement between the Germans and Hungarians led to a resolution that favored centralism through the dynasty and common affairs, but this arrangement excluded other ethnic groups.⁴²

A middle-ground solution was reached regarding the nationalities in Hungary, which stipulated that their status as full citizens would be legally resolved within the framework of the Hungarian constitution and its institutions. As a result, the calls for federalization and autonomous territories were abandoned, and the non-Hungarian peoples did not achieve their goals from the period of the Revolution. Vienna attempted to maintain its previous role as a mediator among the nations of the Monarchy during the era of neo-absolutism, particularly through the adoption of the October Diploma and the February Patent. The ruling dynasty hoped to continue serving as a supranational element, believing this would partially satisfy the

⁴² Kann 1974: 323, 445; Rumpler, Seger 2010: 62, 66;

nationalities. However, they no longer had the strength to adopt such an approach or to exert pressure on the increasingly powerful national movements, such as the Hungarian movement. Consequently, Vienna agreed to grant the Hungarians internal autonomy while the dynasty would act as the guarantor of the new constitution and order. This Settlement aimed to preserve Austria's status as a great power and uphold the privileges of the Germans in the Austrian part of the Monarchy. Nevertheless, the subsequent crisis of Dualism, combined with the Hungarian government's attempts to exert stronger control over the national movements and the serious internal crises among non-Hungarian peoples, meant that the national question was never actually resolved, nor was a clear framework for its integration established. The fact that the Viennese elites were no longer dictating political solutions, and that the programs from the Revolutions of 1848/49 were disregarded, was noted by Miletić. Consequently, he hoped in the early 1860s for a favorable resolution to the Serbian question through an agreement with the Hungarians.

In the following decades, Vienna focused heavily on foreign policy, recognizing that the security of Austria-Hungary was intertwined with the balance of power in Europe and the concept of Dualism. Critics of certain aspects of Dualism within the Viennese political landscape acknowledged that alternative solutions for the Monarchy's security, particularly concerning the Germans and Hungarians, posed significant risks. All political groups, including liberals, conservatives, and social democrats, were able to present their programs and conduct political campaigns within the framework of Dualism. This was especially true for social democrats after the electoral reform of 1907 was implemented. Still, for the various

nationalities within the Austrian part of the Monarchy, this reform was only a partial measure, and the Reichsrat continued to serve as the primary platform for their political efforts. The Viennese press, parliamentary debates, and public opinion highlighted the ongoing contradictions between the principles of Dualism and the issue of nationalities. These contradictions remained unresolved until the collapse of the Monarchy in 1918. While many nationalities benefitted from the economic growth fostered by Dualism, the national question often simmered beneath the surface or was openly debated, particularly in the relationships between Germans, Czechs, and Hungarians.

More broadly, the Slavs of the Monarchy were also partly guided by pan-Slavic ideas. František Palacký believed that the turn towards Dualism also represented the strengthening of pan-Slavism, for the first time since 1848. He considered, using the example of the Czechs, that they were too weak to have their own independent state and that Czech sovereignty was actually guaranteed by their position in Austria-Hungary, but that their historical distinctiveness must be guaranteed by the principles of autonomy and equality. Otherwise, he noted that the Slavs had lived and acted in these areas long before the Monarchy, and that they would continue to exist there if it one day disappeared. The fear of the leading circles of Austria-Hungary was that the driving force of this movement would be Russia. However, even in Petrograd there was often apathy towards Slavic movements within the Monarchy, some of whom feared that Austrian rule would be replaced by Russian autocracy. The military authorities, on the other hand, believed that the state could only be protected by a victorious war against Russia and the Kingdom of Serbia and weren't so concerned with the relationship

between Slavs in Austria-Hungary.⁴³ In fact, the First World War would show where some were wrong and where others were not. The Slavic nations would still get an alternative, but the Monarchy would not.

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⁴³ Wheatley 2023: 68; Kohn 1960: 187, 242, 243, 250, 251; Boyer 2022: 390-391; Judson 2016: 432; Tibor 2012: 27.

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SVETOZAR MILETIĆ, THE SERBIAN QUESTION AND POLITICS IN 1868.

At the Hungarian Diet in early 1868, an important debate for the Serbs was underway concerning the Law on Religious Confessions and Church-School Autonomy. The issue of Serbian-Romanian relations was also raised, which was significant both in church and political terms. Miletić had for years advocated for a compromise, believing that political support from the Romanians would benefit the Serbs more than the complications surrounding the church issue, which had essentially been resolved through division. A request was submitted to the Diet to legalize the decisions of the Church-People's Assembly from 1865 and to adopt a proposal for division with the Romanians based on the Serbian memorandum. There was another attempt to reopen the issue of the decisions made at the Blagoveštenski (Annunciation) Assembly. Serbian liberals were particularly disturbed by the change in wording in the assembly's conclusions — instead of "Serbian Metropolis," the term "Greek-Oriental" was used.

On April 9, 1868, Serbian delegates Branovački, Čarnojević, Miletić, Mandić, Milutinović, Trifunac, and Dimitrijević discussed the assembly's ideas and the proposal of the Hungarian Diet's Committee for the legal framework of this matter. The Serbian deputies believed that the Ministry's position — that the 1864–1865 Assembly had been convened

based on Article 20 of the 1847/1848 law and was thus legitimized — could not be accepted, because the Hungarian Diet had no authority to legalize the Assembly, as it had never been unlawful to begin with. They demanded that the sentence stating that the Romanian Metropolis was equal to the Serbian one be omitted, since the ruler had defined it as being subordinate to the Serbian one. The Serbian deputies insisted that relations be resolved based on the Privileges and partially the Laws of 1790/1791, not on the laws of 1848. They particularly emphasized that the Serbian Church-People's Assembly was not defined by the 1848 laws, but had the right to its own organization, guaranteed by the aforementioned laws and Privileges.

The Serbian deputies especially opposed the Committee's position that the legal foundation of autonomy lay in the law passed in 1848. A dangerous distortion of the facts was precisely the idea that new laws and drafts should be based on 1848, because this would discredit a significant part of Serbian historical rights within the Monarchy. A particularly problematic clause in the Committee's proposal was to divide the Assembly into two parts — Serbian and Romanian — based on the 1848 law, since the Romanians had never had their own Assembly, but had instead been elected as delegates to the Serbian one.

Svetozar Miletić emphasized that resolving the issue of the Metropolis was particularly important for strengthening the position of the Serbs as a people within the Monarchy as a whole. The Serbs had not inherited the Church from the Greeks — it was a Serbian and national Church, Miletić argued. A particularly problematic aspect was that the legal proposal made no mention of the Metropolis in the Triune Kingdom (Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia), where a large part of its property, faithful, and

dioceses were located. Miletić stressed that the Hungarian Diet of 1848 had not created Serbian autonomy, and that the Serbs had been present in Hungary as a people long before. Regarding the Romanians, he sought reconciliation and unity with them, but based on mutual political respect — not one-sided Serbian concessions, whether in politics or in all aspects of church law. The Romanian side's refusal to compromise on the Metropolis issue only further complicated cooperation, especially with the upcoming Law on Nationalities soon to enter the legislative process.

Miletić's idea of unified cooperation between Romanians, Serbs, and Slovaks in all areas — which was in many ways rational — bore fruit only much later. The parliamentary debate on this legislative proposal began on April 25 / May 7, 1868. Baron József Eötvös, in his speech, stated that the state was obliged to grant independence to the Romanian Metropolis and remove it from its subordinate relationship to the Serbian Metropolis. The only principle the Hungarian Diet would follow, Eötvös concluded, was respect for the law and the state — a position that Serbian liberals perceived as somewhat ironic.

To the Serbian deputies, such a statement must have sounded rather cynical, given the decade of fruitless negotiations with Eötvös regarding the resolution of the nationality question. The part about the Romanians being "subordinated" was especially problematic and concerning for the Serbian elites in the Habsburg lands. The Hungarian elite, on the other hand, simply took advantage of the opportunity presented by the Compromise (*Ausgleich*) to address internal matters from the perspective of state interests — and there was no doubt that such an agenda would be strongly pursued in the early years after the Compromise. The underlying reality,

however, was quite different. Emboldened by the Compromise, politicians in Pest, full of confidence, began to tackle the national question actively — and at times aggressively — though, as time would show, with limited results. The constant warnings and writings about Magyarization that Miletić had long advocated began to have an effect: resistance to learning Hungarian or accepting the idea of a "Hungarian political nation" progressed slowly. This is evident in the fact that the Apponyi Law wasn't passed until 1907, and by the mid-1890s, only a small percentage of Serbian teachers knew Hungarian.

Therefore, pressure on Serbian institutions — frequently mentioned in relation to the Gymnasium, Matica Srpska, and others — was constant, but also had limited impact. With the Compromise, Vienna skillfully delegated many of the internal problems of the Hungarian part of the Monarchy to the Diet in Pest. Agrarian issues, internal struggles among the Hungarian elite over their costly expansionist ideas, infrastructure development, railway construction, the urbanization of Pest, and incomplete industrialization were just some of the issues that would take decades to address. As a result, the nationality question was increasingly used to manage social issues and relationships — both in Hungary and in Serbian communities. On the local and identity level, mutual influences turned out to be strong, but in cases of intolerance, the reactions were just as intense. Therefore, the issue of national expansion proved extremely difficult to resolve, as did the issue of integration — challenges that Serbia itself faced in 1878, 1912, and 1918. The burden of problems inherited from earlier decades heavily fell upon both Serbs and Hungarians during the critical years of 1914 and 1918, and again in 1941 and 1945. In many ways, the

roots of these issues can be traced back to the events of 1848 — and especially to the era of Miletić.

The Hungarian Diet passed, by majority vote, a proposal that the Church-National Assembly (*Srpski crkveno-narodni sabor*) be officially referred to as “National,” and that the same designation be confirmed for the Orthodox Romanians, in accordance with the principle of religious equality. Ferenc Deák proposed that the Serbian-Romanian dispute be placed under the jurisdiction of the regular state court, in order to avoid prolonged legal battles and misunderstandings, arguing that the state court would rule according to the law, not personal preferences. This move was clearly directed at the Serbian Church-National Assembly, whose conclusions the government had refused to accept—particularly regarding church property, which was consequently delegated to the state courts. The situation was especially unfavorable for the Metropolitanate, as the internal affairs of the Autonomy were in disarray: disputes had lasted for decades, and the question of the monasteries remained unresolved. In such circumstances, state intervention was not only possible but also expected, eventually culminating in the abolition of the Autonomy in 1912. For this reason, Miletić opposed Deák’s proposal (even though it was adopted), as it ignored the decisions and legal rights of the Serbian Church-National Assembly.

A petition from the Orthodox Greeks was also read, demanding recognition of their right to religious confession and declaring that they did not wish to fall under the spiritual jurisdiction of either the Serbian or Romanian Metropolitanates. Despite Miletić’s opposition, the majority accepted this proposal. Such a position from the Greeks was not unexpected

and was partly connected to emerging ideas from Constantinople, later reflected in the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate and in several cases of overlapping Orthodox jurisdictions—issues that would culminate in proposals to create a Hungarian Orthodox Church in the mid-1920s and again during the Second World War.

The Upper House of the Hungarian Diet accepted the decision of the Lower House within a day, allowing the law to be quickly signed by Emperor Franz Joseph. The Serbian deputies were left with the impression that the Romanians had spoken about them with disrespect and mockery, and that the Ministry's insistence on resolving the dispute through state-appointed courts favored the Romanians. Miletic condemned this situation, aware that any future debate on the Law on Nationalities would require unity between the two nations, not division, disputes, or lawsuits. He was particularly disheartened by the Romanians' attitude toward the name of the Karlovci Metropolitanate and the Orthodox confession itself.

Kálmán Tisza, a Protestant, argued that such formalities in naming were of little importance, since the supreme authority in the country was the Diet, where religious confession played no role in electing representatives. Nevertheless, the proposal to legalize the title of the Serbian Patriarch was accepted. József Eötvös supported the Romanian request that their own assembly also be called "Church-National." The rights of the Orthodox Greeks in Hungary were defined as fully equal in religious terms to those of the Serbs and Romanians, regardless of their smaller numbers. Interestingly, the Metropolitan of Serbia, Mihailo, in a conversation with Austro-Hungarian consul Benjamin Kállay, stated that he believed the new

law would benefit the Romanians more, though he did not consider it a bad one.

In August 1868, Svetozar Miletić published an article criticizing the hypocrisy of the Hungarian elite, accusing it of publicly supporting the policies of the Principality of Serbia while covertly using the Belgrade government's stance as leverage to suppress the Serbs in Hungary and Croatia. In several of his writings, Miletić analyzed the developments in the Hungarian Diet within the broader context of the Serbian national question and the Eastern Question, both of increasing political urgency. He recognized that events were unfolding rapidly and that the assassination of Prince Mihailo had benefited those who opposed both the Principality of Serbia and the Serbs within the Monarchy. The political rapprochement between Ferenc Deák and Kálmán Tisza, which led to shifts in the political scene in Pest, was expected in Miletić's view, as it reflected the Hungarian state idea and internal political interests shaped by *realpolitik*. This was consistent with his earlier claim that the German-Hungarian alliance was inherently anti-Slavic and expansionist.

Miletić regarded the *Honvéd* issue as an internal matter of Hungary, but he had no doubt that Hungarian as the language of command, the Hungarian flag, and a Hungarian army would act in a unified national spirit—part of a broader agenda to assert the dominance of a single Hungarian national policy. According to him, this tendency was facilitated by disunity and internal divisions among the Serbs, as well as between Serbian and Croatian elites. He also considered the Principality of Serbia an inseparable factor in resolving these issues, particularly concerning the nationality question and the Eastern Question, which he viewed as

interconnected. Miletić did not conceal his belief that Hungarian influence in Belgrade was considerable and that it directly affected the internal position of the Triune Kingdom (Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia) and the status of Serbs in the Hungarian Diet. He denounced the conservative Belgrade newspaper *Vidovdan*, which wrote of “Hungarian-Serbian friendship” as nothing more than hollow phrases and journalistic flattery, claiming that such rhetoric was being made “over the ruins of the rights of Serbs on this side of the border.” Miletić maintained that while Hungarian political parties might differ in their positions toward Austria or in their foreign policy views, those differences disappeared when it came to preserving the unity of Hungary. In his view, despite nominal differences among Hungarian party platforms—regarding administration, bureaucracy, the county system, or attitudes toward Germans or Slovaks—all acted in unison on issues such as the events of 1848, the laws of 1848, and the nationality debates.

Miletić placed some hope in the Czechs and Poles to redefine Austro-Hungarian Dualism and establish a form of Trialism, an idea seriously discussed between 1868 and 1871. However, it proved impossible due to opposition from both the Viennese and Pest elites. Later, the idea of Trialism would reappear in various forms, gaining occasional political relevance. The concept of a third Slavic unit resurfaced briefly in the plans of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who emphasized the role of the Triune Kingdom, though the feasibility of this vision remains uncertain. It is still debated whether it was a genuine initiative or a tactical maneuver to pressure the Hungarians, particularly regarding the period between 1908 and 1914.

The assassination of Prince Mihailo Obrenović in Košutnjak on June 10, 1868, marked a turning point for the Serbian national movement on both sides of the Danube and Sava. Svetozar Miletić and members of the Omladina (Young Serbian movement) were broadly accused of having ties to supporters of the Karađorđević dynasty, believed to be behind the assassination. Austro-Hungarian police authorities launched an extensive investigation into any possible connection between Miletić and the crime, with a clear political aim of discrediting the liberal leader. For two months, police agents interrogated prominent members of Miletić's circle, attempting to uncover evidence linking him to the assassins, particularly Radovanović. Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov were placed under surveillance, arrested, and interrogated, but no evidence was ever found.

Miletić sought to clear his name through the press, declaring that he had no connection to the assassins and no knowledge of any plot against Prince Mihailo. He was accused of allegedly giving a speech in the "Bela Lada" tavern in February 1868, claiming that if the Serbs were united, they had nothing to fear from either the Germans or the Hungarians. On June 20, 1868, Miletić was suspended from his position as mayor of Novi Sad. He was accused of inciting the Serbs through the Omladina movement, which followed him unconditionally, of acting against the state, and of spreading anti-Hungarian sentiment among Serbs in Hungary and the Military Frontier. In a session of the Hungarian Diet, Miletić denied any involvement in the assassination and requested a formal interrogation to clear himself of suspicion. He also worked through Stojan Bošković to defend Vladimir Jovanović, arguing that the Hungarian investigation sought

not justice but a justification for political terror against the Serbs and a means of undermining relations between Belgrade and Novi Sad. He urged the Belgrade government to intervene for Jovanović's release. Confidential reports from the General Command in Zemun and letters from Consul Benjamin Kállay show that Austria-Hungary closely monitored events surrounding the assassination. General Wagner and later Kállay believed that the conspiracy was broader, led by the Karađorđevićs, supported by a faction of the Omladina, and aimed at overthrowing the Obrenović dynasty and creating a Greater Serbian state—an idea openly advocated by the Omladina.

Immediately after the assassination, Miletić published several articles in the newspaper *Zastava*, condemning the act as a vile and horrific crime against the Principality of Serbia. He rejected the accusations against the Omladina and the opposition, insisting it was unethical and dishonest to blame them for such an atrocity. He welcomed the election of Milan Obrenović as the new prince and recognized Jovan Ristić as the most capable and statesmanlike member of the Regency Council. The accusations in the Hungarian press, particularly those published in Pest, were seen as highly provocative and clearly intended as a warning to the Serbs on both sides of the Danube and Sava. The aim—to provoke political conflict between liberals in the Monarchy and those in the Principality of Serbia—was evident. Hungarian elites exploited the turmoil to further weaken the Serbs, and this became apparent soon after. The political blow to Miletić was swift and severe: he was removed from the mayoralty of Novi Sad on the basis of false accusations of incitement and inflammatory speeches, a pattern that would repeat in 1876. The plan to place the new

Serbian ruler or Regency under pressure, and eventually under political control, began to take shape rapidly. The internal instability in Serbia, long fueled by dynastic rivalries and political divisions, created a strategic opportunity for Consul Benjamin Kállay, who soon gained disproportionate influence in Belgrade—a factor that later recommended him for the highest office in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although he initially presented himself as a friend of the Serbs, the Serbian elite failed to grasp that “friendship” in the high politics of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as Kállay conceived it, was a privilege reserved for a select few—not for the periphery of the Empire or the Ottoman Balkans. Kállay’s diary, still a crucial historical source for this period, reveals that the Serbian elites were often ill-prepared to navigate the tactical maneuvering, political networks, and traps Kállay so skillfully employed. This was no longer the era of negotiating with local pashas or the Ottoman Porte: the growing interest of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in Serbia and the Serbian Question brought the ideas of the Ballhausplatz directly into Belgrade—with serious consequences for the Serbian cause wherever it was pursued.

Political relations between Miletić’s circle and the Government of the Principality of Serbia remained extremely tense. Svetozar Miletić openly attacked Hungarian policy toward the Serbs and toward the Principality of Serbia in general. Serbian-Hungarian relations needed to be rebuilt from scratch (for 1848 to be forgotten), and mutual understanding and equality established; but in return, an elite (Andrássy, Deák, Eötvös) appeared that desired only to rule. One absolutism changes into another absolutism. Miletić saw the first ingredient for improving such a situation in respect for constitutionalism. The Serbs, as a people who respect laws

and constitutional order, want to live in integrity, while Hungarians, greedily embracing Magyarization, accept this or any political Hungarian state idea. The disregard for constitutionalism and equality among nationalities Miletić commented with the words: “In every people there are, alongside good traits, also bad ones, which mark the weaker side — the passion of a people — and the destiny of a nation depends on whether the good or the bad traits prevail in national life. That weak trait in the Hungarians is the passion to dominate others. There was constitutionalism toward the top of state power, but not toward the surface of the state — toward all citizens and toward peoples who are not of Hungarian nationality.”

Prince Mihailo had earlier, already in February 1868, said that *Zastava* constantly published negative things about his rule. During April 1868, in an article “Serbo-Austrian Friendship,” Miletić criticized the Principality’s attitude toward Austria as overly yielding to the detriment of Serbs in Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina — even calling Serbian policy naive if it trusts promises, that by bringing itself under the Hungarian whip it will suffer, and that Serbs in the Monarchy will likewise suffer as a result of such moves. He called that policy of reliance on the Monarchy shortsighted, called the Serbs who implement it a mob and unfortunate people, so the article exuded harsh words and an exaggerated stance from Miletić — a stance that made many Serbian elites on both sides of the Danube and Sava uneasy. On the other hand, **Gyula Andrássy**, through Consul Benjamin Kállay, did everything to discredit Miletić, and to strengthen the position of **Đorđe Stratimirović**. Kállay himself claimed that one should not trust Stratimirović too much, and that to oppose Miletić

it would be best to use **Milivoje Petrović Blaznavac**. Later, in September 1868, Kállay wrote that Stratimirović was relatively influential and that he directed all his attention toward overthrowing Miletić and was cooperating with Blaznavac. Kállay's political maneuvering was directly aimed, as we have emphasized, at breaking the relations between Serbs in the Principality of Serbia and their compatriots in the Monarchy. He was constantly preoccupied with the idea of pushing out Russian influence in Serbia and replacing it with Austrian (Hungarian). He repeatedly wrote decisively about this to Andrassy and Beust. Also, Kállay skillfully used Blaznavac's pro-Austrian sentiments, his personal character and temperament, and his hostile attitude toward Russia, to attack Omladina, Miletić, and even Regent Jovan Ristić. It is clear that Kállay's plan had significant effect early on: by using internal Serbian disputes and political vanities, he imposed serious damage on the Serbs on both sides of the Danube and Sava.

The Military Frontier, especially after 1867–1868, when its dismantling was already widely discussed and written about, was a constant topic of Miletić's reflections. He sought ways and models to solve the frontier issue in a manner that would essentially help resolve the Serbian question as a whole. The famous question of elections in the Military Frontier he considered crucial. Miletić noted that the method of electing officers must change, with a different selection process for potential frontier representatives if one did not want a state-military-command council but rather free elections in the Frontier on the broadest possible basis, meaning that representatives could also be civilians, the leader of the liberals stated. The Military Frontier was rightfully at the center of Miletić's attention.

Repeatedly insisting that the Military Frontier politically approach the liberals and, more generally, Serbian politics, Miletić sought a balance between the policy of Magyarization and the increasingly loud policy of Croatian historical and state rights, also as one of the reasons for his attempt to connect the frontier and the Serbian question as a single whole.

The activity of the Omladina-United Serbian Youth (USY) and the harsh newspaper articles after the assassination of Prince Mihailo were somewhat in the background. Despite serious energy and valuable ideas, the activity was waning. At the third assembly held in Veliki Bečkerek from August 22 to 25, 1868, on the proposal of Giga Geršić, the Youth adopted a proclamation absolutely distancing itself from all slanders accusing it of involvement in the assassination of Prince Mihailo. Omladina, also expressed full confidence in Prince Milan and the regency regime. Miletić published in *Zastava* a draft Constitution of Omladina, based on liberal principles, which became a kind of foundation and policy for the widely present idea of creating a Serbian political party in Austria-Hungary. At the third assembly, the Constitution of the United Serbian Youth was adopted, which precisely defined its goals, scope, and mode of work. The Youth/ Omladina was defined as a community supporting education and the social progress of the Serbian people (awakening intellectual and moral awareness). All adult Serbs and Serbian women, regardless of faith, could become members. It was emphasized that members of the Youth/ Omladina could also be Serbs from neighboring Serbian states, provided there were no legal obstacles. The scope of the work was defined (with exclusively educational and literary tasks), as well as the Committee (consisting of at least five members), which had the right

to resolve current and important issues until the Assembly convened (once a year). The Hungarian Ministry of the Interior repeatedly transmitted reports accusing the Youth/ Omladina of agitation against Turkey or that Miletić, through the Youth/ Omladina, frequently spread anti-Hungarian policies throughout Bačka, Banat, and Srem. Although not a classic political party, Hungarian authorities considered it an integral part of the liberal party (faction), which the Youth/ Omladina would become in 1869.

Very soon after the Assembly, despite fierce opposition speeches and the involvement of Miletić's liberals, the Croatian Parliament (Hrvatski sabor), adopted the Agreement (Nagodba). Except for deputies Baron Jovan Živković, Brlić, Janković, and Helenbach, all other unionists accepted Žuvić's draft and without debate on September 26, 1868, voted for the Agreement—except for paragraph 66, which referred to the territorial belonging of Rijeka. The Parliament/ Sabor, urged the ruler to adopt the Agreement but to respect the territorial integrity of Croatia and resolve the issue of Rijeka in accordance with Istrian law. Franz Joseph replied on October 9, 1868, that this territorial question could be resolved amicably. In the struggle between two historical rights, the Habsburgs very quickly supported (as expected) the Hungarian concept. The deputies of the Hungarian Parliament acted similarly. The entire Agreement was adopted without debate but without paragraph 66 as well. Emperor Franz Joseph decided to accommodate the stronger political partner. He resolved to adopt the Hungarian interpretation of Maria Theresa's diploma from 1779 and the fourth legal article from 1807 and to hand over the commercial city of Rijeka to the Hungarian Crown. Thus, with this rescript (addition) on November 14, 1868, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the Agreement.

Two days later, this addition (the “Rijeka Patch”) was submitted to the Croatian Parliament as a separate rescript and, after two days, the Agreement was finally adopted in Zagreb (at the 24th session on November 18). This agreement was sanctioned in its final version on November 23, 1868, as the 1st legal article in Croatia and the 30th legal article in Hungary. The Agreement contained 70 provisions and detailed the issues related to relations between Croatia/ Triune Kingdom and Hungary. Miletić repeatedly spoke out about the Hungarian-Croatian Agreement in accordance with his liberal and pragmatic principles on the matter, which he had advocated in previous years. Somewhat ironically, Miletić called the agreement a “đuture” considered the Agreement problematic on a legal basis, recalled all the horrors that the Hungarian army had committed in Croatia in 1848, and reminded that a similar policy was being pursued against both Serbs and Croats (in 1868). He encouraged the Croatian elites with glorious examples from Croatian history and especially returned to internal issues of finance, legislation, the right to elect an independent government, relations toward Dalmatia, Rijeka, and the Military Frontier. Thus, a new and even more complex legal and political framework was defined for solving the Serbian question in Croatia. In the negotiations, the Croatian and Hungarian delegations took into account historical rights and the economic interests of each member, with Budapest having a stronger position and backing, as it was considered by the imperial/court structures—this was expected. The undivided support of the Serbian political elite for the Croatian aspirations to gain a stronger position relative to Hungary did not receive objective political resonance within Hungary itself. The opposition, led by the People’s Party/ Narodna stranka, from

1868 to 1873, and the revisions of the Agreement, would receive serious support from Miletić's liberals.

After the Agreement, the Court/Vienna had a different view of events in the Monarchy. A large number of reforms, primarily attempts at accelerated industrialization, efforts at monetary consolidation, and strengthening international position through closer ties with Berlin—especially after 1873, when, after the financial crisis, it was necessary to consolidate further and deal with economic factors in Bohemia and Galicia—left little room for dealing with the internal affairs of the Triune Kingdom, as this question was considered settled. Also, the always consistent loyalty of Serbs and Croats to the House of Habsburg, especially in the Military Frontier regions, remained until 1918. Therefore, the Court was not too concerned about events on the periphery. Although these facts did not favor the resolution of the Serbian question, up to the creation of the Croatian-Serbian coalition in 1905 and the stronger influence of the Kingdom of Serbia in these areas, the influential circles mostly turned their attention elsewhere.

The Principality of Serbia also became involved in these events during the 1860s, with many tensions but also caution, justifiably fearing its too powerful neighbor. Therefore, successes could be limited, as Belgrade was quite aware of the good intelligence of the Austrian police and the possible foreign policy problems in case of any conflict with the Monarchy. A very valuable opinion on this policy of the Croatian political elite was given by Jovan Ristić himself: "The Croats did not want to admit that there are Serbs in Croatia, and when the Hungarians pressed them hard, they then softened toward the Serbs. They wanted to drag us into their struggle with

the Hungarians so that, once they saved themselves with our help, they would continue denying the existence of the Serbs. They would most gladly see us quarrel with the Hungarians, even if no benefit came from that. We have used our good relations with the Hungarians to their benefit, trying to convince the Hungarians of the need for good harmony with their peoples, but we cannot quarrel with them for anyone because we are convinced that by doing so we would harm ourselves and benefit no one.” Jovan Ristić clearly showed and defined the state of affairs at the Parliament and during the negotiations. There was no doubt about how the cooperation would look, in which direction it would move, and where the peak of the harmony between the political elites of Serbs and Croats lay.

The Eastern Question, the Balkan policy of Austro-Hungary, already after Sadova (Battle of Königgrätz) in 1866, showed that these events would be resolved without much compromise, and that the rift and political intolerance would only be skillfully fueled. Miletić held essentially a similar opinion to Ristić. Ristić emphasized that he would not fall into the traps of the Hungarian government, which wanted the Serbs to quarrel with all other Slavs. Serbia’s interest was to be on good terms with Hungary, but not to be obligated to Hungary. In impossible circumstances, the only feasible plan was attempted—to gradually move toward solving the Serbian/Eastern question and strengthening the Serbian state, to achieve full national independence, to gain political knowledge and diplomatic experience, and then proceed in the direction allowed by the Great Powers.

Regarding the sessions of the Hungarian Parliament in addressing the Serbian question within the Monarchy, the atmosphere reached a point of political boiling with the creation of the Nationalities Act draft in

September 1868, consisting of 30 articles. After a year and a half of work on this key nationality law in Hungary, there was essentially no progress beyond the initial theses imposed by Ferenc Deák and József Eötvös back in 1865. Any serious initiative by the Serbs or Romanians was declared explicitly hostile. Gyula Andrassy, this time as the representative of Csemplen/ Zemplen County, sent a letter to the Parliament warning that if the subcommittee's nationality proposals were accepted, the disintegration of the Hungarian state would be inevitable. Then, a large number of other counties responded with similar interpellations. The Hungarian language remained dominant in all internal administration and government affairs, except for some local and municipal matters — and even there, when dealing with general state authorities, Hungarian was used. Even the Church was obliged to communicate with ministries in Hungarian. This Nationalities Act draft was later rightfully labeled in the press as the foundation of the policy of Magyarization.

Svetozar Miletić called this draft “a satire on equality.” Article 2 of the draft stated that every member in municipalities and counties may speak their mother tongue. Miletić commented on this saying: “It means mercy is granted so that one need not bark.” In schools (Article 4), the language of instruction could be chosen at will. Higher church bodies could determine their language, but minutes had to be kept in Hungarian (Article 5), and higher church institutions had to correspond in Hungarian as well (e.g., Serbs and Romanians). Likewise, church authorities could use both their own language and Hungarian in correspondence with state bodies (but the text had to be translated). Confusion was introduced by the clause on the protocol language in counties, which was interpreted as a desire to impose

Hungarian as an indispensable means of communication even between counties. The use and engagement of Hungarian translators was foreseen if parties or officials did not know the state language. If a county had a Hungarian majority, the use of another language was not allowed. Articles 16–18 stipulated that all court disputes and protocol books must be kept in the state language from the first to the last instance. The language of instruction was Hungarian (Article 26), but the state was obliged to enable the learning of the mother tongue as well. At faculties, the language was also Hungarian, but with the establishment of chairs for the literature of the nationalities (Articles 27–28). All state positions were to be appointed regardless of nationality (Article 29).

Svetozar Miletic referred to numerous models across Europe that had resolved this issue in a liberal and democratic manner. He addressed the situations in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, where, in his view, the conditions were far more complex than in Hungary. He also provided population figures by counties and referred to the rights of Germans, Slovaks, Jews, and Romanians, reminding that Hungary was not a state of only the Hungarian people. Compared to the decisions of the Hungarian Parliament in 1861, when it was defined that nationalities were considered equal as long as they agreed with the personal unity of the country, the 1867 proposal (final version September 1868) contained more provisions directly detrimental to nationalities.

It is also interesting to consider the first Nationalities Law from 1849. Kossuth, during the 1847–1848 parliamentary sessions, stated that only one political nation could exist — the Hungarian one. The Hungarian Parliament officially endorsed this principle on April 11, 1848, and Croatia

was allowed to use the Croatian language in some local administrative matters. The demands of Slovaks and Serbs for recognition of national rights were condemned by Hungarian political society. Slovak political leaders were arrested by the government. The Hungarian political leaders expressed their aims again during the Union with Transylvania on May 29, 1848, when the status of political nation belonged only to the Hungarians. From the start of the military operations in June 1848, the Hungarian political elite led by Kossuth did not retreat from its ideological principles. Eötvös's draft of the Education Law from August 4, 1848, foresaw the use of the mother tongue in primary schools. Most considered this offensive to Hungarians, so the proposal was reformulated to make learning Hungarian mandatory, while learning non-Hungarian languages was allowed optionally outside schools. In spring 1849, Kossuth began negotiations with nationalities for the final resolution of this issue. On May 22, 1849, Colonel Bistrónovský handed to Ilija Garašanin the proposal of rights for the Serbian Voivodeship in six points. It promised the formation of the Voivodeship, language use, a provincial assembly, but correspondence with authorities would be conducted in Hungarian. The Hungarian Parliament and Kossuth reiterated on May 14, 1849, that only one Hungarian political nation could exist. Ultimately, Kossuth predicted the use of non-Hungarian languages in some local administrative affairs. Regarding Romanians, Kossuth and Brătianu signed on July 14, 1849, an agreement recognizing Romanians as a separate nationality (the Pacification Agreement) with rights to church-school autonomy and management of Romanian affairs in the Romanian language. The agreement allowed Romanians to have an independent church organization and elect their metropolitan. Despite

considerable opposition, the agreement was verified by the Hungarian Parliament on July 28, 1849. It showed that the path to resolving Serbian-Romanian relations and nationality issues was essentially set by 1849.

In the new version from 1868, the provisions concerning the use of Hungarian in counties, court disputes, church authorities stand out, especially the deviation from the principle that counties with a clear national majority had the right to determine the language of administration and communication themselves. Svetozar Miletić accused József Eötvös of trying to impose a medieval method of resolving this issue by recognizing confessions that would essentially keep the state under control and direct supervision. Miletić openly wrote that the state had only one main idea: to Magyarize all those who opposed it, using legal bases that were contrary to all contemporary European standards of that time. He noted that even the Turkish *rayah* was judged in its own language. He also wrote very sharply that Franz Joseph was not the Hungarian king; first, because he was not Hungarian, and second, as a monarch, he was the king of Hungary — meaning of all the peoples of Hungary. Regarding the Crown of St. Stephen, Miletić also wrote that it belongs to all the peoples of Hungary, especially since it was joined with the Greek Crown. It was also not true that the country was only Hungarian since Slovaks and Romanians lived on that land before the Hungarians. As for culture, Serbs, Slovaks, and Romanians were not culturally backward, and Hungarian culture belonged to all its peoples. This was a frequent polemic that Miletić led in those days. Thus, the leader of the liberals raised tensions in the Hungarian Parliament without much hesitation, which certainly was not forgotten, but he also reasonably tried to emphasize that other peoples have the right to full

equality and likewise have their own achievements and historical continuity. The Pest press constantly and daily attacked the words of the Serbian deputies Branovački and especially Miletić against this legislative proposal. From their viewpoint, the Serbian deputies demanded the breakup of the Hungarian state. Serbian liberals in the Monarchy, especially Miletić, argued that adopting the law without respecting the national demands was tantamount to a political crime and would inevitably lead to the downfall of Hungary itself. They believed that the Hungarians would turn Serbs, Slovaks, and Romanians against themselves, which would shake the state far more than potentially allowing free use of language in the counties.

The parliamentary debate on the Nationalities Law began in November 1868. The draft law was explained by Ferenc Deák. He repeated his idea that the unity of the state must be preserved under the principle that only one political nation can exist, but that all citizens are equal before the law. Therefore, it was logical that the official language, in accordance with this principle, would be Hungarian (the state language). The situation for the nationalities was drastically complicated by Article 38 of the 1868 law, which defined that four types of schools could exist on the territory of Hungary: religious, communal, private, and state schools. Regarding religious schools, it was stipulated that they be governed by church-school authorities based on the law on church-school autonomy. The state did everything to turn religious schools into state schools, where instruction was mandatory in Hungarian. Authorities had the power to close religious schools if they did not meet certain conditions related to the number of children or general requirements. Since church and school authorities were significantly poorer than state authorities, objective conditions were created

for easier closure and control of religious schools. By the government decision of June 8, 1871, all schools in the Military Frontier that did not meet the conditions were converted into state schools. Specifically, Article 27 of the 1873 law placed supervision of all schools in the former Military Frontier under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Several years later, Article 18 of 1879 ordered the introduction of the Hungarian language in all schools where it had not previously been taught. During the debates, Serbs, Slovaks and Romanians sat on the left side of the chamber against the majority, trying by constant interpellations to change the contentious paragraphs of the majority's draft. Svetozar Miletić wrote that for a full five days this group was under attack from Hungarian arrows, like a handful of Spartans at Thermopylae against the huge masses of Asian Persians. He was especially angry at the Magyarized Germans and Slovaks who defended the draft more vigorously than Eötvös and Deák.

On November 14, 1868, Miletić delivered one of his most notable speeches in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the principle of equality of all peoples in the Monarchy. As later recorded by Gliša Geršić, by opposing the Nationalities Law, Miletić had crossed the Rubicon. At the very beginning, he emphasized that 26 deputies of the nationalities had signed the draft law. According to this proposal, the principle of nationality cannot be tied to the church or to confessions, but through language, each nation forms, spreads, and develops its culture and institutions. If the language of a nation is not politically recognized, then it has no real value; likewise, literature and all progress in culture are hindered. Today, when states rest on modern foundations rather than feudal ones, every nationality strives to have the most basic human and political rights, Miletić argued. A

state that has multiple nationalities must carry and support those nationalities within itself if it does not want to turn them into a dissolving element. Therefore, it was proposed that different peoples be recognized as equal, that in municipalities where peoples have the majority, the language of the nationality be the official language, and that mixed municipalities be surrounded by nationalities according to their geo-ethnographic and administrative position. The situation that all peoples must be part of a single political nation is untenable. It is better for peoples to federatively form a common whole, because otherwise, the negation of those mentioned peoples is formalized—they must disappear. The only real guarantee for the survival of minorities, precisely because of this, is the free use of the languages of all peoples. If an individual does not have the right to use their language in court or in public service, that is practically a denial of the existence of the individual. Insisting on Hungarian as the official language in municipalities is a direct negation of the fundamental principle of nationality demands.

The third part of the Minority Committee's proposal, the so-called rearrangement of counties (arondation), was particularly condemned by Hungarian deputies. Eötvös's stance—that the rearrangement of counties would lead to the creation of national autonomies aiming at the breakup and federalization of Hungary—was supported by deputies from all Hungarian parties. Svetozar Miletić, however, argued that arondation was the correct way to preserve the unity of the state. If nationalities receive their small units (houses), patriotism towards the smaller unit, as well as towards the whole state, develops. The majority claimed that arondation of counties would legalize the violence of the majority (in the county) over the

minority (in the county). Miletić rejected such reasoning as absurd. He insisted on changing the paragraphs relating to mandatory learning of Hungarian in secondary schools and universities and allowing the teaching of nationality languages in municipalities. The majority believed that consideration must be given to preserving the unity of the state and state administration at all levels (especially in judicial affairs). What the majority proposed as equality was merely a form of inequality towards nationalities, which either must obey or be outside the law. The consequence would clearly be the Magyarization of nationalities at all levels, Miletić stated. He concluded by emphasizing that Hungary must be a shield for small peoples on the Danube, and this can only be achieved through true reconciliation, but with the understanding that nationalities cannot sacrifice themselves for the existence of Hungary. He quoted Pál Nagy (speech at the Hungarian Parliament, 1825): “A lost constitutional freedom can be regained by the people under favorable circumstances, but a lost nationality never, not ever.”

The law was adopted without the presence of 24 nationality deputies. “Happy are the peoples and individuals who can forgive the evil side in their nature, but this is rare among peoples and likewise among individuals, and thus a nation carries the seed of its own destruction within itself. This is the Oriental trait in the Hungarian people. Just as among the Turks in the East the religious law was and still is the highest state principle, so it is now with the Hungarians, with the difference that this principle and tendency has been cast upon nationality instead of religion... Be Hungarian or at least a Magyarized one, and you may err, yet you will still be invited to the table maintained by the serving peoples; if not, you

will be hunted no matter how much sweat and bread you live by,” concluded Svetozar Miletić. In his writings, Miletić repeatedly emphasized that European peoples have the right to the principles of freedom and equality, that they have the right to speak their own language, to use their own script, and that the culture and historical rights of all peoples are equal. He argued that problems cannot be resolved by a single political model alone, and that the Serbian elites had done everything possible to find a compromise and offer a hand of friendship—something which, in his view, was ignored and directly undermined.

In summary, over a full eight years, Miletić frequently appealed, proposed, advised, and offered ideas and suggestions to resolve the Serbian and nationality issues through compromise and agreement, with full respect for the rights of all nationalities. The Hungarian elites, however, were not very willing to engage in such negotiations. After finally achieving their political goal through the Compromise (the *Ausgleich*), they expected that the political time had come to establish a national state and to complete their statehood, cultural framework, identity, and territorial space. Time quickly showed how difficult this task was—politically very hard to achieve—and how unsolvable the Serbian question was in the context of the foreign policy relations of the Great Powers in the period after the Crimean War and the process of German Unification.

Under the title *Serbia and Hungarian Politics*, Svetozar Miletić wrote a text that was simultaneously a message to the Principality of Serbia, advising it to avoid friendship with Pest and not to count on its support in its national liberation mission. He condemned Andrassy’s claim that Austro-Hungary helped Serbia peacefully acquire cities, and Balhausplatz’s

stance that it was wise for Serbia to distance itself from the insurgent ambitions of Greeks and Romanians. It was quite clear, Miletić argued, that the key policy pursued in the Monarchy was to seize Bosnia and Herzegovina. His writings against Austro-Hungarian claims on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his vigorous agitation against the Nationalities Law, once again put him at the forefront of opponents of the Monarchy.

A reasonable question arises whether the end of 1868, marking a full eight years of Miletić's and the liberals' political process, brought the expected and desired results. Despite mostly setbacks in the ideas of political cooperation with the Hungarian and Croatian elites, without profound results, Miletić and his supporters did everything possible within the complex political circumstances of the Monarchy itself, and especially the Eastern Question. The Habsburg Monarchy, from 1848–1849, was going through a period of internal consolidation that was not fully accomplished, involving various systems of constitutionality and legality in 1860, 1861, and 1865, with partial solutions often obstructed even by key elite protagonists in Vienna. The role and position of the ruler, specifically Emperor Franz Joseph, was not the same as in the 18th century with Maria Theresa or Joseph II, who also spent decades on their reforms facing very difficult decisions, obstructions, and incomplete tasks with limited results. It was precisely the rejection of Emperor Joseph II's reforms that actually pushed the Habsburg Monarchy backward and later caused deeper internal crises during the Revolution of 1848. The foundation of the Holy Roman Empire, and later the Habsburg Monarchy, was often rooted in local traditions and identities or personal ties to the Crown, which proved very significant up to 1918. The position of the Serbs, initially conditioned by

the Privileges of 1691–1695 and later by the Laws of the Diet of 1790–1792, did not carry the weight of historical provinces or local assemblies tied to the Crown by Habsburg relations or special arrangements within the Empire. Integration proceeded very slowly. Only with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was religious stability achieved, while decades of warfare with the Ottomans (1663–1664, 1683–1739) brought territorial expansions but also a sudden influx of population and the building of further elite structures that governed the Empire. Vienna, as a residential city in the first half of the 18th century, mostly thanks to Italian architects, began to acquire the status of a capital that attracted inhabitants from all parts of the Empire who could afford to live there. The Habsburg Monarchy was not a colonial naval power and could not compete in that regard with Britain or France, but its enormous continental strength provided a foothold for decisive Eastern and Central European influence by the Monarchy itself. Its complex and complicated relations with Russia from the second half of the 18th century onward would significantly determine the fate of the Eastern Question.

The Serbian question, as part of this overly complicated situation, was often resolved without a plan because, until 1814, the Monarchy still tried to maintain its position in Western Europe, especially during the wars of 1792–1815 when the future of Europe itself was being decided. During that period, the Serbs owed their key position primarily to the Military Frontier and the Karlovci Metropolitanate. Serbian elites until the end of the Revolution of 1848–1849 were exclusively dependent on the politics of Vienna, as was then said and written, which conditioned the building of institutions, progress in educating and training people, books, printing

houses, theaters, Matica —all symbols of the development of Central European society at that time modeled in the Empire's center. Therefore, the process of creating the Serbian Voivodina was crucially connected to decisions made in Vienna. Changing such deeply rooted decisions and processes was very difficult, as Miletić himself realized in 1861. Distrust towards the Hungarians from the time of the war of 1848–1849 remained crucial, and the court/ruler/elite was always listened to or awaited for announcements. The situation in which it suddenly became necessary to find a compromise with the Hungarians without the mediation of the Court and at the same time build a sustainable solution was impossible within eight years. Despite all political attempts and ideas, Miletić was not successful, which was evident. Serbian elites were realistically reduced to the interests of the Habsburg Monarchy's foreign policy, which proved very difficult and overall dangerous for the Balkans by the beginning of the 20th century. Increased pressures from Pest only contributed to the feeling of threat and an exaggerated need for resistance, leading to several conflicts. Miletić's rhetoric was in line with the spirit of the times and events in the Monarchy. He advocated for resolving the Eastern Question and its acceleration, often out of fear of the Monarchy's moves, well understanding that the position of the Serbs had been brought into significantly different frameworks than before 1848, and that if a serious conflict arose between Russia and Austro-Hungary, the Serbs would certainly be brought to the brink of existence on both sides of the Danube and Sava rivers.

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REFLECTIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE ON RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 1910-1920

Abstract: With the development of International Olympic Committee (IOC) as umbrella organisation for the Olympic Games and development of sports in general at the crossroads of 19th and 20th century the scene was also set for the reorganisation of political relations between countries that have been included in the organisation or aspired to be the members. Situation with the Kingdom of Serbia and Austria-Hungary was one of the crucial examples in this frame. Negative inclination in the relations between those two countries throughout the first decade of 20th century implicated difficulties in the perspectives of the inclusion of Serbia into IOC and possibility to participate at the Olympic Games. With the rising of the Customs War (also known as the Pig War), specific trade war between them 1906-1911 and imminent Balkan Wars 1912 the constellation was especially tense before the Olympic Games in Stockholm 1912. Upcoming First World War implied huge reset in the foundation of IOC and in the political map of the Europe and whole world.

Keywords: International Olympic Committee (IOC), Olympic Games, Serbia, Austria-Hungary, First World War.

From the very beginning of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1894 and the organisation of first modern Olympic Games in Athens, Greece, in 1896, development of the world leading sports organisation was closely connected with political developments and relations between the states and with the time more and more with the political blocs of the states. The Olympics from the antic Greek era, that started in 776 BC, have been well known as a concept throughout history of

Europe.¹ With the rising of the intellectual and educational capacities of European continent, especially in 18th and 19th centuries, one of the logical consequences was the parallel rising of the notion for the development of “universal Olympic movement”, as one of the crucial carriers of the future political unifications.

Some systematic attempts to establish such a concept were present in the different European regions already since the beginning of 17th century. Tradition of “the Cotswold Olimpick Games“, held in the Cotswolds, region of central South West England, since the reign of James I (1601-1625), is most probably the oldest such tradition in the early modern Europe. The games eventually started in 1612 (perhaps even earlier) and continued all the way until 1852. After the period of discontinuity, they were reactivated in 1963 and exist even today.² Similar example was established in Germany, in the second half of 18th century with “Olympics of Drehberg”. Prince Leopold III Frederick Franz (1740-1811), Prince and Duke of Anhalt-Dessau, started the revival of ancient Olympics in Drehberg, just outside Wörlitz (today in Saxony-Anhalt). The games have been displayed annually and this tradition lasted between 1776 and 1799.³ Even in the frame of “The Fête de la Fédération”, which was a holiday festival held throughout France in the summer of 1790, to mark the first year of the French Revolution, concept of ancient Olympic Games was somewhat revived.⁴

¹ Boulongne 1994: 33-34.

² Clarke 1997: 43.

³ Thomas 2007: 96-97.

⁴ Toohey, Veal 2007: 29.

In all those cases the celebration of the ancient ideals of Olympism from the antic Greek period⁵ was clearly placed on the throne and tendency towards the peace and unity was the main driving force behind the establishments. Similar motives guided also the founder of the IOC, the French Baron Pierre de Coubertin (Charles Pierre de Frédy, Baron de Coubertin, 1863-1937), towards a vision of a world in which all nations and all people would live in harmony. In his scope, such harmony was to be achieved only and exactly through the systematic integration of education and sport, whereby, precisely with ancient, primarily Athenian, patterns, the parallel development of the spirit and body would be forced in attempt to reach ideal society of the future. The plans of French aristocrat were also based on his own experiences from Great Britain, where he had often stayed during his youth, and had the opportunity to see for himself the effective connection between sport and education in the schools and universities there.⁶ His visions of creating a world sports organization were also implied by a whole series of traumas that French society was going through during Coubertin's childhood and youth, which were primarily related to the defeat in the war against Prussia in 1870-1871.⁷ In this way, the political dimension was from the beginning at the very core of the modern Olympic movement.

Political ideas and concepts were present since the founding congress of the IOC, held in Paris in June 1894. The decision to hold the first modern Olympic Games in Athens, Greece, in 1896 further

⁵ "Coubertin, as did many other modern scholars, equated Ancient Greece with the Olympic Games.", Gangas 2021: 27.

⁶ MacAloon 1981: 43-47.

⁷ Boulongne 1994: 28-29.

emphasized the founders' intention to link the modern concept with ancient ideals but also with the aspects of the relative neutral position of Greece, when compared with the major European powers of that era, that were already in pretty strained and complicated system of relations. Initial ideas of Coubertin included, among other things, reviving the ancient Greek system, according to which the Olympic Games were held every four years, and all existing war activities had to be stopped.⁸

This approach was multi-problematic and it was extremely difficult to achieve common goals in conditions of virtually constant deterioration of the geopolitical constellation. Exactly through such an essential connection with the evolution of the geopolitical constellation the question of what the IOC actually is was more and more pressing. This question was inevitably connected with the perception of the roles of countries or group of countries inside of battle for dominant influence on the development of the entire international Olympic movement.

Already from the first modern Olympics in Athens, 1896, in which virtually only Western European countries and the USA participated, it was clear that the Western world dominated the entire spectrum of the IOC. It was exactly during the last decade of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century that the formal and legal division of Europe into political blocs was completed. The alliances of the Entente and the Central Powers were fiercely opposed to each other, but their main protagonists, France, Great Britain and Germany, as well as Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy, along with the USA, which was not yet included in the alliance system, represented a group of countries that decisively influenced the development

⁸ MacAloon 1981: 56-57.

of world sports. Moreover, precisely through the role of the founder of the modern Olympic movement, Pierre de Coubertin, it was clear that the role of France was particularly important.

Problem with the stopping of wars during the Olympics or because of Olympics was especially underlined. Actually, the concept of a total cessation of wars never existed even in ancient Greece.⁹ With the outbreak of First World War in 1914, this concept in essence was completely defeated also for modern IOC. But even before that, since the first modern Olympics, wars never completely stopped during the sport assemblies. Precisely around the start of Olympics in Athens, in spring 1896, Great Britain was particularly aggressive in its colonial campaigns at the different sides of Africa. British colonial forces attacked the positions of the Mahdist State in Sudan and started the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of Sudan (1896-1899).¹⁰ In the same time, they attacked Ashanti territory (around Kumasi, in a contemporary Ghana) inside of Fourth Anglo-Ashanti War (1895-1896)¹¹ and carried out a raid, launched from Rhodesia, against the South African Republic (then commonly known as the Transvaal).¹² Practically simultaneously, Italian forces tried (very unsuccessfully) to conquer Ethiopia inside of the First Italo-Ethiopian War (1895-1896).¹³ And all that during the participation of British and Italian sportsmen in Athens. Similar situation was during the second modern Olympic Games, in Paris 1900, with British actions against South Africa inside of the Second Boer War (1899-1902) or with the military crashing of the Boxer Rebellion in China

⁹ Guttman 2002: 21.

¹⁰ Green 2007: 240.

¹¹ Lloyd 1964: 162-163.

¹² Rotberg 1988: 547-548.

¹³ Jonas 2011: 1-2.

(1899-1901). Moreover, eruption of the war with the Empire of Japan over rivalry in Manchuria and Korea 1904-1905 forced Russia to abandon participation at Third Olympiad, held between July and November 1904 in St. Louis, USA.

Austria-Hungary, as a state under that name and complex system of organisation (since 1867), was not involved in wars all the way until the First World War, but was in constant attempt to expand towards southeast. Such endeavour brought Habsburg Empire into conflict with the Kingdom of Serbia. Trade war between two countries known as the Customs War or Pig War 1906-1911 together with the Bosnian Crisis or Annexation Crisis 1908-1909 was the clearly low point.¹⁴ Possibility of war was constantly in the air.

Already since 1879 Austria-Hungary was closely connected with the German Empire inside of coalition called the Central Powers. General stance of Austria-Hungary around the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century in Europe was definitely lower than of Austrian Empire 50 or 100 years earlier, but Habsburg Empire was still one of European great powers. On the other hand, specific dual structure of the state was also reflected in the participation of the country at the Olympic Games and inside of IOC. Since the First Olympiad 1896, Austria and Hungary participated separately, with two completely distinctive teams.¹⁵

This situation with the separate Olympic teams of Austria and Hungary was deeply connected with the question of national Olympic committees and with the general perception of national or state teams inside

¹⁴ Hösch 1968: 181.

¹⁵ Finlay, Pleket 1976: 34.

of the Olympic movement. That question was actually not clearly answered during the first few decades of IOC and throughout first several editions of Olympic Games. Contemporary perception of first decades in the development of IOC almost always underlines a need for uniform approach in confronting with the past of the Olympics and, in the same time, need to perceive the development of first editions of Olympic Games through the lenses of later editions, when Olympic Games were already established as a concept. Therefore, it is from the very start in 1896 expected to analyse the quantity and quality of now usual antics, like national teams, national participation, hymns, gold medals, victory podium, Olympic flame and torch, Olympic mascot, opening or closing ceremonies, participation of women in the games, selection of judges from different countries rather than just from the host nations, presence of an Olympic Village as a complex for residence and accommodation of participating delegations, fixed schedule of Games concentrated on the frame of two or three weeks etc. although majority of those concepts was introduced slowly in much later decades.

Most important and most questionable of all in the first editions of Summer Olympics was the concept of national teams. This concept was definitely not a major part of the Olympics throughout first decade. Around the First Olympiad in 1896 national Olympic committees were almost non-existent or defined completely alternative in comparison with modern approach.¹⁶ Modern official lists made by IOC are giving number of participating countries in Athens 1896 as 14 (sometimes 13 or 12), although

¹⁶ Gangas 2021: 187.

it was very problematic how the assembly in Athens can be perceived as an assembly of national sports organizations.¹⁷

The Austrian Olympic Committee was formed in 1908. But the formal recognition from the side of IOC took part only in 1912. Like in the German example, already in 1896 there was a “Committee for Olympic Games in Athens for Austria” (“Komitee für die Olympischen Spiele in Athen für Österreich”). For the Second Olympiad in 1900 Austrians created “Komitee für die Beschickung der Olympischen Spiele in Paris”, which actually means “Committee for sending (of sportsmen) to the Olympic Games in Paris”.¹⁸

On the other hand, the Hungarian Olympic Committee (Magyar Olimpiai Bizottság) was founded already in 1895, actually as sixth national committee in the world (after France, Greece, USA, Germany and Australia).¹⁹ Independence of Hungarian Olympic Committee next to the existence of Austria-Hungary as a common state was never in question from the side of Vienna. Specific organization of dual monarchy, which actually was a union of two sovereign states with a single monarch who was titled in the same time as emperor of Austria and king of Hungary, allowed Hungarian part to pursue all possible aspects of independent approach and Budapest indeed pressed in that direction.

The situation was somewhat different in the case of Czech (Bohemian) Olympic Committee. This separate organization was founded already in 1899 as a “Bohemian Committee for the Olympic Games”

¹⁷ Brown 2012: 155.

¹⁸ Roth 2008: 34-35.

¹⁹ Gangas 2021: 196.

(“Český výbor pro hry olympijské”).²⁰ So, there was a separate Czech team, competing with its own flag, under the name “Bohemia”, both in Paris Olympics of 1900 and London Olympics of 1908. Existence of separate Czech representation was never fully accepted from the side of Vienna, for Bohemia was officially part of Austrian rule inside of Austria-Hungary.

It was based on very special personal importance of Jiří Guth (1861-1943, since 1920 Jiří Stanislav Guth-Jarkovský), close friend of the founder of IOC, Pierre de Coubertin, that Bohemian Committee became separate organization and that it managed to survive as such at least through the first decade of 20th century. Coubertin personally appointed him a member of the International Olympic Committee, which was officially founded on June 23, 1894, on the very last day of the Congress. He managed to found “Bohemian Committee for the Olympic Games”, so, thanks to him and his position as a member of IOC, Czech athletes participated in the Olympic Games even before the Czech or Czechoslovak state existed. Guth remained a member of IOC for life, and became one of the longest standing members of IOC in history (1894-1943) and later even served as Secretary General of IOC (1919-1923).²¹

Czech team returned from Paris 1900 with one silver and two bronze medals. After such success the discontent in Austria was in growing and first demands have been expressed that Bohemia should abandon its independence from the Olympic Games and that Guth should be expelled from the IOC. However his friendship with Coubertin and the respect the other IOC members had for Guth, which he had earned through his skill

²⁰ Koralka 1996: 112-113.

²¹ Kössl, Kratky, Marek 1986: 73.

and intellect, made him immune to all external hostility. Pierre de Coubertin actually used Austria's demands as an opportunity to coin the new term called “sports geography”, which was intended to emphasize the independence of sport from political interests.²²

It was only in 1905, that Prince Alexander of Solms-Braunfels (1855-1926) became the first Austrian to be admitted to the IOC, as its 43rd member. During his term of office, Solms-Braunfels strongly sought the removal of Bohemia from the IOC. In protest against the exclusion of the Czech representative Jiří Guth, which was rejected in particular by President Pierre de Coubertin, he resigned from his position in December 1908 and Austria had no IOC member until 1911. At the start of the Session of IOC held in Budapest between 23rd and 27th of May 1911, among 21 members of IOC there were Hungarian representatives “Le Comte” Geza Andrassy and Jules de Muzsa and Czech representative (“Bohême”) Jiří Guth. Austrians were still omitted.²³ But exactly at this Session Pierre de Coubertin proposed new Austrian member of IOC, Prince Otto zu Windisch-Graetz (1873-1952), and he was accepted by acclamation.²⁴

Austrian pressure towards independent position of Czech sportsmen continued further around next Olympiad. At the 1912 Summer Olympics in Stockholm, under impact from the Austrian government, the Czech team had to compete under the Austrian flag, and only under it could the smaller

²² Krüger 1980: 528-532. .

²³ “Séance d'Ouverture à l'Académie Hongroise des Sciences, le 23 Mai 1911... Membres présents : Le Dr. Jiri Guth, Bohême... Le Comte Geza Andrassy, Hongrie... Jules de Muzsa, Hongrie...”, International Olympic Committee, Historical Archives, IOC Sessions 1910-1920, (further: IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920) 1911-05-23 au 27 - PV 14e Session Budapest, P. 2-3.

²⁴ “Le Président prend la parole et aux applaudissements de tout le Comité, propose l'élection comme Membre du Comité International Olympique pour l'Autriche, de S.A.S. le Prince Othon de Windisch-Graetz.”. Ibid. P. 5.

Czech flag appear at the ceremony announcing the winners.²⁵ At the inaugural meeting of IOC session, held at the beginning of Olympiad, on July 4, in the official minutes of the Session Czech representative Jiří Guth was not noted as Czech (“Bohême”) anymore, but as Austrian (“Autriche”).²⁶

This complex example of separate participation of Austria, Hungary and Bohemia was not the only situation where entities without the status of sovereign state had right to participate as independent team at the Olympics. At the crossroads of centuries British colonial possessions, like Canada, Australasia (Australia and New Zealand together) and South Africa were not sovereign, but all of them participated nevertheless as independent teams. Iceland was part of Denmark, but competed separately in the Summer Olympic Games 1908 and 1912. Nevertheless, Denmark blocked admittance of separate Icelandic member of IOC at the Session in Stockholm, on July 4, 1912, securing the right of its own member to decide about the Icelandic proposal (“This request must be dismissed because it would be through the Danish representative at the IOC that the request in question could be considered”).²⁷

Finnish Olympic Committee was created and recognized in 1907, when Finland still was an autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland inside of

²⁵ „Na letní olympiádě 1912 ve Stockholmu již pod tlakem rakouské vlády musela česká výprava vystupovat pod rakouskou vlajkou a teprve pod ní se mohla při ceremoniálu vyhlášení vítězů objevit i menší česká vlajka.“, Koralka 1996: 322-323.

²⁶ “Le Dr. et Madamo Jiri Guth... Autriche.“, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1912-07-04 au 10 et 17 - PV 15e Session Stockholm, P. 2.

²⁷ “Le Président communique encore une lettre des athletes Islandais sur le même sujet. Cette demande doit être écartée car ce serait sur l'intermédiaire du représentant de Danemark dans le C.I.O. que la demande on question pourrait être prise en considération.“, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920 1912-07-04 au 10 et 17 - PV 15e Session Stockholm, P. 12.

the Russian Empire. Finland also made its debut at the Olympic Games in 1908 and afterwards participated at every Olympiad. At the IOC Session in Stockholm on July 8, 1912, Russian representative, Prince Ouroussoff, declined his agreement with Finish representative, Baron von Willebrand, to further maintain the designation "Finnish Committee". Their "very delicate, yet courteous, discussion" implied similar discussion between Austrian representatives Prince Otto zu Windisch-Graetz and Count Colloredo-Mansfeldt with Doctor Jiri Guth about further maintenance of the designation "Czech Committee."²⁸ It was clear that flexibility from early phase of IOC was not present anymore and that the politics was more and more dominant inside of IOC relations.

Olympics in London 1908 were not held in so high esteem by the members of the International Olympic Committee and especially by the President, Pierre de Coubertin. One of the crucial problems was the very expensive scope of the games and huge financial losses for the hosts. Immediately after London Olympiad Sweden started its own campaign for hosting of next Olympic Games in 1912. At the session of IOC in Berlin, through May 1909, the Swedish representatives declared that they had full financial support for hosting the next Games in Stockholm. The session in Berlin was the first session where it was decided that in the future the official brochure with kind of transcript of complete content from previous session will be published and the General Secretary of IOC, Eugenio

²⁸ "La discussion très délicate, autant que courtoise, dans laquelle le Baron de Willebrand declare catégoriquement qu'il est d'accord avec le Prince Ouroussoff pour maintenir la désignation de "Comité Finlandais" se clôt par l'accord entre le Prince de Windisch Graetz et le Comte Colloredo-Mansfeldt avec le Docteur Jiri Guth pour le maintien intégral de la dénomination de "Comité Tchèque".", Ibid. P. 16-17.

Brunetta d'Usseaux (1857-1919) was tasked with this. In his communication with the President of IOC Coubertin, Brunetta d'Usseaux among other things stated:

*“It is in response to the desire you expressed to me at the Berlin Session in 1909 that, for the first time this year, I am printing and sending you the Minutes of the Luxembourg Session of 1910. So that in the future I can more accurately reproduce the ideas, the wishes, and especially the text of the proposed speeches, especially if they were not expressed in French, the language generally adopted in our sessions.”*²⁹

A deal was made in Berlin between Swedish IOC and German IOC representatives on the basis that Stockholm would host Olympiad in 1912 and Berlin would host the next one in 1916. Pierre de Coubertin spoke at the meeting about his concerns that Sweden should ensure that the Games take place, as he did not want a repeat of the problems with Great Britain hosting the 1908 Games. The Games were duly awarded to Sweden to host in Stockholm as the only nominated host city for the 1912 Summer Olympics. The Swedish delegation at the IOC meeting in Berlin on 28 May 1909 had proposed a simple Olympic schedule containing only athletics, swimming, gymnastics and wrestling. However other countries requested

²⁹ “C'est pour répondre au désir que vous m'avez exprimé à la Session de Berlin en 1909, que pour la première fois cette année, j'imprime et vous envoie les Procès-Verbaux de la Session de Luxembourg de 1910. Afin qu'à l'Avenir je puisse avec plus d'exactitude reproduire les idées, les vœux, et surtout le texte des votes proposés, notamment s'ils n'ont pas été exprimés en français, langue généralement adoptée dans nos séances, je vous prie de vouloir bien me remettre à l'avenir une note ou le texte de vos discours. Je me permets de vous rappeler que les propositions qui doivent figurer à l'ordre du jour de la Session de 1911, qui aura lieu à Budapest du 20 au 30 Mai, devront m'être parvenues avant le 20 avril 1911. Veuillez, Monsieur et Cher Collègue, agréer l'expression de mes sentiments les plus dévoués.”, International Olympic Committee, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1910-06-11 au 13 - PV 13e Session Luxembourg, P. 4.

that the schedule be more comprehensive, and with that in mind they put forward a further program at the IOC meeting in 1910 which was met with approval.³⁰ As a result, the 1912 Summer Olympics program was composed of 14 sports encompassing 18 disciplines and 102 events. Final approval of the list took place at the Session of IOC in Budapest, on May 23, 1911.³¹

The official invitation to compete in the Games was issued on November 18, 1910, to 27 countries, either directly or through their representative on the IOC. A further 15 countries were to have been invited, but as they had no IOC representatives, the Swedish authorities were unsure how to proceed. Once the organizing committee for the Games received confirmation of the athletic associations in each of the 15 countries, they too were sent invitations. Based on the previous experience, the Swedish Committee was not ready to accept entries for the Fifth Olympiad by telegram at the last minute, as this system has caused the British Olympic Council the greatest inconvenience in 1908. New approach of Stockholm Committee underlined the need for participants to sign separate ballot and to send them earlier in order to be considered as valid.³²

³⁰ “Le programme des Jeux Olympiques à Stockholm, en 1912, est rédigé d’après le plan qui a été provisoirement fixé par le Comité d’organisation en sa dernière séance, le 6 juin.”, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1910-06-11 au 13 - PV 13e Session Luxembourg, P. 11.

³¹ “Après une longue discussion, le Président prie le Colonel Balck et le Comte de Rosen de vouloir étudier une nouvelle rédaction donnant satisfaction aux desiderata exprimés par différents Collègues, et maintenant en même temps, en son intégrité le principe du Jury International adopté à Berlin.”, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1911-05-23 au 27 - PV 14e Session Budapest, P. 9.

³² “Le Rév. de Courey-Lafian donne le conseil au Comité suédois de ne pas admettre les engagements pour la Ve Olympiade par télégramme a la der nière heure, car ce système a causé au British Olympic Council les plus grands inconvénients. Il conseille de ne tenir pour valables que les engage ments faits par bulletin signé par le concurrent.”, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1910-06-11 au 13 - PV 13e Session Luxembourg, P. 4.

Opening ceremony was held on July 6. Therefore, a “real” period of the Olympics was restricted at only three weeks, which was actually beginning of modern approach, where Olympiad usually lasts for 16 days. Swedish members of IOC feared that with the introduction of many sports the program would have to be extended by a week. IOC decided that extending of the games was unnecessary, and that some competitions could be held simultaneously on different fields, as excluding certain games would “risk displeasing the English and the Americans”.³³ Three previous editions of Olympic Games lasted much longer – five to six months. Only Athens in 1896 lasted 10 days, but the number of participants there was much smaller than in Stockholm. With all five continents represented, Stockholm 1912 can also be considered the first global Olympic Games, with 28 nations taking part. The Kingdom of Serbia was de jure independent country since international recognition at the Congress of Berlin, in July 1878. Immediately after the First Congress and foundation of the IOC in Paris, on June 23, 1894, Serbia submitted its own application for the membership in organization. Application was rejected, mainly from the side of the then Secretary of the IOC, Ferenc Kemény (1860-1944). Kemény was one of the founding members of IOC in 1894, and very influential figure in Hungary. As a crucial Hungarian sports organizer, he

³³ “Le colonel Balck observe qu'avec tous les jeux dont le Comité a exprimé le vœu de voir ajoutés à 'Olympiade suédoise, il faudrait allonger le programme d'une semaine. Prennent part à la discussion plusieurs membres du C. I. O., et on décide que la prolongation des jeux est inutile, que certains concours pourront être faits simultanément sur des terrains différents, car en excluant certains jeux on risquerait de déplaire aux Anglais et aux Américains. Le comte de Rozen déclare que les Suédois se proposent d'étudier de nouveau cette question. — Approuvé. Le Rév. de Courcy-Laffan demande que le programme-projet présenté par le Comité suédois indique d'une façon spéciale les points définitivement arrêtés à Luxembourg. Le colonel Balck, d'accord avec lui, lui promet toute satisfaction.”, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1910-06-11 au 13 - PV 13e Session Luxembourg, P. 40-41.

was also founding secretary of the Hungarian Olympic Committee, created in 1895. He was born in Nagybecskerek (today Zrenjanin, in Serbia) and was never pretended to hide his general hostile attitude towards Serbia.³⁴ Like in the case of Czech representative and founding member of IOC, Jiří Guth, Ferenc Kemény also came into contact with Baron Pierre de Coubertin in France at the end of 1880s and became his close friend. This fact gave huge manoeuvring space for Hungary in the years and decades to come.

Already at the First Olympics in Athens Serbia managed to participate in some way. King Aleksandar I Obrenović (ruled 1889-1903) was invited to the Olympics by the Greek King George I (ruled 1863-1913) so he has travelled to Athens and stayed there for five days during Olympics. National anthem of Serbia was played and the flag of the Kingdom of Serbia was raised at one of the Olympic venues. Those facts underlined the official presence of the Serbian king at the First Olympiad and in the same time presence of Serbia. This official visit was extensively covered by the Serbian press so the parts of Serbian public have been in position to know even more about the sports competitions in Athens and to further imply interest for the institutional development of sports in Serbia.³⁵

Sports in Serbia had long standing tradition already since the Middle Ages. Serbian medieval state originated at the beginning of 7th century in the area that was situated between Byzantium and Western Europe and so it was exposed to influences from both sides. Competitions in medieval Serbia were actually significant part of the everyday life. This

³⁴ Todorović 2003: 26.

³⁵ Šiljak 2020: 27.

applied for almost entire population, which encompassed aristocracy and serfs. Sports competitions were mostly closely connected with martial arts and general preparations for the battling and wars. In numerous cases, in addition to entertainment, the sports activities also were part of an institutional obligation. Inside of nobility, those aspects were connected with the chivalry code and this knightly approach had also a religious umbrella in searching for role models.³⁶

The already mentioned examples of the organization of sports competitions modelled after the ancient Greek Olympic Games in early modern Europe implied the development of a similar concept in the territory of contemporary Northern Serbia, near Subotica, in 1878. The name of the competition that was organized annually in the period 1878-1914 near Lake Palić, in what was then Austria-Hungary, was “The Little Palić Olympics”. The founder and “spiritus movens” of this competition was Baron Lajos Vermes (1890-1945). He was born and raised in Subotica and was one of biggest sports enthusiasts in Austria-Hungary, with a huge impact on general development of institutional sports in Subotica and region around Lake Palić.³⁷ Throughout 19th century general influence of France on social and cultural life of Serbia was constantly in growing. At the crossroads of centuries this influence was clearly at its peak. Connections with the France have been especially strong in the field of education, so many Serbian students were educated in France at the times.³⁸ With the introduction of International Olympic Committee in 1894 and rapid development of Olympic movement, especially Serbian officers, who

³⁶ Zarković 2022: 99.

³⁷ Šiljak 2020: 23-24.

³⁸ Zec, Baljkas, Paunović 2015: 32.

returned from studies in France where they were influenced by ideas of Pierre de Coubertin, started to implement ideas of Olympism. Sports competitions were increasingly called Olympics and clubs that have been formed in various cities around Serbia were more and more called Olympic clubs. Another level of expansion started with “Serbian Olympiad”, organised in Belgrade, in 1908, with the competitions in athletics, rowing and swimming.³⁹

All of this further implicated desire among Serbian sports enthusiasts and athletes to participate at Olympic Games and become part of the International Olympic Movement. Next institutional step was formation of the Serbian Olympic Club in Belgrade, on February 10, 1910. Crucial person in this endeavour was captain Svetomir Đukić (1882-1960), who for years excelled in sports competitions both as competitor and organiser.⁴⁰ After foundation in 1910 there was a clear goal set by the Serbian Olympic Club to become a member of the International Olympic Committee and so to secure participation in the Olympic Games in Stockholm in 1912.

Official invitation for the participation of Serbian athletes at the Olympic Games in Stockholm 1912 sent by hosts was enthusiastically embraced in Serbia. Through the qualifying competition in Belgrade, held in May 1912, two Serbian athletes, Dušan Milošević (for the 100-meter and 200-meter races) and Dragutin Tomašević (10,000-meter race and the marathon race) secured their rights to represent Serbia at the Games in Stockholm.⁴¹

³⁹ Šiljak 2020: 29.

⁴⁰ Zec, Baljkas, Paunović 2015: 29-30..

⁴¹ Šiljak 2020: 30.

With the official admission to the IOC, the Serbian Olympic Club changed its name to the Olympic Committee of Serbia. It was admitted as the 28th National Committee into the composition of the IOC, and Svetomir Đukić was admitted as a permanent member, which he remained until 1948. But his admittance at the IOC Session in Stockholm, on July 4, 1912, was very complicated. President of the IOC Pierre de Coubertin personally stated that “he had received a letter from the Serbian Olympic Committee requesting a representative on the International Olympic Committee.” Without any further notification of the discussion in the official minutes from the Session, it was only noted: “It was decided to postpone the response to this request until a future meeting.”⁴² Next meeting of the Session in Stockholm, where the question of Serbian member of the IOC was raised, took place six days later, on July 10. President Coubertin again “proposes the election of a Serbian colleague”, and again the official minutes have only: “The decision on this question will be postponed to the next Session.”⁴³ And finally, on the very last day of the IOC session, July 17, the President decided to bring the question of a Serbian candidate for the IOC for the third time. This time his initiative was helped by Russian representative, Prince Ouroussoff, who also asked the IOC Members to accept the Serbian candidacy. He underlined that the IOC has a duty to elect Serbian member and that Serbian people have “sporting qualities”. The President then “puts to a vote the choice of a Serbian candidat“, after

⁴² “Le Président informe les Membres du C.I.O. qu'il a reçu une lettre du C.O. Serbe qui désire avoir un représentant dans le Comité International Olympique. On décide d'ajourner la réponse à cette demande à une prochaine séance.”, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1912-07-04 au 10 et 17 - PV 15e Session Stockholm, P. 11.

⁴³ “Le Président propose l'élection d'un Collègue Serbe. La décision sur cette question sera remise à la prochaine Séance.”, Ibid. P. 40.

having been assured that he possesses the required qualities. This time proposal was approved unanimously.⁴⁴

Situation with the granting of Sixth Olympiad set for 1916 to Berlin was not completely solved inside of IOC after the agreement between Sweden in Germany made in 1909. At the Session of IOC held in Budapest, in May 1911, German representative in IOC, Count Adalbert von Sierstorpff (1856-1922), requested that the Committee finally grants the Sixth Olympiad to Germany. The President Coubertin took note of the request on behalf of the Bureau and noted that this same request had been made for the first time 10 years ago, in 1901, and that the Committee would have to consider it “when the time came”. He also announced that he had received three other requests to host the 6th Olympiad: from Alexandria (Egypt), Cleveland, and San Francisco.⁴⁵ It was clear that Pierre de Coubertin was not so in favour of granting the Olympics to Germany. Relations between France and Germany were at the very low point because of the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911.

Around the next session, held in Stockholm, at the beginning of Olympics, on July 4, 1912, German power and pressure were even mightier

⁴⁴ “Le Président demande la parole au sujet d'un candidat Serbe pour le C.I.O. Le Prince Ouroussoff prie les Membres du C.I.O. d'accepter la candidature Serbe. Il trouve que c'est le devoir du C.I.O. de le faire. Parle sur les qualités sportives des Serbes. Le Président met au vote de choisir un candidat Serbe après avoir eu la garantie qu'il possède les qualités requises. Approuvé à l'unanimité.”, Ibid. P. 49.

⁴⁵ “Le Comte Sierstorpff demande que le Comité veuille accorder la VIe Olympiade à l'Allemagne.

Le Président prend note, au nom du Bureau, de la demande et observe que cette même demande a été faite pour la première fois, il y a déjà 10 ans, en 1901, et que le Comité ne pourra pas ne pas en tenir compte quand le moment sera venu. Il annonce avoir reçu trois autres demandes pour avoir la VIe Olympiade : d'Alexandrie (Egypte), de Cleveland et de San Francisco. “, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1911-05-23 au 27 - PV 14e Session Budapest, P. 10-11.

and there was no space for manoeuvring anymore. At the beginning President Coubertin communicated the requests he had received regarding the hosting of Olympics 1916, which were as follows: 1 – Berlin, 2 – Budapest, 3 – Alexandria. Hungarian representative, Jules de Musza proclaimed withdrawal of their candidature in the favour of Germany. Berlin was thus unanimously and by acclamation proclaimed the host city of the Sixth Olympiad. Alexandria was not even mentioned. German representative Count Sierstorpf expressed his gratitude to the IOC on behalf of Germany and declared that “he had the full support of His Majesty the Emperor and the Government”. The President Coubertin proposed that the IOC should send a telegram with congratulations to His Majesty the Emperor of Germany.⁴⁶ Already at the next meeting of IOC Session in the afternoon, President Coubertin has read an answer in a telegram from German Chancellor Bethman-Hollweg expressing „His Majesty the German Emperor's satisfaction at the choice of Berlin as the site of the Sixth Olympiad.“⁴⁷ Story about Berlin and hosting of the Olympics was finally successfully over after 11 years inside of IOC. In that very moment no one has expected horrors of the First World War and cancellation of Olympics set for 1916. Next edition of IOC Session was

⁴⁶ “Le Président communique les demandes qu'il a reçues qui sont les suivantes : 1 – Berlin, 2 – Budapest,

3 – Alexandrie. Monsieur Musza prend la parole pour désister en faveur de l'Allemagne. Berlin est donc proclamé à l'unanimité et par acclamation Siège de la VI Olympiade. Le Comte Sierstorpf remercie le C.I.O. au nom de L'Allemagne et declare avoir l'appui acquis de Sa Majesté L'Empereur et du Gouvernement. Le Président propose au C.I.O. d'envoyer un télégramme à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne.“, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1912-07-04 au 10 et 17 - PV 15e Session Stockholm, P. 12-13.

⁴⁷ “Le Président donne lecture d'un télégramme du Chancelier Bethman-Hollweg exprimant la satisfaction de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne pour le choix de Berlin comme siège de la VIème Olympiade.“, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1912-07-04 au 10 et 17 - PV 15e Session Stockholm, P. 25.

actually identical with Fifth IOC Congress and took part in Lausanne, Switzerland, in May 1913. The title of the Congress was “Psychology and physiology of sports”. Future hosting of Olympics was not discussed and one of the main issues was the presentation of the city of Lausanne itself. New member of the IOC, from Serbia, Svetomir Đukić, was not able to attend and he has excused himself, together with several more members that have been precluded to participate because of different reasons, among others Russian representative Prince Ouroussoff and Austrian representative Otto zu Windisch- Graetz.⁴⁸

The presentation of Lausanne was implemented on the highest possible standard, with numerous organizations of banquets, dinners, tours and trips. Baron Godefroy de Blonay, Swiss member of the IOC, and his wife Baroness de Blonay hosted a grand celebration in Lausanne in honour of the IOC. The celebration was attended by the complete diplomatic corps accredited to Bern, and the elite of Lausanne and Geneva society. The following day, the members of the Committee “spent the afternoon at the Château de Grandson, where they enjoyed a snack.”⁴⁹ Even in May 1913 it was not possible to foresee the extent of upcoming First World War. But it was very obvious that Lausanne managed to make a huge impact on the

⁴⁸ “S'étaient fait excuser : MM. Théodore A. Cook, S. A. S. le prince Othon de Windisch Graetz, A. C. Bolanachi, le comte Mercati, le comte Andrassy, le capitaine Sverre, Plagino, le comte Ribeaupierre, le prince Ouroussoff, le baron de Willebrand et le capitaine Djoukitch.”, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1913-05-06 au 07-PV 16e Session Lausanne P. 97.

⁴⁹ “Le baron Godefroy de Blonay membre du Comité International pour la Suisse et la baronne de Blonay ont donné à Lausanne le mardi soir 6 mai, en l'honneur du Comité International, une grande fête à laquelle assistaient l'Ambassadeur de France, le Ministre d'Allemagne et la baronne de Romberg, ainsi que la plupart des ministres accrédités à Berne... et l'élite de la société Lausannoise et Genevoise. Le lendemain les membres du Comité ont passé l'après-midi au château de Grandson où ils ont goûté.”, Ibid. P. 100.

President of IOC and majority of members. When the war started in 1914 and Paris was in danger because of relative short distance to the frontlines it was Lausanne that was chosen as the seat of IOC and the whole organization was transferred there in 1915. Lausanne is the seat of IOC even today.

The last edition of the IOC Session before the outbreak of First World War took place in Paris, at Sorbonne, in June 1914, and it was connected with 20th Anniversary of IOC foundation at the very same place.⁵⁰ This IOC Session was very pompous and the President Coubertin wanted to display all achievements that IOC implemented in the previous two decades. Meeting on June 17 started with a brief presentation of the addresses of congratulations sent to the IOC and its President, which were listed by Hungarian representative, Jules de Muzsa. The first one that was proclaimed and read out loud was from the Crown Prince of Serbia, Aleksandar.⁵¹ But there was no much time for celebration of IOC. At the end of same month with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in Sarajevo, the provincial capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina province, that was formally annexed by Austria-Hungary in 1908, things went out of control regarding the future war. This assassination implicated huge political crisis in upcoming weeks (the July Crisis) which led to Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia and the start of First World War on July 28, 1914. All

⁵⁰ "Séance solennelle dans le Grand amphithéâtre du Palais de la Sorbonne pour la célébration du XXme anniversaire du Rétablissement des Jeux Olympiques. ", IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1914-06-13 au 14 et 06-23-PV 17e Session Paris, P. 21.

⁵¹ "La séance débuta par la rapide présentation des adresses de félicitations envoyées au Comité International Olympique et à son président et qui furent énumérées par M. Jules de Muzsa. Elles émanaient de S. A. R. le prince Héritier de Serbie, de S. A. R. la Grande Duchesse de Luxembourg... ", Ibid. P. 104.

activities of the IOC have been halted because of the war that lasted until November 1918. National Olympic committees of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria have been excluded from the IOC and their members in IOC have been suspended. After the end of the war, Austria-Hungary was dissolved as unified country, with newly formed Austria and Hungary banned from participation at the Olympics, together with Germany, Bulgaria and Ottoman Empire.

Next Session of the IOC took place in Lausanne, in the hotel “Beau-Séjour”, at the beginning of April 1919 in completely different milieu. Next to the President Coubertin, only eight other members of the IOC participated. New list of IOC members was presented, without earlier members from the states included in the Central Powers. Svetomir Đukić was further on listed as the representative of Serbia. Jiří Guth was listed as the representative of Czechoslovakia for the first time. Prince Ourossoff was still listed as the representative of Russia.⁵²

The main task of the IOC Session in Lausanne 1919 was the decision about the host of next Olympics in 1920. Belgian representative, Count Baillet Latour, confirmed the request made to the IOC already in 1914 by the city of Antwerp to see the celebration of the Seventh Olympiad in that city. He has supported candidature with a few details. The role of Belgium concerning the suffering under German occupation throughout First World War was especially prominent inside of Entente political system. All members voted in the favour of Antwerp unanimously, proclaiming:

⁵² “Serbie - Col. Sv. Djoukitch [Djukic]... Tchéco-Slovaquie - Dr Jiri Guth... Russie - Pce Léon Ourossoff.”, International Olympic Committee, IOC HA IOCS 1910-1920, 1919-04-05 au 08 - PV 18e Session Lausanne (transcription), P. 4.

*“The IOC, in a unanimous tribute to Belgium, decides to entrust it with the task of celebrating the VII Olympiad by organizing the 1920 Olympic Games. The IOC invites all national Olympic Committees to join in this tribute by working to the best of their ability to ensure the participation of their respective countries in these Games.”*⁵³ The creation of the new country in the region - the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, when the Slovenian and Croatian nations joined the Kingdom of Serbia, was followed by a need for a unique Olympic Committee. International recognition of the Olympic Committee of Yugoslavia took place automatically through the inheritance of the Olympic Committee of Serbia, with no specific procedure for admission to the International Olympic Committee. The Olympic Committee of Yugoslavia kept this name until 2003 when it became the Olympic Committee of Serbia and Montenegro. Since 2006, its name has been the Olympic Committee of Serbia.

Next session of the IOC started simultaneously with the beginning of 1920 Summer Olympics in Antwerp. That was usual approach throughout the recent history of the Olympics and Olympic Movement. Opening ceremony of the Games took place on August 14. First meeting of the IOC Session was scheduled for August 17. With the participation of King of the Belgians, Albert I (ruled 1909-1934), at the inaugural meeting, President of IOC Pierre de Coubertin addressed now again very numerous

⁵³ “ Le Comte H. Baillet Latour confirme la demande, adressée au C.I.O. en 1914, par la ville d'Anvers, tendant à voir la célébration de la VIIe Olympiade dans cette ville ; il appuie cette invitation de quelques détails. Résolutions votées. 1) Le C.I.O., dans un hommage unanime à la Belgique, décide de lui confier le soin de célébrer la VIIe olympiade en organisant les Jeux olympiques de 1920. Le C.I.O. invite tous les Comitès Ol.[ympique] nationaux à s'associer à cet hommage en travaillant de leur mieux à assurer la participation de leurs pays respectifs à ces Jeux.. ”, Ibid, P. 5.

members of the IOC. Among them were two representatives of newly formed Yugoslavian state, under the name Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Next to Svetomir Đukić, who was a member since 1912, second member from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was Franjo Bučar (1866-1946). Franjo Bučar was one of the founding figures of The Yugoslav Olympic Committee, new organization that was founded in Zagreb in 1919. It was recognized by the IOC in 1920. The seat was moved from Zagreb to Belgrade in 1927. On the list of participants they have been presented for the first time as representatives of the state called „Serbo-Croatie-Slav“.⁵⁴ The candidacy of Franjo Bučar for membership in the IOC was unanimously adopted.⁵⁵ Hungary placed unofficial request to rejoin the IOC. But Édouard de Laveleye (1854-1938), president of the Belgian Olympic Committee and member of the IOC As for Hungary's, simply stated that „there is nothing to change in the status quo“ and his standing was unanimously accepted.⁵⁶ Hungary was excluded from the participation at the Olympics until 1924, same as Austria. Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes participated at the Olympics in Antwerp only with its football team.

⁵⁴ IOC HA IOCS 1910-19201920-08-17 au 30 - PV 19e Session Anvers (transcription), P. 4.

⁵⁵ “La candidature de M. Dr François (Franjo) Bucar (Yougoslavie) est adoptée à l'unanimité.”, Ibid.

⁵⁶ “Quant à la demande officieuse de la Hongrie d'entrer de nouveau au C.I.O. on accepte à l'unanimité la proposition de M. de Laveleye qu'il n'y a rien à changer au status quo.”, Ibid. P. 5.

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SUMMARY

Institutional development of the world sports at the crossroads of 19th and 20th century opened new possibilities for unified political and social approach among general tense international relations because of the bloc buildings in Europe. Foundation of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in Paris 1894, by Pierre de Coubertin, was crucial

moment in the appliance of ancient Olympic ideals that have been oriented towards the establishment of much more peacefully and harmonically structured society.

Chasing of such ideals was certain chance for improvement of relations between the states that were already involved into different aspects of conflicts. Kingdom of Serbia and Austria-Hungary were at the brink of war throughout first decade of 20th century. However, perspective of common dealing inside of the IOC was not perceived as a mean of normalization of relations from the side of Austria-Hungary. On the contrary, growing of the modern Olympic Movement was almost from the very start connected with the growing of political instrumentalization of the institutional frame of the organization. Aspirations of Serbia to become member of the IOC and to participate at the Olympic Games was connected with the obligations to cross many hurdles that have been set mainly from Vienna or Budapest.

After final admittance in the IOC and opening of the possibility to participate at the Olympics in Stockholm 1912, it was even more clear that position of Serbia depends on the balance of power between the political blocks in Europe. Close relations of Serbia with the France on one, and with the Russian Empire on the other side, were of huge importance to make first steps inside of the Olympic family. Olympics in Stockholm have generally been most successful Olympics of all organised until that moment and most massive regarding the participation of the countries and competitors.

Institutionally the IOC was at its peak around Stockholm and immediately after. But with the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia, First World War erupted in 1914 and the development of the Olympic Movement came to a grinding halt. Among other things, Olympic Games set to be organised in Berlin 1916 must have been cancelled. First Olympic Games after the war, in Antwerp 1920, resulted with the participation of some new countries, like in the case of Yugoslavia (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), of which Serbia was constituent part after 1918. Austria and Hungary were both banned from the participation at the Olympics in Antwerp, because of the perception of their role in the outbreak of the war.

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