

DIGITALNE MEDIJSKE TEHNOLOGIJE I DRUŠTVENO-OBRAZOVNE PROMENE

10



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**DIGITALNE MEDIJSKE TEHNOLOGIJE I
DRUŠTVENO-OBRAZOVNE PROMENE 10**

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UVODNIK

Medijski pluralizam preduslov je za slobodan protok informacija, izražavanje ideja i mišljenja i predstavlja imperativ svake demokratski uređene zajednice. Od stepena njegove ispunjenosti, kako na spoljašnjem planu (brojnost i raznovrsnost medija na određenom medijskom tržištu), tako i na unutrašnjem (raznolikost medijskih sadržaja, dostupnost različitih mišljenja, kao i zastupljenost svih društvenih i etničkih grupa u društvu), zavisi kvalitet društvenog komuniciranja i ostvarivanje uloge medija u zastupanju interesa javnosti. Imajući to u vidu, cilj ovog zbornika bio je da se iz različitih teorijskih i metodoloških perspektiva društveno-humanističkih nauka sagledaju izazovi sa kojima se suočava medijski pluralizam u savremenom kontekstu.

U većini zemalja u svetu medijski pluralizam podložan je srednjem i visokom stepenu rizika, što pokazuju rezultati različitih indikatora merenja. Osim problematičnog stepena slobode izražavanja i pristupa medijima manjina, lokalnih i regionalnih zajednica i ranjivih društvenih grupa, zatim nezavisnosti regulatora, transparentnosti i koncentracije medijskog vlasništva, politizacije medijskih sistema, digitalno okruženje stvorilo je nove izazove za pluralizam. Uvođenje algoritama, veštačke inteligencije i automatizovanog donošenja odluka od strane privatnih kompanija i vlada dovodi do proizvoljnog blokiranja, filtriranja i uklanjanja internetskih sadržaja i uvođenja cenzure u pojedinim zemljama. Imajući u vidu višedimenzionalnu problematiku medijskog pluralizma, zbornik je koncipiran u dve tematske celine prateći različite istraživačke perspektive: na mikronivou – pojedinačnih članova publike, tradicionalnih medijskih organizacija kao i civilnih inicijativa u digitalnoj sferi, i na makronivou – regulatornih mehanizama uređenja medijskog tržišta.

Zbornik sadrži 15 radova – nastavnika, studenata doktorskih i master studija, kao i samostalnih istraživača iz devet zemalja: Bosne i Hercegovine, Crne Gore, Finske, Hrvatske, Rumunije, Srbije, Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Ujedinjenih Arapskih Emirata. Deo radova predstavljen je na 12. međunarodnoj naučnoj konferenciji Mostovi medijskog obrazovanja, održanoj na Filozofskom fakultetu u Novom Sadu 26. i 27. maja 2022. godine. Zbornik je nastao i kao rezultat istraživanja u okviru realizacije projekta (šifra III 47020) koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja

Republike Srbije od 2010. i kategorizovan je kao tematski zbornik međunarodnog značaja (M14).

U Novom Sadu, decembra 2022.

Urednice zbornika
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INTRODUCTION

Media pluralism is a prerequisite for the free flow of information, the expression of ideas and opinions, and is an imperative for every democratically organized community. The quality of social communication and the realization of the role of the media in the interest of the public depends on the degree of its fulfilment, both on the external level (the number and variety of media in a certain media market), and on the internal level (the diversity of media content, the availability of different opinions as well as the representation of different social and ethnic groups in society). Bearing that in mind, the goal of this volume was to look, from different theoretical and methodological perspectives of the social and humanities, at the challenges faced by media pluralism in the contemporary context.

In most countries in the world media pluralism is subject to a medium and high degree of risk, as shown by the results of various measurement indicators. In addition to the problematic degree of freedom of expression and access to the media of minorities, local and regional communities, and vulnerable social groups, the independence of regulators, transparency and concentration of media ownership, politicization of media systems, the digital environment has led to new challenges to pluralism. The introduction of algorithms, artificial intelligence and automated decision-making by private companies and governments leads to the arbitrary blocking, filtering and removal of internet content and the introduction of censorship in some countries. Bearing in mind the multidimensional issue of media pluralism, the volume was conceived in two thematic units following different research perspectives - at the micro level of individual audience members, traditional media organizations, as well as civic initiatives in the digital sphere, and at the macro level of regulatory mechanisms regulating the media market.

The collection contains 15 papers - by teachers, doctoral and master's students, as well as independent researchers from 8 countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Finland, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America. Part of the papers was also presented at the 12th International Scientific Conference *Bridges of Media Education*, held at the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad on May 26 and 27, 2022. The volume was also created as a result of research within the implementation of the project (No. III 47020) funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological

Development of the Republic of Serbia since 2010 and is categorized as a thematic volume of international importance (M14).

Novi Sad, December 2022.

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SADRŽAJ

Jasna Duraković, Jasmin Hasić FOREIGN-DIRECTED MEDIA CONTENT AND NORMATIVE LOCALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT NARRATIVES ABROAD: AN ANALYSIS OF EDITORIAL POLICIES OF CHINESE NEWS AGENCY XINHUA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	11
Ivana Stojanović Prelević, Ilija Milosavljević CITIZEN JOURNALISM, BLOGGERS AND ETHICS.....	29
Lejla Turčilo LOKALNI MEDIJI U BIH: DA LI JE PLURALIZAM (JOŠ UVIJEK) VAŽAN?	43
Simona Bader, Corina Sîrb PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES OF ROMANIAN INDEPENDENT MEDIA PUBLISHERS	59
Nataša Ružić SKRIVENO I PRIRODNO OGLAŠAVANJE NA PORTALU JAVNOG EMITERA	71
Stefan Janjić, Jelena Kleut UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION THROUGH THE MEDIA SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE	89
Dejan Pralica, Smiljana Milinkov „SLOBODA” GOVORA MRŽNJE – PROBLEMATIKA ZLOUPOTREBE SLOBODE GOVORA.....	109
Dušan Ristić ALGORITAMSKA PRISTRASNOST: PROBLEMATIZACIJA I ISTRAŽIVAČKA AGENDA.....	127
Dejan Oblak COMPARISON OF THE HEADLINES IN CROATIAN TELEVISION NEWS PROGRAMS AND ON THE FRONT PAGES OF DAILY NEWSPAPERS DURING THE PANDEMIC	141
Csilla Horváth AND QUIET FLOWS THE OB DISCOURSE OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR IN THE OB-UGRIC PRESS AND SOCIAL MEDIA.....	163

Brankica Drašković	
PREDSTAVLJANJE RATA U UKRAJINI: ANALIZA DISKURSA TELEVIZIJSKIH VESTI	177
Emma E.S. Brandt	
INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND RESISTANCE: EMOTIONS AND MORAL FRAMEWORKS IN THE MEDIA CONSUMPTION OF SERBIAN YOUTH	193
Jasmina Arsenijević, Milica Andevski	
PERCEPTION OF IMPLICIT MARKETING MESSAGES AMONG THE STUDENT POPULATION	207
Marija Marković	
DIGITALNO NASILJE MEĐU UČENICIMA – DA LI SU UČENICI SA INVALIDITETOM, RAZVOJNIM SMETNJAMA I TEŠKOĆAMA NAROČITO RANJIVA GRUPA?	225
Danica Čigoja Piper	
ODVAŽNI LJUDI: OD NEGATIVNOG DO POZITIVNOG MEDIJSKOG DISKURSA O INVALIDNOSTI U MEDIJIMA UJEDINJENIH ARAPSKIH EMIRATA	239

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**FOREIGN-DIRECTED MEDIA CONTENT AND NORMATIVE LOCALIZATION
OF GOVERNMENT NARRATIVES ABROAD: AN ANALYSIS OF EDITORIAL
POLICIES OF CHINESE NEWS AGENCY XINHUA IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA**

International promotion of China-friendly ‘narratives’ to non-Chinese audiences abroad has become the ‘new norm’ in the Chinese government’s foreign-political agenda. Chinese foreign-directed news agencies and media outlets have activated broadcasts in various languages, and in almost all corners of the world. They have also opened many offices in various countries of interest. In some regions, they have even acquired shares in local media companies and actively worked with, and influenced, local media outlets to market their own news outputs (Cook, 2020). The Chinese government has even sponsored news articles in the Western media, including the Washington Post and New York Times (Dotson, 2021). Despite the exhaustive finances and resources invested, the ability of Chinese media and news agencies to establish credibility, stable viewership and readership in various countries faces several practical challenges. For instance, the lack of a tailor-made approach in ‘selling’ news products to non-Chinese audiences undermines the Chinese government’s efforts to localize their narratives in the Western Balkans. This article examines the norm localization and contextualization of Chinese foreign-directed media platforms in the Western Balkans, through an in-depth analysis of the work and editorial policies of the Chinese News Agency Xinhua in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The focus is set on investigating the editorial guidelines and the models used to illustrate China’s interests in B&H and the Western Balkans, its positioning within the international arena and in internationally relevant events, as well as China’s strategy to draw a line between China and the West.

Key words: Norm Localization, Media, Xinhua News Agency, China, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Chinese government has taken steps toward intensifying and expanding its global media presence in the past decade (Tsai 2016; Hu et al. 2018), including promoting China-friendly news via various non-Chinese social media like Twitter and Facebook (Kinetz, 2021). In 2009, the Chinese Communist Party issued a policy document titled ‘The General Plan for Building Major Media’s Capacity of International Communication’ (2009-2020), which sets out the principles of the ‘going-out’ policy of Chinese media, capable of entering the international media environment with aims of portraying China’s growing global role in global politics and economics (Ye and Alborno, 2018). Correspondingly, a large number of Chinese government-controlled media and news outlets, officials and diplomats residing abroad have adopted new models of communication, reoriented their promotion focus, and have actively ‘gone out’ and ‘gone global’ to publicly endorse the positions, accomplishments, and interests of their government within their respective host countries and other available platforms. Over time, China’s media-based soft power has spread to many spheres of influence. However, the overall efforts to transform Chinese soft power and its positive image in the globalized world have for the most part remained undetected. The objectives of China’s international ‘media capture’ strategy have been questioned and disputed in various regional contexts, mainly due to its potential to undermine the democratic values and media independence of Western countries (cf. Bachman, 2020). The prevalent fear of Chinese foreign-directed media propaganda infiltrating ‘local’ audiences around the globe has also been observed as a potential security threat to democratic states. While some regions of the world remain strongly fortified against the influence of the Chinese international information-spreading apparatus (Jiang, 2016), others have already slowly fallen under its sway (cf. Kim, 2020). Despite the exhaustive finances and resources invested in promoting China-friendly content in the Western Balkans, China’s lack of international credibility and a tailor-made approach in ‘selling’ news products to non-Chinese audiences are two key reasons why Chinese media strategies haven’t gained a foothold regionally.

This article aims to address China’s media strategy in the Western Balkans, through a case study analysis of the editorial policies of the Chinese Xinhua News Agency local branch office in Sarajevo. The specific focus is set on investigating the models editors and journalists use to illustrate China’s interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Chinese positioning in the international arena, including relevant international events.

2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

The primary objective of this research is to examine how Chinese news and media agencies wield power, exercise ideology, and frame local mindsets (cf. Fowler et al. 2018), by focusing on organizations' internal editorial guidelines and policies. This article specifically addresses China's international media placement and positioning strategy in the Western Balkans, which, despite exhaustive finances and resources invested, faces numerous practical challenges in gaining a normative foothold. This will be done through a case study analysis of the editorial policies and guidelines of the Chinese Xinhua News Agency local branch office in Sarajevo. The specific emphasis is set on examining the local editorial policy models that shape specific inputs and general guidelines local journalists need to follow when propagating and elucidating China's interests in B&H and the Western Balkans.

This article traces Sarajevo-based Xinhua's editorial decision-making patterns in diffusing and adapting Chinese government-sanctioned foreign-directed media narratives and value-based norms in the Western Balkans. It strives to unearth the evolution of these policy patterns and their key features, and contextualize their application within a wider B&H media landscape. It focuses on uncovering the practical dimensions of Xinhua's media-editorial policies in B&H and juxtaposing them with the theoretical underpinnings of the contemporary Chinese foreign-directed media propaganda schemata. As such, the analysis contributes to ongoing academic and policy debates on normative positioning and the influences of foreign media on democratization in post-conflict countries.

Methodologically, the specific research goal revolves around the editorial choices behind the key media themes and subthemes forwarded by the Xinhua News Agency in B&H, since it was established and coordinated locally in Sarajevo. The objective is to identify the evolution and current displays related to sentiments, appeal techniques, frames, and the larger context in which media content is being diffused to local audiences. Specific data were collected through standardized in-depth semi-structured interviews with Xinhua's managing editor and former journalists and associates, all of whom wish to remain anonymous, to better contextualize the understanding of editorial decisions made (cf. Edwards and Holland 2013; Barkho, 2021). Due to the limited number of interlocutors willing and/or available to speak about this topic, the role of the local branch editors is comprehended as a form of 'systematic engagement' of socially conscious, transnational and territorially externalized actors (cf. Hasić and Karabegović, 2020), who manage policy preferences based on the inputs they

receive from HQs in Beijing. The data collected in interviews are complemented with the use of content analysis methods of Xinhua's publicly available regulatory documents and other secondary data on the subject available publicly (cf. Holloway and Todres 2007; Riffe et al. 2019), centering on topic-specific coding patterns and media data categorizations (cf. Stemler, 2000).

Xinhua News Agency was chosen as a specific case study of interest due to its specific positioning in the Chinese media landscape, and its tradition and exclusivity in news reporting. It is the only Chinese medium with an office based in Sarajevo, and in some other countries in the Western Balkans region. The Agency also played an important role in facilitating the Chinese government's diplomatic relations in various corners of the world (cf. Wang, 2001), and serves as an important tool for targeting foreign audiences. The Agency is also responsible for setting the tone for other Chinese media outlets internationally and eliminating the 'China-as-a-threat' discourse globally. The essential areas investigated in relation to the foreign-directed media-based propaganda techniques Xinhua employs in B&H are founded on contextualized forms of 'appeal to traditional values' embedded in modern international relations, as observed by Chinese officials, as well as on the 'fear appeal', reflected in the efforts of Chinese media and information agents to showcase China as a 'world super-power' ready to pursue and secure its own global interests.

3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND POSITIONING WITHIN THE LITERATURE

China's efforts to re-conceptualize its image in the world, executed through various forms of 'soft power' strategies and campaigns, have been driven by three key elements: culture and mass communication, Eastern political values, and foreign policy interests (Edney, 2012; Ye and Albornoz, 2018). The history of China's external-oriented media and information propaganda in the 21st century is predominantly characterized by large amounts of resources aimed at improving its image and influencing international public opinion. The areas where China wants to influence foreigners' opinions principally depend on the foreign models that Chinese media content creators learn from, taken in the context of advancing their external propaganda sector (cf. Ohlberg, 2013). China's outward publicity is widely considered to be embedded in the country's information culture, i.e. Party's and citizens' beliefs that spreading positive news about China to the rest of the world is a legitimate tool that helps to integrate and build Chinese society from within.

Mass human mobility and social networking, as the key components of the official Chinese information-positioning mission, shape the modern government-induced understanding of the term ‘propaganda’ in China, commonly labeled as ‘*xuanchuan*’ (roughly translated as ‘to announce a decree’). Though the origins of this concept were strongly influenced by Soviet ‘propaganda of integration’ and the US ‘scientific model of propaganda’, its contemporary meaning is effectively contextualized as neutral both among officials and the general public in China.³ Some media and communication scholars argue contemporary *xuanchuan* application schemata in China were not derived from the long-lasting, traditional Chinese political culture, which later was introduced into the modern mass media, but rather as the product of pursuits of Chinese intellectuals’ for national independence, modernization, and the overall awakening of the public (Liu, 2013). Others assert that the practical use of the term ‘*xuanchuan*’ in today’s Chinese political discourse is deeply rooted in the country’s history, social practices, and traditions, and has been steadily present in Chinese society during imperial, republican, socialist, and post-socialist eras (Lin, 2017). Despite outlined divergences in contextualizing the word’s origins and its meaning, the use of *xuanchuan* in the international context is fairly limited among Chinese media agents, and all attempts to spread pro-Chinese information to non-Chinese audiences are habitually cloaked under the ‘public diplomacy’ paradigm (Tsai, 2016), or various diplomatic euphemisms denoting ‘cultural’ or ‘media’ exchange’ (Edney, 2014).

Such an approach is built around a highly state-centric and state-owned apparatus, closely linked with censorship and a lack of basic press freedoms (Ye and Albornoz, 2018), emphasizing the cultural unity of the country and advancing the image of the Chinese people (i.e. the Han majority) (cf. Boden, 2019), while the ‘media discourse’ being produced and put forward is intended to be independent and isolated from Western values (Ohlberg, 2013). Its primary applicative dimension revolves around creating systemic determinations that aim to dispute Western-induced media content on controversial topics and stereotypes, considered to be biased by the Beijing-based government (Sun, 2018), such as the status of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet or Falun Gong, human rights violations

³ The word *xuanchuan* most commonly is used as a verb ‘to announce’ and ‘to convey,’ and in other contexts as a noun/concept denoting ‘spread of information’ or ‘illumination of something presented to the public’, ‘education of people’, or simply publicizing (*xuanchuan zhengce*). For more details, please see Lin (2017).

against the Uyghur minority (Cook, 2021), or the polemics related to the coronavirus incidents (Nossel, 2020; Shullman, 2020). Another dimension is centered on spreading China's counter-narrative and positioning within the international media arena and all relevant social networks (Ye and Alborno, 2018).

4. THE KEY FEATURES AND PRINCIPAL AGENTS OF CHINA'S GLOBAL MEDIA AND INFORMATION CONQUEST

The technological advancements of the 21st century have shaped the interests of every economically and militarily advanced country to enhance its 'soft power' capacities worldwide by applying its full information and media potential within the unlimited online and ever-globalizing television arena (Wu, 2016). The Chinese government has recognized this trend and taken several steps in managing China's 'soft power' vessels to attract attention and protect its interests abroad. China's policy of 'going out', forged in October 2000 at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, is considered one of the breakthrough moments in the country's recent outward-opening foreign policy agenda. In 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao, supported 'creating a favorable international public opinion environment' and a 'good image of China' (Bachman, 2020). His successor, President Xi Jinping, continued down this path by openly declaring his willingness to familiarize a new phase of Chinese externalized propaganda plans (Boden, 2019), and his support for the internationalization of Chinese media policies, establishing overseas media branch offices and setting up a number cultural centers (Ye and Alborno, 2018). In 2009, the Chinese government issued a new policy document on 'Building Major Media Capacity of International Communication', outlining all international traditional media-related expansion plans until 2020 (Hu et al. 2018). This was complemented by the gradual advancement of Chinese engagement in Western online media platforms (Sun, 2018) and social networks like Twitter and Facebook (Bolsover and Howard, 2018), while simultaneously opening up to foreign media in China that include more news coverage from various developing countries (Zhang, 2010).

The contemporary Chinese media and information internalization strategy, aimed at improving the country's image globally through forging friendly relationships and close cooperation with other countries and organizations to realize certain political or economic goals, is coordinated by the Central Propaganda (Publicity) Department (CCP), in charge of domestic affairs and the

Office of Foreign Propaganda⁴ which is responsible for the ‘external’ dimensions of Chinese propaganda, like monitoring research and news about China, as well as controlling the Internet. While both units cover all aspects of political, economic, cultural, and social themes, the practical dimensions of their ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ oriented work almost ceased to exist due to the most recent technological advancements in the media world (Brady, 2008).

The most perceptible attributes of the government-coordinated Chinese media and information strategy since 2012, in both traditional and online spaces in China and abroad, can be categorized into four basic pillars. The first one is related to the promotion of ‘positive’ and ‘pro-China’ narratives, reporting about all relevant events with China-appropriate contexts, while omitting potentially divisive issues. This approach is most evident in developing African states where Chinese media are continually working on shaping the ‘long-lasting friendship narrative,’ refraining from criticism and negative coverage of African political agents (Marsh, 2016) as opposed to the Western media that most commonly depict conflicts, hunger, and illnesses (cf. Gagliardone, 2013). The second core attribute is connected with building an image of ‘the powerful but peaceful China,’ indicating the country’s willingness to maintain world peace and stability, thus actively contributing to the positive developments in international relations and global justice (Bachman, 2020). The third characteristic of China’s international media is the presentation of Chinese history, culture, technological achievements, economics and potential to the world. Chinese media agents use every opportunity to portray their country as united and with a very long tradition of statehood (Bachman, 2020). The final feature is focused on fighting the disinformation patterns and ‘widespread misconceptions and biases’ about China, and ameliorating China’s image among foreign partners that have fallen under the media propaganda of the ‘West’ (Marsh, 2018), especially in the context of the role China played in the most recent COVID-19 pandemic.

The most notable executor of the Chinese government’s media policies abroad is China Global Television Network (formerly CCTV)⁵, China Radio

⁴ Also known as the Chinese State Council Information Office, founded in 1991.

⁵ China Central Television’s (CCTV) international presence dates back to 1985 when they launched an English news-satellite program in Southeast Asia. CCTV launched a 24-hour English-language channel, known as CCTV International and CCTV News, in 1992. Ever since, CCTV broadened its reach to over 100 countries, as well as its audiences’ language base by broadcasting in French (2004), Spanish (2004), Arabic (2009) and Russian (2009). CCTV initially focused only on information related to China without Chinese perspectives

International (CRI), People's Daily newspaper, and Xinhua News Agency (Sun, 2018; Bolsover and Howard, 2018). Since 1978, Xinhua News Agency has been expanding internationally by opening local offices in various countries, reaching 101 by the end of the twentieth century (Jiang and Zhang, 2019). Xinhua has been known as a risk-averse agent, serving as the official mouthpiece of the Chinese party, unlike other Chinese media, which have deliberately positioned themselves as more market-oriented (Repnikova, 2022). As outlined, this article specifically focuses on the role of Xinhua News Agency's work in B&H, as the only Chinese medium with an office based in Sarajevo. It traces the Sarajevo-based Xinhua's editorial decision-making patterns in diffusing and introducing Chinese government-sanctioned foreign-directed media narratives and value-based norms.

5. XINHU'S EDITORIAL POLICIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: MAIN FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Xinhua's structural and normative development is closely interlinked with political circumstances in China. The Agency's transition from a hybrid 'agency-newspaper', through politically directed dependency on other newspapers, to an agency-client relationship, demonstrates the effects of the marketization process resulting from China's media reforms in past decades (Xin, 2006). The organizational scheme of the Xinhua News Agency offices worldwide follows a classic hierarchical structure: the headquarters are located in Beijing, the main European office is located in Brussels, and the largest regional office covering the Western Balkans is located in Budapest. The managing office editors report to higher-ranking officials, all of whom operate under the direct supervision of Xinhua's HQ management located in Beijing.

There were several Xinhua national offices in the Western Balkans, but the strongest editorial decisions were made in Belgrade. Previously, there was an office in Zagreb, and after it was officially closed, the decision-making power shifted to the office in Serbia. There were no offices in Slovenia, Montenegro, or some other countries of the Western Balkans, nor were there any plans of opening them. Each office receives instructions directly from Brussels or Beijing, depending on the topic, and there is no official regional hub that coordinates the

on global events. This paradigm changed during the war in Iraq (Hu et al. 2018), and afterward when they adopted new methods of communication to include more cultural and economic reports.

work of all offices. There is no horizontal or vertical communication between offices even in ‘crisis situations.’ Policy and editorial instructions come directly to the heads of offices, and agencies do not directly communicate with other offices other than through superiors. The heads of Xinhua offices also do not communicate with other large news agencies. Their cooperation is agreed upon at a higher level and sometimes information is exchanged on a global level. Xinhua is materially independent and is not set up commercially. However, each office tries to contain costs and commercialize their services and ‘sell news’, since such a business-oriented approach and its potential successes are often rewarded at higher levels.

Editorial policies and ad-hoc practices clearly illustrate some key struggles and challenges in the functioning of local Xinhua offices. As reported, the policies and guidelines are available internally, but are uncoded and are only communicated verbally or via confidential messages (cf. Barkho, 2021). This is why views on editorial decisions are diametrically divergent among office managing editors (who are exclusively Chinese nationals) and journalists, who are almost exclusively locals. The interviewed journalists in Sarajevo overwhelmingly assessed Xinhua’s editorial policy as firm, uncompromisingly unchanging, and in the service of protecting pre-defined interests of Chinese and Chinese foreign policy, economic and social development, and national modernization (Interviews 1, 2 and 3).

The interviewed journalists also characterize the work policies they operated under as authoritarian and hierarchically rigid, with no room for deliberation or any kind of discussion about the work ideas, texts or the topics being scrutinized. ‘Higher level’ management determines what has to be done, and especially what will be published. The editorial policy of the Xinhua Office in Sarajevo, as well as of all other agencies in the region with which local journalists had the opportunity to cooperate, is described as a simplified reflection of the official Chinese policy and is under the control of the system. Only editors can officially communicate with other editors, while communication with local staff in the newsrooms did not officially exist except through the official communication of the office heads (Interview 1). Some journalists, with more than 5 years of work experience at Xinhua Sarajevo, observed their daily work as unpredictable and unstable, especially when compared to other offices in the region. Consistency of practice somewhat existed within individual offices and in the realization of the minimum conditions in applying the general policies of the Agency, but journalists in some of the agencies in the region, for instance in Serbia, seemingly had greater

freedom of maneuver in covering certain topics, but only if they were perceived as friendly to official Beijing (Interview 2).

While studying internal editorial policies of certain media outlets, most journalism and media scholars often refer to gatekeeping theory, i.e. how and why news-producing organizations allow some stories to be published and others to be put aside, and what the content, discursive representations, and nature of the messages would be (cf. Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). In some cases, scholars also refer to the ‘process of culling’, which comprises both the macro and micro levels of news filtering (cf. Oosthuizen, 2001). As outlined in interviews the Xinhua News Agency editorial structure consists of at least two separate editorial levels, each with its own managing editor. A draft always has to be approved by the head of the office and in some cases, the text is also sent to Brussels for additional review. However, there is no accountability or elaborate feedback system. It often happens that the refusal to publish a news item is not justified at all, and the journalists never receive feedback, so they cannot improve their work or write a new draft. It is not rare that news items with similar content, are published later in a slightly shorter scope, but via other Xinhua channels in the region (Interview 2). In essence, Xinhua journalists are free to follow the stories and write about what they feel is relevant, but all texts and photos go through two-level rigorous filters. If something does not get published, there is no explanation as to why it happened, and the lack of feedback affects the quality of the overall output.

Local journalists have tried to organize a peer review of their unpublished works among themselves, and tried to write and edit news according to what they assumed the editor would accept. Editors are not consulted when drafting news items, as they only reflect on and review the versions submitted for publication. This is where the ‘culling’ practices are most evident, but still, there is no feedback provided to the journalists. Such practice led to many errors in daily work, especially in cases of urgent or sensitive topics. In many instances, the absence of feedback led local journalists to focus on less relevant or even marginal topics in B&H, ones that would keep them away from any unpleasant editorial rejections. Over time, news writing turned into a matter of routine and was done without any personal agency or creativity, because the journalists’ struggle was centered on publishing news items that have a real chance of passing the editorial filters and less on covering the events that are important for the agency or the general public.

The only time when journalistic independence and creativity were encouraged in practice was reacting to breaking news on natural disasters, but only

in cases where there is no room for interpretation or politicization. In such instances, a quick and efficient reaction of journalists was required and this is when Xinhua News Agency Sarajevo competed in the quality and speed of reporting with other local or world news agencies. Depending on the time of day, texts or coverage of breaking news were also sent for review to offices in New York, Brussels or Beijing (Interview 2). It is also interesting to note that sports news items almost always qualified for publishing and passed all filters. The editors considered sports news to be less controversial; the focus is set on fair play and verifiable results. They even approved publishing stories about the local athletes preparing for an international sports tournament or local football games, alpine skiing, etc. (Interview 3). However, if the sports news items had any potential of being considered controversial, such as the recent performances of Russian athletes in international sports tournaments with the letter 'Z' marked on their jerseys, or the performance of the Kosovo national team, they would never be considered for publishing (Interview 1).

Although Xinhua News Agency has its own central management system and internal information database, access to data was limited for local staff; access to certain items is approved directly by the head of office. Journalists could not see advertisements and marketing offers, or the campaigns Xinhua pursued externally. Marketing cooperation with other media in Bosnia and Herzegovina was considered a trade secret even for employees, and announcements and advertising materials were strictly protected before they were published. Once they were public, it was evident that they mostly related to the payment of marketing space in the largest print media in B&H, and almost exclusively related to the Chinese President's or government officials' visits to B&H or the region. All information could only be tracked *ex post facto*, but journalists are not involved in the planning or execution process.

As reported, Xinhua News Agency had no competitive ambitions with other news agencies, except in rare cases of reporting on breaking news. Xinhua's local branch office in Sarajevo cultivated good relations with local media and all news agencies in B&H, especially with entity-level news agencies FENA and SRNA. This cooperation was most visible in the levels of confidence and speed of transferring information on visits to the highest officials to B&H, and especially Chinese delegations. Xinhua also referenced AP and Reuters through very short commentaries consisting of only a few sentences and almost exclusively for breaking news. Foreign agencies that were considered 'state-controlled' by other less democratic countries were habitually not listed as sources in Xinhua's texts to

avoid potential problems in verifying source credibility. On top of this, Xinhua office in B&H has remained relatively under the radar, from both the general public and political elites since it opened. Its competitors rarely scrutinize its role, impacts, reach or other parameters, and public awareness and discussions on the topic in B&H are also marginal.

Interviewed journalists also attribute the influence of external forces and the lack of locally-induced independence in covering socially-relevant stories to diverging preferences and biases in reporting on some of the issues in B&H. Namely, the term ‘opportunism’ in the context of Chinese business culture in practice does not necessarily carry a normatively negative trait, but is often seen as a customary and desirable occupational characteristic that every Chinese needs to exhibit when it comes to promoting the welfare of their country abroad. With uncompromising loyalty, Chinese businessmen have followed the adopted doctrines of their Communist Party, and they tried their best to put on an excellent outward appearance, marked with kindness and polite communication (Interview 1). At the very early stages of Xinhua’s operational setup in B&H, there was no particular political attachment to the local political circumstances and Chinese editors did their best to maintain high levels of impartiality in publishing and promoting news. The importance of keeping the political balance among ‘all three sides’ in B&H was seemingly kept in high regard. However, this changed over time. The Bosniak political elites had not developed a proactive approach to creating political and business contacts with China, while businessmen and other public figures from both Serb and Croat ethnic groups approached the cooperation prospects with China more openly and were receptive to proposals.

Chinese investments in the thermal power plant in Stanari (Republika Srpska entity) are the prime case in point. Relations between China and RS officials have intensified ever since the Stanari project was agreed upon, and this was strongly reflected and reinforced in Xinhua’s news reporting. In order to be fair to the Bosniak political elites, the Chinese have simultaneously proposed and lobbied for Block 7 thermal power plant in Tuzla, which Xinhua also reported on intensively. The rationale, in that case, was that a larger investment in a power plant located in the entity of Federation B&H would demonstrate balance and fairness to ‘every side’ in B&H, but that project is yet to be finalized and it appears there will be no successful resolution to existing problems (cf. Hasić, 2022). Ever since the Tuzla power plant was depicted as a potential issue that could further damage relations between China and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Xinhua editors immediately reduced news production volume on the subject

(Interview 1). The bias in reporting in favor of RS has also been described as interest-driven, either through gaining additional political support for the Chinese companies in RS or Serbia or making direct profits for advertisements and marketing. For example, the head of the Xinhua Sarajevo office habitually travelled to Banja Luka to follow the work of Milorad Dodik, SNSD's party gatherings, and economic projects he favored, while journalists were not allowed to take field trips. The topics of articles drafted after the trips to Banja Luka were not known until they were published, and the unpublished news items were not available to local journalists through the database. Reporting on the events in the RS entity intensified, even more, when one of the Chinese officials formally referred to the topic or a specific project (Interview 2).

Another example of Xinhua's interest-motivated news reporting that the interviewed journalists highlighted was related to the construction of Pelješac Bridge (Croatia), which was labeled as the project of 'high-level Croat interests.' Once the bridge construction announcement was made official and a Chinese company was contracted by the EU to carry out the work, Xinhua's Sarajevo team heavily covered the story, highlighting Chinese successes in bidding for EU funding and the Chinese Sarajevo-based Ambassador's presence at the event, standing right next to Dragan Čović, leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and a member of the tripartite Presidency of B&H. Later, when the Chinese Ambassador to B&H was asked why she attended an opening ceremony of the bridge in Croatia which could potentially close off B&H's only access to the open sea, her response was strategically reported by Xinhua in a soft manner and solely focused on the economic dimensions of the project and the fact that Chinese companies will be paid by Croatia and the European Union, and that this arrangement cannot damage B&H in any way (Interview 1).

Aside from the perceived biases in news reporting, Xinhua's coverage of other sensitive issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina was seemingly fully charged with many normative linguistic patterns that fit the Agency's interests and policies, as defined by the official Beijing-based government. Interpretative style of published texts, a lack of universalist approach to journalistic ethics and Chinese 'predictability' in topic selection and its coverage, as well as full editorial autonomy, were the main reasons why Xinhua's attempts to gain a foothold in B&H's media landscape have not been as successful as anticipated.

Xinhua's gatekeeping editors, in practice, rely on strict fact-checking procedures. For instance, all information found on social media has to be directly verified by the journalists themselves, with at least three cross-referencing sources

(Interview 3). However, the editors are purportedly more interested in the careful transmission of minimally invasive news and saving themselves from potential embarrassment or simple printing mistakes, rather than providing high-quality journalistic content or commentary on current events in B&H or the Western Balkans region. Journalists had no direct influence on editors' decisions nor could they communicate about the nature of their outputs, and there was no editorial crisis management either (Interview 2). Promotion of the Agency's produced content through available and widely used social networks in B&H was also not fully utilized in practice, as it was considered distanced from the norms of an average Chinese Internet user. This is why Xinhua's editors tended to be risk-averse and avoided promoting content via social networks in B&H.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This article investigates an important, yet under-studied, dimension of China's growing presence in the Western Balkans, by analyzing its soft power and so-called 'media imperialism' expansion in the region. In particular, the article examines Chinese Xinhua News Agency's internal editorial guidelines, practices and policies as a case-oriented study of its local office in Sarajevo. It traces how said policies are created, modalities in which they shape the news content being published, and ways in which they reflect on the internal work dynamics among the Chinese editors and the B&H local journalists working at the Agency. The article also explores how different forms of internal guidelines and policies, combined with a lack of firm regulatory frameworks, affect Xinhua's overall positioning within the Bosnian-Herzegovinian media landscape, how the Agency's work is tied to its HQs in Brussels and Beijing, its financiers, and its relations with the other media and news agencies in B&H and beyond.

The analysis of data collected through interviews with Xinhua's managing editor and former journalists, along with desk research of secondary data, demonstrates that despite Xinhua's attempts to increase its impact in B&H and the Western Balkans region, the Agency is still insufficiently positioned in national and regional media landscapes, but still able to compete with local and international news agencies, in either speed, quality, credibility, or influence. Xinhua's role in the news production system in B&H, though kept relatively under the radar of the general public, is being additionally weakened by its 'status' and by being perceived through its dual function: as a propagandist tool of the Chinese

government and as a news agency whose interest and credibility are not fully in line with socially accepted and otherwise dominant liberal views.

Xinhua's editorial policies and other internal constraints limit its influence in B&H, and though its engagement with local stakeholders and the general public has been consistent over the years, the normative foothold has not been fully established. There are several reasons that might account for this. Local journalists and correspondents described their daily work at Xinhua as unpredictable and unstable, especially when compared to other offices in the region. The overall job-related sense of insecurity was closely tied to the Agency's inconsistencies in applying general policies across the region, and with the lack of horizontal or vertical communication between offices, even in 'crisis situations.' On top of this, the interviewed journalists found Sarajevo-based editorial policies to be based on ad-hoc practices, driven by strict and hierarchical two-level gatekeeping and culling processes. If a journalist's text is refuted or not published, the reasons for such a decision are not provided, with no feedback on editorial filtering decisions.

Journalists are not allowed to have full access to the Agency's central management system and internal databases and are not allowed to see advertisements and marketing offers. The Agency also does not foster a competitive approach in news reporting with other news agencies, except in rare cases of reporting on breaking news. Though it cultivates good relations with local media and all news agencies in B&H, especially with entity-level news agencies FENA and SRNA, the promotion of Xinhua's content through social networks is not utilized in practice. Finally, the influence of external forces and the lack of locally-induced independence in covering socially-relevant stories lead to diverging preferences and biases in reporting on some of the issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which further limits the Agency's capacity to establish credibility as well as a stable viewership and readership in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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CITIZEN JOURNALISM, BLOGGERS AND ETHICS

Citizen journalism is increasingly present in the online sphere. When the mainstream media is silent, citizens often publish relevant news and information. One of the forms of their expression is blogs, which in many countries are not ethically regulated. Since citizen journalism is not represented by journalists but by citizens, many of them lack journalistic and ethical education. Also, blogs are often used in election campaigns as propaganda tools, in which case the imperative of telling the truth is often overwhelmed by information that benefits the minority. In this paper, we examine what types of violations of ethical principles are present in blogs. The paper aims to point out the importance of ethical values in society and the need to respect them in citizen journalism. Descriptive analysis of Rebecca Blood's ethical standards for bloggers as one of the first guidelines in that sphere, Code of the Association of Online Media of Serbia (2017) and Code of Journalists of Serbia in the online environment 2.0 (2021) concludes that blogging ethics has many similarities with journalistic ethics and that a code for bloggers should be compiled in countries where does not exist. It would serve as a set of guidelines for citizens who want to participate in public life in this way. For that reason, at the end of the paper, the Code for Bloggers in Serbia is proposed.

Key words: Civic journalism, Citizen Journalism, Blog, Ethics, Ethical Codes

1. INTRODUCTION

The development of technology and digitalization make big changes in the media sphere and journalism. Today we are faced with new kinds of journalism as online journalism, brand journalism, data journalism, citizen journalism, etc. Citizen journalism stands out as a special kind of journalism where ordinary people are journalists, namely people who are not specialized journalists. This arises two main problems. First, those "journalists" don't know how to write articles, they don't know the rules of writing a journalistic article and, second, they don't know the ethics of journalism (Obradović 2011). Someone could think that

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this is not a huge problem because specialized journalists also do not respect ethics often. When we are faced with unethical journalism we often deal with propaganda. We could say that we don't need more propaganda, and for that reason, people have more trust in ordinary people, but the problem is that they could make unintentional mistakes and disrespect ethics. In the paper, we want to show why ethics is important for citizen journalism and society in general. We will show it in the example of blogging ethics because people often express their opinion in the online sphere through blogs.

There are various kinds of blogs. Many of them consist of photos or videos and text. The communities of bloggers are spread and are ethically regulated in many countries, such as the USA, Ireland, Nordic countries, etc. On the other hand, many countries do not have codes for bloggers, Serbia being among them. We will sketch one potential Code for Bloggers in Serbia using one of the first Codes for Bloggers of the famous blogger Rebecca Blood and the Serbian Journalists Code of Ethics, considering the practices in Norway², where blogging codes are founded on journalistic ethical codes, which refer to the similarity of two ethics - one for bloggers and another for journalists, and to the similarity of their roles - to inform people. From this connection between the two Codes, we could conclude that people will trust citizen journalism more if it is ethical and ethically regulated.

2. CITIZEN JOURNALISM AND BLOGS

Citizen journalism is considered as a creation of journalistic products by citizens, generally speaking. The rise of modern citizen journalism comes with the popularization and increasing accessibility of digital technologies at the beginning of the new millennium. Although the phenomenon itself implies the participation and contribution of ordinary citizens in the creation of traditional media content, when we talk about citizen journalism, we usually mean cases when members of

² According to the World Media Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders, a double polarization has taken place in the world. The polarization is reinforced by information chaos, and it is present both in individual countries and in the relationship between countries at the international level. Norway remains at the top of the world freedom index in Europe. On the scale, Serbia moved up by 14 positions compared to 2021 and is now in the 79th position and belongs to the category of problematic countries (Source: Indeks slobode medija Reportera bez granica, Srbija najgora od zemalja ex-Yu 2022, 2022, May 3).

the public create blogs and websites intended for the community or publications with a specific goal, that is, when citizens assume the role of professional journalists (Quinn, Lamble 2008:43). The connection between digital and online development and citizen journalism is not accidental. WEB 2.0 era of Internet communication enabled users to move from the passive role of recipients to the active role of someone who can respond to content on the Internet, but also create their own. Another dimension that led to the flourishing of citizen journalism, as soon as technological availability paved the way for such a thing, is the fact that journalism is an open profession. This means that her skills can be learned just by entering the newsroom, in other words, anyone who wants and has the skills to do so can become a journalist (Milivojević 2011:14).

The combination of these two possibilities very quickly led to the hyperproduction of media and quasi-media content on the Internet, creating what we know today as "information chaos", and the largest part of Internet citizen journalism, especially in the first phase of its development, consisted of Internet blogs, i.e. the blogosphere (Hughes 2011:19). Their popularity came from the simplicity and the fact that anyone can tell a story on a topic of their choice and distribute it to an unlimited number of people all over the world (Adams 2013:88). Even today, this form of internet expression is very dominant. According to data from 2021, there are more than 600 million blogs on the Internet and more than 8 million blog texts are published daily, that is, more than 3 billion per year (Byers 2022). Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the period of the last 15 years has been called the "golden age of citizen journalism" (Mirvajová 2014). It had such an impact not only on society but also on the journalistic profession itself that some theorists introduced the term "blogization" to explain the transformation of mainstream and traditional media due to the emergence of blogging journalism (Yagodin 2014). It is precisely this difference between blogs and traditional media that makes blogs so attractive to the public. From its inception to the present day, mainstream citizen journalism has occasionally proven to be a very useful form of informing the public about a particular event. This is because it has certain differences compared to traditional reporting. The most important can be classified as: speed - the possibility brought by the available forms of communication, but also because of lack of limitations by conventional editorial rules that sometimes slow down the production of news; ubiquity - related to speed and comes from the fact that bloggers write about what is often physically close to them and what they have witnessed; specialization - proximity does not only refer to spatial, but also to the fact that people who engage in citizen journalism report on topics that are

professionally close to them, and can often process topics in much more detail and professionally compared to journalists who often have to deal with a wide variety of daily current events; greater independence - as many people that engage in citizen journalism do not make money from it, nor do they depend on certain centers of power when it comes to finances, editorial policy or other forms of limiting journalistic activity, they enjoy absolute freedom in their work, which leads to potentially more complete information; unrestricted by conventional topics, ideas and agenda - freedom from influence allows people who engage in citizen journalism to deal with many topics that are too unconventional for professional media (Krstić 2011; Bharadwaj 2017; Etemad 2020).

Especially the first two characteristics have influenced citizen journalism to become very influential on several occasions, especially in crises. It is often considered that citizen journalism showed its strength for the first time during the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001, when the largest number of information and photos from the field reached media houses precisely from ordinary citizens (Mirvajová 2014:152). In the following years, citizen journalism, especially blogs, shed light on and influenced some significant events such as the resignation of US Senator Tenta Los due to racist comments or a story in the form of a blog by Salam al Janabi, who described how the war in Baghdad was destroying his suburb, and whose story received global attention (Quinn, Lamble 2008:43). In Serbia, the blogger Branka Stamenković had a significant influence, who in 2008 published a blog about the poor conditions in the country's maternity wards, which quickly became viral and encouraged other mothers to talk about this problem (Bogdanović 2013:79). Particularly significant role citizen journalism gained during the explosion of the ammunition warehouse in Paraćin in 2006 (Krstić 2011:108) or eight years later, during the May floods, when professional journalists were unable to adequately cover the crisis, and the majority of information came from citizens. Due to the massiveness and suddenness of these events, the media and the public relied heavily on the reports of ordinary citizens who were at the scene. Current information, photos and videos first appeared and spread on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, and were then picked up by the media. Without them, the amount of information about events would be significantly less, and reporting would be slower. Such examples have greatly contributed to the fact that citizen journalism is increasingly being talked about as an instrument for the democratization of information, freedom of speech and revitalization of the public sphere.

However, citizen journalism is not without its many problems. Because of all of them, the question is often raised whether such a form of expression and information can be considered journalism and whether the term "citizen journalism" is adequate at all (Krstić 2011:102). Reasons for mistrust in citizen journalism can be found precisely in those segments that are considered its biggest flaws. The ones that are most often mentioned in discussions are:

Lack of training of ordinary citizens for journalistic work

Subjectivity

A large number of unverified information and rumors in reporting

Open space for manipulation, propaganda and hidden interests

Lack of ethical dimension of reporting (Krstić 2011; Bharadwaj 2017; Etemad 2020; Apeh, Didiugwu 2017)

In fact, all others can be derived from the last one because, in addition to the journalistic work techniques, it represents the main basis of journalism and its cornerstone. The lack of ethics and responsibility that can often be found in the publications of citizen journalism is incompatible with the concept of journalism and its role in informing citizens. That is why some authors believe that it should not even be called journalism (Obradović 2011). However, this does not diminish the importance of this type of information; moreover, it appeared and became popular, precisely because of the dissatisfaction and inability of professional journalism to satisfy the public's growing hunger for new, current and detailed information (Krstić 2011).

The current order, which is increasingly dominated by citizen sources of information, both through blogs and podcasts, social networks, vagues and civic portals, and the high level of anarchy and chaos caused by the lack of regulation of this form of expression represents a serious problem that can result in the complete destruction of truth, objectivity, reliability and professionalism in journalism. One of the possible solutions, which is already present in certain countries, is the definition of a code of ethics for bloggers, that would help and direct all those citizens who want to write truthfully and reliably. Of course, it can be argued that this code would be neglected due to the general absence and neglect of ethics in reporting, both by citizen and professional journalism in Serbia, but it is necessary, for a better social environment, to give people instructions and guidelines for writing, some kinds of advice which can help themselves and society.

3. FIRST BLOGS AND CODES FOR BLOGGERS

Megan Knight in her paper “Blogging and Citizen Journalism” researched blogging and citizen journalism, especially in South Africa. She said: “This is not to say that South Africa is merely imitating the first world (although to even a less than casual observer it is clear that a substantial amount of imitation is occurring), but that the whole world is following the lead of the USA and the UK.” (Knight 2010: 2). The last part of the previous sentence is something that attracts attention. Is such a case with blogging?

Weblogs appeared in 1998. American blogger Rebecca Blood explains in her paper “Weblogs: A History and Perspective”, the appearance and development of blogs, their first look and contemporary blogs. Jesse James Garret starts making a list of weblogs and Cameron Barret published it on Camworld. Garret made a list of 23 weblogs at the beginning of 1999. After that community sprang up (Blood 2000). The Bloggers Code of Conduct was proposed by Tim O'Reilly in 2007. This code was created as a result of harassment on the internet and the need to stop such behavior³. This is the preliminary version:

“1. Take responsibility not just for your own words, but for the comments you allow on

your blog.

2. Label your tolerance level for abusive comments.

3. Consider eliminating anonymous comments.

4. Don't feed the trolls.

5. Take the conversation offline, and talk directly, or find an intermediary who can do so.

6. If you know someone who is behaving badly, tell them so.

7. Don't say anything online that you wouldn't say in person. “(O'Reilly 2007).

We will briefly return to Megan Knight's research and then move on to blogging ethics and ethical principles. In her paper, Knight, refers to Dan Gillmor's book, *We The Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People*, and the events of September 11th, 2001. She states: “He writes that the

³ Just before the creation of the code, a disturbing picture of the expert Kathie Sierra appeared on the Internet; she also received disturbing emails, after which she retired from the world of technology. (Call For a Bloggers Code of Conduct, 2007, March 31)

events of that day were so momentous, so earth-shattering, that people were turning to all possible news sources for information, even informal ones." (Knight 2010: 4) Gillmor then goes on to argue that the mobilization of 'citizen' journalists during September 2001 was a watershed; the beginning of a new kind of journalism, detached from the commercial interests of the mainstream media, and providing a new kind of engagement with civil society. Of course, there are numerous other examples where citizen journalism helps people to get information when mainstream media fall asleep. A recent example of this in Serbia was the environmental movement before the 2022 election. It concerns the role that citizen journalism played in informing the public about the Jadar Project, which would provide Rio Tinto the right to mine lithium in Serbia, and its potentially detrimental effects on human health and the environment. A large number of movements and citizens expressed their dissatisfaction through protests as a result of this type of reporting to the public at times when the mainstream media did not deal with this topic to a significant extent. This resulted in the withdrawal of the law on expropriation and the termination of the contract between the Government of Serbia and the aforementioned company. The results of the Republic of Serbia's parliamentary elections in 2022, in which the ruling party lost its absolute parliamentary majority, were one probable effect of this displeasure.

4. REBECCA BLOOD'S CODES FOR BLOGGETS

Blood wrote: "Bloggers write as much or as little as they choose on a topic, and although entries are presented together on the page, each post is given a permalink so that individual entries can be referenced separately"(2003:61). Bloggers use hypertext. It helps them to summarize and contextualize complex stories using other sources. Hypertext provides transparency, explains Blood (2003). Not every weblog is journalism.

"The four Weblog types most frequently cited are:

- Those written by journalists;
- Those written by professionals about their industry;
- Those written by individuals at the scene of a major event;
- Those that link primarily to news about current events." (2003:62).

Rebecca Blood is categorical when she talks about the similarity between journalism and weblogs. Not every weblog is journalism, just as not every journalistic article is journalism. As an example, she shows the case of Jason Blair from The New York Times for fabricating news. People who write blogs are not

journalists if they state what they think, or report what happened. We could say that they do research but not that they practice journalism (2003: 62). She suggests: "Instead of inflating the term "journalism" to include everyone who writes anything about current events, I prefer the term "participatory media" for the blogger's practice of actively highlighting and framing the news that is reported by journalists, a practice potentially as important as—but different from—journalism." (2003: 62). What could we expect from webbloggers? "It is unrealistic to expect every weblogger to present an even-handed picture of the world, but it is very reasonable to expect them to be forthcoming about their sources, biases, and behavior" (2002). Blood suggests following ethical standards for those who want to behave ethically, but she said if someone wants protection from journalism must to go further:

Publish as facts only that which you believe to be true;

If the material exists online, link to it when you reference it;

Publicly correct any misinformation.

Write each entry as if it could not be changed; add to, but do not rewrite or delete, any entry;

Disclose any conflict of interest;

Note questionable and biased sources; (Blood 2002)

This code seems very practical and clear. Yet, we will explain it to show the importance of those principles or, perhaps, some of its lacks. The first one mentions "the facts which we believe to be true". It shows, undoubtedly, that we could make mistakes or have false beliefs. This principle shows that the author or blogger is responsible and stands behind their work. Yet, we could suggest that it is more professional to add "Publish as facts only that which you checked and believe to be true". The second principle refers to other sources and the possibility to inform people more by links to them. When we refer to the works which we used, we show respect for them and behave morally- we do not plagiarize. If we link to online material, we democratize information and help people to be more informed, if they want this. The third principle tells us to correct publicly any misinformation we post online. People make mistakes and it is not a shame to correct them publicly, on the contrary. The remaining principles (4, 5, 6) are clear and do not need any addition.

5. PROPOSAL OF THE CODE FOR BLOGGERS IN SERBIA

When it comes to the journalistic ethical codes in Serbia, officially, there are two of them. The first and most widespread is the Serbia Journalists Code of Ethics from 2006, which was adopted by the two largest journalist associations in the country - the Association of Journalists of Serbia and the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia. This code commits journalists and editors to: truthfulness in reporting, independence from pressures, absence of corruption and conflicts of interest, responsibility in reporting, attention when reporting, special attitude towards sources of information, respect for privacy, use of honorable means and respect for authorship. It also noted that anyone who adheres to these ethical principles has the right to protection from professional associations (Savet za štampu 2015).

That these principles are immutable and fundamental when journalistic ethics are in question is also shown by another code - the Code of the Association of Online Media of Serbia. This document, created in 2017, represents a type of supplement and contribution to the Serbian Code of Journalists and self-regulation, providing additional rules, guidelines and instructions to journalists in a changing digital environment. The important segments he deals with are: fact-checking and handling of sources, the balance of reporting and reporting in specific situations, user-generated content moderation rules, response to information, correction of information and indication of change, information, privacy policy, copyright protection, storage of materials, information security (Stojković 2017)

Therefore, there is a great deal of agreement within the ethical regulation of the journalistic profession regarding the ethical rules that professional journalists must respect. The existence of a different document that is an addition to the Code of Journalists of Serbia should also be highlighted. The Press Council created it in 2016 and updated it in 2021, and gave it the title *Guidelines for the implementations of the Code of Journalists of Serbia in the online environment 2.0* (Savet za štampu 2021). These rules discuss how to apply and update the fundamental principles of the code in an online setting. They address issues such as anti-dating, alterations to and fabrication of digital information, click bait headlines, techniques for posting denials, transparency, moderation of comments, utilization of user-generated content, and the application of artificial intelligence to content creation. Additionally, a sizable portion of the text discusses issues with

fact-checking, source interactions, authorship, as well as privacy because these facets of journalistic ethics take on a lot of new implications in the digital era.

However, these codes and guidelines hardly deal with issues of citizen journalism. Blogs are mentioned in the newer code, as somewhat more subjective forms in which journalists who write must base their subjectivity and attitude on facts (Stojković 2017:10). But, when it comes to citizen journalism, it is not mentioned. It should also be noted that, as it is not traditional, nor completely identical to professional journalism, citizen journalism cannot always be subject to the same, sometimes rigid, rules. However, when creating the proposal for the code of bloggers, the fundamental principles of informing and creating informative content intended for the public, which are found in the aforementioned codes, were taken as a starting point and basis.

Similar to the practices in Norway where the Codes of Ethics for Bloggers, Social Media and Content (2009) are based on the Code of Ethics for the Norwegian Press (2003) published by the Norwegian Press Association we will sketch Codes for bloggers in Serbia using Serbian Journalists Codes of ethics (Savet za štampu 2015). Whereas, as shown above, the code for journalists in the online sphere provides guidelines for journalists and indicates the link between the journalistic code and the code for bloggers in social media; the proposal of the code in the paper presents instructions and guidelines to all bloggers who publish on different social networks. One should not lose sight of the connection between ethics and law; therefore, the same principles can be observed in law and the codes such as the principle of privacy, plagiarism, etc.

The first part of our proposal is a preamble:

Bloggers are an important part of the public sphere. Their opinions could influence other people and their decisions. For this, they need to be responsible and respect ethical principles.

Ethical Codes for bloggers:

Bloggers need to write stories based on facts that are checked. They respect truth as a basic ethical principle.

By speaking the truth bloggers do not deceive the audience.

Bloggers need to be objective.

It is hard to exclude subjective opinion, but by using credible sources and informing readers/viewers about the primary source of information you are doing the right thing.

Do not use other blogs as your own.

This is plagiarism and it is bad because if you do that you deceive the audience and second, you are violating copyright, which is illegal.

You need to be independent. This is one of the reasons why readers believe you.

On the other hand, if you have any political affiliation, mention that.

In other words, be sincere and brave to utter your opinion.

Be responsible. Be credible.

If you are critical of everything and yourself you behave responsibly. Let other people comment on your blogs and answer if it is needed. If you respect truth and you cite sources, you become a credible blogger.

To be credible means to be a trustworthy person.

Respect the privacy of other people. Do not treat people as instrumental values but rather as intrinsic values.

By respecting other people's privacy you respect people's dignity.

In this proposal ethical principles are supplemented with a short explanation of their importance. We think that this needs to become practice in every country keeping in mind that many people are not ethically educated. Ethical self-regulation and adherence to principles can help bloggers gain more respect. By respecting the codes, bloggers help the democratization of society and the flow of true information. This code is not binding. There are people, including journalists, who find the codes restrictive. However, the existence of such a code can be useful for those who do not want to make a mistake by setting up their blog or representing some ethical problems that may arise by publishing certain content.

6. CONCLUSION

Citizen journalism and blogs could help in the democratization of communications, but they need to be true and based on ethical principles such as human dignity, privacy, authenticity, credibility, justice, etc. One good thing about citizen journalism is independence. On the other hand, there are cases of false activism. It often happens that people use some sources and do not list them, which shows disrespect for other people's work. Because of that, we recommended ethical regulation of blogs. It does not matter if a blogger wants to be read or make profit; he/she needs to have credibility. Credibility exists where there are trust, truth and freedom. Our paper presents the first ethical codes for bloggers, Rebecca Blood's codes, and the Serbian Journalists' Code of Ethics and, in the final section,

proposes the ethical principles for bloggers. The idea came from the connection between journalism and blogging and practice in Norway. The proposal of the Ethical Codes for bloggers consists of six principles and a short explanation. Considering that not all blog creators are ethically literate, we add a short explanation of principles in the code itself after each principle. The connection between digital and online development and citizen journalism is not accidental, as we mention in this paper, and it shows that media literacy is a necessary part of education in the 21st century, including ethical education as well.

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LOKALNI MEDIJI U BIH: DA LI JE PLURALIZAM (JOŠ UVIJEK) VAŽAN?

Pluralizam informacija, mišljenja i izvora u lokalnim medijima u Bosni i Hercegovini je pitanje o kojem se često raspravlja među akademikima i profesionalcima, budući da sva dosadašnja istraživanja pokazuju da su lokalni mediji pod snažnim pritiskom lokalnih vlasti, koje ih percipiraju kao sopstveni kanal obraćanja lokalnoj javnosti, a ne kao javne institucije. U ovom tekstu predstavljaju se rezultati medijskog monitoringa lokalnih medija (štampa, radio, TV, *online*) urađenog u dvije faze (2020. i 2021.) sa glavnim ciljem da se ispita pluralizam informacija, izvora i mišljenja prisutnih u lokalnim medijima u BiH. Također, predstavljeni su i intervjui sa novinarima lokalnih medija kojima se kroz „pogled iznutra” pokušalo odgovoriti na pitanje: šta lokalni novinari vide kao glavnu/e prepreku/e medijskom pluralizmu u lokalnim zajednicama.

Ključne riječi: pluralizam, lokalni mediji, Bosna i Hercegovina

1. MEDIJSKI PLURALIZAM – NEKE POLAZNE PREMISE O LOKALNIM MEDIJIMA U PLURALISTIČKOM MEDIJSKOM SISTEMU

Pojam medijskog pluralizma shvata se i definira na različite načine, uglavnom u kontekstu prisustva širokog spektra stavova i mišljenja u medijima, odnosno u medijskoj spremnosti i sposobnosti da osiguraju slobodan i otvoren prostor za sučeljavanje ideja od strane različitih aktera društva. Da bi to uopće bilo moguće, neophodno je da budu osigurane brojne medijske i izvanmedijske pretpostavke, uključujući i oslobađanje medija od različitih, uglavnom političkih i ekonomskih pritisaka, kao i otvorene, demokratske medijske/uređivačke politike koje na nediskriminatoran način pristupaju različitim društvenim akterima, uzimajući za ključni parametar kreiranja agende javni interes.

Za razumijevanje medijskog pluralizma kao koncepta, koji nije samo komunikološki determiniran, nego umnogome filozofskim i politološkim shvatanjem uslovljen, neophodno ga je kontekstualizirati u suodnosu sa pojmom pluralizma općenito. Kukoč (2016) pojam pluralizma u javnom prostoru opisuje

¹ lturcilo@gmail.com

kao “pokušaj uspostave konsenzusa oko zajedničkih, to jest univerzalnih vrijednosti, pri čemu često dolazi do nepremostivih poteškoća koje se mogu prevladati samo i isključivo trajnim priznavanjem kulturnih, svjetonazornih, filozofijskih, epistemologijskih različitosti, bez pretenzija na dohvaćanje i posjedovanje jedne i jedinstvene univerzalne apsolutne istine”. U tom kontekstu, Evropska komisija definira medijski pluralizam kao „koncept koji obuhvaća niz aspekata, poput različitosti vlasništva, raznolikosti u izvorima informacija i rasponu sadržaja dostupnih u različitim državama članicama” (Klimkiewicz 2010 prema Peruško 2010: 263) Zrinjka Peruško, nadalje, definira medijski pluralizam kroz nekoliko njegovih ključnih komponenti: a) pluralnost/raznolikost dobavljača medija; b) sloboda i dostupnost pristupa; c) pluralizam sadržaja i raznolikost ideja, kao i kvaliteta sadržaja (odnosno javni interes); d) raznolikost izvora vijesti; e) neovisne i nekoncentrirane uredničke prakse za vijesti; f) raznolikost i transparentnost vlasništva nad medijima; i g) kulturna i društvena raznolikost u medijskim programima i idejama zastupljenim u medijima. (Klimkiewicz 2010 prema Peruško 2010: 264).

Nerijetko se medijski pluralizam kao pojam poistovjećuje s pojmom medijske raznolikosti, odnosno diverziteta, obuhvatajući tako ne samo različitost stajališta u medijima, nego i različitost medija koji su građanima na raspolaganju. Na tom tragu i Gibbons (1998) stavlja znak jednakosti između medijskog pluralizma i raznolikosti, nazivajući raznolikost sadržaja u medijima internim pluralizmom, a raznolikost medijskih izvora eksternim pluralizmom. I interni i eksterni pluralizam imaju svoje opozite, koji uključuju *shrinking space* (Turčilo i Buljubašić, 2017) kao suprotnost raznolikosti medijskih sadržaja i medijsku koncentraciju kao suprotnost raznolikosti medijskih izvora².

Raznolikost i pluralizam medijskih sadržaja i medijskih izvora osnov je informisanog građanstva i demokratskih principa i procedura u svakom društvu, pa tako Doyle (2002) upozorava da „građani trebaju i očekuju diverzitet” (Doyle, 2002: 11–12), dok McQuail (1992) smatra da je strukturalni pluralistički medijski sistem preduvjet medijske raznolikosti, „koja se razumijeva kao raznorodnost medija (izvora, kanala, poruka i publika) u smislu relevantnih razlika u društvu (političkih, geografskih, socio-kulturalnih itd.). Pluralistički mediji moraju odražavati suprotstavljene glasove i interese u društvu, nuditi pristup različitim

² Jelenka Voćkić Avdagić (2002) tako govori o koncentraciji medijskih formi, firmi, sadržaja i učinaka kao o ključnim problemima medijske scene današnjice.

kanalima i sveobuhvatnu listu proizvoda i usluga publikama” (McQuail, 1992: 147).

Za medijski pluralizam svakog društva od izuzetnog su značaja lokalni mediji. Kunac i Roller (2015) ih razmatraju u kontekstu „teorijskog normativnog okvira deliberativne demokracije koji se temelji na premisi da funkcioniranje demokracije zahtijeva aktivno sudjelovanje građana u javnim raspravama, te na značenju lokalnih medija za izražavanje kako pojedinačnih tako i kolektivnih pogleda i interesa u kontekstu društvene komunikacije” (Roller; 2015: 860). Pojam lokalnih medija *per se* je inkluzivan i uključuje kako javne, tako i privatne medije koji su dominantno usmjereni na sadržaje u lokalnim zajednicama, ali i takozvane *community medije* koji se zasnivaju na konceptu *grassroot novinarstva*, u kojem pripadnici lokalnih zajednica kreiraju sadržaje jedni za druge, uglavnom vezane za lokalne teme. Helena Popović smatra kako se „u liberalnom okviru ovi mediji povezuju s dvije ključne značajke liberalne demokracije – pluralizmom i decentralizacijom. Oni primarno omogućuju komunikaciju, participaciju i interakciju manjeg dometa u okviru različitih zajednica, i različitih interesnih grupa (McQuail, 1987), te potiču pluralizam i raznolikost jer se obraćaju i u sadržaje uključuju manjine u društvu i potiču teme koje nisu zastupljene u dominantnim medijima” (Popović, 2016: 24).

Picard (2006) opisuje važnost lokalnih medija na sljedeći način:

„Najviše vijesti dolazi iz globalnih i nacionalnih izvora zbog čega u tom području postoji velika konkurencija među izvorima – tiskanim, elektroničkim, internetskim i mobilnim – kako bi osigurali takve informacije. Kako bi bili konkurenti i stvarali ekonomsku vrijednost, mediji moraju povećati diferencijaciju i time ekskluzivitet. Najefikasniji način za to je da kreiraju veću vrijednost kroz lokalni sadržaj koji je povezan uz živote, aspiracije i razumijevanje pojedinaca na području na kojem žive. To je vrsta izvještavanja koju drugi mediji ne mogu osigurati” (Picard, 2006: 130).

Kada posmatramo lokalne medije kao dio pluralističkog medijskog sistema, nekoliko je ključnih uloga/funkcija koje bi oni u idealno-tipskom modelu trebalo da ispunjavaju. Najprije, oni su kreatori lokalnih agendi, odnosno na javnu raspravu stavljaju teme koje su od značaja za lokalno stanovništvo, ali i utiču na lokalne vlasti da pitanja i probleme lokalnih zajednica rješavaju u skladu s javnim interesom. Lokalni mediji su i kanali višesmjerne komunikacije između izabranih lokalnih zvaničnika i građana, ali i platforme za izražavanje ideja, stavova i mišljenja o lokalnim temama i pitanjima. U idealno-tipskom modelu, lokalni

mediji su jedan od značajnih agenasa medijskog pluralizma, budući da su oni garant postojanja javnog prostora koji podržava diverzitet lokalnih zajednica u svim njegovim aspektima (politika, ekonomija, kultura, društvo).

2. DA LI PRAKSA REFLEKTIRA TEORIJU: ISTRAŽIVANJE PLURALIZMA LOKALNIH MEDIJA U BIH 2020–2021. GODINA³

Neke ključne metodološke napomene o istraživanju

Vodimo li se tezom o neophodnosti eksternog (raznolikost izvora informacija) i internog (raznolikost sadržaja) medijskog pluralizma kao preduvjeta demokratskih procesa u društvu, te smatramo li lokalne medije jednim od važnih aktera svakog društva, analiza kvaliteta sadržaja lokalnih medija i nivoa poštovanja profesionalnih standarda u lokalnim medijima može dati veoma važan uvid u pluralizam u lokalnim zajednicama. Stoga je istraživanje izvještavanja lokalnih medija u Bosni i Hercegovini, koje je provedeno u 2020. i 2021. godini bilo usmjereno na pitanje koliko se u njima osigurava interni i eksterni pluralizam kroz poštovanje profesionalnih standarda, a što uključuje kreiranje sadržaja u skladu sa profesionalnim principima nepristasnosti i etičnosti, kao i kvalitet medijskog izvještavanja o temama od javnog interesa (interni pluralizam), kao i raznorodnost izvora dostupnih građanima u vezi sa tim temama (eksterni pluralizam), te na razmatranje konteksta u kojem djeluju mediji, a koji bi trebao da osigura pluralizam. Preciznije kazano, kao jedan od ključnih elemenata profesionalizma lokalnih medija uzet je javni interes, te je jedan od ciljeva istraživanja bio analizirati u kojoj mjeri se u medijskim sadržajima lokalnih medija u cijeloj Bosni i Hercegovini reflektira javni interes, kroz teme o kojima se izvještava (lokalna politika, infrastruktura, ekonomija i zapošljavanje, obrazovanje, zdravstvo, kultura i umjetnost, drugo). Na ovaj način istražen je jedan od aspekata internog pluralizma, na tragu Gibbonsove teorije, a to je raznorodnost sadržaja i/ili tema o kojima se izvještava. Pored utvrđivanja prisutnosti javnog interesa u medijskim sadržajima i raznorodnosti tema od javnog interesa, fokus istraživanja bio je na prisutnosti različitih izvora informacija i na

³ Istraživanje je provelo Udruženje BH novinari u saradnji sa Asocijacijom elektronskih medija, u okviru projekta „Slobodni mediji, slobodno društvo“ uz finansijsku podršku Evropske unije; glavni istraživač, autor metodologije i analize rezultata prof.dr. Lejla Turčilo. Cjelovit izvještaj sa rezultatima dostupan na: <https://bhnovinari.ba/bs/2021/12/17/istrazivanje-lokalni-mediji-kvalitet-medijskih-sadrzaja-i-informacija-za-gradjane-pluralizam-misljenja-i-razlicitost-izvora-informacija-2021/>

načinu kako su oni tretirani (da li su neki od njih u povlaštenom položaju u odnosu na druge). To je, skupa sa pitanjem u kojoj mjeri su u medijskim sadržajima lokalnih medija u Bosni i Hercegovini prisutna različita mišljenja i stavovi o temama o kojima se izvještava, jedan od elemenata eksternog pluralizma.

U skladu sa ciljevima istraživanja definirane su i varijable koje su korištene u kodnom listu za monitoring medija u obje faze istraživanja. Te varijable grupisane su u dvije skupine: varijable korištene kako bi se kodirao interni pluralizam (koje se odnose na broj sadržaja koji reflektiraju raznorodnost tema u lokalnim medijima i broj sadržaja u kojima su zastupljene teme od javnog interesa lokalnih zajednica u odnosu na broj sadržaja o drugim pitanjima), te varijable koje su korištene kako bi se kodirao eksterni pluralizam (koje se odnose na broj sagovornika u sadržajima koje objavljuju lokalni mediji, pristup medija različitim sagovornicima (ravnopravan prema svima ili pristrasan prema nekima), te u slučaju uočene pristrasnosti, akteri koji su u povlaštenom statusu u medijskim sadržajima (jesu li to lokalni političari, ekonomski moćnici, predstavnici civilnog društva, analitičari, građani); nadalje, eksterni pluralizam kodiran je i preko broja sadržaja koji uključuju različita/suprotstavljena mišljenja i stavove o određenom pitanju u odnosu na broj sadržaja u kojima su stavovi/mišljenja usaglašeni).

U Bosni i Hercegovini postoji 81 lokalni javni emiter (12 TV stanica, 62 radio stanice i 7 TV stanica koje se emituju putem drugih elektronskih komunikacijskih mreža)⁴. Riječ je o općinskim, gradskim i kantonalnim emiterima, no pored njih postoji izuzetno veliki broj portala koji se bave pitanjima od interesa određenih lokalnih zajednica, od kojih su neki podržani i/ili dijelom finansirani od lokalne vlasti. Smatrajući kako je za pluralizam medijskih sadržaja i pluralizam izvora informacija jednako važno analizirati i javne i privatne lokalne medije, u uzorak istraživanja uključeni su i jedni i drugi. Istraživanje je provedeno u dvije faze: u prvoj fazi 2020. godine analizirana su 34 lokalna bosanskohercegovačka medija (4 štampana, 11 radio stanica, 10 TV stanica i 9 *online* portala) koji su i u javnom i u privatnom vlasništvu, a u drugoj fazi 2021. godine 20 lokalnih bosanskohercegovačka medija (3 štampana, 7 radio stanica, 7 TV stanica i 3 *online* portala) koji su i u javnom i u privatnom vlasništvu. U korpus istraživanja ušli su tekstovi iz štampanih medija i sa web portala, kao i svi prilozi/priče u dnevnicima radijskih i TV stanica. Broj sadržaja koji su ušli u korpus istraživanja je 617 u prvoj fazi i 331 u drugoj fazi (ukupno 948 sadržaja). Ključni razlog za provođenje istraživanja u dvije faze bio je da se najprije izvedu


⁴ <http://www.rak.ba>

zaključci o nivou medijskog pluralizma u lokalnim medijima u BiH, potom da se sa novinarima i novinarkama uradi niz diskusija i debata, kako bi se povećao stepen njihove svjesnosti o medijskom pluralizmu, te znanja o načinima kako kreirati priče koje ga reflektiraju, te da se nakon toga u drugoj fazi istraživanja analizira koliko su (sa)znanja koja su novinari i novinarki dobili reflektirana u medijskim sadržajima. U tom kontekstu, istraživanje je, na izvjestan način, longitudinalno, a korištena je kvantitativna analiza sadržaja u obje faze istraživanja (kako bi se prikupili statistički pokazatelji internog i eksternog pluralizma medijskih sadržaja u lokalnim medijima u BiH), te kvalitativna analiza medijskog konteksta (kako bi se dobio kontekstualni uvid u uzroke i posljedice izvještavanja lokalnih medija u BiH). Tehnike prikupljanja podataka bile su monitoring medija te intervjui s novinarima lokalnih medija.


3. ANALIZA I INTERPRETACIJA REZULTATA KVANTITATIVNOG ISTRAŽIVANJA

Kad je riječ o internom pluralizmu, odnosno raznolikosti sadržaja u lokalnim medijima, oni su mjereni na osnovu tema o kojima se izvještava, kao i autorskog rada novinara u odnosu na *copy-paste* sadržaje, Eksterni pluralizam mjeran je na osnovu broja sagovornika koji se konsultuju za priče, njihovog ne/ravnopravnog statusa u pričama i broja suprotstavljenih mišljenja, a dodatna objašnjenja konteksta lokalnih medija u BiH od novinara koji u tim medijima rade dobivena su kroz intervjue.

Kad je riječ o temama o kojima izvještavaju lokalni mediji, lokalna politika zastupljena je u više od jedne petine sadržaja, dok su teme koje su direktnije vezane za život lokalne zajednice, poput obrazovanja, kulture i zaštite životne sredine podzastupljene. Teme vezane za zdravlje u drugoj fazi istraživanja dobile su na značaju, obzirom na ekspanziju pandemije COVID-19. Najmanji procenat sadržaja u obje faze istraživanja zabilježen je u vezi sa temama iz oblasti kulture i umjetnosti, te zaštite životne sredine. Ovo pokazuje ne samo da ove teme nisu visoko na agendi medija, nego nisu ni dominantne u agendama lokalnih vlasti, odnosno lokalnih zajednica.



Grafikon 1: Teme lokalnih medija – prva faza istraživanja




Grafikon 2: Teme lokalnih medija – druga faza istraživanja


Ono što je posebno zabrinjavajuće je da je tokom jedne godine zabilježen pad broja sadržaja koji govore o temama od javnog interesa, u odnosu na druge

teme, koje su uglavnom vezane za protokolarne aktivnosti lokalnih zvaničnika ili neke *light* sadržaje zabavnog karaktera. Procenat sadržaja od javnog interesa smanjen je sa 73% u prvoj fazi istraživanja na 51% u drugoj fazi istraživanja.

Nadalje, pluralizam mišljenja i stavova nije osiguran, budući da dominiraju sadržaji u kojima uopće nema sagovornika, nego su napravljeni na osnovu saopćenja za medije ili ličnog stava novinara, te da dominiraju sadržaji u kojima uopće nema suprotstavljenih mišljenja (95% u prvoj i 93% sadržaja u drugoj fazi istraživanja) ili je u cijeloj priči izneseno tek jedno mišljenje ili stav koji je suprotan *mainstreamu*. Ovakav pristup medija apsolutno nije u skladu sa profesionalnim standardima, jer preferira *copy-paste* metod, pri čemu se kopiraju saopćenja lokalnih vlasti, bez ikakve intervencije i interpretacije njihovog sadržaja i/ili relevantnosti. Također, jednostrano izvještavanje bez sučeljavanja više strana u priči, koje bi dale različite uvide u pitanja, probleme i teme koje se obrađuju, onemogućava građane da iz priča koje pročitaju/čuju/vide u lokalnim medijima dobiju širi i multiperspektivni kontekst lokalnih događanja.




Grafikon 3: Broj sagovornika u lokalnim medijima – prva faza istraživanja




Grafikon 4: Broj sagovornika u lokalnim medijima – druga faza istraživanja

U sadržajima lokalnih medija, u situacijama kada svi sagovornici nisu ravnopravni, uglavnom se preferiraju lokalni zvaničnici. To također nije u skladu sa profesionalnim standardima. Ono što, međutim, ohrabruje, jeste da je između prve i druge faze istraživanja došlo do povećanja procenta sadržaja u kojima su svi sagovornici ravnopravni (sa 42% u prvoj fazi na 58% u drugoj fazi istraživanja), te smanjenja procenta sadržaja u kojima se favorizuju lokalni zvaničnici (sa 30% na 15%). Razlog za to možemo, dijelom, pronaći u činjenici da su između prve i druge faze istraživanja provedeni treninzi i konsultativni sastanci sa novinarima lokalnih medija na kojima im je ukazano na propuste u izvještavanju koji su uočeni tokom prve faze monitoringa. Iako su neki od propusta ponovljeni, odnosno uočeni i u drugoj fazi istraživanja (poput malog procenta tema od javnog interesa ili malog procenta tema vezanih za kulturu, obrazovanje i zaštitu okoline), u ovom segmentu tretiranja sagovornika na profesionalan način i bez preferiranja onih koji imaju pozicije moći došlo je do poboljšanja.



Grafikon 5: Status sagovornika – prva faza istraživanja



Grafikon 6: Status sagovornika – druga faza istraživanja

Kada sumiramo i dovedemo u korelaciju istraživačke nalaze, očividno je da nije osiguran interni pluralizam lokalnih medija, budući da teme od javnog interesa nisu dovoljno zastupljene, te da lokalni mediji uglavnom izvještavaju o lokalnoj politici ili o revijalnim, zabavnim temama. Također, zaključujemo i da nije osiguran ni eksterni pluralizam, budući da postoji značajan broj medijskih sadržaja bez sagovornika, kao i značajan broj sadržaja u kojima su preferirani lokalni zvaničnici kao sagovornici,

4. STAVOVI NOVINARA I UREDNIKA LOKALNIH MEDIJA – KVALITATIVNO ISTRAŽIVANJE

Budući da je uočen izostanak internog i eksternog pluralizma lokalnih medija u Bosni i Hercegovini, a imajući u vidu da kvantitativna analiza sadržaja ne može dati kontekstualni uvid i pojasniti uzroke stanja u medijima, urađeno je i 10 intervju sa novinarima iz lokalnih medija, kojima se pokušalo doći do odgovora na pitanja zašto je lokalna politika, odnosno praćenje/pokrivanje dnevnih aktivnosti lokalnih zvaničnika dominantni medijski sadržaj, te zašto se saopćenja lokalnih vlasti i institucija neselektivno i bez ikakvih novinarskih intervencija prenose u medije, kao i dobiti uvid u ključne probleme sa kojima se suočavaju lokalni mediji, te dobiti preporuke od samih novinara kako osigurati veće slobode i veći nivo profesionalizma i kvaliteta sadržaja lokalnih medija.

I sami novinari saglasni su da lokalni mediji nisu izuzetak od općeg trenda izvještavanja medija u BiH, a koji podrazumijeva šablonsko pokrivanje dnevnih događaja, slijedeći agendu koju nameću nosioci javnih funkcija, s tim da smatraju da su lokalni mediji u ovom kontekstu u još nepovoljnijem položaju, obzirom da lokalni zvaničnici od njih očekuju da prate sve ono što oni rade i sa pozitivnim uklonom o tome prenose informacije. Pored tih očekivanja, kao dodatnu otežavajuću okolnost novinari navode nedostatak vremena da se posvete dubljem istraživanju tema, odnosno općenito pravljenju tematskih priča, obzirom na to da je većina redakcija potkapacitirana u pogledu ljudskih resursa, pa mali broj ljudi proizvodi ogroman broj sadržaja za različite platforme (najčešće i za *online* izdanje medija i za „klasično”: radio i/ili TV). I u slučaju pandemije COVID-19 koja jeste nešto povećala udio tema iz oblasti zdravstva u ukupnom broju sadržaja, izvještavanje je također uglavnom bilo površno, uz navođenje statističkih podataka o broju oboljelih, dostupnim vakcinama itd., a manje tematsko i kontekstualno. Kad je riječ o raznolikosti sagovornika i mišljenja u pričama, novinari kažu da nailaze na nespremnost sagovornika, posebno onih koji su eksperti, da govore za medije, što pravdaju ili svojom zauzetošću primarnim poslom ili činjenicom da

nakon istupa u medijima ako iznesu stavove koji su suprotni *mainstreamu* suočavaju se s napadima stranačkih botova i trolova, *online* prijetnjama i slično, zbog čega izbjegavaju pojavljivanje u medijima. Tako političari i dalje ostaju najspremniji za pojavljivanje u medijima, posebno na lokalnim TV stanicama, ali ne zato što imaju visoku razinu svjesnosti o potrebi da putem lokalnih medija polažu račune građanima o svom radu, nego zato što smatraju da im pojavljivanje na TV ekranima donosi popularnost i podršku. Ono što je svakako zabrinjavajuće jesu problemi koje novinari lokalnih medija navode kao nešto sa čim se gotovo svakodnevno suočavaju, a što uključuje: pritiske lokalnih vlasti da se izvijesti o svemu što oni rade, čak i kad je riječ o nekim aktivnostima koje spadaju u njihov redovan opis posla, žalbe lokalnih zvaničnika urednicima lokalnih medija na način na koji novinari izvještavaju o njima ili na činjenicu da njihova PR saopćenja nisu prenesena u formi vijesti, zatim loš radno-pravni status i, posebno, strah od gubitka posla u malim lokalnim sredinama u kojima je novinarima teško naći drugo radno mjesto, pa nerijetko pristaju i na cenzuru i autocenzuru, stavljajući puku egzistenciju ispred profesionalnih standarda. Posebno zabrinjava činjenica da novinari lokalnih medija u malim sredinama smatraju kako njihov način izvještavanja koji nije u skladu sa dominantnim narativima i koji ne slijedi agendu lokalnih političara ne ugrožava samo njih osobno, nego i njihove porodice koje se nerijetko suočavaju s prijetnjama u malim sredinama u kojima „svako svakog poznaje”.

Novinari smatraju da je neophodno redefinisati zakone o lokalnim medijima kako bi oni dali bolji pravni okvir i bolju pravnu sigurnost novinarima, kao i bolje definisali uzajamni odnos lokalnih vlasti i lokalnih medija. Osvještavanje lokalnih zvaničnika i općenito lokalnih političara da lokalni mediji nisu i ne treba (čak ne smiju) da budu njihovi megafoni, nego servis građana ključni je preduslov kojeg novinari navode za oslobađanje lokalnih medija od političkih pritisaka. Transparentnija dodjela javnih sredstava medijima, koja neće biti uslovljena „poželjnim” izvještavanjem, također je nešto što veliki broj novinara smatra važnim. Podizanje tehničkih i posebno ljudskih resursa u lokalnim medijima novinari smatraju izuzetno važnim, naglašavajući da je, uslijed stresa na poslu i prekovremenog rada, veliki broj novinara suočen sa ozbiljnim zdravstvenim problemima.

Iz navedenih odgovora može se zaključiti da su novinari lokalnih medija svjesni izostanka pluralizma u lokalnim medijima, odnosno činjenice da građanima nije osiguran ni interni, ni eksterni pluralizam, jer iako imaju veći broj lokalnih medija na raspolaganju, njihov način izvještavanja, pristup temama i

činjenica da dominira površno pokrivanje dnevnih događaja i *copy-paste* novinarstvo ne garantuju raznorodnost izvora iz kojih bi građani dobili kvalitetne informacije, odnosno, posljedično, ne garantuju ni raznorodne informacije.

Kada posmatramo lokalne medije u Bosni i Hercegovini, možemo reći da se oni u značajnoj mjeri razlikuju od idealno-tipskog modela, jer nisu kreatori lokalnih agendi, odnosno na javnu raspravu ne stavljaju teme koje su od značaja za lokalno stanovništvo, nego uglavnom prate agendu lokalnih zvaničnika, odnosno političara. Također, umjesto da oni vrše uticaj na lokalne vlasti da pitanja i probleme lokalnih zajednica rješavaju u skladu s javnim interesom, dominantniji je (pa i vidljiviji) uticaj lokalnih vlasti i politika na lokalne medije. Lokalni mediji u BiH samo u manjoj mjeri su i kanali višesmjerne komunikacije između izabranih lokalnih zvaničnika i građana i platforme za izražavanje ideja, stavova i mišljenja o lokalnim temama i pitanjima, budući da u malom procentu preferiraju stav građana u svojim sadržajima. U idealno-tipskom modelu, lokalni mediji su jedan od značajnih agenasa medijskog pluralizma, budući da su oni garant postojanja javnog prostora koji podržava diverzitet lokalnih zajednica u svim njegovim aspektima (politika, ekonomija, kultura, društvo). No, u Bosni i Hercegovini, barem prema rezultatima provedenog monitoringa, ne možemo tvrditi da je tako.

5. JE LI LOKALNA MEDIJSKA ZAJEDNICA U BIH PLURALNA I PLURALISTIČKA: ZAKLJUČCI I PREPORUKE ISTRAŽIVANJA

Istraživanje lokalnih medija u BiH pokazalo je, dakle, nedostatak i internog i eksternog pluralizma, čemu su ključni uzroci, prije svega, pritisci i nerealna očekivanja lokalnih vlasti prema lokalnim medijima, kao i nedostatak materijalnih i ljudskih resursa u lokalnim medijima, koji bi im omogućili profesionalnije i kvalitetnije izvještavanje o temama od javnog interesa. Nedostaci su uočeni već nakon prve faze istraživanja, a odnosili su se, prije svega na način obrade lokalnih tema, koje dijelom jesu bile vezane za javni interes, ali je pristup uglavnom fokusiran na prijenos stavova lokalnih zvaničnika. U tom kontekstu zaključeno je da lokalni mediji nisu u punom kapacitetu osigurali diverzitet stavova i mišljenja, jer su preferirani stavovi lokalnih moćnika. Diverzitet tema također je bio manje zastupljen, pa su obrazovanje, kultura, zdravstvo i zaštita životne sredine bili u drugom planu u odnosu na praćenje aktivnosti lokalnih vlasti. „Pokrivanje” dnevnih događaja je dominantan pristup medija, te se jedna od preporuka u prvoj fazi istraživanja odnosila na potrebu postojanja većeg broja istraživačkih priča, kao i tematskih priča koje bi uključivale veći broj sagovornika, što bi građanima omogućilo da iz više uglova i sa različitim perspektivama

sagledaju lokalne teme, probleme, pitanja i događaje. Izbor sagovornika prema kompetencijama, a ne prema poziciji moći također je bila jedna od preporuka, kao i izbor sagovornika koji imaju raznorodna, odnosno međusobno različita mišljenja. U sučeljavanju njihovih stavova u javnom prostoru tako bi se kristalisalo javno mnijenje kroz argumentovanu debatu. Izbor sagovornika koji su u stanju neostrašćeno i razložno argumentovati pitanje ili događaj o kojem se izvještava ključan je za osiguravanje internog pluralizma lokalnih medija.

I nakon druge faze istraživanja zaključeno je da lokalni mediji nisu uspjeli staviti javni interes u prvi plan. U drugom monitoringu uočen je čak manji procenat tema koje su od javnog interesa u odnosu na prvi monitoring. Pandemija COVID-19 uzrokovala je povećan broj sadržaja koji su se bavili temom zdravlja, dok su teme iz oblasti obrazovanja, kulture i zaštite životne sredine i dalje ostale u druom planu u odnosu na praćenje aktivnosti lokalnih vlasti i dnevno pokrivanje događaja. Primijećeno je da mediji uzimaju nešto veći broj sagovornika u svojim pričama, ali su to i dalje bili sagovornici sa međusobno usaglašenim stavovima, pa i dalje nije došlo do ozbiljnijeg sučeljavanja raznorodnih stavova i ideja u javnom prostoru lokalnih medija. Također, novinari su nastavili s praksom biranja sagovornika prema dominantnom stavu ili pristupu koji zauzimaju u priči, odnosno sa selektivnim pristupom sagovornicima, što je spriječilo da se o nekim temama čuju različita mišljenja, a ne samo ona koja podržavaju *a priori* kreiran stav u medijskom sadržaju.

Stoga su i ključne preporuke istraživanja, i nakon prve i nakon druge faze, suštinski apel za vraćanjem standarda profesionalizma u lokalne medije. One se odnose, između ostalog, na stavljanje javnog interesa u prvi plan prilikom izvještavanja lokalnih medija, što se ne vezuje samo uz izbor tema o kojima se izvještava, nego i uz pristup temama koji bi bio zasnovan na javnom interesu, a ne na interesu lokalnih zvaničnika da javnosti predstave svoje stavove i aktivnosti. Diverzitet tema kojima se bave lokalni mediji također treba biti povećan, s akcentom na više tematskih priča iz oblasti obrazovanja, zdravlja, kulture i zaštite životne sredine. Na ovaj način bi se osigurao interni pluralizam u lokalnim medijima u Bosni i Hercegovini. U tim tematskim i/ili istraživačkim pričama, koje treba da budu dominantne u odnosu na dnevno pokrivanje događaja, potrebno je povećati broj i raznolikost sagovornika, čime bi se građanima omogućilo da iz više uglova i perspektiva sagledaju neko pitanje. Različitost mišljenja i stavova treba osigurati i kroz izbor sagovornika prema kompetencijama, kao i argumentaciji koju mogu ponuditi u okviru priča. Na ovaj način bi se osigurao eksterni pluralizam u lokalnim medijima u Bosni i Hercegovini.

No, da bi to bilo moguće, novinari lokalnih medija smatraju da je potrebno omogućiti slobodniji i kvalitetniji rad lokalnim medijima, kako onima koji se finansiraju iz javnih fondova, tako i privatnih lokalnih medija. To bi podrazumijevalo više rada sa lokalnim zvaničnicima kako bi se oni osvijestili da lokalni mediji ne služe kao njihovi megafoni, te da moraju imati više razumijevanja za kritičke i disonantne glasove predstavljene putem lokalnih medija. Također, potrebno je i snažnije osvještavanje urednika u lokalnim medijima o važnosti vraćanja javnog interesa u fokus izvještavanja, odnosno o potrebi promjene diskursa lokalnih medija koji, nerijetko, ima za cilj da lokalni zvaničnici, a ne građani, budu zadovoljni prezentiranim medijskim sadržajima. Osiguravanje boljih uvjeta za rad medija, kako tehničko-tehnološki, tako i ljudskih resursa, te oslobađanje od političkih i ekonomskih pritisaka ključni su preduslovi za pluralizam lokalnih medija u BiH.

U konačnici, cilj podizanja kvaliteta izvještavanja lokalnih medija trebalo bi biti ono što R. Horwitz (prema Freedman, 2008) opisuje kao „vrijednosti slobode govora i divergentnih gledišta, koje podvodimo pod pojam pluralizma”, umjesto „više izbora u okviru relativno površnog seta zadatih koordinata kojeg zovemo diverzitet”, a što je danas prisutno u BiH. Krajni cilj su, svakako, informisani suvereni građani.

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Lejla Turčilo

Summary

The pluralism of information, opinions and sources in the local media in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an issue that is often discussed among academics and professionals, since all previous research shows that the local media are under strong pressure from the local authorities, who perceive them as their own channel for addressing the local public and not as public institutions. This paper presents the results of media monitoring of local media (press, radio, TV, online) conducted in two phases (2020 and 2021) with the main goal of examining the pluralism of information, sources and opinions present in local media in B&H. Interviews with local media journalists were also presented, which through an "inside view" tried to answer the question: what do local journalists see as the main obstacles to media pluralism in local communities.

Key words: pluralism, local media, Bosnia and Herzegovina

PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES OF ROMANIAN INDEPENDENT MEDIA PUBLISHERS

Often called *the Alternative Press* (as journalist Diana Oncioiu referred to independent media in an interview we conducted), Romanian independent journalism goes beyond the patterns of the traditional media, as it has succeeded to build, with a handful of journalists, complex journalistic work with a great impact on society. These editorial projects promise to have no ties with any media company (hence no political or economic interests) and merely exist for the public interest. In Romania, most of the alternative journalism projects have emerged in the last ten years, as a reaction to the constant decrease in quality and ethics within traditional media. They function as online collective platforms and are guided by a common set of principles and values that finally define their purpose: great quality of content, provided by very good and correct documentation; editorial independence; equidistant approach, through references to clear sources and using objective, rational arguments based on reports, data and statistics; accountability and transparency; freedom of expression, professionalism; critical thinking. However idyllic this emergent industry would sound, it does not lack specific challenges and endeavors, such as financial insecurities, scarce human resources and political and social pressure. In order to further explore this issue, we conducted qualitative research utilizing an interview with journalists who have chosen the path of independent journalism. Their input to this research revealed the fact that alternative media is an appealing work field for Romanian media professionals, because of its rigorous manner of doing journalism and its openness to new technologies, but also full of challenges such as financial insecurity and time management issues.

Key words: independent journalism, alternative press, traditional media, collective platforms, editorial projects

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1. WHAT IS INDEPENDENT JOURNALISM?

As Diana Oncioiu, a lead journalist from Dela0.ro, one of the most important Romanian independent media projects said in our interview, "independent journalism is ownerless journalism; journalism that spends more time than most mainstream newsrooms can afford; it is journalism that relates without restraint topics that some mainstream newsrooms would not even approach, especially in the area of investigations". Independent journalism refers to all editorial projects that promise to have no ties with any media company (hence no political, economic or social interests) and merely exist for the public interest. It works based on donations from readers, occasionally with volunteers, and through projects of local communities or certain non-governmental organizations. It is also called *Alternative Press* (www.oxfordreference.com). Many times, journalists from the classic newsrooms work here too, searching for more unrestrained freedom of expression. AP publishes extensive materials, revelations, investigations, and topics that sometimes require months of documentation. Christian Fuchs states that alternative journalism should have four characteristics: the audience must be involved in what is published in alternative media; it has to be different from mainstream media; the third is that it should create a different perspective than the one provided by state institutions or corporations; and that alternative journalism must establish different kinds of relations with the state (Fuchs, 2010). We understand alternative journalism in the same key as Atton and Hamilton, who state that "alternative journalism is not an unchanging, universal type of journalism, but is an ever-changing effort to respond critically to dominant conceptions of journalism. Alternative journalism is best seen as a kind of activity instead of as a specific, definitive kind of news story, publication or mode of organization" (Atton, Hamilton, 2008). The alternative approach to journalism is not just about selecting different stories, but rather about what can be done with these stories. Alternative journalists may see themselves covering different stories, operating in an alternative set of ethical beliefs, "and to an extent operating as a watchdog on the mainstream media organizations that like to portray themselves as a watchdog" (Harcup, 2013, 2019). In Romania, most AP projects have emerged in the last ten years, as a reaction to the constant decrease in quality and ethics within traditional media.

2. THE CURRENT STATE OF ROMANIAN JOURNALISM: A FEW WORRYING FACTS

Romania is ranked 56th in the Press Freedom Index for 2022, published by Reporters Without Borders (<https://www.g4media.ro>). The same study stresses the fact that Romania's media funding mechanisms are "often opaque and even corrupt". Another pressing issue, this time, at a more personal level, consists of ongoing attacks against reporters and citizen journalists, which are alarmingly increasing (www.libertatea.ro). Moreover, it can no longer be ignored that public interest journalism faces powerful competition from disinformation campaigns led by certain media and politicians (www.recorder.ro). These are just a few examples of the challenges for Romanian journalists and media institutions. The opportunity given to journalists by online media and digital transformation is not itself enough to ensure a healthy media environment. We believe that it takes time, financial resources and educational initiatives aimed at preparing young journalists for the kind of documented, thorough professional work we saw in the previous analysis.

Principles and values of AP

Romanian independent journalism functions as online collective platforms that are guided by a common set of principles and values: the quality of the materials - given by very good and correct documentation; editorial independence; equidistant approach - by referring to clear sources and using objective; rational arguments, based on reports, statistics; accountability, transparency; freedom of expression; professionalism; critical thinking.

But none of these is new. For example, here is a list of journalistic principles, as presented by Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel in their book, *Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect* (2007):

Journalism's first obligation is to the truth.

Its first loyalty is to citizens.

Its essence is a discipline of verification.

Its practitioners must maintain independence from those they cover.

Journalism must serve as an independent monitor of power.

It must provide a forum for public criticism and compromise.

It must strive to make it significant, interesting and relevant.

It must keep the news comprehensive and proportional.

Its practitioners must be allowed to exercise their personal conscience

So why do we state that these are only the characteristics of independent journalism? Our main reason is the fact that ever since the Romanian media transitioned from print to online, these principles have been ignored or altered. Instead, we mainly see clickbait journalism, catastrophic narrative approaches and content marked by conflictual, aggressive language, which in our opinion represents a different discourse turn, which we referred to as a *fight paradigm*. (Bader, Sîrb, 2021). The differences between the materials published on independent journalism platforms and those in the traditional media can be noticed at the first level of contact with the media content, in the headlines and/or social media descriptions: in contrast to mainstream media content, they indicate exactly the subject, exclude fake news precisely through proper documentation and also indicate by keywords (e.g. "investigation", "we track...", "report", " what is behind..." etc) the type and extent of the material to be read.

Why is independent journalism needed?

Freelance journalists produce materials without financial institutional support (publishing houses, owners or political institutions such as the Government or the parties) so we can assume that the facts presented in these articles do not try to favor, manipulate or accuse someone for no other reason than exposing the truth. It is a type of journalism that takes seriously the phrase "the press is the fourth power in the state" because the articles have primarily social and not commercial intentions. Unlike any other type of media (written, audio-visual or digital) that receives financial support from public or private funds, independent journalism allows bringing the facts to light without having to answer to anyone but the author's consciousness. That is why the existence of so many such platforms is a necessity in a media world where it is increasingly difficult to discern quality news from fake news, or articles objectively documented by those imposed, influenced by third parties (political, economic) or censored (www.cji.ro). As Deborah Potter puts it, "In a complex world where information is no longer a scarce commodity, the role of the journalists has become more important than ever." (Potter, 2006: 11)

3. METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

In this article, we aim to explore and present the contents of alternative journalism on Romanian online platforms using a qualitative methodology, in particular - content analysis. We list the platforms with more visibility and present

their content in order to better understand what are their particularities in contrast with traditional online media. Qualitative research is seen as "a means to explore and understand the meaning that individuals or groups attribute to social and human problems" (Creswell, Clark, 2011). Qualitative methods can include analyzing texts and documents such as media articles, websites, and journals, in order to learn about social problems or private matters (Hammarberg, Kirkman, Lacey, 2016). We chose this method because we believe that qualitative methodology is the most appropriate when investigating phenomena with a high degree of peculiarity. In independent journalism, every voice is peculiar and every publication has its own characteristics. Hence, in our opinion, a statistical approach would not be fit for this kind of survey.

To fulfill our purpose we explored the independent media landscape and we selected 12 of the most popular and significant alternative media platforms from Romania in the last five years (2017 - 2022). Then, we sent a short interview by email to all of these platforms, asking 2 main questions: a) *how would you define the concept of independent journalism in Romania?*, and b) *what are the main challenges for an independent journalist in Romania?* The answers we received, brought to the surface several issues, such as funding sources, time management and lack of personnel. In the following lines, we will describe these main platforms revealing their main values, methods and characteristics.

We conducted qualitative research on all significant Romanian active platforms of alternative media that stood out for the journalistic quality of published materials (reports, inquiries, large-scale investigations), proven by political changes and social events that took place after their publication (e.g. cases of ministers who resigned after media articles about different frauds). By active, we understand any webpage that publishes new content at least once a month, in the last year (2021-2022). Our research took into account the following variables:

- Medium of communication;
- Type of topics they approach;
- Types of content (in terms of genres and formats);
- Publication Frequency
- Social media exposure

We also extended our research to several platforms that defend the right to accurate information and that deal with the verification of information published in the media, the verification of public statements of politicians, the identification of fake news and slippage in the press. They have assumed the role (though non-

institutional) of overseeing the professionalism of the press, an initiative that we consider to be necessary for the existence of quality journalism.

4. THE MAIN INDEPENDENT JOURNALISM PROJECTS IN ROMANIA

We gathered the data we collected in our research and put it in the table below. We were mainly interested in seeing what kind of content these independent projects publish, as far as the topic and formats are concerned. As can be seen, most of them tackle topics that are not covered in the mainstream media or that are not approached as they would deserve. As far as formats are concerned, almost all publish ample pieces that abound in multimedia content and even interactive content. The frequency varies and is mainly dictated by the complexity of the article and the time and resources that are needed in order to document and produce the journalistic piece in question. All of them are active primarily online and some of them also build a community on social media.

Project	Medium	Type of topics	Types of content	Frequency
The Center for Independent Journalism	Online platform: www.culturaladuba.ro NGO offline initiatives	Social Issues Journalistic education	Complex investigations; Courses for professionals; Documentaries.	weekly/bi-monthly
Culture in a van	Online platform:	Art in all its forms & representations	Interviews, news, complex pieces	daily
Dela0.ro	Online platform www.beta.dela0.ro	Stringent social & political issues	Report, documentaries & multimedia projects	weekly
Decât o Revistă	Online platform: www.dor.ro Offline events Social media	Social & culture	Written pieces, articles, podcasts, infographics.	bi-weekly

G4Media.ro	Online platform; Social media.	Social & politics	Opinion pieces, investigations, analysis, news	daily
Pressone	Online platform: www.pressone.ro Social media	Social & politics	In-depth Reports, investigations, analysis, news with a strong multimedia approach	daily
Recorder	Online platform: www.recorder.ro Social media.	Politics & corruption	Video documentaries, complex investigations	monthly/bi-monthly
RISE Project	Online platform: www.riseproject.ro ; Social media;	Organized crime & corruption	Thorough, multimedia investigations	Weekly/bi-monthly
Factual	Fact-checking site: www.factual.ro	False news	Amends and corrects false news published in the media	Irregular
Larics (Laboratory for Information Warfare Analysis and Strategic Communication in Romania)	Online research laboratory: www.larics.ro	Informational "warfare" concerning Romania and the Republic of Moldova	Analysis, reports, opinion pieces	Irregular
Misreport	Newsletter	Disinformation	News, analysis, investigations	Weekly
Veridica	Monitoring platform: www.veridica.ro	Fake news	Reports and analysis on fake news & misinformation.	Multiple pieces/day

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The Challenges of Romanian Independent Journalism Projects

Starting an independent journalism project means taking on an editorial project with a lot of enthusiasm but with very little money. This is because, in Romania, the platforms we mentioned are based almost exclusively on donations from readers, and obtaining them is, perhaps, the biggest challenge. There are also regular amounts of money from scholarships won or funded by NGOs and sometimes some sites receive grants from European Union projects.

Diana Oncioiu, a journalist at Dela0.ro, also considers that "there are times when you have no financial stability. And maybe at 20 it's not a problem, but it could be at 35, for example" (from private correspondence with Diana Oncioiu). In an interview for IQads.ro, journalist Andreea Pavel says that "journalists who choose to work independently are passionate, love their job, and the public interest and finding out the truth are the most important things for them. They are in constant search and anxiety. So they don't lack passion and motivation, but the thing we all run into when we want to do something, anything is money. Here is the difference between a freelance journalist and a journalist from a classic newsroom, with a fixed salary, which he receives monthly. Or, well, in some cases, in a few months. But he still gets it. The journalist in the newsroom knows for sure that he will have money that month, but he is not always sure that he will have the freedom to publish any subject he wants or that they will not "drop" some information when editing. Instead, a freelance journalist knows for sure that his materials will be published without missing information, but he never knows how long he will be able to live his dream."

In addition to the financial part, a challenge for freelance journalists also seems to be time management: "You have to learn not to work until you get burnt out, but be careful not to think that journalism is a hobby, that you do it so, once a year, with a subject that you think is great. Journalism is done every day, even if you don't publish every day. When you are a freelance journalist, you learn to do everything. You are an editorial office by yourself. What I mean is that you learn everything - from how to make a website to video montages and how to set up a small video studio. You are obliged to deal with administrative issues as well", says Diana Oncioiu (private correspondence).

Once all these problems are known, another difficulty for the teams of independent journalists is the attraction of new colleagues to join a quality project, but with many risks and financial insecurity. However, independent journalism

somehow survives, with little money and very good articles, highlighting the fact that good journalists still manage to contribute to the improvement of society, because through their articles, they support the community to understand the problems, to empathize with them, look for solutions and take action.

What does it mean to be a good journalist today?

The answer, we believe, consists in solving the dilemma between the purist and the mercantile approach of the journalistic profession by launching the idea that these two aspects are not mutually exclusive, but quite the opposite. We would like to briefly explain what each of these two approaches refers to, in our opinion. Firstly, the purist journalistic approach sees journalistic endeavors as an activity that should merely be guided by public interest, focuses on reporters' role as watchdogs, and insists on rigorous documentation prior to any content release. Secondly, the mercantile approach brings an entrepreneurship dimension to the practice of journalism, regards content publishing primarily as a business, not a public service and focuses on maximizing its profits, even if sometimes this involves a decrease in quality or a loosening of principles. The reconciliation of these two opposite views on journalism could be expressed, in our opinion, in the following manner: in an environment soon to be overwhelmed by low-quality content and distrustful news, there is a market for independent media projects that do good-quality journalism, guided by traditional principles, but in a modern, multimedia focused manner, that has the capacity to attract readers, investors and advertisers and, thus, becomes a profitable business.

Therefore, shortly, we believe that being a good journalist nowadays means putting the public interest first and serving it in a form and format that makes the information readable, understandable and shareable. And as proof for an optimistic perspective on this matter are precisely the islands of independent, quality journalism, presented in this paper.

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SKRIVENO I PRIRODNO OGLAŠAVANJE NA PORTALU JAVNOG EMITERA

U ovom radu na primjeru portala *RTCG* istražit ćemo zastupljenost skrivenog i prirodnog oglašavanja u pomenutom onlajn mediju. U cilju dokazivanja hipoteze analiziraćemo rubriku ekonomija, koja je najposjećenija i posvećena temama od javnog interesa. Ujedno ćemo napraviti poređenje sa analizom kompanija i institucija koje se oglašavaju na portalu *Javnog emitera* da bismo utvrdili vezu između uredno označenog promo sadržaja i marketinga. S obzirom na to da je izmjenama Zakona o medijima zabranjeno skriveno oglašavanje, a prirodno još uvijek nije zaživjelo, utvrdićemo koliko su prisutne nove pomenute forme na portalu *RTCG* imajući u vidu novčane kazne koje su propisane crnogorskim zakonodavnim okvirom.

Gljučne riječi: advetorijal, prirodno oglašavanje, portal *RTCG*, ekonomija, Crna Gora

1. UVOD

Još šezdesetih godina XX vijeka Maršal Makluan je pisao da je čovjek nomad u sakupljanju informacija koje ću mu umnogome olakšati život u savremenom svijetu. Danas je više od pet milijardi ljudi svakodnevno izloženo ogromnom broju informacija koje serviraju novi mediji, postmediji i različite platforme. Nekadašnji mejnstrim mediji polako gube informativnu i edukativnu ulogu jer se sve više zamera (generacija rođena u periodu od 1997. do 2012. godine) informiše putem društvenih mreža. Mediji su se odavno pretvorili u instrumente bogatih industrijalaca i političkih moćnika, te je evidentno da pri izvještavanju dolaze do izražaja pomoćne funkcije poput političke, propagandne, usmjeravajuće i komercijalne. Mnoštvo objavljenih tekstova nemaju čak ni informativnu vrijednost, dok u onlajn prostoru sve češće dolazi do kršenja profesionalnih standarda – istinitosti, tačnosti, poštenja, uravnoteženosti i nepristrasnosti. U ovakvim uslovima teoretičari i međunarodne organizacije sa svih strana upozoravaju građane da ne nasjedaju na različite vrste informacijskih poremećaja – dezinformacije, misinformacije i zloćudne (maligne) informacije.

Stjepan Malović u knjizi „Medijski prijevori“ navodi direktne i indirektne metode manipulacije iz kojih je vidljivo da indirektne metode (sprega s

vlasnicima, uticaj na urednike, novinari kao članovi ili simpatizeri određene partije) rezultiraju direktnim metodama poput *agende-setting-a*, pseudodogađaja, funkcije kao elemenat vrijednosti vijesti i skrivene reklame (Malović, 2004: 124). S jedne strane, mediji djelimično zavise od oglašivača, a s druge, same kompanije u uslovima ekonomske krize traže jeftinije i drugačije načine dolaska do publike. Od 2008. godine mediji konstantno posluju u akutnoj fazi krizne situacije koja se odražava na prihode od oglašavanja. Francuska ekonomistkinja Žilija Kaže konstatuje da savremeni mediji ne mogu živjeti od reklame i teško je steći političku i ekonomsku nezavisnost. Ona upozorava da savremeni moguli kupuju medije u cilju sticanja nove poluge moći i tretiraju ih kao „skupe ljubavnice“ ozbiljno ugrožavajući demokratske procese u društvu (Kaže, 2016: 73). Ipak, uprkos pesimističkim prognozama, istraživanje Rojtersovog instituta pokazuje da je za vrijeme pandemije došlo do porasta pretplate na pojedina izdanja što će uticati na povećanje prihoda od oglašivača. Tako je elitni list *New York Times* povećao broj inostranih pretplatnika za 21% u poslednjih godinu dana prešavši jedan milion (Beta, 3. 11. 2021). To se može djelimično objasniti i činjenicom da su u periodu od 2020. do 2022. godine građani širom svijeta bili suočeni sa brojnim dezinformacijama o koronavirusu, vakcinama, kampanjama onlajn ratnika u pogledu međunarodnih i domaćih zbivanja.

2. EKONOMSKI PRITISCI I NOVE FORME OGLAŠAVANJA U MEDIJIMA

Komercijalizacija novinarstva u XIX vijeku dovela je do porasta broja reklama u medijima. Danas se prosječni Amerikanac može susresti sa 4.000 do 10.000 reklama na dnevnom nivou (Prodanoff, 2022.) Imajući u vidu ovaj podatak jasno je da ljudi više pažljivo ne konzumiraju reklame, već će prvenstveno primjetiti one koje nude proizvode za koje su građani zainteresovani. Dubravka Valić Nedeljković i Dejan Pralica ističu da su reklame neophodne jer „omogućavaju da ekonomija napreduje“ (Valić Nedeljković, Pralica, 2021: 79) Nikola Dojčinović i Samir Ljajić objašnjavaju razliku između oglašavanja u različitim vrstama medija (novine, radio, televizija i novi mediji). Autori ističu da su televizija i onlajn mediji najsnažniji kanali za plasiranje marketinških poruka jer omogućavaju prikazivanje pokretne slike, zvuka, čitanog i pisanog teksta. (Dojčinović, Ljajić, 2020: 108). Aleksandar Luj Todorović u knjizi „Medijske industrije“ navodi da je ključni momenat u industriji oglašavanja nastupio pedesetih godina prošlog vijeka jer se u tom periodu stručnjaci za oglašavanje

upoznaju sa najnovijim dostignućima u oblasti psihologije, sociologije, antropologije što je znatno uticalo na reklamni pristup (Todorović, 2020: 194).

Zašto su reklame toliko privlačne ukoliko su ljudi zasićeni ovom vrstom sadržaja? Đuro Šušnjić u knjizi „Ribari ljudskih duša“ objašnjava da građani vjeruju da kroz određeni proizvod zadovoljavaju potrebe i ne razmišljaju o interesima osobe koja prodaje taj proizvod. Osim toga, osobine stvari se povezuju sa društvenim i psihološkim osobinama ličnosti, odnosno čovjek će kupiti veliki sjajni automobil zbog osjećanja moći (Šušnjić, 2008: 164). Marketinški stručnjaci manipulišu ljudima i svjesni su da mogu prodati svaki proizvod bez obzira da li je riječ o pragmatičnom ili emocionalnom potencijalnom kupcu. Kod osoba sa niskim stepenom samoposmatranja koristiće tvrdnu prodaju i centralni put ubjeđivanja, koji se fokusira na kvalitet proizvoda, a osobe sa visokim stepenom samoposmatranja lakše će podleći mekoj prodaji, koja se bazira na perifernom putu ubjeđivanja, tačnije na sloganu, muzici i pripovjedanju imajući u vidu važnost imidža za ove osobe (Džajls, 2011: 73–74). Aleksandar Luj Todorović navodi skrivene pokretače koji će motivisati osobe da kupe reklamirani proizvod: emotivna sigurnost, zadovoljenja ega, želja za moći i osjećanje pripadnosti (Todorović, 2020: 195–197).

Tehnologija je omogućila i pojavu novih oblika reklamiranja proizvoda i publiku usmjerila na digitalno oglašavanje, koje je najuspješnije na društvenoj mreži Meta i platformama Google i Youtube. Marketinški stručnjaci konstantno razvijaju nove tehnike kako bi javnost obratila pažnju upravo na reklamu određene kompanije. Jedan od takvih načina je skriveni marketing.

Predrag Haramija objašnjava klasifikaciju skrivenog oglašavanja praveći razliku između informativnog i zabavnog sadržaja. U informativnim sadržajima možemo naći oblike skrivene reklame koje navodimo u nastavku.

Naručeni autorski novinarski prilog je medijski proizvod koji je potpisan od strane novinara, a kojim se promoviše određena kompanija ili proizvod.

Naručeni redakcijski ili urednički prilog je medijski sadržaj potpisan od strane redakcije u kojem se dodatni publicitet daje instituciji/kompaniji/proizvodu ili usluzi.

Advertorijal (*advertisement* i *editorial*) predstavlja reklamu upakovanu u informativni sadržaj.

Infomercials (*information* i *commercials*) predstavlja reklamu upakovanu u informativni prilog.

Tematsko oglašavanje je medijski sadržaj u kojem se kroz, navodno, javno mnjenje (naručene ankete ili pomoću stručnjaka) reklamira određeni proizvod ili kompanija.

Postavljanje proizvoda u informativne sadržaje (*product placement*) forma je reklame u kojoj voditelj informativne emisije nosi na sebi prepoznatljiv znak određene kompanije ili je ispred njega postavljen određeni proizvod.

U zabavnim programima razlikujemo sljedeće oblike skrivenog reklamiranja.

Postavljanje proizvoda u zabavne sadržaje je reklamiranje koje možemo vidjeti u filmovima, zabavnim programima, muzičkim programima, kvizovima, itd.

Integracija proizvoda (*product integration*) forma je reklamiranja u kojem je proizvod utkan u cijeli program.

Zabavni oglas (*advertising i entertainment*) predstavlja reklamu kojoj možemo biti izloženi u vizuelnom ili muzičkom obliku.

Sponzorisanje programskih sadržaja (*content sponsorship*) označava situacije u kojem oglašivači postaju sponzori posebnih programa.

Oglašivačka TV produkcija predstavlja specijalizovani zabavni program koji su proizveli oglašivači.

Subliminalne poruke su kratki signali ugrađeni u dužu poruku, koji utiču na podsvjest ljudi (Haramija, 2011: 393). Ova tehnika je zakonski zabranjena u mnogim zemljama, dok drugi teoretičari tvrde da Džejms Vikari nikada nije izveo ovaj eksperiment.

U informativnim programima često se plasiraju advertorijal i infomeršal. Advertorijal je direktna metoda manipulacije koja se ogleda u reklamama upakovanoj u informativni sadržaj. Ova pojava nije nova i datira iz 1812. godine. Početkom XIX vijeka u štampanim medijima bio je sve popularniji *puff* (dašak) koji predstavlja prikriveni, indirektni oglas za koji su vlasnici kompanija bili spremni platiti i smatrao se efikasnijim od običnog oglasa (Gocini, 2001: 167).

Infomeršal je kombinacija informacije i reklame koju Valić i Pralica definišu kao „balansiranu, kritičku, medijski dobro oblikovanu informaciju“ (Valić i Pralica, 2021: 85). Ova vrsta reklame se koristi veoma uspješno u kampanjama javnog zagovaranja.

Zahvaljujući novoj tehnologiji došlo je do razvoja displej oglašavanja koje obuhvata različite vrste banera, kao i influencer marketinga, koji se bazira na ljudima koji mogu uticati na tržište. Baneri predstavljaju reklamnu poruku na internetu koja olakšava praćenje reakcije internet-korisnika, odnosno stepena

zainteresovanosti za određeni proizvod. Međutim, baneri polako gube svoju funkciju jer konzumenti ignorišu oglašavanje u ovom obliku i razvili su svojevrсни *banner blindness* (Tomljanović, Jakopović, 2019: 148) U izvještaju “Journalism, media, technology trends and predictions 2022” Rojtersovog instituta navodi se da je popularnost displej oglašavanja u padu u posljednje dvije godine (sa 81% na 73%), kao i prirodno oglašavanja sa 75% na 59% (Jennings, 2022).

U novinarskom svijetu se danas raspravlja o dva pravca razvoja: uvođenju pretplate za onlajn novinarstvo i usmjeravanju novinara da se više ponašaju kao influenseri da bi izgradili zajednicu. Mnogi tradicionalni mediji dali su se u potragu za talentovanim licima koja bi im omogućila povećanje broja pretplatnika. Nik Njuman u izvještaju “Digital news report” objašnjava da su urednici zabrinuti kako da privuku mlađu populaciju i rješenje ovog problema vide u prirodnom oglašavanju.

Od 2011. godine, zahvaljujući Fredu Wilsonu, u upotrebu je ušao termin – *native* monetizacija, tačnije reklama koja se uklapa u platformu na kojoj je objavljena fokusirajući se na benefite, a ne na karakteristike samog proizvoda. Tekst koji predstavlja prirodno oglašavanje mora biti uredno označen kao promo sadržaj. Maria Tomljenović i Hrvoje Jakopović u radu „Hibridni oblici odnosa s javnošću i marketinga: od advertorijala do *native* oglašavanja na portal 24sata.hr“ objašnjavaju da se *native* sadržaj oslanja na kredibilitet medija i proizvode ga novinari u skladu sa uredničkim standardima. *Native* se može objaviti u obliku teksta, fotografije i videa, koji je izuzetno popularan među milenijalcima i zumerima.

Mediji su izloženi različitim pritiscima koji dolaze od pretplatnika, oglašivača, konkurencije, javnosti. Luis Alvin Dej navodi nekoliko etičkih izazova kroz ekonomske pritiske u oglašavanju koji se ogledaju u sljedećem:

1. kvantitet komercijalnog materijala određuje količinu prostora koji je preostao za informisanje i zabavu;

2. smanjenje budžeta za reklamiranje od strane kompanije (Dej slikovito ilustruje da će u vremenima ekonomske krize kompanije smanjiti izdatke za oglašavanje, te će reklamna industrija početi kašljati, ali će mediji prvi završiti sa prehladom);

3. pritisak na medijske menadžere da se nepovoljne informacije koje mogu ugroziti reputaciju neke institucije/kompanije ne objave (Dej, 2004: 292).

Zanimljivo je da je istraživanje Sindikata medija Crne Gore na uzorku od 87 anketiranih novinara pokazalo da urednici i vlasnici medija u najvećoj mjeri vrše pritisak na novinare, dok je procentualno mali pokazatelj u pogledu političara

i poslovnog sektora. Čak 75,6% ispitanika su izjavili da urednici izuzetno, veoma ili djelimično utiču na njih, dok je izuzetan i djelimičan uticaj vlasnika medija navelo 40 % medijskih radnika. Uticaj biznis sektora na novinare konstatovalo je svega 20% ispitanika. Autorka izvještaja zaključuje da se ovaj procenat može objasniti činjenicom da se takva vrsta uticaja može ostvariti preko urednika (Laković Konatar, 2021: 9).

3. PORTALI U BORBI ZA OPSTANAK NA CRNOGORSKOM MEDIJSKOM TRŽIŠTU

Prema izvještaju Sindikata medija Crne Gore, na tržištu posluje 200 medija u kojima radi 1.806 novinara. Globalna ekonomska kriza pogodila je i malo crnogorsko tržište na kojem se većina medija od samog osnivanja bori za opstanak. Poslednje dvije godine su bile osobeno teške po medije. U 2021. godini ugašen je list *Dnevne novine* ostavljajući bez posla 30 medijskih radnika, dok je iste godine prestao sa radom i *Fos media*. Sindikat medija Crne Gore upozorava da plate zaposlenima često kasne, a posebno u lokalnim javnim emiterima. (Veličković Camović i Laković Konatar, 2022: 8). Ovakva situacija je dovela do toga da sve veći broj novinara traži radni angažman u odnosima s javnošću, dok su mediji prinuđeni da pristaju na kompromise s oglašivačima. U izvještaju „Jednake šanse za sve medije u Crnoj Gori“ nevladina organizacija Centar za građansko obrazovanje je na osnovu prikupljenih podataka iz 192 organa došla do sljedeće statistike koja se itekako odražava na slobodu medija. „Organi javnog sektora uplatili su štampanim medijima, televizijama, radio-stanicama, portalima i informativnim agencijama, marketinškim i medijskim agencijama, produkcijskim kućama te ostalim vezanim pravnim licima koji su pružali medijsko-marketinške usluge, ali i po drugim osnovama, najmanje 3.426.183,33 eura“ (Nikočević, 2021: 33) Ovim iznosom nije obuhvaćena državna pomoć, kao ni sredstva iz budžeta koja se izdvajaju za Javni servis. Tokom 2021. godine Vlada je pomagala medijima kroz subvencije za plate, odlaganje plaćanja poreza i doprinosa na zarade zaposlenima, kao i kroz jednokratnu novčanu pomoć (Ibid, str. 8–9). Advertajzing tržište za oko 200 medija na godišnjem nivou iznosi oko 10 miliona eura. Tokom pandemije veliki regionalni oglašivači su se povukli sa crnogorskog tržišta što je uticalo da se prihodi od oglašavanja drastično smanje (Janković, 2020).

Ipak, Sindikat medija Crne Gore u dokumentu „Socioekonomski položaj medijskih radnika u Crnoj Gori“ ukazuje da su mediji pozitivno poslovali tokom 2020. godine i pored apokaliptičnih predviđanja. Mediji su prihodovali oko 41,8

miliona eura, a rashodovali 39,1 milion. Više od 20 miliona mediji su dobili iz državnog budžeta ili budžeta opština, a ostatak od marketinga (Laković Konatar, 2021: 5).

Dodatni pritisak na medije predstavlja i medijski zakonodavni okvir iz 2020. godine, koji zabranjuje skriveno oglašavanje. Članom 38 Zakona o medijima precizirano je da nije dozvoljeno reklamiranje prodaje i kupovine ljudskih organa, oružja, opojnih droga, duvanskih proizvoda, lijekova koji su dostupni isključivo uz recept, medicinskih tretmana i metoda liječenja koje nisu u skladu sa zakonom, itd. Između ostalog, eksplicitno je ukazano da je skriveno oglašavanje zabranjeno (Službeni list br. 082/20 od 6. 8. 2020). Upravo iz navedenog razloga portal *Vijesti* uredno označava advertorijal na početku teksta kao promo sadržaj, portal *Analitika* objavljuje takve vijesti u okviru podrubrike marketing u rubrici Abiznis, dok je jedini medij koji ima podrubriku sponzorisan tekstovi portal Javnog servisa. Ova činjenica ne iznenađuje imajući u vidu da portal *RTCG* ima stabilne i redovne prihode iz budžeta. Na primjer, u 2022. godini za potrebe Javnog emitera iz budžeta je izdvojeno 15.919.800 eura, dok su marketinški prihodi u prvih šest mjeseci 2022. godine iznosili 399.433 eura (Radio i televizija Crne Gore, 2022).

Smjernica 10 Kodeksa novinara/novinarki Crne Gore je jedna od najsveobuhvatnijih i propisuje da novinar ne bi trebalo da prihvata privilegije bilo koje vrste koje bi se mogle odraziti na izvještavanje. Medijsko lice mora izbjegavati poklone, poslovna putovanja, popuste ili nešto što bi moglo uticati na kredibilitet medija. Smjernica 10.2 nalaže da novinar ne smije prećutati ili iskazati informacije usljed pritiska ili uticaja oglašivača ili lica koja imaju poslovni, politički interes u konkretnom mediju. Smjernica 10.3 precizira razdvajanje funkcija radi izbjegavanja sukoba interesa ukoliko novinar radi u nekom državnom preduzeću ili privatnoj kompaniji. Međutim, na osnovu anketiranja Sindikata medija Crne Gore u 2021. u kojoj je učestvovalo 87 novinara, utvrđeno je da svaki četvrti novinar prima između 500 i 600 eura neto, te 44% novinara rade na dva posla ili iz oblasti odnosa s javnošću, u nevladinom sektoru, pružaju konsultantskih usluga, itd. Stoga se postavlja pitanje da li su novinari prinuđeni da krše ovo načelo radi ekonomske egzistencije.

Smjernica 10.4 zabranjuje objavljivanje advertorijala jer informativni i reklamni sadržaji moraju biti razdvojeni, dok novinar ne može da se bavi reklamno-propagandnim poslovima. Smjernicom 10.5 takođe nije dozvoljeno skriveno reklamiranje prilikom izvještavanja o nekim kompanijama, uslugama jer se informativni materijal mora razlikovati od materijala za odnose s javnošću.

Istraživanje Instituta za medije na uzorku od četiri dnevna lista (*Pobjeda*, *Vijesti*, *Dan*, *Dnevne novine*) i četiri televizijske stanice sa nacionalnom pokrivenošću (TVCG, *TV Vijesti*, *TV Nova M* i *TV Prva*) u periodu od 14. do 20. januara 2019. godine pokazalo je da je najviše skrivenih reklama zabilježeno u štampanim medijima (16), onlajn medijima (4) i na televiziji (2). Najviše takvih objava je registrovano u rubrici ekonomija i region. (Vukčević, 2019: 6–7). Ovo istraživanje je sprovedeno prije usvajanja Zakona o medijima, kojim je zabranjeno skriveno reklamiranje i iz tog razloga je važno istražiti u kojoj mjeri je zakonodavni okvir uticao na promjenu uređivačke politike onlajn medija u pogledu skrivenog oglašavanja.

4. METODOLOGIJA

Cilj ovog istraživanja je utvrditi u kojoj mjeri portal javnog emitera poštuje medijski zakonodavni okvir i Kodeks novinara/novinarke Crne Gore. RTCG bi trebao biti primjer dobre prakse za ostale medije u pogledu pridržavanja profesionalnih i etičkih standarda. Osim toga, ovo je jedini portal koji ima podrubriku sponzorisan tekstovi i stoga je interesantno istražiti da li se i pored pomenute rubrike objavljuje skriveno i prirodno oglašavanje kroz jednu od najčitanijih rubrika – ekonomiju. U ovom radu polazimo od pretpostavke da će portal *Javnog emitera* uredno označavati promotivni sadržaj u rubrici ekonomija. Pomoćna hipoteza je da će portal RTCG u rijetkim situacijama koristiti advertorijal, a ne prirodno oglašavanje u rubrici ekonomija.

U cilju dokazivanja hipoteze koristićemo kvantitativnu analizu sadržaja u periodu od 15. do 27. aprila 2022. godine. Ovaj period je odabran jer su vjernici katoličke vjeroispovjesti proslavili Uskrs 17. aprila, a pravoslavni 24. aprila, pa očekujemo da će u toj nedelji kompanije čestitati vjerske praznike i iskoristiti priliku za dodatno reklamiranje u rubrici ekonomija. Kvantitativnu analizu sadržaja baziraćemo na sljedećim varijablama: tema, žanr, grafička oprema, sadržaj grafičke opreme, tip naslova i izvori. Jedinica analize je svaki pojedinačno objavljen tekst u navedenom periodu.

5. REZULTATI ISTRAŽIVANJA

Radio i Televizija Crne Gore je transformisana iz državnog medija u javni servis 2002. godine. Proces digitalizacije koji je koštao 17,8 miliona eura završen je 2019. godine, te je Javni servis u privilegovanoj poziciji u odnosu na ostale medije i posjeduje najsavremeniju opremu. Prema članu 9 Zakona o nacionalnom

javnom emiteru *Radio i Televizije Crne Gore*, ovaj medij se obavezuje da će „nepristrasno, tačno, blagovremeno, razumljivo i uravnoteženo informisati javnost o svim međunarodnim i domaćim dešavanjima od javnog interesa“ (Službeni list Crne Gore br. 080/20 od 4. 8. 2020). Imajući u vidu da je ekonomija jedna od najvažnijih i najčitanijih rubrika, kao i da je ekonomska kriza zahvatila cijeli svijet kao posljedica globalne pandemije jasno je da smo našu pažnju usmjerili na pomenutu rubriku.

U periodu od 15. do 27. aprila 2022. godine u rubrici ekonomija na portalu *RTCG* objavljeno je 70 tekstova. U istom istraživačkom periodu objavljena su dva teksta u rubrici sponzorisani sadržaj: „Kompanija One predstavila nove servise“ (15. 4. 2022) i „Otvoren specijalizovani salon za klimatizaciju“ (21. 4. 2022).

Tabela 1. Tema

opšte ekonomske teme	30
opšti ekonomski problemi	8
ekonomski razvoj	8
socioekonomski položaj građana	2
ekonomski kriminal	2
susreti sa međunarodnim zvaničnicima	9
konkursi i pomoć države u vidu subvencije	11

U rubrici ekonomija crnogorski građani su se mogli informisati o raznovrsnim temama, ali u 42% objava dominiraju opšte ekonomske teme poput „Svjetska banka snizila prognozu globalnog rasta“ (19. 4. 2022), „Smirivanje finansijskog tržišta u svijetu 2023.“ (19. 4. 2022), „MMF smanjio prognozu rasta crnogorske ekonomije“ (19. 4. 2022), „Potrošačka korpa u martu 715,5 eura“ (20. 4. 2022) itd. Nakon opštih ekonomskih tema, portal *RTCG* posvetio je najviše pažnje konkursima i pomoći države u vidu subvencija poput „Podrška barskim poljoprivrednicima i zanatlijama do 10.000 eura“ (19. 4. 2022), „Od sutra isplata po 200 eura poljoprivrednicima“ (20. 4. 2022), „Na programe o podršku privredi već stiglo 140 prijava“ (25. 4. 2022), „Za podršku turizmu 400 hiljada eura“ (15. 4. 2022). Najveći publicitet u pogledu pomoći mladim proizvođačima je dobilo Ministarstvo poljoprivrede, vodoprivrede i šumarstva.

Opšti ekonomski problemi na koje ukazuje javni servis je inflacija u svim oblastima – porast cijene hljeba usljed poskupljenja brašna koje se uvozi iz Srbije, cijena goriva, cijena električne energije, cijena nekretnine. Međutim, o padu životnog standarda građana se izvještava u 17% tekstova. Ovu temu zloupotrebljavaju i političke partije i kroz populističku retoriku izražavaju zabrinutost i koriste priliku za

napad na političke protivnike. U tekstu „Joković hitno da zakaže sjednice Odbora zbog pada životnog standarda“ član Socijaldemokratske partije Mirko Stanić optužuje za ekonomsku situaciju odlazeću vlast. „Kao odgovorni predstavnici građana koji su nas birali, moramo uraditi sve što je u našoj moći da donesemo odluke koje će spriječiti strmoglavi pad životnog standarda građana, izazvan podjednako neodgovornom i odlazećom Vladom Zdravka Krivokapića, kao i blokadom rada Skupštine Crne Gore“ („Joković hitno da zakaže sjednice Odbora zbog pada životnog standarda“, 15. 4. 2022). Demokratska partija socijalista, takođe, kritikuje odlazećeg ministra finansija i socijalnog staranja Milojka Spajića da tri mjeseca nije uplatio sredstva za materijalne troškove centrima za socijalni rad, a direktori čute. „Vjerujemo da se domišljati ministar Spajić dosjetio da zakine najugroženije grupe stanovništva, kako bi 'uštedio' u budžetu, i to predstavio kao svoj uspjeh kada bude predavao funkciju svom nasljedniku. Nadamo se da ne vjeruje da se nova vlast neće baviti dugovanjima njegovog resora. Poznato je da je u stvaranju dugova najuspješniji“ („Centri za socijalni rad tri mjeseca bez uplata z troškove“, 26. 4. 2022)

Ekonomski razvoj nalazimo u povećanju prihoda od opsluživanja vozila na prelazu tunela Sozina, formiranju Direktorata za blokčejn i kriptovalute, napretka u oblasti evropskih integracija, tačnije poglavlja 8 (konkurencija) i poglavlja 32 (finansijski nadzor). Na primjer, „Za pola godine naplaćeno više od milijardu eura prihoda“ (19. 4. 2022), „Prihodi budžeta u martu veći na godišnjem nivou i u odnosu na plan“ (15. 4. 2022), „Crna Gora ostvarila napredak u oblasti finansijskog nadzora“ (15. 4. 2022), itd.

U ovom periodu nalazimo dvije objave o kompaniji Air Montenegro, koje predstavljaju skrivenu reklamu. Tekst „Air Montenegro leti i za Kopenhagen“ bazira se na saopštenju pomenute kompanije koje je objavila agencija *Mina*. U saopštenju se kaže „“Danska je od danas još jedna nova destinacija ka kojoj od ove godine leti crnogorska nacionalna avio-kompanija“ (18. 4. 2022). Mogli bismo reći da ovaj tekst ima informativnu vrijednost, ali se u saopštenju nabrajaju destinacije i dodatni letovi koje uvodi kompanija na postojećim rutama za Beograd, Banjaluku, Ljubljanu i Istanbul. Osim toga, kroz saopštenje se informišemo da je Air Montenegro uveo letove za Pariz, Nant, Lion, Prag i Cirihi i „na taj način već od ove sezone znatno povećao broj letova i destinacija za što bolju povezanost Crne Gore sa regionom i evropskim zemljama, iz kojih se od ove godine očekuje dolazak velikog broja stranih turista“ (18. 4. 2022). Na kraju advertorijala publika je obavještena da kompanija posluje uspješno, što nema nikakvu informativnu vrijednost za građane. „Raduje nas što već u drugoj godini poslovanja imamo duplo veći broj destinacija i što sve pripreme za ljetnju turističku sezonu, kada je i najfrekventiji sobračaj, sprovodimo u skladu sa planom.

Kao nacionalna avio-kompanija trenutno povezujemo Crnu Goru sa preko deset različitih gradova, što će doprinijeti i daljem razvoju crnogorske privrede, naročito turizma“ (18. 4. 2022). Kroz tri dana portal RTCG objavljuje još jedan tekst u kojem je već iz naslova vidljivo da je u pitanju reklama „Do Pariza, Nanta i Liona po specijalnim cijenama“ (21. 4. 2022). U saopštenju kompanija ponavlja informaciju od prije tri dana u pogledu letova prema Francuskoj, ali i sam tekst je napisan u duhu reklame.

„Predstojeći period praznika idealno je vrijeme za planiranje putovanja, a specijalne cijene razlog više da odaberete Nant, Pariz ili Lion i uživajte u ljepotama i čarima Francuske. Zbog toga će tokom promotivnog perioda, od 22. aprila do 2. maja, povratna karta iz Podgorice do Nanta biti dostupna po cijeni od 79 eura. Oni koji su već bili u Parizu, gradu svjetlosti i ljubavi i žele da dožive posebno gastronomsko iskustvo, iz Air Montenegro preporučuju da ovoga puta odaberu Lion, grad na ušću rijeka Saone i Rone, koji se zbog svoje bogate istorije i kulture nalazi na Listi svjetske baštine UNESCO-a. Tokom istog promotivnog perioda prodaje, cijena povratne karte iz Podgorice za Pariz i Lion iznosiće po 159 eura. Sve navedene cijene sa svim taksama i uključenim prtljagom do 23 kg, biće u prodaji od sutra i mogu se iskoristiti za putovanja od 1. maja do kraja juna mjeseca. Podsjećamo, Air Montenegro saobraća i ka: Beogradu, Istanbulu, Ljubljani, Cirihi, Pragu, Frankfurtu, Kopenhagenu, Banjaluci, a putem sajta airmontenegro.com i ostalih kanala prodaje od 22. aprila do 2. maja će i za neke od navedenih gradova biti dostupne promotivne cijene“ (21. 4. 2022).

Ovo su dva primjera advertorijala jedne te iste kompanije jer nije bilo dovoljno reklamirati uvođenje letova u Kopenhagen i Pariz, Nant, Lion, već se povodom praznika preporučuje posjeta Francuskoj ubjeđujući publiku da je ova zemlja idealan izbor zbog niskih cijena karata, bogate istorije i odlične gastronomije.



Slika 1. Primjer skrivene reklame
Izvor: rtcg.me (18.04.2022.)



Slika 2. Primjer skrivene reklame
Izvor: rtcg.me (21.04.2022)

Tabela 2. Žanr

vijest	54
izvještaj	2
intervju	10
članak	2
hibridni žanr	2

Kao što je vidljivo iz date tabele, dominiraju faktografski žanrovi. Čak 77% informacija su objavljene u formi vijesti. Hibridni žanrovi su rezultat konvergencije medijskog sadržaja, odnosno preuzeti su sa *TVCG*. Na primjer, „Povećane otkupne cijene mlijeka ili radikalizacija štrajka“ predstavlja kombinaciju priloga i intervju nezadovoljnih proizvođača mlijeka. Tekst „Čelno mjesto prihoda i carina upražnjeno“, takođe, sadrži prilog sa *TVCG*. Medijski iniciranih tekstova gotovo da nema. Čak je i intervju sa državnim sekretarom u Ministarstvu finansija i socijalnog staranja preuzet od agencije *Mina*. Kao primjer dobre prakse možemo navesti tekst „Ekonomska sistem CG uznemiren, ali nije kataklizmično uzdrman“ u kojem se publika može upoznati sa stavovima ekonomske analitičarke Mile Kasalice.

Tabela 3. Grafička oprema

fotografija	52
video-snimak	6
ilustracija	10
više kategorija	2

Svi tekstovi sadrže grafičku opremu, dok su video-snimci preuzeti sa *TVCG* što označava da portal u svega 10% tekstova koristi prednosti konvergencije u medijskom sadržaju.

Tabela 4. Sadržaj grafičke opreme

osoba koja se spominje/citira u tekstu	19
mjesto događaja	14
osoba koja se spominje/citira u tekstu i mjesto događaja	2
asocijacija na predmet izvještavanja	21
objekat koji se spominje u tekstu	12
teško je odrediti	2

Asocijaciju na predmet izvještavanja nalazimo u 30% tekstova. Na primjer, u tekstovima posvećenim štrajku mljekara prikazano je mlijeko, dodjela vaučera poljoprivrednim proizvođačima propraćena je fotografijama gazdinstava, itd. U nešto manjem broju (27% tekstova) prikazane su osobe koje se spominju ili citiraju u tekstu, dok u 20% tekstova možemo pogledati mjesto događaja, odnosno grad u kojem se nešto desilo ili fotografiju sa samog sastanka. Teško je bilo odrediti sadržaj grafičke opreme u dva teksta. Jedan od takvih tekstova je „Crna Gora će učestvovati na izložbi EXPO u Osaki“ koja je propraćena fotografijom kao iz reklame, ispod koje nije dato pojašnjenje u pogledu sadržaja.

Tabela 5. Tip naslova

informativni	68
metaforički	2

Čak 97% tekstova su informativnog karaktera. U ovom periodu nailazimo na dva metaforička naslova „Ekonomski sistem CG uznemiren, ali nije kataklizmično uzdrman“ (21. 4. 2022) i „Bankarski sistem se pokazao stabilnim i otpornim na šokove“ (23. 4. 2022)

Tabela 6. Izvori

službeni	29
neslužbeni	8
sekundarni	3
službeni i sekundarni	30

U 84% tekstova dominiraju službeni izvori informacija. Kombinaciju službenih i sekundarnih izvora nalazimo u tekstovima u kojima su informacije preuzete iz drugih medija. Čak 21 tekst je preuzet od agencije *Mina*, dok su 25 informacija bazirane na prenošenju saopštenja. Najveći publicitet u ovom periodu je dobilo Ministarstvo poljoprivrede, šumarstva i vodoprivrede (osam informacija), kao i Privredna komora Crne Gore koja je obilježila 94-godišnjicu postojanja. Pomenuto Ministarstvo je dodjeljivalo pomoć poljoprivrednicima o čemu je detaljno izvještavao portal *RTCG*. „Podrška za nagradu električnih ograda u pčelarstvu“ (16. 4. 2022), „Dodjeljuju besplatne plastenike za proizvodnju povrća“ (18. 4. 2022), „Isplata vaučera svim registrovanim poljoprivrednim proizvođačima“ (18. 4. 2022), „Od sutra isplata po 200 eura poljoprivrednicima“

(20. 4. 2022), „Danas isplata vaučera poljoprivrednim proizvođačima“ (21. 4. 2022), „Počela isplata vaučera poljoprivrednicima“ (21. 4. 2022), itd.

Pseudodogađaji se odnose na susrete zvaničnika ili sastanke radnih grupa u kojima se veoma površno pominje saradnja ili napredak, kao i na najavu učešća u nekim događajima. „Crna Gora će učestvovati na izložbi Expo 2025 u Osaki“ (21. 4. 2022), „Spajić i Milatović na sastancima SB i MMF-a“ (21. 4. 2022), „Crna Gora ostvarila napredak u oblasti finansijskog nadzora“ (15. 4. 2022), itd. Neslužbeni izvori informacija, tačnije građani pojavljaju se kao izvori u tekstovima o štrajku mljekara zbog toga što nije povećana otkupna cijena mlijeka. „Povećanje otkupne cijene mlijeka ili radikalizacija štrajka“ (18. 4. 2022), „Najavljuju nove obustave isporuke mlijeka“ (20. 4. 2022), itd. U svojstvu eksperata u šest tekstova citirani su Aleksandar Damjanović, Mila Kasalica i Predrag Drecun.

6. ZAKLJUČAK

Na osnovu sprovedenog istraživanja dolazimo do zaključka da je osnovna hipoteza djelimično potvrđena uzimajući u obzir broj objavljenih tekstova, odnosno da je portal *RTCG* u periodu od 15. do 27. aprila 2022. godine objavio dvije skrivene reklame, 16 pseudodogađaja i pružio dodatni publicitet Ministarstvu poljoprivrede, šumarstva i vodoprivrede (osam informacija), kao i Privrednoj komori Crne Gore (tri teksta). Statistika potvrđuje da 41% tekstova nisu imala informativnu vrijednost za građane, već su predstavljali promovisanje aktivnosti predstavnika i institucija izvršne vlasti i državnih kompanija.

Pomoćna hipoteza je dokazana jer je u navedenom periodu *RTCG* objavio dvije skrivene reklame u rubrici ekonomija, dok prirodno oglašavanje još uvijek nije zaživjelo u Crnoj Gori, tačnije portal Javnog servisa ne koristi ovu metodu promovisanja i reklamiranja. Iako je u ovom onlajn mediju zaposleno devet novinara, rezultati istraživanja svjedoče da se vijesti pronalaze u redakciji. Autorskih tekstova nema već se rad novinara na portalu zasniva isključivo na preuzimanju informacija iz agencije *Mina* i eventualno priloga sa *TVCG* i *RCG*, što je primjer loše prakse. Ovakav površan način izvještavanja rezultira time da se krši član 9 Zakona o nacionalnom javnom emiteru *Radio i Televizije Crne Gore*, koji nalaže da je *RTCG* dužna da informiše javnost o domaćim i međunarodnim dešavanjima od javnog interesa, kao i da artikulise aktuelne životne probleme različitih struktura crnogorskog društva. U zemlji sa 620.000 stanovnika i 44.265

nezaposlenih građana očekuje se da javni emiter bude medij koji će temeljnije pristupiti ovom važnom životnom pitanju svih građana.

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Nataša Ružić

ADVERTORIALS AND NATIVE ADVERTISING ON PORTAL PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN MONTENEGRO

Summary

In this paper, on the example of portal RTCG, we will explore representation of advertorials and native advertising. To prove the hypothesis, we will analyze the business news section, which can be classified as the most visited ones dedicated to topics of public interest. We will also make a comparison with companies and institutions that advertise on

the mentioned portal in order to find the connection between properly labelled promotional content and marketing. Given that the amendments to the Law on Media prohibit advertorials, we will determine the extent to which covert the new forms of advertising is present on portal *RTCG*, bearing in mind the fines prescribed by the Montenegrin legislative framework.

Key words: advertorials, native advertising, portal of *RTCG*, business news section, Montenegro

UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION THROUGH THE MEDIA SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE

Disinformation, understood as the creation and dissemination of intentionally false or misleading news, is mostly discussed as a global phenomenon that is accelerated by fast and decentralized digital flows of information. With a growing scholarly interest, a body of knowledge focused on originators, targets and fact-checking practices is expanding beyond studies that examine disinformation in the USA and Western Europe. This is opening the doors for comparative insights into the characteristics of disinformation ecology. Following this line of research, our paper aims to provide a theoretical discussion which probes the value of a media systems perspective in understanding disinformation. Formulated by Hallin and Mancini in 2004, and modified in subsequent decades by other scholars, the media systems approach integrates social, political and economic factors to account for national differences. Specifically, it identifies points of divergence through four variables: the development of the media market, political parallelism, journalistic professionalism, and the role of the state in the media system. In this paper, we discuss the effects of these variables on the creation and dissemination of disinformation, with a focus on the Western Balkan countries.

Key words: disinformation, resilience, comparative media systems, Western Balkans

1. INTRODUCTION

Disinformation can be defined in different ways, and the scope of the definition depends on which forms of inaccurate content are treated as intentionally inaccurate. In the Merriam-Webster dictionary, disinformation is defined as “false information deliberately and often covertly spread (as by the planting of rumours) in order to influence public opinion or obscure the truth” (Merriam-Webster n.d.). The most extensive research so far on the spread of disinformation on Twitter showed that “it took the truth about six times as long as

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falsehood to reach 1500 people” (Vosoughi et al. 2018). This development of the disinformation system has strengthened the need for media and information literacy (MIL) programmes and fact-checking initiatives for countering disinformation. In 2018, the European Union adopted the Action Plan against Disinformation and dozens of fact-checking platforms have been launched around the world (IFCN 2021: 4).

Following these global concerns about disinformation, the aim of our paper is to propose a framework that recognizes media system specificities by using key elements of comparative media systems (Hallin & Mancini 2004) to shed light on the creation, dissemination and reception of disinformation. This approach is not novel and there is a growing number of scholars calling for a comparative approach in examining disinformation (Cushion, Morani, Kyriakidou & Soo 2021; Hardy 2021; Humprecht, Esser & Van Aelst 2020; Seo & Faris 2021). Nevertheless, the elements of media systems which should be accounted for remain debated. Humprecht and colleagues (2020) observe three sets of factors related to political, media and economic environments, including polarization of society, populist communication, trust in news, public service media and audience fragmentation, ad market size and social media use. Hardy (2021) proposes to look at media markets – including digital channels, political parallelism, professionalization, and the role of the state, together with geo-cultural factors and media and civil society. Additionally, comparative surveys on disinformation rely on self-reported perceptions of disinformation (Newman et al. 2022; Eurobarometer 2018), perceived exposure, ability to recognise disinformation, perceived impact, and attribution of responsibility for stopping the spread of fake news.

The factors and their impact on disinformation ecology depend for the most part on the countries selected for observation and availability of data, if secondary analysis is performed. This leads to conclusions that are not equally relevant for all countries. For example, in their study Humprecht and colleagues (2020) correlate high social media use with higher exposure to disinformation. While well-informed by previous research that shows that social media are primary channels for the dissemination of disinformation (Shin & Thorson 2017), this conceptualization neglects the role of mainstream media (Tsfati et al. 2020), which in some countries act as primary creators of disinformation (Cvijetićanin 2021). In general, Western Balkan countries are starkly absent from previous comparative surveys, Digital News Report, Eurobarometer, or academic studies. Following these observations, we use the media system perspective to elucidate

how different political, economic and other variables affect the creation and dissemination of as well as resilience to disinformation, in general and in the Western Balkans (WB). In doing so we map the existence or lack of data needed for comparative insights that would better account for WB countries in comparative studies.

2. COMPARATIVE MEDIA SYSTEMS

Comparative analysis of the media system, as proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004), is based on four dimensions: structure of the media market, political parallelism, professionalization of journalists, and the role of the state. The first is related to the development of the media market, especially high circulation newspapers. In countries where newspapers already reached a mass public in the early 20th century, journalistic professionalism developed to a higher degree and the media as institutions became more autonomous from politics. In other countries, newspapers addressed the elite public and remained connected to politics. The second dimension, political parallelism, points to connections between the media and the political sphere. In some countries, media have a distinct political orientation that can be seen in their content, organizational connections, partisanship of audiences, etc. These distinct orientations can lead to moderate or polarised pluralism, depending on the depth of these overlaps (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 59). In other countries, political parallelism is not prominent, and journalists see their professional roles primarily as reporters, not as commentators. The third dimension is related to professionalism among journalists, understood as autonomy, the existence of distinct professional norms, and public service orientation. Hallin and Mancini (2004: 33) contrast highly professional journalistic cultures with the cultures in which journalism is subject to political instrumentalization. The fourth dimension – the role of the state – is connected to issues of media ownership and regulation (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 42). Both can be either in the hands of the state or distributed among profit and non-profit organizations, private companies, civil society, or journalistic associations. Analysis of these four elements led Hallin and Mancini to provide three types of media systems (see Table 1).

Table 1 *The three models of media systems (adapted from Hallin & Mancini 2004: 299)*

	Mediterranean Polarized Pluralist	Northern European Democratic Corporatist	North Atlantic Liberal
Newspaper industry	Low circulation; Elite politically oriented press	High circulation; Mass-circulation press	Medium circulation; Mass-circulation press
Political parallelism	High political Parallelism; External pluralism; politics-over-broadcasting system	External pluralism; Politics-in-broadcasting	Neutral commercial press; Professional model of broadcast governance
Journalistic professionalism	Weak; Instrumentalization	Strong; Institutionalized self-regulation	Strong; Non-institutionalized self-regulation
Role of the state	Strong	Strong	Weak

Following its formulation, the model has been subject to several lines of modification. While some authors claim that the classification requires more precise indicators and data for measurement (Brüggemann et al. 2014), others advocate for introducing the scope and kind of relations or qualities to supplement the level of each dimension (Voltmer 2011). A growing body of literature has continued to expand the model beyond the Western world to examine its applicability to different media systems.

Literature on the adaptation of the model to account for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) starts from a recognition that decades of communist rule have created specific market related and political constellations for the media (Dobek-Ostrowska 2012; Jakubowicz & Sükös 2008; Peruško et al. 2021). The privatization of media companies followed by the entrance of Western media companies, the transformation of state media into public service broadcasting, and professionalization of journalism were key transformational elements in the first decade of post-communist transition. For the CEE countries that became EU members these processes continued and led to relatively favourable conditions for media freedoms. Western Balkan countries followed a bumpy road of transformation, which for the most part preserved clientelistic networks between media and politics (Peruško et al. 2021). Still, in recent years, the paths of media development across the CEE have converged with the declining levels of media

freedoms in many countries – EU (e.g. Hungary) and non-EU (e.g. Serbia) alike. Media capture as state interference with regulation and regulatory bodies, control of public service media, use of state financing as a control tool and ownership takeover are all to a higher or lesser degree present in at least nine WB countries (Dragomir 2018).

3. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

In subsequent sections we use the framework proposed by the comparative media systems approach, relating each of its dimensions to disinformation ecology. In this way, we present an overview of the criteria that could be taken into account when analysing the environment in which disinformation is created, spread, consumed and debunked. We point out potential limitations when interpreting those criteria, which becomes a rather sensitive issue if the intention is to quantify sets of those criteria and to compare different media systems, WB included, on that basis.

Within the limited scope of the paper, we do not have an ambition for a systematic review, rather we offer a set of considerations for more comprehensive future theoretical or empirical investigations. Wherever possible we rely on studies that are comparative in scope. The relative scarcity of data on the WB, from single country and comparative studies alike, prevents us from in-depth observations within single dimensions of media systems. What we lose in depth we hopefully gain in scope as this bird's-eye view will allow us to map how all four dimensions of media systems relate to disinformation ecology.

Since in the systems of captured media in CEE and WB political parallelism and the role of the state go hand-in-hand and have significant influence (Herrero et al. 2017), we start with a joint examination of these dimensions. Then we move to the structure of the market, finalizing the discussion with the topic of internal media logic and its prospects to counteract disinformation.

4. POLITICAL PARALLELISM AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE

The creation of disinformation has generally been linked to political communication, with the USA and UK often taken as examples. Benkler, Faris and Roberts (2018) showed that online disinformation in the USA works together with algorithmically created echo chambers, Russian hackers and alt-right trolls to produce a polarized political and social environment. This polarization is further found in the media, although the degree of polarization in the USA is not matched

by any country (Fletcher et al. 2022). In the Digital News Report, Fletcher and colleagues (2022: 41) conclude that the perception of media polarisation is highest in Poland, Spain, Thailand and Argentina, while at “the regional level, perceived polarisation is, on average, lower in Northern Europe but higher in Southern Europe and Latin America”.

Together with polarisation, Humprecht and colleagues (2020: 7) see populism as an important indicator that diminishes resilience to disinformation:

“First, populism and disinformation both relate to the spread of partisan information that supports one particular party’s attitudinal stance while discrediting information from the other party. Second, similar to the social identification process underlying populism, partisan disinformation constructs an all-encompassing moral and causal divide between two camps: ‘we’ are right and truthful and ‘they’ are wrong and fake”.

The logic behind this understanding assumes that populist parties will have more success among citizens who are less resistant to disinformation, manipulation, and political bullshit (as defined by Frankfurt 2009). However, this conclusion should be taken with caution for at least two reasons. First, the outcome of an election, apart from the level of MIL, is influenced by a large number of other factors (Tyszler & Schram 2016; Fairstein et al. 2019). Second, given that the turnout in democratic countries is always far from absolute, there is a significant part of the population, especially the young, who remain invisible in the process. For example, in the last EU elections (2019), the turnout in Slovakia was only 22.74%, and 50% turnout was not reached in another 14 member countries (Eurostat, 2019). This means that the success of populist parties should be approached with caution as an indicator of resilience.

Observing four CEE countries, Štětka (2021) finds that Hungary and Serbia exhibit higher degrees of polarization than Czechia and Poland, although all four countries are faced with illiberal tendencies. The key trait of polarization in most of the Western Balkan countries is that it exists within the hybrid regimes, marked by a mix of democratic and autocratic practices, with competitive elections, but a weak institutionalization of the rule of law and civil liberties (Voltmer 2012). In hybrid regimes with one party dominance, there is “a hegemonic public sphere in which the ruling party’s interpretation of the political situation prevails while oppositional views are marginalized and even delegitimized” (Voltmer 2012: 243). This situation is an adequate characterisation of the media in Serbia and Hungary.

The analyses of WB countries show that media and political parties form clientelistic networks in which disinformation is used as a tool to discredit political opponents. In Serbia, tabloids that are heavily funded by the government are frequently blamed for the spread of disinformation (Valić Nedeljković 2020), while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, political disinformation usually originates from anonymous websites and is later disseminated and amplified by public media (Cvijetićanin et al. 2019). In North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania, disinformation is mainly found in the online sphere, among alternative websites, or from foreign-owned media outlets (Nikodinska 2020; Bogdanović 2020; Londo 2020).

In general, politically polarised environments with hybrid regimes dominated by populist parties can be regarded as a breeding ground for disinformation, since each element reinforces the other. In such a situation, media supported or captured by the state do not spread disinformation for economic reasons, but for political gains. When polarised environments have a strong populist party, but nevertheless strong institutionalization of the rule of law, it can be hypothesized that disinformation would originate from alternative media and spread through social networks.

Polarisation is in part reflected in the role of the state since it leads to a “politics-over-broadcasting” regulation model (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 32). In connection to disinformation, the question is, who creates the framework for policing disinformation? In more autonomous systems of the EU, disinformation is addressed through self- and co-regulatory mechanisms. In their analysis of government initiatives, Fagan and Sugarman (2021) show that the USA and Argentina lag behind the EU, UK, Australia, Canada and Brazil since they have disinformation policies in place only for elections. This lag will probably grow wider as the EU starts implementing the Digital Service Act and prepares the European Media Freedom Act, which will make platforms more accountable and secure media pluralism. While for the most part adequate regulatory measures are indicative of increased resilience, in the hybrid and captured media systems regulation can serve to silence oppositional voices. Russia’s and Turkey’s suspension of social media is a case in point. In the WB countries, regulatory authorities are only beginning to address digital platforms, mainly from the perspective of established legislative provisions related to libel, discrimination and similar (Petković et al. 2020). In addition, WB and some CEE countries are known for misuse of legislation in silencing opposition voices (Csaky 2020). Thus, an

absence of government initiatives to address disinformation can be regarded as a positive sign in a system in which regulation is used to diminish media freedoms.

5. MEDIA MARKET AND AUDIENCES

A functional media market, with educated citizens who are served by a trusted media, is thought to create greater resilience to disinformation. In this context, a special role is dedicated for public service broadcasting (PSB) as a beacon of professionalism, which needs to report across political divisions and serve varied audiences. In addition, Humprecht and colleagues (2020: 500) highlight the adverse effects of large ad market size on resilience to disinformation, since it creates a highly competitive environment in which disinformation is disseminated to capture attention and generate profit.

While in a classical comparative systems approach education serves as an implicit background for the development of the mass press (Hallin & Mancini 2004), in contemporary settings the quality of formal education could be ranked high among the preconditions for raising the level of resilience to disinformation. At least in principle, it enables the development of literacy, the adoption of scientific logic, and critical thinking. The literacy rate in Europe is very high, ranging from 97% in Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina to 100% in Slovenia and Estonia (World Bank, 2022), while the share of citizens with higher education ranges from 19% in Romania to 50% in Ireland (Eurostat 2021).

However, these data do not say enough about functional literacy as the ability to understand text and recognize manipulative strategies. The Open Society Institute Sofia (OSI 2021) tried to overcome this problem by including four parameters related to education in its Media Literacy Index (MLI): in addition to the already-mentioned share of population with a university degree, OSI considers PISA scores in reading literacy, scientific literacy and mathematical literacy, where the first is recognized as the most valuable and carries 30% of the total MLI, while the next two are weighted 5% each.

Following Hardy's call (2021) to introduce civil society in comparative media studies of disinformation, we could also look for non-formal education in MIL, i.e. the availability and effects of MIL programmes. A study devoted to the effects of MIL interventions in the USA and India showed that in both countries "the intervention improved discernment between mainstream and false news" (Guess et al. 2020: 15536), while another meta-analysis of 15 studies determined that "these interventions produce positive effects on media literacy skills and

positive but smaller effects on attitudes and behavioral intentions” (Vahedi et al. 2018: 140). However, as with the PISA tests, such programmes, as well as the analysis of their results, mainly refer to the younger population.

In this sense, it is possible to consider IPSOS' Misperception Index, which shows the level of misperceptions of citizens of different countries “around some of the key issues, such as global warming, economy, unemployment, health, crime, immigrants” (IPSOS 2018). The results show that the index is lower in more developed countries: the lowest in Taiwan, New Zealand and Sweden, and the highest in Thailand, Mexico and Turkey, with Serbia placed in the middle. This index does not indicate the level of MIL skills, but it can be considered important if we assume that disinformation will be spread more easily among those target groups which already have wrong ideas about the world around them.

The next element we can turn to is trust – a complex phenomenon, but in the context of disinformation it can be formulated as the users' expectation of the media to provide accurate and credible accounts of events. Data from the annual Digital News Report shows that trust levels vary greatly, from 69% of citizens in Finland who trust most of the media most of the time, to only 26% of citizens in the USA and Slovakia who do so (Newman et al. 2022: 15). In general, trust is higher in Northern and Western Europe and lower in Southern and Eastern Europe. Measured through slightly different methodology, a study focused on Western Balkan countries showed that:

“trust in the media varies across the region, with citizens in BiH, Serbia and North Macedonia divided in around half of those that trust and half of those that distrust the media, and a higher number of citizens in Kosovo, Montenegro and Albania having trust in the media” (Hrvatinić et al. 2021: 19).

We could consider the issue of trust through the lens of exposure and money: how much attention will citizens invest in following the news and are they ready to financially support the media they trust? We can monitor the aspect of exposure through selective news avoidance, as a deliberate limitation of time and attention for consuming news. According to Digital News Report 2022, the proportion of those that say they avoid the news, sometimes or often, has doubled in the UK (46%) since 2017, while this type of selective avoidance seems to be less widespread in Northern European countries (Newman et al. 2022: 10). It should be emphasized here that news avoidance does not have to reflect distrust only, but also other factors, such as a feeling of oversaturation. Willingness to

financially support the outlet can be interpreted as a reflection of high trust, but also high attachment. The share of citizens who support online content by subscription is highest in Norway, followed by Sweden and Finland (Newman et al, 2022). In Serbia, for example, only 4% of citizens pay for news online (Milivojević et al. 2020). However, as noted, financial support should not necessarily be interpreted as support for media professionalism, but potentially as a reflection of ideological closeness and attachment.

Existence of strong public service broadcasting that is trusted by citizens is deemed an important aspect of resilience to online disinformation (Horowitz et al. 2021; Humprecht et al. 2020; Wardle & Derakhshan 2017). Digital News Report shows that “Nordic PSBs as well as those of other smaller countries like Ireland and Portugal have retained or even increased trust since 2018” (Newman et al. 2022: 17). On the other hand, the same report notes extremely negative findings for the BBC, with a drop of trust from 75% to 55% in just five years, although this media is often taken as a symbol of a strong PSB. Humprecht and colleagues (2020) also mention this discrepancy and explain it as a consequence of strong political and social polarization in the UK.

In addition to observing trust in PSBs, other aspects are to be considered in the context of resilience to disinformation. First, some PSB core values such as independence, universality, diversity, and accountability are necessary prerequisites for providing accurate information to counterbalance disinformation. Second, sufficient funding to support the achievement of these aims is also important. And finally, the extent to which PSBs perform debunking of false information or cooperate with fact-checking and debunking initiatives can be taken as an indicator of resilience (Horowitz et al. 2021).

For most of these elements there is no comprehensive comparison. However, a study that included Finland, Spain, the UK and Czechia shows that there are some contextual differences in how PSBs in these countries perform their roles – with the BBC being the pioneer of fact-checking but nevertheless often delegitimized and with an uncertain future; frequently used and trusted Czech television engages in multi/stakeholder collaborations with programmes promoting media literacy and understanding on disinformation; highly trusted Finnish provider Yle puts emphasis on its educational programmes without direct reference to disinformation; and with a relatively small share of viewers, the Spanish PSB system is often accused of bias which hinders its fact-checking and debunking efforts (Horowitz et al. 2021).

In the Western Balkan countries, Hrvatin and colleagues (2021) establish that there is a clear division of trust-distrust in the public service broadcaster indicative of an ethnic and/or political divide. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in different components of PSBs (BHRT, RTVFBiH, RTRS) trust follows ethnic lines; in Montenegro an equal number of citizens (48%) trust and distrust PSBs; while in Serbia “over 56% of citizens trust the public service broadcaster, while 40% distrust it” (Hrvatin et al. 2021: 20). These findings can be interpreted against the data that show PSBs in the Western Balkans are fully captured (Dragomir 2019) and “are widely considered politically biased, even a propaganda tool of the ruling parties” (Petković et al. 2020).

6. PROFESSIONALIZATION

Under the label of professionalization, we are interested in those producing the news, their adherence to professional norms of journalism and their orientation towards public interest, as opposed to private, commercial and political interests. In regard to norms, facticity and objectivity are of utmost importance when discussing information disorders since these contribute to journalistic resilience to disinformation. The next element pointing to resilience is the extent to which self-regulation is institutionalized, offering media accountability instruments and serving to protect the profession from government (regulatory) interference. In addition, the strength of PSBs, discussed above, and the ecology of fact-checking and debunking initiatives can be valuable and heuristic in observing this dimension of media systems.

Analysis of media freedoms can shed light on professionalization, if we start from the assumption that a higher level of media freedom contributes to the development of a media market where journalists are not forced to publish inaccurate content in favour of the authorities or other interest groups. However, we should bear in mind that a high level of media freedom does not necessarily imply a high level of professionalism, so even a media system that is considered free can be burdened with a large amount of disinformation from which outlets have direct financial benefit.

Different indexes show discrepancy between the countries that cherish freedom of the press and those in which freedoms are under pressure. Based on several parameters such as pluralism, media independence, self-censorship, legislative framework, and abuses, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) provides

country rankings and classifies countries into six groups based on levels of press freedom. In its annual report, RSF (2022) highlights three Nordic countries as models at the top of the rankings and stresses a very serious situation in more than 20 countries. It is noted that in democratic societies “media polarisation is feeding and reinforcing internal social divisions”, while “the suppression of independent media is contributing to a sharp polarisation in ‘illiberal democracies’” (RSF 2020: para. 4). The WB countries all belong to the category of countries in which press freedoms are in a problematic situation.

These results correspond to the audience's perception of media freedoms. If we compare the results of the Press Freedom Index (RSF 2022) and the indicator “Proportion who think the news media are free from undue political influence” in the Digital News Report (Newman et al, 2022), we can see significant overlaps: where the RSF recognizes the level of media freedom as high (Scandinavia), citizens consider the media to be autonomous; in EU countries with a lower degree of media freedom (Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy), citizens express low confidence that the media are independent. The Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2022) highlights the risks for media pluralism and media freedom in four areas: fundamental protection, market plurality, political independence, and social inclusiveness. In the general overview, Malta, Montenegro, Romania, Greece, Serbia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Albania are flagged as high-risk countries (Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom 2022).

Large international comparative studies, such as ‘Worlds of Journalism’, show that globally journalists attach great importance to impartiality and neutrality, as well as factualness and reliability of information (Hanitzsch et al. 2011). However, the importance of empiricism and objectivism is not distributed along recognised cultural and political lines, which can be – at least in part – explained by the individual differences (Hanitzsch et al. 2011). There is a certain overlap when journalistic cultures are mapped onto media systems: journalists from polarized countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain report stronger outside influence, while holding to the monitoring and interventionists roles; journalists from liberal media systems observe some level of outside influence but subscribe to populist roles; democratic corporatist systems have journalists who experience weaker outside influence and hold both monitoring and populist roles (Hovden & Väliverronen. 2021). Future waves of the ‘World of Journalism’ will probably place greater emphasis on disinformation; the limited findings from smaller studies show that journalists are reconsidering their roles and are willing to invest time in fact-checking their accounts (Schapals. 2018).

Awareness of the need to make journalists more accountable in the era of alternative facts and falling trust can be observed through the functioning of different instruments, most notably press councils, journalistic codes and ombudsmen. A comparative study of 14 European countries shows that in general the instruments are deemed inefficient, with some national variation:

“Central and Eastern as well as Southern European journalists are more skeptical towards the concept of media transparency: while a majority of journalists from Northern and Western European countries was convinced (at least in theory) that being transparent about journalistic procedures, as well as publishing corrections and apologies, leads to more trust.” (Fengler et al. 2015: 257)

In addition to self-regulation, fact-checking services are also important as independent platforms dedicated to countering disinformation. The impact of these initiatives can be twofold. First, they can influence the sources of disinformation, in both an affirmative, educational way, and indirectly through sanctions. Meta’s Third-Party Fact-Checking Program brings together more than 90 fact-checking organizations “who identify, review and rate viral misinformation across Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp” (Facebook n.d.). When a fact-checking organization spots inaccurate content on these platforms, they flag it and the visibility of the content, and consequently its profit-making ability, decreases. Second, fact-checking initiatives also have an impact on the audience. Research conducted in the UK, Argentina, Nigeria and South Africa shows that “fact-checks reduced false beliefs in all countries, with most effects detectable more than 2 weeks later and with surprisingly little variation by country” (Porter & Wood 2021: 1).

The number of independent fact-checking initiatives is on the rise – with 150 identified in 2018 (Amazeen 2019). However, fact-checkers that operate outside of large media organisations list financial sustainability and visibility as the main challenges in their work (Amazeen 2019; Singer 2021). For the most part they are funded through grants, charities or by Internet corporations (i.e. Google), leaving them little space to plan ahead. Their primary communication channels are social media, although some have established cooperation with legacy media to increase their impact (Singer 2021).

These findings are equally relevant to the Western Balkans in which there is at least one fact-checking initiative per country – in Serbia there are four. Like their peers, they are funded by grants, and they mainly communicate their stories on social media. The support of citizens for these initiatives is yet to be

established. Previous research in this matter shows that conservatism, dissatisfaction with democracy and negative orientation towards the EU lead to less support for fact-checking in Italy, Spain, France, and Poland, while in Sweden and Germany the support is higher (Lyons et al. 2020).

7. TOWARDS A CONCLUSION

In rather broad brushes we have attempted to apply a comparative media systems perspective to understanding disinformation ecology and the factors contributing to greater resilience to its impact. We have reviewed previous studies and in doing so we have attempted to supplement previous comparative studies which are often lacking perspective of the captured Western Balkan media. In general, our discussion shows that dimensions of the media system discussed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) prove useful, although they do not provide a straightforward framework for comparative analysis of disinformation. It is complicated mostly by social media which affects media markets and the reach of professional journalists. Political parallelism still has its heuristic value, especially for polarized countries, and the role of the state will regain importance with the growing regulation of digital platforms.

Our analysis offers more questions than answers and it should be read as an invitation to include more elements into resilience assessments, and to obtain more data from the Western Balkans. Table 2 summarizes our findings on possible indicators and the availability of comparative data, with a focus on the WB.

Table 2 Availability of comparative data for WB countries

Indicator	Source	WB countries
Media literacy index	Open Society Institute Sofia	All
PISA scores	OECD	All
Press Freedom Index	Reporters Without Borders	All
Trust in Media	Reuters (Digital News Report)	None
Trust in PSBs	Reuters (Digital News Report)	None
Confidence in one's own MIL skills	IPSOS	Serbia
Misperception index	IPSOS	Serbia
Level of populism	Global party survey	All
Number of verified fact-checking initiatives	International Fact- checking Network	All
Number of third-party fact-checking	Meta	All

partners		
Impact of fact-checking initiatives	Porter, E., & Wood, T. J. (2021)	None
Government initiatives to combat disinformation	Fagan, F. & Sugarman, A. (2021)	None
Media pluralism in the digital era	EUI - Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom	All except Bosnia and Herzegovina

In assessing the data, it should be noted that the lack of data is sometimes related to countries, and sometimes to specific population groups. For example, media literacy is measured only for young people (e.g. in the Media Literacy Index) and disinterested citizens who avoid news and do not take part in elections are absent.

Further studies should also take into account the two aspects we did not address sufficiently. First, not all WB countries are faced with the same challenges – lumping them in a single group might be worthwhile from a global perspective, but it neglects significant differences in constellations of media, politics and economy. Second, we neglected geopolitical factors which are especially relevant in the context of technology and global politics. In terms of technology, the issue of regulation should be viewed on the global scale in which social media companies operate, usually with no sensibility to local regulation. In terms of global politics, the war in Ukraine has made it clear that some countries are investing huge efforts to counter cross-border disinformation attempts, while others are more vulnerable. In this case, the Western Balkan countries can again be an interesting case to study.

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„SLOBODA” GOVORA MRŽNJE – PROBLEMATIKA ZLOUPOTREBE SLOBODE GOVORA

Cilj ovog rada jeste da analizira zloupotrebu prava na slobodu govora radi širenja i podsticanja mržnje u javnoj sferi, s akcentom na novim medijima. Autori pokušavaju da na osnovu primera iz medija provere u kojoj meri danas važe definicije govora mržnje, kao i na koji način se on manifestuje u elektronskim i onlajn medijima i na društvenim mrežama. U radu se, pored ostalog, razmatraju (moguće) posledice nakon odluke kompanije *Meta* da se preko najuticajnijih društvenih mreža na svetu – *Fejsbuka* i *Instagrama*, dozvoli korisnicima u nekim zemljama da pozivaju na nasilje protiv Rusa i ruskih vojnika, u kontekstu ruskog napada na Ukrajinu. U radu se problematizuju i direktne posledice širenja govora mržnje i homofobije uoči održavanja *Europajda 2022.* u Beogradu. Ključno pitanje na koje će pokušati da se ponudi odgovor jeste da li je danas potrebna sloboda govora kako bismo štitili onaj govor koji nam se ne dopada.

Ključne reči: govor mržnje, sloboda govora, onlajn mediji, društvene mreže, *Meta*, *Fejsbuk*, *Instagram*, elektronski mediji, REM

„Borba za slobodu govora je rat koji
nikad ne možete potpuno dobiti ili
izgubiti. To je rat u kome se sve vreme
vode bitke. I svaka generacija mora da
dobija ili gubi sopstvene bitke”

Fleming Roz, urednik u danskom listu *Jilands posten*³

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³ Izvor: <https://www.cenzolovka.rs/svet/strah-nas-vodi-u-tiraniju-tisine-ne-treba-zabraniti-govor-mrznje-politicka-korektnost-opasna/> Pristupljeno 22. 9. 2022.

1. UVOD

Nalazimo se u digitalnoj medijskoj eri kada nas od gotovo bilo koje informacije dele samo jedan klik ili sekunda. U takvom okruženju postavlja se pitanje u kojoj je meri moguće ograničiti pristup određenim informacijama i na koji način mogu važiti određena pravila u komunikacionoj sferi za sve učesnike. Vrlo je teško – gotovo nemoguće – u potpunosti kontrolisati protok informacija, naročito putem interneta⁴.

Borba za slobodu mišljenja i govora u javnosti je od izuzetne važnosti. Cilj ovog rada jeste da analizira zloupotrebu prava na slobodu govora radi širenja i podsticanja mržnje u javnoj sferi, s akcentom na digitalnim medijima. Urednik rubrike *Kultura* u danskom listu *Jilands posten* Fleming Roz⁵ 2015. u intervjuu za portal *Cenzolovka* tvrdio je kako se političari najčešće deklariraju kao mirotvorci i da žele da očuvaju mir, „ali tako što zabranjuju reči, što je pogrešno”. On je još tada konstatovao kako „sloboda govora ne znači ništa, ako ne predstavlja pravo da se kaže ono što neko ne želi da čuje” (Vučić i Ljujić 2015)⁶. Činjenica je da pravila na globalnoj medijskoj sceni pored države, kroz zakonske regulative, određuju i moćne svetske kompanije, odnosno njihov interes koji može da se stavi čak i ispred javnog interesa. Ono što svakako treba imati u vidu jeste to da mora postojati jasna razlika u pravu na iznošenje kritičkog mišljenja ili sopstvenog stava, što predstavlja slobodu govora sa jedne strane u odnosu na širenje mržnje, ksenofobije, podsticanje ili direktno pozivanje na nasilje prema *drugima*, što se nikako ne može pravdati pravom na slobodu izražavanja. Dakle, kritike upućene predstavnicima vlasti, političarima ili drugim osobama koje obavljaju javne funkcije ne mogu se tumačiti kao govor mržnje zato što njihov rad, ukoliko nije transparentan ili u javnom interesu, mora biti podložan društvenoj kritici. Prema *Komitetu pravnika za ljudska prava*, iznošenje različitih političkih i ideoloških stavova, pa i onih koji se odnose na prava društveno osetljivih grupa najčešće ne predstavlja govor mržnje ali pod uslovom „da se ne podstiče mržnja, netolerancija, agresivni nacionalizam ili etnocentrizam, ne glorifikuju zločini ili superiornost rase ili nacije ili negiraju ratni zločini, genocid ili uspomena na lica koja su

⁴ Izuzetak je ako se ograniči pristup internetu.

⁵ Ovog novinara radikalni islamisti osudili su na smrt zbog prikazivanja karikatura proroka Muhameda. Zbog tih pretnji on već godinama živi pod stalnom policijskom zaštitom.

⁶ Izvor: <https://www.cenzolovka.rs/svet/strah-nas-vodi-u-tiraniju-tisine-ne-treba-zabraniti-govor-mrznje-politicka-korektnost-opasna/> Pristupljeno 22. 9. 2022.

izgubila živote u takvim događajima” (YUCOM 2007)⁷. Kada je reč o internetskim društvenim mrežama, prema Turčilo i Išerić (2022: 41), fokus je često na definisanju i uspostavljanju mehanizama kontrole koji neće ugroziti slobodu govora. Međutim, kako autori dalje navode, ključno je uspostavljanje jasne distinkcije između ova dva pojma, te da nijedna od definicija ne situira govor mržnje u okvire slobode izražavanja.

2. DEFINISANJE PROBLEMA ISTRAŽIVANJA

Sam termin *govor mržnje* (engl. *hate speech*), kako navodi Nikolić (2018: 27), prvi put se pojavio krajem osamdesetih godina 20. veka u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama (SAD) među pravnicima koji su želeli da bolje objasne specifičnu vrstu štetnog ekstremnog rasističkog govora. Prema Nikoliću, pojam govor mržnje odnosi se na akciju (govor) koji je motivisan specifičnom emocijom (mržnje), a u cilju povređivanja i omalovažavanja određene osobe ili grupe. Pored određenih reči i rečenica koje mogu direktno ili indirektno pozivati na mržnju, prezir i nasilje, čini ga i kompletan sistem vrednosti i stavova koje jedno lice ili grupa može imati prema nekoj drugoj grupi, sistem koji je najčešće utemeljen na predrasudama i stereotipima. U samom govoru mržnje iskazuju se prezir i netrpeljivost prema drugom i drugačijem, a ono što je najbitnija karakteristika govora mržnje jeste da se njime negira samo biće i suština drugoga (Nikolić 2018: 28–30).

Za definisanje i utvrđivanje postojanja govora mržnje, neophodno je da se problematičan govor, odnosno njegovo moralno i emotivno značenje, posmatra iz perspektive šireg kulturnog, istorijskog i društveno-političkog konteksta. Govor koji nije opasan u jednom kontekstu, može predstavljati govor mržnje u drugom (Milinkov, Sedlarević 2021: 49). Govor mržnje usko je povezan i sa ideologijom koja se može širiti putem medija. „Razumevanje obrazaca jezičke interakcije daje nam jasniji uvid u strukturu kulturnih modela i razotkriva ideološke postulate koji formiraju naše viđenje sveta koji nas okružuje” (Filipović 2009: 19).

„Jezik mržnje, govor mržnje ili politički nekorektan govor u medijskom kontekstu jeste odstupanje od pravila dobre prakse medijskog izveštavanja koji se bazira na istinitom, pravovremenom, izbalansiranom i etičkom pisanju medija o

⁷Izvor:

http://www.yucom.org.rs/upload/vestgalerija_38_5/1198696141_GS0_Metodologija%20govor%20mrznje%20zlocin%20mrznje.pdf. Pristupljeno 19. 11. 2022.

ljudima, događajima i pojavama” (Pralica 2014: 336). Takav govor, odnosno jezik, usmeren je na to da se pojedinac omalovažava i predstavlja „proizvođenje neprijatelja ili učvršćivanje drugoga ili čak suprotnoga kao neprijatelja” (prema Veljak 2001). Pojedini autori ga nazivaju i *diskriminatorški medijski govor*, te ga definišu kao „ispolitizovanu jezičku upotrebu” (Valić Nedeljković 2010: 201).

Sa druge strane nalazi se *politički korektan govor/jezik*, koji je usaglašen sa zahtevima datim u *Deklaraciji Ujedinjenih nacija o ljudskim pravima* da niko ne može biti diskriminisan pomoću jezika (prema Savić 2004: 3–8; Savić 2009: 7–8). Iako se u medijskim zakonima Srbije – *Zakon o javnom informisanju i medijima* (član 75) i *Zakon o elektronskim medijima* (član 51) zabranjuje govor mržnje, ne postoji neki striktan dogovor ili propis o nediskriminatornoj upotrebi jezika. Zbog toga je veoma važna samosvest i novinara, ali i pojedinaca, posebno u onlajn sferi (Pralica 2015: 83).

Definisanje, a samim tim i kontrolu i prevenciju govora mržnje dodatno usložnjava činjenica da su korporacije koje upravljaju najvećim društvenim mrežama locirane u SAD, gde se drugačije shvata govor mržnje u odnosu na Evropsku uniju. Kako pojašnjavaju Turčilo i Išerić (2022: 42), govor mržnje je u SAD u suštini zaštićen slobodom govora, sem ukoliko ne predstavlja „objektivnu i neposrednu opasnost od nasilja” (ibid.). U nastavku će biti navedeni primeri koji donekle mogu ilustrovati upravo pomenutu složenost rešavanja problema, koji širenje jezika mržnje uzrokuje na globalnom nivou.

3. REGULATORNI OKVIR

Međunarodna konvencija o ukidanju svih oblika rasne diskriminacije (CERD) usvojena na sednici Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih nacija 21. decembra 1965.⁸ može se odrediti kao prvi dokument koji ukazuje na neku vrstu regulacije govora mržnje. Premda pojam *govor mržnje* nije korišćen u konvenciji, njena suština, kako pojašnjava Dragičević, odnosila se na zabranu rasističkog govora. U *Konvenciji* se od država potpisnica zahtevalo ne samo da zabrane nego i da propišu kao kažnjivo delo neke pojave oblike rasističkog govora. U pomenutom dokumentu identifikovana su četiri oblika onoga što danas prepoznajemo kao govor mržnje: širenje ideja utemeljenih na rasnoj superiornosti, širenje ideja utemeljenih na rasnoj mržnji, podsticanje na rasnu diskriminaciju i podsticanje na dela rasno motivisanog nasilja (Dragičević u Turčilo 2020: 135).

⁸ SFRJ je ratifikovala tu konvenciju 1966/1967.

Komitet za suzbijanje rasne diskriminacije u opštoj preporuci (35/2013) ukazuje da se govor mržnje ne odnosi samo na rasističke komentare i da može imati mnogo oblika. Državama se preporučuje da preduzmu neophodne mere da suzbiju govor mržnje, kao i da obrate pažnju na različite manifestacije: usmeno ili pisano, preko elektronskih medija, društvenih mreža, kao i u vidu neverbalne forme izražavanja poput rasističkih ili fašističkih simbola, slika, grafita ili ponašanja na javnim okupljanjima i sportskim takmičenjima (prema Milinkov i Sedlarević 2021: 63).

Sa ciljem da se približi praksa Evropskog suda za ljudska prava, kao i zarad konstantne težnje da se uspostavi ravnoteža između člana 10 *Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima*, koji garantuje slobodu izražavanja, i člana 17, koji zabranjuje svaku zloupotrebu prava priznatih *Konvencijom*, Savet Evrope je krajem 2008. godine izdao *Vodič o govoru mržnje*⁹ (*Manual on Hate Speech*). Termin *govor mržnje* obuhvata različite poruke mržnje, od uvredljivih, negativnih, stereotipnih komentara, do govora koji podstiče nasilje prema određenim osobama ili grupama. U razmatranju svakog pojedinačnog slučaja Evropski sud za ljudska prava znatnu pažnju poklanja analizi konteksta, vrsti i sadržaju govora, cilju i nameri širenja, kao i kojoj osobi ili grupi je poruka mržnje upućena, odnosno da li je reč o deci, odraslima ili pripadnicima različitih društveno osetljivih grupa (prema Milinkov i Sedlarević 2021: 64).

Regulacija govora mržnje na internetu

Evropska komisija je 2016. objavila *Kodeks postupanja radi suzbijanja nezakonitog govora mržnje na internetu*¹⁰, koji podrazumeva uklanjanje problematičnog sadržaja. Među prvim, *Kodeks* su prihvatile najpoznatije IT kompanije kao što *Fejsbuk*, *Twitter*, *Jutjub*, *Majrosoft*, a 2018. godine priključili su se i *Instagram*, *Snepčet* i *Dejlimoušn*, *Ževideo.com*. Potpisujući *Kodeks* (prema Milinkov i Sedlarević 2021: 68) pomenute kompanije su se obavezale da će sprečavati širenje nepriličnih sadržaja, uz pomoć pravila i smernica na osnovu kojih se jasno zabranjuje podsticanje nasilja i uznemirujućeg sadržaja, te predviđa procenjivanje prijavljenog sadržaja i uklanjanje ukoliko je neophodno. IT

⁹ <https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/Publications/Manuals/Manual-on-Hate-Speech>.
Pristupljeno 21. 4. 2021.

¹⁰ https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combating-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-counter-illegal-hate-speech-online_en.
Pristupljeno 24. 4. 2021.

kompanije su dužne da preispitaju većinu prijava za uklanjanje nezakonitog govora mržnje za manje od 24 časa, te ukoliko je potrebno, da onemoguće pristup takvom sadržaju ili da ga uklone. Uz navedeno, obavezuju se i da će obrazovati i informisati korisnike o vrstama sadržaja, koji prema njihovim pravilima i smernicama zajednice nisu dopušteni. Predviđena je i saradnja s organizacijama civilnog društva kako bi se približile najbolje prakse u suzbijanju mržnjom ispunjene retorike i predrasuda.

U *Kodeksu* se navodi i da IT kompanije i Evropska komisija, svesni vrednosti nezavisnog govora protiv mržnjom ispunjene retorike i predrasuda, žele nastaviti rad na utvrđivanju i promovisanju nezavisne protivargumentacije, novih ideja i inicijativa, te pratećih obrazovnih programa koji potiču kritičko razmišljanje. Evropska komisija u saradnji s državama članicama treba da promoviše pridržavanje obaveza utvrđenih *Kodeksom* o postupanju i drugih relevantnih platformi i društvenih medija. Na samom početku primene *Kodeksa*, reagovanje i sklanjanje problematičnog sadržaja sa navedenih društvenih mreža nisu bili izraženi¹¹. Međutim, podaci s kraja 2019. govore da je sa *Fejsbuka* sklonjeno skoro 88%, a sa *Jutjuba* oko 80% sadržaja koji predstavlja govor mržnje (prema Milinkov i Sedlarević 2021: 69).

Činjenica je da ubrzani razvoj onlajn medijske sfere i sve veći uticaj koji ona ima na javnost i te kako predstavlja izazov za mnoge (demokratske) vlade i države kako da naprave ravnotežu između slobode mišljenja i govora s jedne strane, ali i zabrane govora mržnje s druge.

Dve najmoćnije zemlje Evropske unije to su pokušale da reše visokim novčanim kaznama, odnosno suspenzivnom cenzurom spornih informacija.¹² U Nemačkoj je od 2017. na snazi zakon kojim se visokim novčanim kaznama sankcioniše govor mržnje na društvenim mrežama. Kazne se kreću i do 50 miliona evra ako kompanije, na čijim je stranicama uočen problematičan sadržaj, taj sadržaj ne uklone u roku od sedam dana. U Francuskoj nema novčanih kazni, ali zakon iz 2020. godine obavezuje kompanije-vlasnice društvenih mreža da sporni sadržaj moraju ukloniti u roku od 24 časa.

Evropski parlament usvojio je 2022. godine Zakon o digitalnim uslugama (*The Digital Services Act*) koji se, između ostalog, bavi i problematikom

¹¹ Tako je npr. sa *Fejsbuka* uklonjeno 28%, sa *Tvitera* 19%, a sa *Jutjuba* 48,5% kompromitujućeg sadržaja.

¹² Izvor: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/holikaust-negiranje-genocida-govor-mrznje/31412934.html> Pristupljeno: 21. 9. 2022.

dezinformacija u onlajn sferi.¹³ Cilj tog propisa jeste da pokuša da reguliše nelegalni sadržaj na internetu i praktičnu primenu na društvenim mrežama. Zadržano je postojeće pravilo, prema kome vlasnici društvenih mreža koje prenose tuđe digitalne sadržaje nisu odgovorni za taj sadržaj osim ako ne znaju da je on nezakonit (prema Penfrat 2020)¹⁴.

Kada je u pitanju Srbija, može se konstatovati da postoji korektan normativni okvir, ali i da je broj slučajeva širenja mržnje, kao i krivičnih dela koji se mogu okvalifikovati kao zločini iz mržnje, a dobili su sudski epilog, vrlo mali u odnosu na prisustvo jezika mržnje u javnom diskursu, što ukazuje na problematičnu primenu zakona.

U zakonskim aktima Srbije nije posebno precizirano sankcionisanje govora mržnje u onlajn sferi, ali se, kako navode Milinkov i Sedlarević (2021: 72–73) u *Zakonu o organizaciji i nadležnosti državnih organa za borbu protiv visokotehnološkog kriminala* navodi da se zakon primenjuje radi otkrivanja, krivičnog gonjenja i suđenja između ostalog i za „krivična dela protiv sloboda i prava čoveka i građanina, polne slobode, javnog reda i mira i ustavnog uređenja i bezbednosti Republike Srbije, koja se zbog načina izvršenja ili upotrebljenih sredstava mogu smatrati krivičnim dilema visokotehnološkog kriminala” (član 3). U *Zakonu o potvrđivanju Dodatnog protokola uz Konvenciju o visokotehnološkom kriminalu* „rasistički i ksenofobični materijal” definiše se kao svaki pisani materijal, svaka slika ili svako drugo predstavljanje ideja ili teorija koje zagovaraju, promovišu ili podstrekavaju mržnju, diskriminaciju ili nasilje, protiv bilo kojeg pojedinca ili grupe pojedinaca, zasnovano na rasi, boji kože, naslednom, nacionalnom ili etničkom poreklu, kao i veri, ako se koriste kao izgovor za bilo koji od tih faktora (član 2). Ovim zakonom izričito se zabranjuje širenje ksenofobičnog i rasističkog materijala preko računarskih sistema (član 3).

Situacija u Americi razlikuje se od one na evropskom kontinentu, gde se suzbijanjem govora mržnje bave državni organi. U SAD su velike tehnološke kompanije u dobroj meri samostalne i nezavisne u regulisanju sadržaja na društvenim mrežama. Tamo postoji *Zakon o pristojnosti komunikacija* (*Communications Decency Act*), koji na neki način štiti kompanije poput *Tvitera*, *Mete* (*Fejsbuka* i *Instagrama*) od odgovornosti za sadržaj koji objavljuju njihovi korisnici na mrežama čiji su vlasnici te kompanije.

¹³ Primena ovog akta počinje od januara 2024.

¹⁴ <https://edri.org/our-work/eu-attempt-to-regulate-big-tech/> . Pristupljeno 10. 11. 2022.

4. ANALIZA

4.1. Primer iz istorije – Holokaust

Generalna skupština Ujedinjenih nacija 1966. usvojila je *Međunarodni pakt o građanskim i političkim pravima* koji obavezuje sve države potpisnice da usvoje zakone kojima zabranjuju podsticanje i promovisanje nacionalne, verske ili rasne diskriminacije. To znači da su i države koje posebno ne sankcionišu negiranje Holokausta u obavezi da kažnjavaju sve one koji koriste govor mržnje. Brojni autori u svojim radovima bavili su se problematikom negiranja Holokausta u *klasičnoj* literaturi, ali i u digitalnoj sferi (Lasson 1997. i 2016, Knechtle 2008, Altman 2012, Ring 2013, Daniele 2016, Herceg-Pakšić 2017, Bjola & Manor 2020, Vučić 2022).

Od evropskih zemalja na primer: Nemačka, Austrija, Francuska, Holandija i Rumunija, negiranje Holokausta sankcionišu zakonima. Bosna i Hercegovina, Crna Gora, Mađarska, Slovenija, Švajcarska i Kipar kažnjavaju svako negiranje genocida. Sa druge strane, Poljska, Češka, Mađarska, Estonija i Letonija, osim negiranja nacističkih zločina, kažnjavaju i negiranje komunističkih zločina i javno isticanje nacističkih i sovjetskih simbola. Rusija, osim Holokausta, kažnjava i dovođenje u pitanje uloge Sovjetskog Saveza u Drugom svetskom ratu. Postoje i zemlje koje nemaju posebne zakone kojima se sankcioniše negiranje Holokausta – to su Španija i Slovačka, kao i Velika Britanija, ali i SAD¹⁵. Poslednje dve smatraju da bi se usvajanjem takvih zakona dovela u pitanje sloboda govora (prema Štavljanin 2021)¹⁶.

Kada je u pitanju Srbija, na sajtu Ministarstva spoljnih poslova navedeno je saopštenje u kome piše da se „Republika Srbija protivi poricanju ili iskrivljavanju istorijskih činjenica o Holokaustu i aktivno se zalaže za sagledavanje masovnog stradanja Jevreja u Drugom svetskom ratu kao jednog od najvećih zločina u istoriji čovečanstva” (Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Srbije 2022).¹⁷

¹⁵ Zanimljiv je podatak da većina internetskih stranica sa neonacističkim sadržajem potiče upravo iz SAD.

¹⁶ Izvor: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/holikaust-negiranje-genocida-govor-mrznje/31412934.html> Pristupljeno: 22. 9. 2022.

¹⁷ Izvor: <https://www.mfa.gov.rs/mediji/saopstenja/srbija-se-protivi-poricanju-i-iskrivljavanju-istorijskih-cinjenica-o-holokaustu> Pristupljeno 22.9.2022.

Govor mržnje u medijskom diskursu – primeri iz Srbije

Pravo na slobodu izražavanja nikad ne bi smelo da se zloupotrebljava kao izgovor za širenje jezika mržnje i netrpeljivosti, te se u cilju jasnijeg postavljanja granica u demokratskim društvima teži ka uspostavljanju regulativnih mehanizama koji bi trebalo da sankcionišu pojavu govora mržnje. Još početkom devedesetih godina 20. veka, zbog straha od učestalog ponovnog širenja rasizma, ksenofobije i antisemitizma, Savet Evrope prepoznaje medije kao važan faktor u suzbijanju netolerancije i mržnje. Na samitu u Beču (1993) usvojen je *Plan akcije za borbu protiv rasizma, ksenofobije, antisemitizma i netolerancije*, u kojem se od medija zahteva da „izveštavaju i komentarišu dela koja spadaju u rasizam i netoleranciju na istinit i odgovoran način i da nastave da razvijaju profesionalne etičke kodekse koji odražavaju ove zahteve”¹⁸.

Suprotno navedenom zahtevu, u pojedinim medijima u Republici Srbiji poslednjih godina sve je izraženije širenje jezika mržnje na osnovu nacionalne, verske, rodne, seksualne i polne pripadnosti, ali i prema gotovo svima koji javno izražavaju kritički stav u odnosu na vladajuću političku strukturu. Navedeno potvrđuje i godišnji izveštaj Beogradskog centra za ljudska prava (Pokuševski i Petrović 2021: 21), a problem diskriminatornog izveštavanja o osetljivim društvenim grupama prepoznaje i *Strategija razvoja Sistema javnog informisanja u Republici Srbiji za period 2020–2025* (Sl. glasnik RS, broj 11/20).

U ovom segmentu osvrnućemo se na pojavu jezika mržnje u elektronskim medijima koji imaju dozvolu da emituju program na nacionalnom nivou. Iako *Zakon o elektronskim medijima* (2014) obavezuje Regulatorno telo za elektronske medije (REM) da kontroliše programski sadržaj pružalaca medijskih usluga, u praksi te kontrole u najvećoj meri izostaju.

Tako je, kako prenose Milinkov i Sedlarević (2021: 51), kada je reč o slučajevima izveštavanja elektronskih medija, na koje su upućene pritužbe zbog sumnje da je u pitanju širenje govora mržnje, Savet REM-a do 2017. godine izrekao samo dve mere zbog širenja mržnje. Jedna opomena upućena je 2011. godine *Radio Fokusu*, kojem je u međuvremenu i oduzeta dozvola, ali ne zbog širenja mržnje, već zbog previsokih cena SMS-poruka. Mera upozorenja izrečena je 2016. televiziji *Happy* zbog širenja mržnje prema albanskoj populaciji od strane jednog od učesnika rijaliti programa *Parovi*, Kristijana Golubovića, koji je u nekoliko navrata služio kaznu zatvora. U obrazloženju REM-a navodi se da su

¹⁸ http://ravnopravnost.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/images_files_SE_Preporuka%20R_97_20.pdf. Pristupljeno 19. 11. 2022.

„navedene informacije sadržale diskriminaciju, mržnju, nasilje zbog rasne, nacionalne pripadnosti, jezika, verskih i političkih ubeđenja, genetske osobnosti prema zatvorenima albanskoga naroda”, kao i da je *Happy TV* bila dužna da se stara da navedeni programski sadržaj ne podstiče diskriminaciju, mržnju i nasilje (prema Rakša Zubčević, Beder i Vojvodić 2017: 80).

Rezultati analize koju je sprovedla *Fondacija Slavko Ćuruvija*¹⁹ pokazuju da od juna 2020. REM donosi nešto strože mere zbog nepoštovanja odredaba zakona i pravilnika o zaštiti prava maloletnika i zaštiti ljudskih prava. Ipak, konstatuje se i da je problem u tome što je u više slučajeva REM pokrenuo postupak protiv pojedinih televizija, ali članovi Saveta nisu bili saglasni da se donese odluka o kazni. Tokom 2020. godine REM je izrekao²⁰ 11 mera televizijama zbog povreda obaveza koje se odnose na programski sadržaj, a jedna od izrečenih mera odnosila se na pojavu govora mržnje u emisiji *Goli život* na televiziji *Happy*. Mera privremene zabrane emitovanja programskog sadržaja navedene emisije u trajanju od sedam dana izrečena je zbog toga što je u aprilu 2020. godine gost Mihajlo Ulemek izneo informacije kojima se na otvoren ili prikriven način podstiče diskriminacija lica ili grupe ljudi zbog njihove rasne pripadnosti (prema Milinkov i Sedlarević 2021: 52).

Ilustrativan je i primer iz 2019. godine koji svedoči o selektivnoj primeni zakona, ali i o nerazumevanju ozbiljnosti problema širenja govora mržnje. Profesora Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu, Danijela Sinanija, glavni i odgovorni urednik televizije *Happy*, Milomir Marić, omalovažio je na osnovu etničke pripadnosti i profesionalnog integriteta. Tužilaštvo je odbacilo²¹ krivičnu prijavu koju je zbog širenja rasne, verske, nacionalne ili druge netrpeljivosti podnelo nekoliko civilnih i medijskih udruženja, kao i Filozofski fakultet. Savet REM-a je u ovom slučaju reagovao te je televizijskoj kući izrečena²² opomena „zbog iznete informacije kojima se podstiče, na prikriveni način diskriminacija zbog nacionalne pripadnosti kao ličnog svojstva profesora Filozofskog fakulteta Danijela Sinanija”, te je emiteru naloženo da odluku objavi u svom programu, kao i u jednom dnevnom listu. Izrečena mera u navedenom sučaju najblaži je vid sankcionisanja

¹⁹ <https://www.slavkocuruvijafondacija.rs/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Analiza-efekata-rada-REM-a-2017-2020-Slavko-%C4%86uruvija-fondacija.pdf>. Pristupljeno 15. 5. 2021.

²⁰ <http://www.rem.rs/sr/odluke/izrecene-mere#gsc.tab=0>. Pristupljeno 15. 5. 2021.

²¹ <https://www.cenzolovka.rs/etika/i-trece-osnovno-tuzilastvo-odbacilo-krivicnu-prijavu-protiv-milomira-marica>. Pristupljeno 23. 4. 2021.

²² <https://www.cenzolovka.rs/etika/rem-opomenuo-tv-hepi-zbog-vredjanja-i-omalovazavanja-profesora-sinanija/>. Pristupljeno 19.11.2022.

elektronskih medija zbog kršenja zakona. Prema *Zakonu o elektronskim medijima*, REM ima mogućnost da izrekne mere opomene, upozorenja, da medijima privremeno zabrani prikazivanje programa, kao i da im trajno oduzme dozvolu.

„Sloboda” govora mržnje – slučaj Mete

Agencija *Rojters* objavila je 10. marta 2022. godine informaciju koja, formalno gledajući, predstavlja dozvolu za upotrebu eksplicitnog govora/jezika mržnje na najmoćnijim društvenim mrežama na svetu – u vlasništvu kompanije *Meta*: „*Fejsbuk i Instagram dozvolice korisnicima u nekim zemljama da pozivaju na nasilje protiv Rusa i ruskih vojnika samo u kontekstu ruskog napada na Ukrajinu*”, objavio je *Rojters* večeras nakon uvida u određene interne mejlove *Meta* platforme, što je, kako se navodi, privremena promena u politici o govoru mržnje”.²³

Kompanija je još navela da dozvoljava poruke i navela primer kao što je „smrt ruskim osvajačima”, koje bi inače prekršila pravila *Mete*. U isto vreme kompanija je saopštila da neće dozvoljavati objave u kojima bi se preko njenih društvenih mreža pozivalo na nasilje protiv ruskih civila. Takođe, prema internim mejlovima koji su bili upućeni moderatorima na *Fejsbuku i Instagramu*, privremeno se dozvoljavaju čak i pozivi na ubistvo predsednika Rusije, Vladimira Putina, i predsednika Belorusije, Aleksandra Lukašenka. Ove privremene mere koje odobravaju nasilje protiv „ruskih agresora” odnose se samo na jedan broj zemalja, poput Estonije, Litvanije, Letonije, Poljske, Slovačke, Mađarske, Rumunije, Rusije²⁴ i Ukrajine.

U prvim reakcijama na ovu krajnje problematičnu odluku *Mete* brojni medijski analitičari, stručnjaci za digitalna prava i aktivisti za ljudska prava procenjuju da je najpre ta kompanija prekršila sopstvene standarde i pravila, koji se inače odnose na nultu toleranciju u vezi sa ratnim huškanjem, i počela da primenjuje „dvostruke standarde”, jer bi se ta odluka mogla u nekom trenutku primeniti i u slučaju drugih (ratnih) konflikata u svetu.

Novinarka i urednica na *Radio-televiziji Vojvodine* Ljubica Gojgić ocenila je da ta odluka *Mete* „dokazuje razmere mogućih zloupotreba tzv. novih medija, koji mogu da postavljaju uslove i pravila svakome, a s druge strane, da na svaki

²³ Izvor: <https://www.euronews.rs/magazin/tehnologija/40483/promena-u-politici-o-govoru-mrznje-fejsbuk-i-instagram-ce-dozvoliti-pozive-na-nasilje-protiv-rusije/vest>
Pristupljeno 21. 9. 2022.

²⁴ Rusija je, kao odgovor na ovu odluku *Mete*, stavila zabranu na upotrebu *Fejsbuka, Instagrama i Tvitera*.

način izbegavaju da se i sami povinuju pravilima i kontroli” (prema Dragaš 2022)²⁵. Aktivistkinja iz grupe za digitalna prava *Akses nau (Access Now)* Marva Fatafta kaže da taj potez predstavlja „dvostruke standarde, naročito ako se ima u vidu neuspeh *Mete* da suzbije govor mržnje u drugim ratnim zonama” (prema SeeBiz 2022)²⁶. Digitalni program menadžer u NVO za zaštitu ljudskih prava *Artikl 19 (Article 19)*, Majkl Klaster, smatra da odluke bilo koje kompanije, pa i *Mete*, „treba da budu oblikovane prema principima Ujedinjenih nacija o poslovanju i ljudskim pravima, a ne na osnovu onoga što je najekonomičnije ili logistički isplativo za kompaniju” (prema Bogetić 2022)²⁷.

Iz virtuelnog u fizičko nasilje

Širenje panike, jezika mržnje i homofobnih poruka na društvenim mrežama, ali i na medijskim portalima i pojedinim elektronskim medijima, intenzivirano je tokom leta 2022, nekoliko meseci uoči održavanja manifestacije *Europrajd* za koju je još 2019. postignut sporazum da će biti organizovana u Beogradu.

Početkom juna 2022. na televiziji sa nacionalnom frekvencijom, *Happy TV*, prikazana je emisija *Posle ručka*, u kojoj su sagovornici konstatovali da bi organizacija *Europrajda* u Beogradu mogla da doprinese širenju epidemije majmunskih boginja. U navedenom slučaju radi se o prenošenju netačnih i zlonamernih informacija koje mogu da podstaknu stigmatu, diskriminaciju i mržnju prema LGBT+ osobama, što je u suprotnosti sa profesionalnim i etičkim načelima (*Kodeks novinara Srbije*), a zabranjeno je i *Zakonom o javnom informisanju* (2014).

Nekoliko nedelja kasnije preko socijalnih mreža delio se video-zapis govora banatskog episkopa Nikanora Bogunovića, koji je anatemisao organizatore i učesnike prajda, ali i premijerku Srbije Anu Brnabić, uz širenje mržnje i pominjanje „upotrebe oružja”. Navedenu besedu episkopa Srpske pravoslavne crkve prenosili su i mediji, a reakcije nadležnih su uglavnom izostale. U društvu je stvorena atmosfera netrpeljivosti prema seksualnim manjinama, a kao direktna

²⁵ Izvor: <https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/594585/sloboda-govora-mrznje>
Pristupljeno 29. 9. 2022.

²⁶ Izvor: <https://seebiz.eu/tehnologija/facebook-ima-dvostruke-standarde-u-pogledu-govora-mrznje-protiv-rusa/272855/> Pristupljeno 29. 9. 2022.

²⁷ <https://www.vijesti.me/svijet/evropa/595875/dupli-standardi-za-govor-mrznje>
Pristupljeno 29. 9. 2022.

posledica episkopovih reči, desilo se i fizičko nasilje u javnom prevozu u Beogradu, o čemu je izvestila organizacija *Da se zna*²⁸.

Navedeni primeri samo su deo problematičnog sadržaja kojim su obilovale/obiluju mediji i društvene mreže, a odabrani su jer ilustrativno prikazuju kako izrečeno nasilje vrlo lako može preći u fizičko, i zbog čega je širenje mržnje nedopustivo i ne može se smatrati pravom na slobodno izražavanje.

5. ZAKLJUČNE NAPOMENE

Ideja ovog rada jeste da problematizuje zloupotrebu prava na slobodu govora radi širenja i podsticanja mržnje u javnoj sferi. Kroz pregled regulatornog okvira i primera iz medija postavljen je okvir koji može doprineti daljoj analizi toga u kojoj meri danas važe definicije govora mržnje, kao i na koji način se on manifestuje u elektronskim i onlajn medijima i na internetskim društvenim mrežama.

Važnost jasnog uspostavljanja granice između mišljenja i stava i govora mržnje jeste upravo u posledici tog govornog čina. Često se rasprave zasnivaju na tome da li je neko imao pravo nešto da kaže i koje su granice slobode govora, a zaboravlja se na grupe ili pojedince izložene verbalnom nasilju i mržnji. Nesigurnost, strah, obezvređenost ili životna ugroženost posledice su osuda, pretnji, stvaranja i širenja prezira, stereotipa, diskriminacije i mržnje. U govoru mržnje iskazuje se prezir i netrpeljivost prema drugom i drugačijem, a ono što je osnovna karakteristika je da se njime „negira samo biće i suština drugog” (Nikolić 2018: 30).

Sa druge strane, za preventivu pojave mržnje neophodno je uključivanje različitih faktora, za šta je svakako primarna senzibilisanost i spremnost vladinih i pravosudnih institucija da reaguju i rešavaju problem, zatim obrazovanje, digitalna i medijska pismenost, ali i individualna odgovornost svih članova društva, pojedinačna odgovornost jednih prema drugima. To pretpostavlja aktivnije uključivanje građana i građanki u zaštitu ljudskih prava, što za početak može da se ogleda u tome da se reaguje i prijavi problematičan sadržaj na društvenim mrežama ili širenje mržnje u medijima. Takođe, neophodna je i solidarnost, koja podrazumeva reakciju na jezik mržnje, ne samo kada se odnosi na nas lično, već i kada se dešava drugima.

²⁸ <https://twitter.com/dasezna/status/1559138756497637376> . Pristupljeno 5. 9. 2022.

„Sloboda govora ne može biti opravdanje za govor mržnje, a važno je da institucije brzo i efikasno reaguju na negativne pojave” (Bedalov 2022)²⁹. Kada je u pitanju oblast novih medija, na internetu ne bi trebalo da bude dozvoljeno ništa što nije dozvoljeno i u stvarnom životu, jer jedina razlika između govora mržnje u oflajn i onlajn prostoru jeste u platformi preko koje se ona ispoljava.

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²⁹ Izvor: <https://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/57/srbija-danas/4800943/sloboda-govora-ne-moze-biti-opravdanje-za-govor-mrznje.html> Pristupljeno 29. 9. 2022.

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“FREEDOM” OF HATE SPEECH - THE PROBLEM OF ABUSE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Summary

The aim of this paper is to analyze the abuse of the right to freedom of speech in order to spread and incite hatred in the public sphere, with an emphasis on new media. Based on examples from the media, the authors try to check to what extent the definitions of hate speech are valid today and how this type of speech affects the audience in traditional electronic and online media. The paper, among other things, considers the (possible) consequences after *Meta's* decision to allow users in some countries to call for violence against Russians and Russian soldiers through the most influential social networks in the world - *Facebook* and *Instagram*, in the context of the Russian attack on Ukraine. The paper also examines the direct consequences of the spread of hate speech and homophobia

ahead of *Europride 2022* in Belgrade. The key question they will try to answer is whether freedom of speech is needed today to protect the speech we don't like.

Key words: hate speech, freedom of speech, online media, social networks, *Meta*, *Facebook*, *Instagram*, Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media.

ALGORITAMSKA PRISTRASNOST: PROBLEMATIZACIJA I ISTRAŽIVAČKA AGENDA

Funkcionisanje društava na globalnom nivou sve više zavisi od inteligentnih sistema i automatskog procesuiranja podataka, što sve više obavljaju algoritmi. Medijacija društvenog života putem računarskih tehnologija znači da se predviđanja i odluke u vezi sa ljudima sve više donose uz pomoć različitih algoritamskih modela. U ovom istraživanju, algoritme definišemo kao društveno-tehničke sklopove i kodirane instrukcije koje prate računari kako bi izvršili određene zadatke: analiza obrazaca ljudskog ponašanja u onlajn okruženju, analiza ukusa, preporuke koje se baziraju na tome, ili sortiranje i klasifikacija velike količine podataka. Cilj ovog rada je da napravi pregled i problematizuje pitanja koja su otvorena u okviru različitih istraživanja algoritama, a posebno u vezi sa problemom algoritamske pristrasnosti i to iz perspektive digitalne sociologije. Glavni zadatak je da se napravi pregled literature i identifikuju ključne teme i pitanja u vezi sa problemom algoritamske pristrasnosti. U tom smislu, rad daje koncizan pregled stanja u oblasti. Naglasak je na etičkim i društvenim aspektima, odnosno na aspektima regulacije. U radu se takođe otvaraju pitanja o implikacijama izostanka društvenih aktera (*agential cut*) i problematizuju se praktični i epistemološki „zahtevi”, koje algoritmi i principi računarskog razmišljanja na kojima su zasnovani otvaraju.

Ključne reči: algoritmi, algoritamska pristrasnost, etika, regulacija, društvena pitanja, pregled literature

1.UVOD

Jedan od slučajeva koji je uzburkao međunarodnu javnost u vezi sa pitanjem algoritamske pristrasnosti jeste sada već poznato svedočenje Frensis Hojgen (Francis Haugen), uzbunjivačice i bivše zaposlene u kompaniji Fejsbuk (sada Meta) koja je u javnost iznela tvrdnje o tome da ova kompanija (uključujući i druge medije u njegovom vlasništvu, poput Instagrama), najkraće rečeno, razvija algoritme zahvaljujući kojima se korisnicima plasiraju sadržaji koji vode polarizaciji javnog mnjenja. I dalje, kako je tvrdila Hojgen, interna organizaciona

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kultura, koja profit stavlja ispred dobrobiti ljudi, pokazala je da „ne postoji volja u vrhu kompanije da se osigura sistem koji će funkcionisati na adekvatan i siguran način” (Waterson & Milmo 2021). Ubrzo nakon objavljivanja njenog identiteta i izjave, mnogi mediji u Sjedinjenim Državama, poput Vol Strit Džornala (Wall Street Journal) i televizijske mreže CBS, prenele su njena svedočenja, a ona je takođe svedočila i pred organima Senata SAD.

Iako ne znamo koji su sve motivi i okolnosti tog javnog istupa, pomenuto svedočenje možemo posmatrati kao jedan od poziva na drugačiji i sigurniji način *regulacije* sadržaja koji plasiraju kompanije zahvaljujući novom moćnom tehnološkom oružju – algoritmima. To na žalost nije bio prvi put da je problem u vezi sa algoritamskom pristrasnošću (*bias*) ili algoritamskom štetom (*harm*) „isplivao” u javnost. Naime, poznat je i slučaj iz 2014. godine, kada je Fejsbuk takođe, bez informisanja svojih korisnika, uradio eksperiment zahvaljujući kojem su istraživači iz ove kompanije tvrdili da postoji „eksperimentalni dokaz o masovnoj ‘zarazi’ na mreži“, koja može da nastane kao posledica redukcije sadržaja (pozitivno ili negativno intoniranih objava) putem algoritamski posredovane funkcije najvažnijih vesti (*News Feed*) (Tufekci 2015: 203; Kramer, Guillory & Hancock 2014). Slučaj je izazvao ne samo ozbiljnu pažnju, već i ozbiljnu zabrinutost.

U ovom radu polazimo od pretpostavke da društveni mediji poput Fejsbuka ili Instagrama, kao i druge kompanije koje posluju u domenu prikupljanja, obrade i distribucije ili prodaje podataka koje imaju o svojim korisnicima, upotrebljavaju algoritme kako bi uticali na ponašanje svojih korisnika. Kada kažemo ponašanje, tu mislimo na čitav dijapazon mogućih uticaja, od izazivanja specifičnih emotivnih i psiholoških stanja, do podsticaja na politički ili neki drugi angažman, potrošačke aktivnosti, itd. Pomenute kompanije zahvaljujući algoritmima upravljaju podacima koje im dostavljaju sami korisnici ili podatke kupuju od trgovaca podacima (*data brokers*). Ulog u tom procesu nije sam(o) profit, već su implikacije mnogo šire i ozbiljnije. One prevazilaze „ekonomsko ponašanje”, zadirući u temelje društvenih odnosa.

Osnovni problem koji nalazimo u pomenutim primerima, kao i mnogim drugim slučajevima uticaja algoritama i društvenih medija, poznatih i nepoznatih u javnosti, jeste problem (ne)transparentnosti. Drugim rečima, izvesno je da algoritmi imaju uticaja na ponašanje ljudi (Amoore & Piotukh 2016; Beer 2017; Haidt 2022), a koje vrste algoritama i u kojim domenima našeg svakodnevnog života kompanije koriste te algoritme, samo možemo da pretpostavimo. Takođe, pored pitanja o transparentnosti, važno pitanje o kojem će još biti reči jeste ono

koje se odnosi na *donošenje odluka*. Jer, ukoliko ova vrsta tehnologije može da ima toliki uticaj na emotivna stanja i društvena ponašanja ljudi, čini se da nije više pitanje tehnoloških mogućnosti, već samo *mere* – do koje naš individualni i društveni život od toga može imati koristi ili štete. Uzimajući u obzir, dakle, i pozitivne i negativne uloge ovih tehnologija, pitanja koja otvaramo posledica su realnih društvenih praksi (Tufekci 2015: 212).

Danas je razvijeno čitavo jedno polje studija koje se naziva *kritičke studije algoritama* i koje proučava ova i slična pitanja. To su pitanja o tome na koji način algoritmi doprinose društvenim predrasudama, pristrasnostima ili diskriminaciji (Angwin et al. 2016; Barocas & Selbst 2016; Eubanks 2017; Malik et al. 2022: 183; Sandving et al. 2016), pitanja o narušavanju prava (Citron & Pasquale 2014), o društvenim nejednakostima ili destabilizaciji političkog okruženja (Gillespie & Seaver 2016), pitanja o podsticajima za učešće ljudi u društvenom životu i pretnjama društvenoj pravdi (Cinnamon 2017), itd. Ima istraživača koji smatraju da tehnologije koje se baziraju na algoritmima značajno doprinose i razvoju kapitalističkog načina akumulacije (Suarez-Villa 2009), ili obrnuto – da „duh kapitalizma” sve više postaje upisan u algoritme pretrage i pretraživače (*search engines*) (Mager 2012). U tom smislu, govori se i o uticaju algoritama na racionalizaciju rada i društvenih odnosa posebno u finansijskom sektoru. Još opštije, o njihovom značaju u razvoju novog načina mišljenja i društvene kontrole (Parisi 2015).

Cilj ovog našeg pregleda i problematizacije jeste da predstavimo neka otvorena pitanja i probleme koji se pojavljuju u oblasti istraživanja algoritamske pristrasnosti. Pored toga, zadatak je da u radu i zaključnim razmatranjima problematizujemo ta pitanja i ukažemo na dimenzije koje smatramo ključnim i koje grupišemo na sledeći način: etičke i društvene dimenzije i pitanja regulacije. U zaključku ćemo pokušati i da naznačimo mogućnosti i pravce daljih istraživanja ove problematike.

2. ALGORITAMSKA PRISTRASNOST: ETIČKA I DRUŠTVENA DIMENZIJA, PROBLEMI REGULACIJE

Algoritme je moguće definisati na različite načine. Oni predstavljaju operativan pojam u više nauka, odnosno u različitim društvenim praksama. U ovom istraživanju pod pojmom algoritma misli se na „sekvencu naredbe računarskog koda koja govori računaru koje operacije da izvršava kako bi kroz serije instrukcija ispunio određeni cilj“ (Lupton 2015: 11). Drugim rečima, algoritmi se koriste kako bi se rešavali određeni softverski problemi.

Računarski algoritmi postaju sve važniji u posredovanju načina na koje digitalne tehnologije funkcionišu i prikupljaju podatke o korisnicima (određenih stranica, platformi ili medija), a pored toga, čini se da su oni mnogo važnije oruđe za klasifikaciju prikupljenih podataka i preporučivanje određenih sadržaja, davanje sugestija na koji način bi korisnik mogao da se ponaša (npr. preporučivanje kupovine određene robe kroz reklamu). Algoritmi, dakle, mogu da analiziraju obrasce ljudskog ponašanja kroz tzv. „digitalne tragove” ili podatke koje ljudi o sebi ostavljaju na različitim stranicama u digitalnom okruženju. Oni identifikuju ukuse, želje i interesovanja korisnika putem procene koje i kakve sadržaje ili stranice oni posećuju i u kojoj meri. Takođe, algoritmi vrše klasifikaciju velike količine podataka. Sve to samo po sebi ne zvuči problematično, a problemi i pitanja koje otvaramo u ovom radu upravo se „kriju” iza toga: iza mogućnosti da se sve navedeno događa, da to koriste različite kompanije sa ciljem sticanja profita, a da korisnici usluga tih kompanija to ne znaju. Sa druge strane, naravno, postoji i mnoštvo korisnih i pozitivnih primera koji nisu predmet ovog rada, u kojima algoritmi „pomažu” ljudima ne samo da donose odluke, nego i procesuiraju – i to sa vrhunskom preciznošću – ogromne količine podataka, u vrlo kratkom vremenu.

Govorimo, dakle, o skupovima procedura koji su ugrađeni u računarski kod, i o tome da savremeni algoritmi, posebno oni koji se razvijaju uz pomoć tzv. mašinskog učenja (*machine learning*), „imaju sposobnost” donošenja odluka koje mogu biti nezavisne od onoga što su njihovi autori u njih „upisali”. U sociološkom okviru, problemi nastaju upravo zbog činjenice da algoritmi mogu da se „otmu kontroli onih koji su ih stvorili i izazovu nenameravane posledice” (Gallagher 2017: 26). Prema mišljenju Galagera, primer mogu biti objave koje prikazuju platforme poput Fejsbuka (*Facebook*). Ukoliko objava ima određeni broj svidanja (*likes*), ona menja mesto i postaje „prioritetna”, prikazuje se u delu koji je predviđen za najvažnije vesti (*newsfeed*) iako nisu u pitanju najvažnije, tj. najnovije vesti. Na taj način, ne menja se samo redosled objava. Činjenica da određene objave ili informacije mogu stići do korisnika *pre* nego neke druge, svakako da može uticati na način na koji ljudi razmišljaju ne samo o određenim događajima, već i o međuljudskim odnosima. Algoritmi sve više postaju *oruđa* ili tehnologije koje vrše evaluaciju, selekciju i prikazivanje sadržaja. Oni nemaju volju i namere kao akteri, ali mogu u tom smislu biti posmatrani kao *aktanti*, što je termin koji se koristi u teoriji aktera i mreža (*Actor-network theory*) i odnosi se na ne-ljudske (ili nežive) objekte – tehnologiju na primer – koji ne delaju kao ljudi, ali koji mogu da „izazovu efekat delanja” u svetu (Latour 2007). Oni su u tom

smislu jedna potpuno nova pojava koja otvara pitanje *računarske agensnosti* (Tufekci 2015), što znači da u određenom smislu računari i algoritmi mogu postati nezavisni „akteri” i da, u zavisnosti od inputa, mogu proizvesti različite rezultate (Maly 2022: 3).

Kada govorimo o teorijskim mogućnostima objašnjenja algoritama, onda njih možemo odrediti kao kompleksne *društveno-tehničke sklopove*. Sklopovi se sastoje iz više različitih komponenata, materijalnih i nematerijalnih, koji se nalaze u međusobnim odnosima. Oni predstavljaju komplekse odnosa koji se neprekidno mogu menjati. Zato se i u studijama softvera, koje naglasak stavljaju na transmisiju ili recepciju poruka, računarskim kodovima pristupa kao konfiguracijama ili „kodiranim sklopovima” (Lupton 2015: 25). U svakom slučaju, koncept *sklopa (assemblage)* predstavlja koristan način za razumevanje i objašnjenje „hibridnih pojava” poput algoritama, zahvaljujući kojima ljudski akteri i ne-ljudski aktanti stupaju u međusobne odnose i izazivaju određene društvene posledice. Koncept sklopa omogućava nam takođe da shvatimo da se radi o odnosima u kojima akteri i aktanti utiču jedni na druge i menjaju se (Lupton 2015: 23–24).

Diskusija Kolijera i Onga (Collier & Ong 2005: 11) o *globalnim sklopovima* takođe može biti primenjena na algoritme. Naime, algoritmi kao delovi softvera i forme, koje sve više postaju globalno distribuirane, „imaju distinktivne kapacitete za dekontekstualizaciju i rekontekstualizaciju, apstraktnost i pokret, kroz različite društvene i kulturne situacije i sfere života”. Algoritmi su globalne forme utoliko što postaju bitni elementi procesa koji se odvijaju na globalnom nivou (digitalizacija na primer) ili izazivaju posledice na tom nivou. Pa ipak, algoritmi označavaju i heterogene pojave i procese kodiranja, predstavljanja i klasifikacije podataka. Ne treba zaboraviti da govoreći o algoritmima kao tehnološkim pojavama, mi govorimo i o pojavama koje imaju svoje kulturne i društveno-istorijske kontekste, a da su u njima i zahvaljujući njima implicirane određene društvene vrednosti, interesi i norme. Algoritmi u tom smislu teritorijalizuju, konkretizuju ili spacijalizuju podatke i informacije koje doprinose odlučivanju i izgradnji *smisla* u različitim društvenim praksama. Uz pomoć definicije algoritma, dolazimo i do određenja *algoritamske pristrasnosti*. U pitanju je – sudeći prema interesovanjima istraživača – veoma važna i sve popularnija oblast istraživanja, koja je još uvek u početnoj fazi i zahteva(će) interdisciplinarne napore. Problem algoritamske pristrasnosti postaje važan jer su posledice tog procesa vidljive na globalnom nivou.

Kada i zašto se pristrasnost pojavljuje? To su na primer situacije u kojima je neki objekat ili predmet analize samo parcijalno zahvaćen, na osnovu podataka koji su dostupni. Algoritmi su ti koji često analiziraju prijave za posao u velikim kompanijama ili prijave za kredit u bankama i na osnovu određenog broja upisanih komandi donose „odluke” koje kandidate da favorizuju, a koje da isključuju iz procesa. Odluka u tom slučaju može biti zasnovana samo na nekoliko ključnih reči, što znači da se potencijalno može zanemariti čitav niz „kvalitativnih” podataka i odlika ljudi. U članku objavljenom u magazinu *Markap* (*The Markup*), Martinez i Kirchner (Martinez & Kirchner 2021) navode podatak da je na državnom nivou u SAD verovatnoća da aplikacije za kredit budu odbijene veća za 40–80% kada su u pitanju ljudi koji nisu bele boje kože. Kada je reč o prijavama za posao, primera radi, sistemi preporuke koji se baziraju na algoritmima, često repliciraju obrasce koji favorizuju određenu populaciju. I ne samo da takvi sistemi ponavljaju greške i pristrasnost u odlučivanju, već često to niko i ne shvati (Bogen 2019). Isti princip ili „logika isključivanja” može se primeniti i na druge oblasti i institucije (školski sistem, zdravstveni sistem, finansijski sistem, itd.).

Pristrasnost se takođe pojavljuje kada sistemi i tehnologije zasnovani na veštačkoj inteligenciji i odlučivanju zahvaljujući algoritmima koriste samo podatke koji su im dostupni, a ne relevantne podatke. Često u određenom domenu praksi ne postoji dovoljno podataka ili dovoljno validnih i relevantnih podataka, pa se – ukoliko za tim postoji interes – mogu koristiti samo oni koji su raspoloživi. A to dalje može voditi ka „iskrivljavanju” slike. Pristrasnost se takođe pojavljuje kada se određene tehnologije, koje nisu u potpunosti razvijene, stavljaju u pogon („beta verzije”), zbog potrebe efikasnosti ili profita, što dalje vodi nepotpunim analizama i klasifikacijama podataka i ograničenim rezultatima. Algoritamska pristrasnost u društvenom kontekstu najviše štete može naneti kada *isključuje* određene kategorije ljudi iz procesa odlučivanja, a ta isključivanja često su zasnovana na „nesavršenosti” tehnologije i to kada joj je u potpunosti i bez nadzora ljudi prepuštena regulacija ili upravljanje određenim procedurama: ko će ili ko neće dobiti posao, zdravstvenu zaštitu, kredit, stipendiju, itd.

Na osnovu pregleda studija iz ove oblasti, izdvajamo tri dimenzije (problema) koje smatramo ključnim. To su potencijalne oblasti problema koji se pojavljuju u društvenim odnosima zahvaljujući algoritamskoj pristrasnosti i koje se svakako međusobno ne isključuju. U pitanju su *etička* dimenzija, oblast *društvenih problema*, kao i pitanja *regulacije*.

Istraživači zainteresovani za etičke dimenzije u domenu proučavanja algoritama često problematizuju pitanje *pravednosti* (*fairness*) (Kearns & Roth

2020). Ovaj koncept je još uvek daleko od preciznog i zahteva kontekstualizaciju kako bismo mogli da shvatimo na šta se odnosi. Jer, pitanje *pravednosti* u društvenim praksama i oblastima (privatne kompanije i privreda, školstvo, civilno društvo, politika, zdravstvo, itd.) može se odnositi na različite stvari. U tom smislu, pravednost ne može biti univerzalno definisana, ali postoje određena načela koje je moguće *poštovati* kako bi se eventualni loš učinak tehnologije i algoritama smanjio na najmanju moguću meru. Pristrasnost i pravednost su posebno izazovni koncepti kada se shvate u kontekstu mašinskog učenja i razvoja veštačke inteligencije, jer u toj oblasti ne postoji jasna i konkretna metrika, kao što je to slučaj u drugim društvenim sferama. Na primer, šta konkretno znači narušavanje *privatnosti* neke osobe jeste takođe pitanje pravednosti, na koje se može dati odgovor koji podrazumeva konkretne korake ili mere, odnosno društvene norme i regulatorne prakse koje to određuju.

Oblast *društvenih pitanja i problema* koja je „pod udarom” algoritamske pristrasnosti veoma je široka. U tom smislu, nije potrebno (a nije ni moguće), navoditi primere koji bi svedočili o svim aspektima društvenih odnosa koji su tome izloženi. Navešćemo samo nekoliko primera kao ilustraciju u kom pravcu se istražuju problemi. Sa porastom broja ljudi koji koriste različite društvene medije, moderiranje sadržaja (*human content moderation*) je nešto što se vremenom počelo smanjivati i u čemu sve više učestvuju algoritmi. O tome svedoče i primeri sa početka ovog teksta. Do sada su evidentirani brojni slučajevi u kojima su algoritmi društvenih medija (Fejsbuk, TikTok, Instagram i dr.) funkcionisali na takav način da su isključivali ili preporučivali određene „problematične” sadržaje, a time posredno izdvajali ili isključivali grupe ljudi prema rasnim ili etničkim kriterijumima. U istraživanjima se za tu vrstu „čišćenja” sadržaja na društvenim medijima koristi termin *algoritamski čuvari kapija* (*algorithmic gatekeeping*). U pitanju su procesi u kojima netransparentna algoritamska računarska oruđa dinamički pročišćavaju, naglašavaju ili ograničavaju sadržaje i protok tih sadržaja (Tufekci 2015: 208). Širenje uticaja procesa u kojima posreduje algoritamsko „čuvanje kapija” posledica je intenzivirane digitalizacije svakodnevnog života.

U literaturi se može naći primer koji govori o tome na koji način je društveni medij TikTok diskriminisao sadržaje zbog fraze „Crni životi su važni” (*Black Lives Matter*), što je slogan antirasističkog protesta i pokreta koji je pokrenut 2012. u SAD.² Još jedan primer dolazi iz sfere rada i tržišta poslova koje je nakon pandemije COVID-19 veoma poremećeno. Zbog ograničenih „ljudskih

² Više o tome videti na: <https://library.law.howard.edu/civilrightshistory/BLM>

resursa” u kompanijama koje se bave zapošljavanjem ili pronalaženjem odgovarajućih kandidata za posao (tzv. *head hunters*), često se primenjuju algoritmi koji biraju kandidate na osnovu ključnih reči. Iako su ta algoritamska oruđa pravljena sa ciljem da mogućnost greške svedu na najmanju moguću meru, često se događa da je proces odabira veoma problematičan i diskriminativan. Još jedna oblast, koja se često navodi kao problematična, jeste finansijski sistem (bankarstvo, osiguranje, krediti, itd.), ali i zdravstvo u kojima se određene usluge institucija, ukoliko su „prepuštene” odlučivanju algoritama, mogu smatrati diskriminirajućim. Već pomenuti društveni mediji i mreže koje između ostalog, funkcionišu i zahvaljujući automatizovanim preporukama (vesti, potencijalnih prijatelja, audio-video ili tekstualnih sadržaja, itd.) navode se u literaturi kao primeri kako algoritamska pristrasnost čini društvenu štetu (Gupta et al. 2022). Malik i saradnici (Malik et al. 2022) daju dobar pregled i sistematizaciju pitanja i problema *društvene štete* (*social harms*), koja nastaje zahvaljujući algoritamskoj pristrasnosti, i navode da su štetne posledice moguće na makro i mezo društvenom nivou i da se ogledaju kroz: 1) doprinos pristrasnosti i nejednakosti; 2) uvećanje propagiranja štete na do sada neviđenom nivou; 3) zamagljivanje percepcije te štete.

I na kraju, ne manje važna pitanja *regulacije*. Političari, civilno društvo, akademija i drugi društveni akteri sve više postaju zainteresovani za pitanja na koji način je moguće implementirati norme i pravila, odnosno prakse na osnovu kojih će nove tehnologije (i oni koji njima upravljaju, posebno kompanije) biti prinuđeni da otkriju informacije o tome na koji način te tehnologije (i algoritmi) funkcionišu. Jedno od centralnih pitanja u ovoj oblasti je zato pitanje *transparentnosti*. Radi se ne samo o mogućnosti, već i o *pravu ljudi* da saznaju logiku funkcionisanja tehnologije i odluka koje itekako imaju posledice po njihov život. Korak ka „inteligibilnom društvu” jeste uvođenje zakonodavstva i normi koji mogu doprineti tome da svi društveni akteri koji u svom poslovanju ili društvenom saobraćanju koriste veštačku inteligenciju, odnosno tehnologiju koja se zasniva na algoritmima, to rade na što je moguće transparentniji način. Tu je na primer, vrlo važna direktiva o zaštiti podataka u EU iz 1995. (*EU Data Protection Directive*), Generalna regulacija o zaštiti podataka (*General Data Protection Regulation*)³ i zakoni iz 2022. godine (*Digital Markets Act*, *Digital Services Act*), čiji je cilj

³ Više videti na: <https://gdpr.eu>

kreiranje bezbednijeg digitalnog prostora.⁴ Regulacija se u tom smislu odnosi na pitanja zaštite podataka (o ličnosti) i privatnosti, ali i na pravo na informisanost, transparentnost u oblasti poslovanja, a nesumnjivo ima i važan politički i javni, društveni značaj (Binns 2018: 547; Paskvali 2018; Zubof 2021). Ako je cilj ovih mera da doprinesu većoj odgovornosti i transparentnosti (*accountability*), a to uključuje navođenje razloga, objašnjenja i opravdanja, to znači da regulacija može voditi ka (raz)otkrivanju epistemičkih i normativnih standarda na kojima se „računarska logika” implicitno zasniva (Binns 2018). Ovo su svakako pitanja od javnog društvenog značaja i otuda potreba da se o njima ne samo debatuje, već i da na određeni način budu regulisana.

3. ZAKLJUČNA RAZMATRANJA

Pitanja i problemi u vezi sa algoritamskim odlučivanjem i pristrasnošću nisu u potpunosti nova. Njih postavljamo i otvaramo na tragovima pitanja i problema u vezi sa ljudskim odlučivanjem uopšte i posledicama koje odlučivanje ima u kontekstu transparentnosti, odgovornosti, diskriminacije, grešaka, itd. Računarske i medijske tehnologije sve više se oslanjaju na mašinsko učenje, algoritme i tehnologije veštačke inteligencije. S obzirom na to da one sve više posreduju u našim društvenim praksama, opravdana je bojazan u vezi sa tim kako ove tehnologije funkcionišu i kakve društvene posledice mogu izazvati. Sve više kompanija danas odlučuje se da unapredi svoje poslovanje i proces odlučivanja uz pomoć pomenutih tehnologija. To samo po sebi ne predstavlja problem, kao ni tehnološki napredak uopšte. U ovom slučaju, radi se ipak o *raskoraku (gap)*, koji se očigledno javlja između: tehnoloških praksi inovacija, odlučivanja koje se na njima zasniva, individualnim i društvenim dimenzijama upotrebe tih tehnologija, pitanja regulacije i društvenih posledica.

U tom okviru su pomenuti primeri pristrasnosti koji vode ka isključivanjima i diskriminaciji prema različitim kriterijumima i društvenim obeležjima (pol, rasa, etnicitet, religija, itd.) i to je nešto što sa sigurnošću znamo da se događa. I ti primeri predstavljaju samo „vrh ledenog brega” kako bi se skrenula pažnja na to da sve prisutnija *agensnost računarskih tehnologija (computational agency)*, a u prvom redu algoritamsko odlučivanje u različitim segmentima društvenog života može izazvati veoma štetne posledice. Treba još

⁴ Više videti na: <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act-package>

jednom naglasiti da su u pitanju tehnologije koje, očigledno, nisu same po sebi loše. Ne radi se o tome da je potrebno napustiti ove tehnologije ili da je napredak „otišao u pogrešnom smeru”. Problem i pitanja su otvorena zbog potreba normiranja i regulacije, transparentnosti i odlučivanja, kao i svih onih „starih” pitanja koja je moguće neprekidno postavljati u vezi sa izazovima savremenih tehno-društvenih praksi.

U vremenu ubrzanog razvoja digitalnih tehnologija i „pametnih” uređaja koji sve više posreduju u našim svakodnevnim aktivnostima, pitanja o tome šta stoji „iza” tih uređaja, softvera i tehnologija koje koristimo takođe su pitanja o mogućnostima „inteligibilnijeg” društvenog života. Tehnologije veštačke inteligencije podjednako mogu služiti unapređivanju „demokratičnosti” naših društvenih i političkih sistema, posebno u oblasti *odlučivanja*, baš kao što mogu i da zamagljuju važna pitanja, da isključuju „nepodobne” aktere i dodatno marginalizuju one koji su već marginalizovani.

Algoritmi kao *globalni sklopovi* očigledno omogućavaju različite načine *predstavljanja* podataka, jer su u njih upisane određene društvene *vrednosti* i *interesi*. U tom smislu su procesi imenovanja, strukturiranja, procesuiranja i predstavljanja podataka, zahvaljujući tim tehnologijama, doveli do jednog potpuno novog načina razumevanja i iskustva informacije kao takve (Lupton 2015: 25). U pitanju su procesi u kojima više ne posreduju i odlučuju isključivo ljudi (*agential cut*). Pitanje je u tom smislu, na koji način se odvija proces *dekontekstualizacije podataka*? To je promena koja veoma „komplikuje” sociološka istraživanja u kojima su težišta uglavnom na društvenim praksama ili akterima koji su kontekstualno zavisni i predstavljaju proizvod društvenih aktera i okolnosti u kojima se nalaze i delaju (odvijaju). Jer, kada ljudsko odlučivanje biva zamenjeno odlukama koje donose automatizovani računarski sistemi, potencijal za uvećanje pristrasnosti kao da eksponencijalno raste.

Upravo taj novi i sve veći *prostor računarske agensnosti* nije oblast koju treba napustiti niti prepustiti imaginarijumu i pitanjima koje treba da „rešava” sve popularnija literatura iz oblasti naučne fantastike... U pitanju su prakse koje pored tehničkih nauka i inženjera sve više interesuju istraživače iz oblasti društvenih nauka i to sa ciljem *prepoznavanja problema* koji zahtevaju nove načine društvene regulacije, bez obzira na to da li se radi o procesima koji unapređuju ljudsko znanje i rešavaju društvene probleme ili o procesima koji nanose različite vrste društvene štete.

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Dušan Ristić

ALGORITHMIC BIAS: A PROBLEMATIZATION AND RESEARCH AGENDA

Summary

Societies on a global scale are increasingly dependent on intelligent systems and automatic processing of data run by algorithms. The mediation of social life through computation means that predictions and decisions are made about people, on the basis of algorithmic models. In this research, algorithms are approached as socio-technical assemblages and coded instructions that computers follow to perform a given task: to analyze patterns in people's online behavior and taste, to recommend more of the same, or to sort and classify vast amount of data. The aim of this paper is to give an overview and to problematize algorithms research agenda from the perspective of digital sociology. The main task is to

do a literature review and to identify core topics and questions raised about algorithmic biases. The emphasis is on ethical, social and issues of regulation. Paper provides a concise overview of the state of the art in the field. Furthermore, it raises questions about implications of the “agential cut” and the practical and epistemological demands of algorithms and the principles of computational thinking that underlie them.

Key words: algorithms, algorithmic bias, ethics, regulation, social issues, literature review

COMPARISON OF THE HEADLINES IN CROATIAN TELEVISION NEWS PROGRAMS AND ON THE FRONT PAGES OF DAILY NEWSPAPERS DURING THE PANDEMIC

Placing the most important news on the front page is a journalistic rule that has existed since the appearance of the first newspaper. The headlines used to be shouted out by colporteurs, and the practice of highlighting the headlines that sell the newspapers has persisted to this day. In English, the term 'headlines' is used for both newspapers as well as television news programs. Since their very beginnings, television news programs followed the example of newspaper front pages, announcing the main news stories in the program right at the beginning in order to keep the viewers until the end of the program. Just as the front page is considered a key element in creating identity and creating a relationship with the audience, so do television news headlines reveal the editorial practice of a particular media outlet particularly in the time of global crisis, the last one being the Covid-19 pandemic.

In this paper, we will analyze the front pages of the three most read daily newspapers in Croatia - Jutarnji list, Večernji list and 24sata, as well as the headlines of prime-time news programs on the commercial channels of Nova TV and RTL and on the public service television HRT. Quantitative content analysis was conducted within the project "JOURNALISM RESEARCH LABORATORY: Innovative storytelling practices to engage new audiences"², with the intentional sample consisting of 26 covers of each analyzed newspaper, i.e. a total of 78 front pages and a total of 363 headlines on three national television channels, published/broadcast in February, March and April, October, November and December 2020. The sample includes four key events that marked 2020: the beginning of the pandemic, entering the lockdown, the Zagreb earthquake, and the peak of the pandemic that year. The aim of the research is to determine the specifics and differences of headlines on the front pages and in television news programs, to determine which topics dominate, to what extent newspaper and TV headlines are informative (if they contain elements of the news), sensationalist and conflicting, and to determine how

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² Project of the Croatian Science Foundation, IP-2019-04-6331, project leader Professor Tena Perišin, PhD (Jourlab, 2021)

these headlines and which specific linguistic elements try to attract readers' or viewers' attention.

Key words: headlines, television news, newspapers, journalism practice, journalism laboratory, newsroom practice

1. INTRODUCTION

The year 2020 will definitely be a year that will enter history books. It was the year when the Covid-19 pandemic hit almost every country in the world. At the same time, it was a great challenge for the news media and daily reporting. Already in February 2020, World Health Organization (WHO) warned that the fight against the pandemic was accompanied by a fight against "infodemic" (or "infodemia") which they described as the dissemination of "false or misleading information in the digital and physical environment during the outbreak and spread of a disease" (WHO, 2020).

The first case in the Republic of Croatia was reported in Zagreb on 25 February. The first case was a patient who arrived from Italy where numerous Covid cases were reported earlier. Within a few days, a cluster of cases was reported in numerous Croatian cities and the Croatian Government declared a State of Covid Epidemic on 11th March. The declaration was followed by a set of strict epidemiologic measures. Only five days after the declaration of the Covid-19 epidemic, all educational institutions were closed and three days later a complete lockdown was imposed, except for pharmacies and grocery stores with had shorter office hours, the public transport stopped operating. During the escalation of the pandemic, on 22nd March the citizens of Zagreb were struck by a strong earthquake with the magnitude of 5.5 Richter (Lazić et al., 2020:44). The earthquake left numerous damaged buildings in the centre of Zagreb and some surrounding areas and was one of the important news topics. As Deutsche Welle reported, Zagreb at that time, lived in a state of double emergency (Puljiz, 2020). The fact that in 2020, two major crises overlapped during this period and were present on daily basis in the news media, was interesting enough to be included in the research project (Perišin et al. 2021) "Journalism Research Lab: Innovative Storytelling Practices to engage new Audiences" (Perišin et al. 2021) carried out

by the media researchers from the Faculty of Political Science and financed by the Croatian Science Foundation³.

As part of the research project, this paper analyses how the headlines are created in television prime time news and newspaper headlines in Croatia. The news editors, both in tv and print newsrooms, see headlines as one of the most important elements in the structure of the news outlet, the first impression which can draw attention to the rest of the content. The origin of the term headlines is related to the history of newspapers. Still, according to Montgomery and Feng, headlines are a quite late development in the history of journalism, emerging towards the end of the 19th century at a time of increased competition among newspapers for readership (2016:501) It also revokes the times when newsboys were shouting headlines on the streets to make people buy „their” paper.

The term *headlines* was also adopted in television news production. Television News programs used to begin with a short segment that announced the main news which would follow. In the television newsrooms of ex-Yugoslavia, the segment announcing the main news or topic was called general introduction - "generalna najava" ("generalka"), but in recent years, the term "headlines" is common in Croatian television newsrooms. In broadcast news, headlines are used at the beginning and within the program to provide a summary of the news items and the function of the headline is to draw attention to a certain news story (Montgomery and Feng, 2016: 501). Since broadcast news headlines may be separated by several minutes from the item to which they refer they can be understood as 'trailers', „projecting forward into the program, providing clues to its overall structure and providing the audience with reasons to keep viewing or listening“(Montgomery and Feng, 2016:501).

Although television and newspaper headlines have their specifics, both share a common goal in relation to the audience – they are "selling" their content. Newspaper front pages are often the most important part of a newspaper because their design and headlines have the greatest impact on the reader's decision to buy a newspaper (Ciboci,2011:134) and television news begins with headlines – a short summary of the main topics in the following news program (Perišin,2010:72). Its function is not only to inform but to engage the viewing audience for the duration of the broadcast (Montgomery, Feng, 2016:518). Just as the front page is considered a key element in creating identity and creating a

³ Project funded by the Croatian Science Foundation, IP-2019-04-6331, project leader Professor Tena Perišin, PhD (Jourlab, 2021)


relationship with the audience, so do television news headlines reveal the editorial practice of a particular media outlet.

This study analyses the front pages of the three most read daily newspapers in Croatia – Jutarnji list, Večernji list and 24sata, and the headline section of three news programs from televisions with a national concession – Croatian Public Broadcaster (HRT) and two commercial TV stations Nova TV and RTL during the four crisis periods that marked 2020. The analysis was performed on a total number of 78 front pages and 78 news headlines, published and aired, respectively, during February, March, April, October, November and December. A qualitative analysis of the content revealed which topics dominated the front pages and TV news headlines in the analyzed period, do headlines contain actual news and to what extent both headlines in newspapers and television were sensational, emotional, and conflictual. This study also examined whether the headlines were predominantly positive or negative, and in what way certain linguistic elements aimed at attracting the attention of the audience differ in newspapers and on television.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH


The starting point of the Journalism Research Lab (Jourlab) project is that the trust in media and journalism is declining and one of its goals is to re-build that trust and attract new audiences with the use of technology and new forms of innovative journalistic content (Perišin et al., 2021). This ongoing project conducted a preliminary comprehensive study of Media perception in Croatia titled "What does the audience want?" in November 2020 – mirroring the audience perception during the pandemic year, the same period that the content analysis discussed in this paper took place. It provided insight into media habits and trust in media and journalism on a national representative sample (Perišin et al. 2021). This survey showed that television is still a dominant force in the media landscape in Croatia and that 60% of the general population is being informed daily by television on social and political events followed by Internet portals and social media. Daily newspapers on the other hand are in a steady decline as a media in which the audience keeps informed daily with 13% of the general population in Croatia stating newspapers as their daily input of political and social events. According to Reuters Digital Report, in the first year of the pandemic there has been an increase in the consumption of news, especially television and online content that have brought information about the pandemic (Newman et al. 2020).

Figure 1: *Ways of keeping informed daily on social and political events, Study of Media Perception: What does the audience want? (Perišin et al.2021) N=1006*



When it comes to trust, both daily newspapers and television, compared to social media and internet news portals, are still considered to be more trustworthy. In the mentioned survey, the general population was asked to identify the media where they find news that misrepresent reality or are even wrong daily. As visible in the graph below, the results show that social media and internet portals are regarded as the media where they are more likely to encounter false information or misrepresented reality even though they are the media where more and more general population are getting their daily news. Even young audiences, who get informed almost solely through online media, tend to trust traditional media more. Therefore, we felt the importance to study traditional media through this research because reporting in times of crisis is one of the biggest journalistic and editorial challenges due to the extremely important role of the media in society in such situations and their responsibility.

Figure 2: *Trust in media; In what media do you find pieces of news that misrepresent reality or are even wrong on a daily basis?; Study of Media Perception: What does the audience want? (Perišin et al. 2021.) n=1006*




This result of the survey shows that the audience returned to traditional media in search of more credible and relevant information in times of crisis. Even other international studies, like Reuters Digital News Report (Newman, 2020) or EBU study (Media Intelligence service, 2020) show that the beginning of the pandemic was a moment of extremely high consumption when TV news programs were reaching record viewership. Another EBU study also states that only some weeks later, there was a decrease in news consumption and certain fatigue with the news related to the Covid crisis (Baekdal, 2020).

There are two terms that are often mentioned in relation to news consumption. News fatigue and News avoidance. News avoiders are considered to be the people who have decided that news was no longer valuable and decided to cut it from their lives while news fatigue shows that people are tired of the news they are getting but didn't give up on the news. In recent years researchers and scientists have been looking for an answer to the question – why do young people avoid news? The research so far has not yet defined what is meant by this, and what news is being avoided by those who consider themselves *news avoiders* (De Bruin et al. 2021). According to Jurlab's survey the main reason why people in Croatia avoid news – either consciously or sometimes unconsciously, is that they think that the news is too negative. They perceive news as being responsible for encouraging quarrels and tensions in society. Also, citizens seem to resent the

media for not addressing topics that they personally find important and therefore the news is not relevant to them.

Figure 3: *Reasons behind News Avoidance; Study of Media Perception: What does the audience want? (Perišin et al. 2021.) n=1006*



The Jourlab study also shows that Croatian citizens have low trust in journalists as a profession with less than 25 percent of the general population stating that they trust journalists and even lower trust (19.3%) among the young population (18-29). Traditionally politicians in general scored the lowest score in trust among all professions but there is a strong correlation between trust in journalists and trust in politicians – those citizens who do not trust politicians, do not trust journalists. This points to the fact that journalists in Croatia are perceived as being a part of the same media-political elite (Perišin et.al.,2021) and negative relation towards politics and the political system is reflected in the audience's relation towards media.

When researching what was the role of the media in the Covid-19 crisis, the Jourlab study showed that there is a strong divide in Croatian society between those who think that the media helped them to better understand the Covid-19 crisis and those who think that the media contributed to creating confusion in the public. According to the first group, the media provided them with information on how to behave during the COVID-19 crisis, while the others felt that the media exaggerated in describing the seriousness of the crisis (Perišin et al. 2021).

The survey on the public perception of the news content and its results was a starting point for the further study of news media content. The second phase of the research was focused on media content: we wanted to study the media itself further. Using quantitative analysis, this study examines headlines on front pages and television news as a primary news point of contact between media and the audience.

3. METHODOLOGY

The empirical survey conducted as part of this study included 78 front pages of the three largest daily newspapers in Croatia (*Večernji list*, *Jutarnji list* and *24sata*) and 78 headline segments from three national television news programs (*Dnevnik HRT*, *Dnevnik NovaTV*, *RTL Danas*). The survey covers headlines of both newspapers and television news programmes of 26 dates from 2020. in the period from February to April and October to December. In total 3 to 4 dates of each month were selected, and those dates represent a deliberate sample considering the crisis events that have marked the world and Croatia's everyday life, namely the global Covid-19 pandemic and the already mentioned devastating earthquake that hit Zagreb. The dates of chosen newspapers corresponded with television news, meaning that evening news and the next morning paper were analysed. Those dates were selected as peak periods when the most relevant information related to the mentioned events came to the public, and the aim of the research was to analyse and compare the front pages of newspapers and TV news headline segments and to determine the specifics of reporting in the period of pandemic and earthquake.

As mentioned earlier, this research was conducted as part of Jourlab project at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. For this quantitative content analysis research team was divided into two groups, one analysing newspapers and the other analysing television news programs. After the initial design of this research, a single matrix with variables applicable both to front pages of newspapers and headline segments was created by the research team and the following research questions were asked:

What are the specifics and key differences between newspaper and television headlines?

What topics are dominant in headlines?

To what extent are headlines informative, sensationalist and conflictual?

Are headlines predominantly positive or negative?

What are the specific linguistic elements that try to attract the readers'/viewers' attention?

To answer the research questions asked, the very structure of newspaper covers and television headlines was analysed first, namely, how many topics were headlined on the front pages and in the television headline section. In total 292 units from newspapers and 342 units from television were analysed. Individual units for newspaper headlines consisted of the supertitle, title and subtitle of a single headlined topic and the following graphic equipment – an image, a montage, or a graph. The television headline unit consisted of a single topic in a series of headlined events that day consisting of the anchor's voice-over, edited video footage and overlay graphics with a caption of the following news segment.

After determining the dominant topic of the headlines, the study tries to identify if the analysed headlines contain news or information. It is evident that one headline cannot give answers to all the key journalism questions 5W and How, but we looked deeply if the headline answers at least to some of the key questions like – Who, What and Where? To what extent do headlines give information or convey actual news to the audience rather than just attract the audience to buy their newspapers or stay with their programme. Television headlines, unlike print headlines, have a certain time distance from the news item they are referring to. In printed media, readers are forced to be selective, and a headline on the front page provides necessary clues for readers to choose which items or stories to read. Broadcast headlines, on the other hand, need to be both self-sufficient and, at the same time, project interest in the upcoming programme. As Montgomery and Fang put it "headlines, highlight or even dramatize, often in the supplement, aspects of the news value of the item, whether this be contrast, conflict, the voices of the powerful or the unexpectedness of event" (Montgomery and Feng, 2016: 517).

The research also included questions about whether the headlined topic was value-positive or negative, and to what extent, which shows the approach to the topic itself – whether the negative or positive aspects of the topic in the headlines are emphasized, and this often indicates the editorial policy of the media. This aspect is extremely important in emergencies and crises. Furthermore, overemphasizing the negative in times of crisis can lead to an additional spread of panic, but also moral panic (Cohen, 1972) while value-positive announcements can help calm audiences.


In this analysis, we also examined whether headlines have sensational elements. Gordana Vilović, explaining sensationalism, quotes Marvin Kalba, who

defined tabloidity as "degrading relevant news and giving importance to information about sex, scandals and entertainment" (Watson and Hill, 2000:307, according to Vilović, 2003:960). Hrnjić-Kuduzovic, meanwhile, conveys an understanding of sensationalism as McQuail sees it. "We understand sensationalism here in a broader sense as all forms of media representation of reality that deviate from the ideal of objectivity" (McQuail, 1994:255, according to Hrnjić-Kuduzović, 2016:54).


To obtain as a comprehensive overview as possible of the presentation of headlined topics in both media the analysis also included questions about whether linguistic enhancers were used, which would further highlight the headlines and cause the desired effect, be it further attracting attention or provoking a reaction, e.g., emotional.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The first thing to note when discussing the results of this comparison of front pages and television headline sections is that the total daily number of headlines vary in number depending on the media. In the mentioned period *Večernji list* has the most headlined news on the front pages (between 2 to even 7 headlines per day were recorded), while the lowest number of headlines has *24sata* (1 to a maximum of 4 headlines per day), and which in most cases had 2 front page headlines. Unlike most tabloids, which have a larger number of headlines on the front page, *24sata* concentrated on fewer headlines, very often on only one or two. On television, the number of headlines varies from 4 to 6. Where HRT has a strict policy of 4 main headlines per day, *Nova TV* has 5, where the last headline is usually reserved for sports and *RTL*'s number of headlines varies between 5 and 6 headlines per day. In more than 75 percent of the television headlines slotted on the first spot, Covid-19 was a dominant topic. All topics related to the earthquake were categorized under the "Environmental disasters" category and were most represented in the number 3 slot, often dealing with the topic of the aftermath of the earthquake, reparation efforts, etc.

Figure 4: *Television Headline slots 1-4 with dominant topics (n=342)*

When analysing television headlines further, there seemed to be an editorial difference between two commercial stations - RTL and Nova TV and a public broadcaster HRT. While each of the headlines on HRT contained a single topic, or event which was then usually covered in the main news program by a single news item or rather form of TV reporting – tv package, live coverage, interview, etc., the headlines on the commercial television stations more often had multiple topics announced in a single headline which was later covered by several news items or even a whole thematic block. This was especially evident in the early days of the pandemic when multiple news from around the world were combined with domestic news to accommodate the influx of Covid-19-related news.

Figure 5: *Dominant topics - Newspapers and television (n=292 + 342)*


Comparing both front pages and television headlines it can be seen clearly that the most common topic in all three print editions and on all three analysed prime-time news was COVID-19, which is the pandemic. This was expected and more evident in the analysed television headlines where more than 35 percent of all analysed headlines Covid-19 was the main topic in the analysed period. This can be misleading as Covid-19 was even more present in the media because other topics, like economy, local domestic policy and even natural disasters like the earthquake were more often related to, or in the context of COVID-19. A broader study conducted by the same research team on the Jourlab project, which included the analysis of every individual news item that was headlined during the first pandemic year of 2020, showed that more than 64 percent of all topics were covered in the context of Covid-19 (Blažević, Perišin, Oblak, 2022). Similarly, the same study showed that 9 percent of all the headlined news in 2020 were covered in the context of the earthquake. However, the coverage was dominant in the period after the earthquake, after 22nd March and the following months.

The second most prominent topic differs between prime-time television news and newspaper headlines. While newspapers focus on crime, television headlines tend to focus more on topics related to national domestic policy e.g., government, policymaking, parliament, etc. With both compared media sharing similar interest toward Economy, Industry and Entrepreneurship in the headlined topics, newspapers, in general, have more tendency to put forward topics which we categorized as “Oddity / Bizarre” due to relatively large share of such topics on the covers of analysed 24sata. Perhaps surprisingly, both newspaper and television headlines have a relatively low share of news related to "Foreign policy" (Vanjska politika) which included news from the region, European Union, and the world.


Those topics were represented in respected media outlets but from the editorial perspective, they were rarely seen worth headlining.

When analysing to what extent are headlines informative, we found out that there is a difference between newspapers and television in whether the news is contained in the headlines. Due to the inherently more self-sufficient nature of television headlines (Montgomery and Feng, 2016:515), results do show that television headlines are to some extent more informative and in the majority of cases (86.5%) answer to at least three basic news questions – Who? What? Where?


Figure 6: *Do headlines contain news?* (n=292 + 342)



When analysing the difference between two media – newspapers and television primetime news, the results of the study show that there is less difference between the three television news programs and their editorial practices than among the editorial practices related to the headlines in the 3 daily newspapers where the difference is much more present. Jutarnji list (70%) and Večernji list (69%) tend to have more informative headlines than 24sata (57.1%).

Figure 7. *Headlines containing news; Individual media (n=292 + 342)*

When considering the reasons for news avoidance among the general population, the perception that news is negative and that they encourage quarrels and tensions in society comes into the spotlight as the main reason for either consciously or unconsciously avoiding news. Therefore, another aspect we were interested in this study was the value orientation of the headlines, which we categorized into three possible outcomes – predominantly positive, predominantly negative, neither positive nor negative, or both positive and negative. This last category was introduced as sometimes headlines had no clear positive-negative value attached to them and in other instances, headlines had both value-positive and value-negative features. For example: “While medical staff working at Covid departments is completely exhausted wearing protective suits, in Rijeka’s hospital they have found a solution – they’ve created their own virtual doctor” (Nova TV, 14.11.2020.) or “Four victims of coronavirus in Croatia today, 9 newly infected. In 16 counties yet, there are no new cases” (HRT, 27.4.2020.) That type of balance – “good news/bad news” appears more frequently on television headlines where almost half of all analysed headlines (48.2%) had neither positive nor negative or both positive and negative valued headlines with 32.6 percent of those types of headlines appearing in newspapers.

Figure 8: *Positive vs Negative news (n=292 + 342)*


On the other hand, television headlines had less significantly less predominantly value positive headlines with only 16.4 percent versus over 30.2 percent value positive headlines in newspapers during the analysed period. Predominantly value negative headlines appear as the most dominant type of headlines in newspapers (37.2%).

When looking at individual media outlets the two commercial tv channels Nova TV and RTL had “neutral” oriented news or good “news-bad news” editorial approach in over half of the analysed headlines while public broadcaster HRT had only 34% of such headlines. On the other hand, more value-negative headlined news was much more present on HRT (48.5%) than on RTL (30% and Nova TV (30.4%). The difference between value orientation of the headlines can directly be attributed to the editorial approach in presenting headlines both in the number of actual headlines and in the number of headlined news items. Where HRT has strictly 4 headlines and usually single news item focused on hard news, commercial news programmes have 5 or 6 headlines with each one being longer and highlighting multiple angles as well as multiple news items. In newspapers 24sata, had the most predominantly negative headlined news (51%), Jutarnji list had slightly more value negative than positive news and Večernji list had the most value-neutral headlines (45.6%). This difference can be best summarized by comparing the front pages from 25th and 26th of February 2020 when three analysed newspapers presented completely different narratives while reporting on the topic of Covid-19.

Figure 9. Front pages of *Jutarnji list*, *Večernji list* and *24sata*, 25.,26.2.2020.

While *Jutarnji list* on the 25th of February headlines “Panic engulfs Croatia”, *Večernji list* quotes a “soothing” statement by one of the leading Croatian scientists the day after with the words “Don't panic” dominating the front page. *24sata*, on the other hand, brings negative-value-oriented news about the ongoing problem of protective mask shortages with the title “50 kunas for one mask” displayed across the whole page. The same news is headlined on the front page of *Večernji list* on the same date at the bottom of the page with significantly less space dedicated to the problem and value-positive news dominating the front page. Comparing this “soothing” value-positive headline with *Jutarnji list* value-negative headline the day before we can see how *Večernji list* responded to the competing *Jutarnji list* editorial policy i.e., followed up the topic of panic by changing the narrative for its audience.


Following this perception that news encourages quarrels and tension in society (Perišin et. al.2021) we were interested in the presence of conflict in headlines. Conflict can be viewed as a clash between two opposite parties or two simultaneous but incompatible positions. Conflict entails newsworthiness and it serves “not only to dramatize individual events but also to provide overarching frames for organising diverse material” (Montgomery, 2007:7). Further Montgomery argues that in order to foreground the newsworthiness of the event, journalists tend to accentuate conflicts in the headlines (Montgomery and Feng, 2016:515).

Figure 10: *Are elements of conflict present in the headlined news? (n=292 + 342)*

While the most dominant type of conflict can be described as a clash between different opposing groups and parties there is also a conflict that can be exemplified by a "man versus nature" – where an out-of-the-ordinary or unexpected event clashes with groups or individuals. In the above graph we can see, perhaps surprisingly given the two crises which of the analysed period that the conflict is not prominent as a newsworthy component of headlines in Croatian media. In the analysed period we found that elements of conflict are present in 19% of newspaper headlines and 14.9% in television headlines.

When discussing the presence of sensationalism in the headlines, we must look at each media separately. While headlines containing elements of sensationalism were low, and almost uniform among television headlines, newspapers have greater differences between each media outlet. Večernji list had no headlines with elements of sensationalism in the analyzed period, Jutarnji list had them to a lesser extent (10.6%), while 24sata in most cases used sensational elements in headlines (as much as 63.3%).

Figure 11: *Does the headline contain elements of sensationalism - individual media outlets (n=292 + 342)*



As an example of sensationalism, one can single out the cover of 24sata (19.11.2020) in which the headline depicting a masked man translates as: “I’m going to war against the corona virus, and I am looking for a girlfriend”. Sensationalism is also manifested to present some news under the pretense of exclusivity when there is no exclusivity. An example is the demolition of the second tower of the Zagreb Cathedral which got damaged in the earthquake, which 24sata displays across almost an entire page and headlines it as exclusive information. On the same date (2.4.2020) the same information is on the front page of Večernji list with a significantly smaller space assigned to the news than 24sata, which demonstrates that the exclusivity of 24sata was false. On the same date, Večernji list dedicated most of the front page to the topic of Covid-19. It is this example that visibly shows a significant difference in the approach to editing with these two newspapers, which are both owned by the same media company. On television, like in newspapers, one of the most common editorial uses of sensationalism elements in headlines was the emphasis on exclusivity.

As for linguistic enhancers in the headlines we wanted to find out what types of linguistic elements are used to “enhance” headlined news. Our results show the three main groups of linguistic enhancers and a combination of 2 or more groups present both in newspapers and television headlines. First group, a single word such as "shocking", "alarming", "scandal", "affair". Those types of enhancers are common journalistic discourse, and their main goal is to accentuate the

newsworthiness of headlined news. The second group consists of the catchphrases such as "Record-breaking", "Black weekend", "New beginning" and word games in Croatian such as "Lijekova ni za lijek" (24sata, 21.10.2020). The third group includes deliberate use or even misuse of diacritics - !,?. This last group is more prevalent in newspaper headlines than on television, although significant use of diacritics is used in captions embedded into headlines which are used to summarize narrated headlines into a single sentence and are often heavy on linguistic enhancers. Similar to the results regarding the use of sensationalism, the use of linguistic enhancers on television is uniform across all three analysed news programs (around 20% of analysed headlines), but in newspapers, headlines tend to vary. Večernji list and Jutarnji list did not use enhancers in more than 80 percent of cases, while 24sata uses enhancers in more than 50 percent of the analysed headlines.

5. CONCLUSION

In this quantitative media analysis, we have seen the specifics of headlines in newspapers and on television in Croatian media during the peaks of pandemic reporting and the earthquake that hit Zagreb in 2020. While difficult to fully compare headlines on equal terms due to differences in headline design, structure, and form we can say that the headlines reflect the adapted role of the media in times of crisis. COVID-19 was unsurprisingly a dominant topic across all analysed media and even other topics were often reported in the context of the pandemic. There was a difference in the editorial selection of other topics between newspapers and television prime-time news but in both media, there is an apparent absence of topics such as international news (*Vanjska politika*) in headlined news with a strong focus on domestic affairs. By incorporating sufficient details of the news items to which they relate and with medium affordances of sound and vision, and sometimes even soundbites, television headlines have to some degree more informative value than their newspaper counterparts from the perspective of answering the basic journalistic questions.

At the same time, this quantitative media study to some extent aligns with the Jourlab's previous study of the perception of the media that the news is negative and encourages quarrels and tensions in society. In the analysed period there is less value-positive news than value-negative news present in the headlines in both media, although there is a significant presence of headlines with no attached value or both value-positive and value-negative characteristics. In that

regard, television headlines tend to be more balanced (neither positive nor negative) than newspaper headlines which tend to be on either end of the spectrum. There is, however, less accentuated conflict present in the headlines than the perception would suggest in both television and newspapers. There is a big difference among the three analysed newspaper outlets regarding sensationalism and the use of linguistic enhancers. Where Večernji list uses it the least, 24sata uses it extensively, television news headlines in all three national prime-time television newscasts tend to be uniform across all media outlets.

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AND QUIET FLOWS THE OB DISCOURSE OF THE RUSSIAN- UKRAINIAN WAR IN THE OB-UGRIC PRESS AND SOCIAL MEDIA

The aim of the paper is to describe the discourse discussing the events, consequences and attitudes concerning the Russian-Ukrainian War of 2022, created by the Khanty and Mansi users of social media pages. The paper also describes the situation of Ob-Ugric language use, the history of the Mansi, Khanty press, the pre-war model of Ob-Ugric peoples' digital discourses and use of the internet, and places the discourse of war and peace in the context of the communicative strategy of silence. The data on the Ob-Ugric discourse about the Russian-Ukrainian war were obtained via online observation on social media pages used in Khanty-Mansiysk, in two periods, first between 24th February - 9th May 2022, second between 21st September – 15th October 2022. According to the analysis of the result, we may conclude the Ob-Ugric users' silence concerning the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a deliberate choice of communicative strategy, fitting to the general model of the conflict-solving strategy of silence.

Key words: Mansi, Khanty, Russian-Ukrainian war, freedom of speech, silence

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of the paper is to introduce the Ob-Ugric discourse discussing the events, consequences, attitudes concerning the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The invasion is the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian war that started in 2014 with Russia's annexation of Crimea and Donbas. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has started on 24th February 2022. The ("partial") mobilisation of the military reservists in Russia started on 21st September 2022 by the announcement of Vladimir Putin. By 2nd October 2022 2,500 citizens were mobilised from the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (*Б Югре...*). The proportion of Mansi and Khanty mobilised is unknown, but on one hand the mobilisation's disastrous effects on the indigenous minority peoples is already clear (*Иди через лес*), on the other hand occasional reports about Ob-Ugric soldiers being mobilised (Артемьев

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2022), and eventually killed in combat (*На Украине погиб...*) are appearing in the Russian online media.

The outlets of Russian mass media were called upon to use exclusively Russian state resources already on the first day of the invasion, but “distributing unreliable information” about the “special operation” and the “discreditation” of the Russian army also became criminalised on 4th March 2022, providing imprisonment for up to 15 years and 5 years, respectively (Act N 32-ФЗ). The use of Facebook and Instagram became restricted the same day, while on 21st March 2021, as a reaction to Meta Platforms’ temporal lift of ban for call for violence against Russian in certain countries, at the request of the Russian state communications regulator Roskomnadzor, the Tverskoy District Court in Moscow pronounced Meta Platforms as extremist organisation (*Генеральной прокуратурой России...*).

The paper presents the situation of Ob-Ugric language use, the history of the Mansi, Khanty press, the pre-war model of Ob-Ugric peoples’ digital discourses and use of internet. The paper concentrates on the description of lack of discourse of war and peace and the possible explanations of remaining silent. The data used in present paper concerning the Khanty and Mansi language use were collected via participant observation during fieldwork in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (eight times between 2006 and 2019), while the data on online language use of the Ob-Ugric language use were conducted via online participation carried out on social media pages since 2012. The data on the Ob-Ugric discourse about the Russian-Ukrainian war were obtained via online observation in two periods, first between 24th February - 9th May 2022, second between 21st September – 15th October 2022.

2. MANSI AND KHANTY LANGUAGE USE

2.1. *The Ob-Ugric languages*

Mansi (by former exonym: Vogul) and Khanty (by former exonym: Ostyak), together known as the Ob-Ugric languages, are endangered indigenous Uralic languages, in minority position, spoken in Western Siberia, especially on the territory of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. According to the UNESCO categorisation (UNESCO 2011), the Ob-Ugric languages are endangered, while according to the EGIDS classification (Lewis and Simons 2010) most of the varieties of the Ob-Ugric languages are located between stages 7 and 8a. The digital vitality (c.f. Kornai 2013) of the Ob-Ugric languages is close to non-

existent. Although some of the speakers with native competence have digital skills as well, the speakers of the Ob-Ugric languages are absent from the majority of existing digital platforms, with the exception of the social media sites. Mansi and Khanty are not an official languages, neither at the regional nor the municipal level. According to Act N 89-03, passed on 4th December, 2001, by the Duma of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, the authorities of the Okrug provide a social, economic, and legal protection of the languages of indigenous peoples living in the Autonomous Okrug (Act N 89-03).

2.1.1. Demographic data

The demographic processes characterizing the Mansi and Khanty languages are quite different from the tendencies observed among other Uralic language-speaking communities. Since 1926, the first census carried out in the territory of the whole Soviet Union, the size of the ethnic groups' population has been constantly rising, while the number of speakers, oscillating until 1970, started to quickly decrease and continue to do so ever since (for the Mansi data see Table 1, for the Khanty data see Table 2).

	1959	1970	1979	1989	2002	2010
Mansi population	6,318	7,609	7,434	8,279	11,432	12,269
Speakers of the Mansi language	~ 3,820	~4,040	3,742	3,184	2,746	938
Ratio of the Mansi population living in urban settlements				45.6%	51.8%	57.3%

Table 1. *The census data of those declaring themselves to be of Mansi ethnicity, to speak Mansi, and the ratio of Mansi population living in urban settlements (1959-2010).*

Paying attention to the data of the two censuses carried out after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the decreasing numbers of Mansi and Khanty speakers are even more prominent. Regarding the data available on the ratio of Mansi and Khanty populations living in urban type of settlements compared to the total population, the growing importance of the urban population is visible.

	1959	1970	1979	1989	2002	2010
Khanty population	19,410	21,138	20,934	22,521	28,678	30,943
Speakers of the Khanty language	~14,946	~14,564	~14,193	~13,625	13,568	9,584
Ratio of the Khanty population living in urban settlements				29.8%	34.6%	38.4%

Table 2. *The census data of those declaring themselves to be of Khanty ethnicity, to speak Khanty, and the ratio of Khanty population living in urban settlements (1959-2010).*

In the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, according to the 2010 census, the largest ethnic group was the Russians (68.1% of the population), 7.6% of the district's population was Tatar, 6.4% were Ukrainian, and 1.8% were Azerbaijani (Census RF 2010 7). While the Mansi form only 0.72%, the Khanty form 1.24% of the population of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, their proportion is twice as high in the city of Khanty-Mansiysk, where the Ob-Ugric peoples together give 3.7% of the population.

2.3 Mansi and Khanty language use

The Ob-Ugric languages are not used as the language of jurisdiction, and no laws, regulations and administrative provisions are published in Mansi or Khanty, except for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN's Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Short summaries of the regional directives in Mansi and Kazym Khanty are regularly published in the Mansi newspaper *Luima Seripos* and the Khanty newspaper *Khanty Yasang*. The Ob-Ugric languages are also absent from public transport and official public signage. Mansi and Khanty have extremely limited economic significance. They play a marginal role in the business sphere or the labour market. The Khanty language has slightly higher prestige than Mansi, but it is true for both languages that speaking or understanding Mansi or Khanty does not provide any advantage in working positions unconnected to the Ob-Ugric languages or cultures.

Although the use of the Ob-Ugric languages is of course closely connected to the speakers' proficiency, there are several other factors influencing the language choice, such as the participants, the situation, the topic of discourse, and the function of interaction (c.f. Grosjean 1984: 135-143). When referring to the topics of discussion, the respondents mentioned no preference, they stated that they could converse about any kind of topic. To appoint the persons whom they would address only in their indigenous mother tongue, but not in Russian, one

respondent mentioned the Ob-Ugric gods and spirits. Perhaps in connection with religious practices and ritual taboos, the Mansi and Khanty native speakers prefer to use their mother tongue when speaking or writing about various illnesses and their treatments, certain crimes, and family secrets, often of a sexual nature.

3. HISTORY OF THE OB-UGRIC INTERNET

3.1. *External resources*

The first webpage in Mansi and Khanty was created by Finnish researchers in 2010, it displayed the history of the early Finnish researchers investigating the Mansi language and culture at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. The page used many pictures (comics) and few texts. This page remained the only online content in the Ob-Ugric languages for a few years, without any followers among the Mansi, Khanty or non-Ob-Ugric users.

Regarding the DLDP Scale for Digital Language Vitality (Ceberio et al 2018), the situation of Mansi and Khanty digital vitality is most typical for the Emergent Level, since Ob-Ugric languages definitely enjoy only limited technical support, having fonts (designed in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug) and keyboard layout (designed in Norway), a few digital language resources (e.g. in the case of Mansi, c.f. Horváth et al 2017), and the languages are used first and foremost on social media pages. Mansi definitely aspires to move on to the Developing Level, as basic electronic resources and machine translation are in the making, but no such news is published about any variety of the Khanty language.

3.2. *Mansi and Khanty users*

Access to the internet spread in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, especially in cities and larger settlements by the late 2000s. Since web 1.0 media sites have been offering neither content in Ob-Ugric languages, nor the possibility to fill this absence, the Ob-Ugric users and the content created by them either in Russian and especially in the Ob-Ugric languages were to be found typically on various sites of social media (to a lesser extent on Facebook, more generally on its Russian equivalent VK.com).

The internet users and content creators of Ob-Ugric background started to appear in growing numbers since the 2010s. Not only urban representatives of the indigenous minorities with extra-community connections but also speakers and heritage language speakers from almost every Mansi and Khanty settlement of the

Okrug registered to the social media pages by the end of the decade. The shared content became thematically diverse, the self-made content created by the Ob-Ugric users was closely connected to the expression of the users' ethnic identity, the most popular topics were family life, traditional lifestyle and ethnic sport. The users preferred to post photos or short texts, to their personal accounts or thematical mini-groups.

3.3. Web2.0 in the time of the pandemic

The relatively calm and predictable internet use of the Khanty and Mansi people underwent a drastic change during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021. Besides the presence of the previously dominating middle-aged native and heritage speakers, many new users registered on the social media platforms, including the urban representatives of the national intelligentsia as well as a large number of rural users, and children. Institutions with the Ob-Ugric profile started to run their official page, also online shops and other new services appeared. Many unprecedented genres started to flourish in this period, including for example the presentation of researchers' scientific legacies and scientific projects, as well as performers of Ob-Ugric popular music and grassroots initiatives aiming to revitalise the Ob-Ugric languages.

4. DISCOURSE OF WAR AND PEACE IN RUSSIAN

4.1. Institutions with Ob-Ugric profile

The online discourse strategy of the cultural institution of Ob-Ugric relevance concerning the Russo-Ukrainian war shows great differences between urban and rural settings. Among the institutions of Khanty-Mansiysk, once again contrast can be observed between institutions of regional importance that operate only departments working with the Ob-Ugric cultures, and some of those institutions that completely focus on the Ob-Ugric peoples. The online presence of the majority of the museums and other cultural institutions of Khanty-Mansiysk, such as e.g. the Museum of Human and Nature anthropological museum, or the Torum Maa open-air museum, does not differ from the pre-war practice, except for the institutions' inactivity on Facebook and Instagram. These institutions do not feature any reference to war, mobilisation, or special operation, and do not allude to the emerging trends of cultural policy, such as imperial or Soviet nostalgia, either.

The entirely Ob-Ugric institutions show greater affinity towards the official narrative concerning the Russian attack on Ukraine. The rural museums, libraries and educational and cultural institutions located in smaller Mansi or Khanty settlements often feature profiles or cover images containing the symbol "Z" or the ribbon of St. George in their profile on VK.com. Although they do not mention the war explicitly in their posts, they emphasise patriotism and Russian (*росси́йский*, a citizen of Russia, as opposed to *русский*, ethnic Russian) identity. The number and intensity of federally designed events, organised for the visitors of these institutions, is higher than in previous years, both in the case of reoccurring memorials, such as e.g. the Victory Day (9th May) or the Day of National Unity (4th November), as well as revitalised Soviet holidays, such as e.g. the Pioneers' Day (19th May). The completely Ob-Ugric institutions of Khanty-Mansiysk, on the other hand, such as the Ob-Ugric Research Institute or the Lylyng Soyum Centre, have been leaving their social media profiles unaltered, while the employees of these institutions attended the local parade supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine, or, as in the case of the Ob-Ugric Theatre, participated in the federal flash mob campaign in which the representatives of various (especially indigenous) ethnic groups support the "special operation". Although these events were organised offline, the photos and videos recorded during the events were presented in the online sphere.

4.2 Ob-Ugric public figures

The Khanty and Mansi form only a small proportion of the population of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and hardly a larger proportion of the population of its capital, Khanty-Mansiysk. Although the region and the city are economically important subjects of the Russian Federation, in other aspects they are rather marginal. Thus the number of public figures living in the Okrug is not very high, and the proportion of Ob-Ugric public figures is even smaller, there are only a handful of Khanty and Mansi individuals who could be regarded as public figures by the Ob-Ugrians or the majority community.

In the case of observing the Ob-Ugric public figures' viewpoint about the Russo-Ukrainian war, the possible definitions of being a public figure would have a merely symbolic significance, since only a couple of Khanty or Mansi leaders decided to express their (supportive) opinion. Two of the known announcements were declared in an interview situation, by elderly local academic researchers, at least one of whom has been known as a notorious supporter of Putin's politics well before the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The only prominent public figure,

holding both local esteem and international fame, who decided to participate in the discourse about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, was the Khanty writer and politician Yeremey Aypin. In February 2022, days before the start of the invasion, he actively propagated the charity movement collecting donations for the Donbas Region, supporting the motto “We don’t leave people behind” (*Своих не бросаем*, implicating that the Russian Federation is supporting its own subjects and citizens when providing humanitarian help in the occupied regions). On 23rd February 2022, among 500 other writers, Aypin also signed an open statement that appeared in the Russian cultural-political newspaper *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, arguing that Russia has never initiated war throughout history and that the aim of the “special operation” is achieving peace. On 12th March 2022 Aypin announced on Facebook that because of the allegedly Russophobic nature of the Meta Platforms he was abandoning his accounts on Facebook and Instagram. Ever since he has been active only on VK.com, posting almost exclusively about various conferences, congresses, and other non-political gatherings.

4.3. Individual users

In the short period of relative freedom of speech between 24th February and 4th March, the communication of individual Khanty and Mansi users on the social media pages represented a great variety of opinions. Some users were actively supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine, sharing not only the mainstream but also more radical propaganda, while others were overtly or symbolically demanding peace and condemning the war. By 12th March 2022, all the Ob-Ugric users of Facebook and Instagram bid farewell to the Meta Platforms, inviting their followers to join VK.com or Telegram. However, their activity on their VK.com and, particularly, Telegram accounts has never reached the density of interactions in the abandoned platforms. Almost immediately after the official ban of Meta platforms, most of the previous users tried to return to using VPN tools, but the frequency of their appearance on Facebook or Instagram became more and more seldom.

4.4. Mansi and Khanty press

While individual Ob-Ugric social media users, including public figures, and even institutions may remain silent about the war if they decide to do so, the Ob-Ugric press is still obliged to provide information to some extent on the latest

news concerning the community. Khanty Mansi Mir, the Russian-speaking site² of the united Ob-Ugric editorial board of the only regularly appearing Mansi and Khanty newspapers of the Okrug managed to provide relatively balanced reports about the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, until 4th March 2022 the site published occasional reports and articles, quoting not only the official propaganda and interviewees supporting it, but also critical voices, even to the extent of reporting about people openly condemning the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Starting from 4th March 2022 the site basically ceased to write about the armed conflict in any way, neither the war, the invasion, or the "special operation", nor the names of separatist republics of the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic were mentioned. This tendency was not changed even after the start of the mobilisation, the only article mentioning the newest phase of the war tells the readers about the possibility to complain about malfeasance concerning the mobilisation. Reports about the mobilisation, and even about the death of Khanty or Mansi soldiers are missing from the site. In the observed period, no news written in Mansi or Khanty about the war appeared in the Ob-Ugric newspapers.

5. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SILENCE IN SIBERIA

Silence as a linguistic or cultural phenomenon has already been a category of the research of the indigenous peoples of Western Siberia for decades, and recently it became an important independent research subject as well, as, e.g. in the case of Laptander's dissertation on the significance and functions of silence in Tundra Nenets discourse and storytelling (Laptander 2021). Although part of the cultural anthropological research of the Vasyugan river, it is Nagy's (2021) description of the Ob-Ugric peoples' silence that brings us closest to understand the lack of reactions concerning an event affecting the Ob-Ugric peoples' life in the most direct way. Nagy states that indigenous peoples of Western Siberia have known to prefer the problem-solving strategy of remaining silent instead of open confrontation (Nagy 2021: 195-196). In the same analysis, besides the communicative and cultural role of silence, Nagy also refers to the significance of unequal power relations that have been present in the region since the Russian conquest of Siberia, and more notably since Soviet times.

² <https://khanty-yasang.ru/news>

“Another important reason for the lack of conflicts, according to Stämmeler, is the sense of collectiveness among the local population. The basis of this collective feeling was the creation of the ideology of the “Soviet man” during the Soviet period, which, based on the ideology of common interests, common sufferings, and patriotism, proved to be quite successful. The post-Soviet manifestation of this is the ideology of “Rossiyanin”, a supra-ethnic national feeling built on belonging to Russia, which is able to place one's own interests behind the interests of the community and the national economy, or rather, it is able to make the state's interests appear as one's own interests. As a result, even the local elite often considers it justified and acceptable to sideline their own interests, while debating the state's regards is a morally dubious strategy even for them, which could only lead to their downfall. Furthermore, the state has tools to accommodate and cover up any conflicts that may arise, using its position of power to sooner or later assert its will (...) and to silence possible opposition through its direct control of the media; or rather to repress, to liquidate problems by crude, but hidden methods and force” (Nagy 2021: 196).

As a result of the sensitive nature of the research question, as well as the political and technical difficulties of communication, it is regrettably impossible to carry out interviews with Ob-Ugric social media users about their attitudes and strategies of being silent. Given the more than a decade long history of Ob-Ugric users being present and creating content in the digital sphere, as well as the flourishing digital discourse emerging during the pandemic and abruptly vanishing in weeks after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, presumably it is not farfetched to conclude that the unexpected silence of the Mansi and Khanty users of the social media platforms is the result of the users' conscious decision. Since the start of the silent period more or less concur with the introduction of new Russian laws sanctioning negative opinion or information in connection with the war, as well as the use of certain social media platforms, it is natural to assume that it has been the Russo-Ukrainian war that lies behind the decision. Since the users indicate their presence on the social media pages by posting politically neutral photos of themselves, but not only the openly critical remarks, but largely the communication supporting the war and state propaganda in general are missing from the digital domain of language use, the users supposedly have negative attitudes towards the topic. The lack of news about the war and its consequences, published by the Ob-Ugric press in Russian or especially in any of the Ob-Ugric languages seem to support this conclusion as well.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Mansi and Khanty, the Ob-Ugric languages are endangered indigenous languages spoken in Western Siberia, with a limited range of domains of language use. The representatives of the Ob-Ugric peoples started to use social media pages in large numbers in the 2010s and developed a flourishing online sphere of language use and the expression of ethnic identity during the COVID-19 pandemic, characterised by a large number of new only trends and genres, as well as the online collaboration of native speakers and heritage speakers of the Mansi and Khanty languages.

This Covid-time prosperity was halted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when only a handful of users actively discussed their support or objection towards the war and ceased completely after 4th March 2022 by the criminalisation of free expression of opinion. Ever since, individual users and institutions of the Ob-Ugric profile are neglecting the topic of the invasion completely, while the Ob-Ugric press occasionally reports about the consequences of the invasion in Russian, it did not publish a single sentence about the invasion in Mansi or Khanty.

The patterns of offline language use prove that Ob-Ugric speakers are willing and capable of discussing traumatic and taboo topics in Khanty and Mansi. The Covid-time bloom of Ob-Ugric use of the social media pages proves that Khanty and Mansi users had both the intention and the competence to express their opinion in the online sphere, in Russian as well as in the Ob-Ugric languages. The users' occasional and apolitical online activity proves that they are still active and present on social media platforms, including the ones banned in Russia. Taking these phenomena into consideration we may conclude the Ob-Ugric users' silence concerning the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a deliberate choice of communicative strategy, fitting to the general model of the conflict-solving strategy of silence, largely motivated by the unequal distribution of political power between the state and the indigenous minorities.

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PREDSTAVLJANJE RATA U UKRAJINI: ANALIZA DISKURSA TELEVIZIJSKIH VESTI

Predmet istraživanja ovog rada jeste diskursno predstavljanje rata u Ukrajini u televizijskim centralnim informativnim emisijama. Oslanjajući se na koncept reprezentacije i metode kritičke analize diskursa cilj rada bio je da se utvrde dominantne diskursne strategije pomoću kojih su se u televizijskim vestima *Radio-televizije Srbije* i kablovske televizije *N1* identifikovali glavni aspekti (uzroci i posledice) i akteri rata (direktni i indirektni), kao i da se sagledaju načini na koje slične ili različite reprezentacije konstruisane određenim ideologijama mogu eksplicitno ili implicitno uticati i oblikovati percepciju gledalaca.

Ključne reči: reprezentacija, rat u Ukrajini, kritička analiza diskursa, televizijske vesti, Srbija

1. UVOD

Polazeći sa stanovišta da masovni mediji imaju moć da oblikuju percepciju javnosti i utiču na razumevanje onoga što se događa kako u njihovim društvima tako i u širem globalnom kontekstu, ovaj rad istražuje načine jezičke reprezentacije izveštavanja o početku rata u Ukrajini – njegovim glavnim aspektima (uzroci i posledice) i akterima (direktni i indirektni) u televizijskim vestima. Uloga masovnih medija u ratnim sukobima smatra se relevantnom temom u akademskim raspravama budući da mediji predstavljaju važnu kariku „između onih koji direktno učestvuju u ratu i onih koji su u njega uključeni indirektno ili koji osećaju njegove posledice” (Lakić 2010: 276). Istorijska perspektiva nam pokazuje da se tokom svakog sukoba istovremeno „vode dva odvojena rata, fizički rat i rat koji se prenosi, filtrira i pakuje za medijske konzumente” (Volčić, Džihana 2011: 24). Delujući unutar različitih konteksta – društvenih, političkih, kulturnih i istorijskih, masovni mediji podržavaju određene ideologije, političke stavove i mišljenja u interpretiranju događaja konstruišući predstave koje, ako se ne čitaju kritički, mogu imati manipulativne efekte i navesti publiku da prihvati ono što se

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predstavlja kao slika stvarnosti. U kriznim uslovima, kada su mehanizmi kontrole političkih i vojnih struktura informacija veliki, a sloboda medija ograničena, publika je još više „osetljiva na manipulativne apele” (McQuail 1994: 33), što može imati negativne posledice, kako pokazuju brojni primeri iz prošlosti.

Zadržati neutralnost jedan je od najvećih izazova u izveštavanju o sukobima, jer principi verodostojnosti i etičnosti mogu biti lako narušeni ne samo u načinu prikupljanja i selekciji informacija već i na nivou njihove reprezentacije ili prilikom posredovanja pri informisanju. Jedan od postupaka koji dovodi do pristrasnog predstavljanja odvija se kroz jezičku manipulaciju, prilikom koje „novinari, svesno ili ne, iskorištavaju lingvistička sredstva, upotrebljavajući gramatičke konstrukcije ili leksičke izbore kako bi manipulirali mišljenjem ljudi” (Iwamoto, 1995: 58 prema Moustafa 2013: 4). Da bi se ona razotkrila, neophodno je dubinsko tumačenje medijskih tekstova, njihove strukture, rečenika i skrivenih poruka. Za takvu vrstu ispitivanja podesna je diskurzivna analiza koja, najšire rečeno, proučava upotrebu jezika u kontekstu, jer „značenje koje istraživač pronalazi neizbežno će odražavati izbor konteksta u okviru koga se korišćeni jezik – diskurs – proučava” (Kolsto 2008: 14–15). Rad se oslanja na Ferklafov (Fairclough 1995) pristup kritičkoj analizi diskursa kao opštem teorijskom okviru za analizu reprezentacije u medijskom izveštavanju, dok se u postupku tumačenja nalaza tekstualne analize oslanja na van Dejkov (Van Dijk 1998, 2006) pristup analizi stavova i ideologija u medijskom diskursu. Za razliku od većine studija fokusiranih na analizu medija koji pripadaju jednoj od strana direktno uključenih u rat, ovo istraživanje u fokusu ima medije koji ne pripadaju nijednoj od strana, ali su određenim kontekstualnim faktorima indirektno povezani sa akterima sukoba.

2. KONTEKSTUALNI OKVIR

Rat u Ukrajini, kao posledica veoma kompleksnih istorijskih, identitetskih i geopolitičkih okolnosti, doveo je do najozbiljnije krize na tlu Evrope u 21. veku i do najveće zategnutosti globalnih odnosa od kraja Hladnog rata. Prethodio mu je niz napetih događaja koji su se odvijali krajem 2013. godine (blokada procesa početka integracije u Evropsku Uniju u ukrajinskom parlamentu, evromajdanske demonstracije i nasilje na ulicama Kijeva, smena proruski orijentisanog predsednika Viktora Janukoviča i dr.) i koji su početkom 2014. godine doveli do oružane pobune i rata u Donbasu, ruske vojne intervencije, te referendumu i pripajanja Krima Rusiji. Genezu krize pratila je i umešanost Zapada. Nameru širenja NATO alijanse na istok (Ukrajina i Gruzija) ruske vlasti tumačile su kao

pokušaj ugrožavanja svojih interesa i slabljenje pozicija u geopolitičkom nadmetanju sa Zapadom, dok je Zapad njihove postupke u Ukrajini predstavljao kao imperijalističke težnje.

Vesti o ulasku ruskih vojnih trupa na teritoriju Ukrajine, 24. februara 2022. godine, o razaranju i žrtvama, humanitarnoj krizi, razmerama odgovora Zapada na rusku agresiju, strahu od potencijalne opasnosti aktiviranja nuklearnog naoružanja, kao i o ekonomskim posledicama u vidu inflacije, nestašica hrane i energenata, postale su udarna tema svih globalnih i lokalnih medija u narednim danima i mesecima. Međutim, medijska slika rata već je u prvim danima bila konfuzna. Brojni mediji, ali i različiti glasovi iz onlajn sfere doprinosili su toj slici. Od običnih građana, preko novinara, aktivista, do političara i vojske, svi su se utrkiivali „da dokumentuju užase rata u realnom vremenu” (Eddy, Fletcher 2022). U kakofoniji informacija našao se veliki broj lažnih i montiranih fotografija, kao i video-zapisa poput scena iz popularnih filmova i serija, čak i video-igara, a neke od njih su hakerskim sajberaktivnostima podmetane i na sajtove zvaničnih medija. U hibridnom ratu² između Rusije i Ukrajine na meti su bili državni sajtovi na obe strane, nalozi na društvenim mrežama, kao i mediji za koje su hakeri procenjivali da šire „dezinformacije”. Nekoliko dana nakon početka rata, u svim evropskim zemljama zabranjeni su ruski državni mediji³, a u Rusiji su, pak, ugašeni globalni mediji, za koje je rusko rukovodstvo procenilo da šire propagandu⁴.

Početak rata u Ukrajini bio je dominantna tema i u srpskim medijima, kao što je bio slučaj i izveštavanjem o događajima 2013/2014. godine. Naime, studija koja se bavila kvantitativnom analizom izveštavanja medija o početku krize u Ukrajini 2013/14. godine u 13 evropskih zemalja pokazala je da je srpska štampa objavila najveći broj članaka tokom referenduma u istočnoj Ukrajini (30,3%, dok je prosek svih zemalja bio 24%). Ovaj nalaz autori su tumačili 'pripitomljavanjem' u lokalni kontekst, odnosno uticajem istorijskog konteksta i mogućeg prepoznavanja sličnosti s raspadom Jugoslavije (Fengler et al. 2020: 409).

² Pojam *hibridni rat* spominje se od 2007. godine, ali precizna definicija još nije usaglašena. NATO ga definiše kao „kombinaciju upotrebe konvencionalnog i nekonvencionalnog, regularnog i neregularnog, informacionog i sajber ratovanja”, čiji je cilj plasiranje dezinformacija kako bi se narušila veza države i njenih građana i pripremio teren za nemire (Van Puyvelde 2015).

³ Evropski savet doneo je 2. marta odluku da se obustavi emitovanje *Sputnjika* i *Raša tudej*.

⁴ Rusija je 4. marta blokirala više sajtova, uključujući *Radio Slobodna Evropa*, *BBC* i *Dojčevele*. Ograničen je i pristup društvenim mrežama *Fejsbuk* i *Tviter* i prodavnicama aplikacija *Epl* (*Apple*) i *Gugl* (*Google*).

Aktuelni rezultati monitoringa, koji je sprovedla organizacija CRTA⁵, pokazuju da su se prorežimski mediji u Srbiji otvoreno stavili na stranu „bratske Rusije”, koju su označili kao žrtvu, dok su Zapad – konkretno Ameriku i NATO, videli kao agresora i glavnog krivca za rat u Ukrajini. Naklonjenost Rusiji uočena je kroz plasiranje dezinformacija u tabloidima i pozivanje na ruske državne izvore na prorežimskim televizijama. Imajući u vidu širi kontekst, a naročito veoma kompleksan lokalni kontekst u Srbiji koji karakteriše niz specifičnih faktora: od aktuelnih geopolitičkih, ekonomskih, preko društveno-političkih zbivanja u zemlji (predizborni period, nerešen status Kosova, evropske integracije, specifični politički, ekonomski i kulturni odnosi sa Rusijom itd.) do duboke polarizacije društva, kao i medija, čije uređivačke politike karakterišu dihotomija političko-ideoloških matrica i zatvorenost za stavove i perspektive onog Drugog, cilj ovog rada bio je da se istraže reprezentacije u jeziku televizijskih vesti o ratu u Ukrajini i da se sagleda kako te slične ili različite reprezentacije konstruisane određenim ideologijama mogu eksplicitno ili implicitno uticati i oblikovati percepciju gledalaca.

3. TEORIJSKI OKVIR

Osnovno polazište koncepta reprezentacije (engl. *representation*) jeste da značenje bilo koje pojave, događaja ili stvari nastaje u procesu produkcije i razmene između pripadnika kulture u određenom društvenom, kulturnom i istorijskom kontekstu (Hall 1982). U kontekstu medija ona podrazumeva „aktivni proces selekcije, prikazivanja, strukturisanja i oblikovanja” sadržaja, čiji cilj nije samo „preneti postojeće značenje nego i aktivno raditi na tome da stvari dobiju značenje” (Hall 1982: 64). Prilikom tog postupka ugrađuju se određene ideje i vrednosti, što implicira da je reprezentacija u osnovi ideološka. Jedan od načina na koji se mogu razumeti načini na koje reprezentacija funkcioniše jeste razumevanje diskursa, budući da je on fokusiran na njene efekte i posledice.

Kao kompleksan komunikacioni događaj, koji određuje celokupan društveni kontekst kao i osobine učesnika određenog komunikacijskog čina zajedno sa procesima produkcije i recepcije (Van Dijk 2006: 261), diskurs se bliže definiše i kao „upotreba jezika shvaćena kao deo društvene prakse” (Fairclough

⁵ Analiza je sprovedena od 24. februara do 31. maja 2022. godine. Više u izveštaju <https://crtars/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/STUDIJA-SLUCAJA-SRPSKI-MEDIJI-O-RATU-U-UKRAJINI.docx.pdf>.

1995: 7). Njegova analiza podrazumeva ne samo jezičku analizu tekstova, već se određeni tekst mora posmatrati i tumačiti u okviru ideoloških, političkih, socijalnih i drugih okolnosti koje utiču na kreiranje medijskog sadržaja. Ferklafov model analize diskursa, na koji se oslanja rad, odvija se kroz tri dimenzije komunikacionog događaja: *tekst* (odnosi se na leksičke i sintaksičke izbore i obrasce, koheziju i strukturu), *diskursnu praksu* (uključuje proizvodnju i intepretaciju teksta) i *društvenu praksu* (proučavanje političkog konteksta događaja, odnosno kako se tekst koristi u odgovarajućem društvenom kontekstu) (Fairclough, 1995: 97).

Lingvistička analiza tekstova pomaže da razumemo način na koji su dominantne ideologije ugrađene u jezik, odnosno kako su izražene u tekstualnim praksama i održavane u njima. Prema van Dejku, ideologije kao „društvena uverenja što ih (specifične) društvene grupe dele” (Van Dijk 2006: 415), organizuju konkretne društvene kategorije koje čine *ideološku shemu*, kao što su *pripadnost, delatnosti, ciljevi, vrednosti i položaj određene grupe*. Kategorija „grupnih odnosa” može se manifestovati u (ideološkom) diskursu strategijom koja uključuje „način na koji su grupe unutar i izvan grupe predstavljene” (Van Dijk, 2006: 368). Ideološka polarizacija (Mi naspram Njih) u predstavljanju grupa uglavnom se odvija, s jedne strane, u naglašavanju 'naših' dobrih strana (svojstava i akcija) i 'njihovih' loših strana, a sa druge strane u nenaglašavanju (ublažavanju pozadine) i isključivanju 'naših' loših strana (svojstava/radnje) i nenaglašavanju 'njihovih' dobrih. Ova strategija se pojavljuje u većini društvenih sukoba i, kako se ističe, može se ogledati u svim jezičkim dimenzijama teksta, naročito u „izboru leksičkih jedinica koje impliciraju pozitivne ili negativne ocene, kao i u strukturi celih iskaza i njihovih kategorija” (Van Dijk, 1998: 33).

4. REPREZENTACIJA DISKURSA O RATNOM IZVEŠTAVANJU

O načinima na koji mediji utiču na konflikt i obrnuto – kako konflikt i njegov kontekst utiču na medije, već decenijama se raspravlja iz različitih teorijskih i metodoloških perspektiva. U brojnim istraživanjima potvrđena je teza da su se neki od ključnih događaja u ratu desili upravo kao reakcija na medijsku reprezentaciju događaja i da već samom selekcijom tema i aktera kojima ustupaju prostor, prenaplaćavajući jedne aspekte sukoba, a ignorišući druge, mediji usmeravaju publiku u željenom pravcu (Reljić 1998). Na primer, u raspadu Jugoslavije neki od ključnih konfliktnih događaja desili su se upravo zbog „načina na koji su definisali krizu, identifikovali njene glavne aspekte i aktere”

(Milivojević 1996: 663). Medijski jezik predstavljao je „jezik rata”, odnosno „jezik mržnje” (Tompson 1999), i kako se ističe, „nijedna politička elita niti njen diskurs ne bi imali toliki uticaj koliki su imali bez posredničkih i ponekad osnažujućih funkcija medija” (Van Dijk 1993: 241 prema Volčić, Džihana 2011: 13). Mediji uglavnom dobrovoljno pristaju da postanu deo vladine strategije za manipulisanje javnošću, ističe Kelner, navodeći kao primer rat u Iraku, gde su Bušova administracija i Pentagon uspeli da sprovedu jednu od najuspešnijih kampanja koristeći američke medije u mobilisanju podrške javnosti: „ratna drama bila je istinski uzbudljiva i publika se uživiljavala u prizore, zvuke i jezik rata” (Kelner 2004: 359).

U ratnom izveštavanju značajan faktor predstavlja činjenica da je „novinar uvek vezan za svoje društvo, za vrednosti, tradiciju, ideologiju i političku realnost” (De Beer 2008 prema Fengler et al. 2020: 403) i samim tim granice pristrasnosti i etičnosti uvek su pod znakom pitanja. Međutim, u slučajevima kada matične zemlje medija nisu u direktnom sukobu, tada na način izveštavanja može uticati stepen uključenosti i interesa određene zemlje u odnosu na teritoriju na kojoj se sukob događa i njegove aktere. Ističe se da je ekonomska razmena s dotičnom zemljom veoma značajna determinanta, a to mogu biti i istorijske i kulturne veze, kao i pripitomljavanje sukoba u lokalni kontekst (Fengler et al 2020). Istraživanja diskursnog predstavljanja rata pokazuju da različite ideologije mogu oblikovati izveštavanje, kao i da razlike u vlasništvu i izvoru prihoda mogu potencijalno uticati na uredničku slobodu i način na koji novinari jezički predstavljaju aktere rata (Moustafa 2013). Ideološki procesi koji se manifestuju na lingvističkom nivou, odnosno načini na koje skup retoričkih i stilističkih sredstava korišćenih u medijskom govoru, mogu jedno stanovište (najčešće provladino) da opravdavaju, a alternativnom da oduzimaju legitimitet (Van Dijk 2006). Prethodna istraživanja o krizi u Ukrajini pokazuju da su ukrajinski akteri krize (političke vođe, demonstranti, policija, vojska) predstavljeni na pozitivan, a ruski akterina negativan način, kao „agresivni i preteći”, te da su njihova stajališta ostala uglavnom nejasna, kao i okviri koji bi doveli u pitanje legitimitet ukrajinskog režima i ulogu EU, SAD i NATO u povećanju međunarodnih napetosti i podela unutar Ukrajine (Ojala, Pantti 2017: 41). Istraživački nalazi političkog diskursa u ruskim i američkim medijima od 2014. do 2016. godine ističu da su ruski mediji diskursno predstavljali Ukrajince „kao 'nasilne ekstremističke organizacije', 'pronaciste' ili 'fašiste', dok su američki medijski izveštaji koristili različitu vojnu terminologiju kojom su rusku politiku opisivali „kao 'agresivnu', 'opasnu',

'destruktivnu' itd." čime je potvrđena jaka ideološka veza određene zemlje i medijskog diskursa (Kolmogorova, Gornostaeva 2019: 93).

Kako se ističe, „diskurs sam po sebi ne određuje smer konflikta, ali može da objasni kako političke elite manipulišu ljudima” (Kolsto 2008: 16). Razobličavanje mehanizama manipulacije medija u kriznim situacijama važno je posmatrati, jer „emotivna reakcija čitaoca/gledaoca na traumatične ratne događaje dodatno doprinosi njenoj podložnosti sugestivnom uticaju medijskih poruka” (Pankov 2016: 298).

5. METODOLOGIJA ISTRAŽIVANJA

Uzorak za analizu činile su centralne informativne emisije dve televizije: *Radio-televizije Srbije* (RTS) i kablovske televizije *N1*. Ove dve medijske kuće odabrane su ne samo kao predstavnici različitih uređivačkih politika, vlasničke strukture, ideoloških i političkih orijentacija, već i zbog različitog odnosa prema vladajućem rukovodstvu u aktuelnom društveno-političkom kontekstu. U stručnoj javnosti preovlađuje mišljenje da je *RTS* pod velikim uticajem vlasti, jer se nekritički odnosi prema njenim mehanizmima vladanja i ne neguje pluralizam mišljenja koji se očekuje od javnog medijskog servisa. S druge strane, *TV N1*, kao kablovski *news kanal* u vlasništvu korporacije *UnitedMedia* i ekskluzivni regionalni informativni partner *CNN*-a, zbog izrazito kritičkog odnosa vladajuće strukture etiketiraju kao proameričku, antivladinu i proopozicionu televiziju. Korpus je prikupljan u sedam ciklično izabranih dana u periodu od 24. februara do 14. marta 2022. godine. Selektovane su vesti koje su se odnosile na rat u Ukrajini (u prvim danima bile su to cele emisije). Izdvojen je ukupno 91 medijski tekst u različitim novinarskim formama (vest, izjava, TV paket, reportersko lajv-uključenje) kao jedinica analize. Nakon toga pristupljeno je dubinskoj analizi na nivou mikrostrukture teksta koja omogućava da se utvrde „društvene tvrdnje i pretpostavke, kao i druge implikacije medijskog diskursa koje mogu biti relevantne za ideologije koje su u njihovoj osnovi” (Van Dijk, 1998: 170).

Istraživanjem se pokušao dati odgovor na sledeće pitanje: da li reprezentacije u jeziku televizijskih vesti o ratu u Ukrajini kojima posmatrane televizije legitimizuju određene ideologije i politička stanovišta (na osnovu kojih se može sagledati i stepen pristrasnosti u korist jedne od sukobljenih strana u odnosu na drugu) na eksplicitan ili implicitan način navode gledaoce da zauzmu određena gledišta. Polazeći od toga da kritički pristup tekstualnoj analizi podrazumeva da elemente kao što su leksika, gramatika, semantika itd. treba

analizirati u odnosu na funkciju(e) koju obavljaju, bilo društvenu ili ideološku, u kontekstu njihove upotrebe (Fairclough, 1995), formiran je kodni protokol sa sledećim potpitanjima: na koji način svaka od odabranih TV kuća koristi različite leksiko-gramatičke strukture za predstavljanje aktera i njihovih postupaka u ratu?, odnosno, kako proizvođači teksta percipiraju i klasifikuju procese i njihove prateće učesnike u svakoj od odabranih vesti (diskurzivna konstrukcija) – ko ili šta (uloge aktera) je učinio šta (vrste procesa) kome ili čemu (pogođeni akter) i kako/zašto (pod kojim okolnostima)?; koje akcije (npr. materijalne, verbalne, relacijske, itd.) se pripisuju različitim akterima u ratu?; koje su vrste uloga dodeljene različitim akterima u procesima i koje karakteristike, kvalitete i značenja im novinari pripisuju? Osim posmatranja glagola i imenica koji se koriste za označavanje procesa i upotrebe aktivnih konstrukcija nasuprot pasivnim (ko je krivac, a ko žrtva u određenom uzajamnom delovanju), posmatrano je i kako se procesi označavaju upotrebom metafora, metonimije i različitih indikatora kao pokazatelja načina na koji se strukturiše tekst oko „deičkog centra”: prostorno (ovde i tamo), vremenski (onda–sada–uskoro), osobno (mi–oni) i modalno (dobar–loš, lep–ružan) (Jusić 2008: 28). Ispitivan je i izraženi stav, odnosno u kojoj se meri novinari distanciraju ili poistovećuju s događajem o kojem izveštavaju, te da li je taj stav eksplicitno artikulisan (pojačan ili ublažen) ili je implicitno prenesen, kao i na koje izvore se najčešće oslanjaju, koje citiraju ili im ustupaju prostor.

6. REZULTATI ISTRAŽIVANJA I DISKUSIJA

6.1. Analiza leksičkih izbora za identifikaciju rata

Analiza diskursa vesti na dve posmatrane televizije najpre pokazuje neujednačenost u određenju samog karaktera rata. Leksička identifikacija zasniva se na upotrebi različitih „kontekstualnih ekspresiva” (Ristić 2004: 210) u određenju rata koji upućuju na legitimizaciju kvalifikacija koje dolaze iz različitih centara moći. Diskurs novinara TV *N1* koristeći termine: „vojna invazija”, „masovna invazija”, „okupacija”, ili „agresija Rusije” implicira odgovornost Rusije (osvajanje). U upotrebi je i sam pojam *rat* praćen prisvojnim pridevom „Putinov” kojim uglavnom citirani glasovi – bez obzira u odnosu na značaj pozicije sa koje dolaze ili uloge (indirektne ili direktne) koju imaju u sukobu – akcentuju personalnu odgovornost, odnosno krivicu za sukob. S druge strane, *RTS* odbacuje da rat identifikuje kao invaziju ili agresiju, što je prema međunarodnom pravu definicija napada jedne zemlje na drugu. U izveštajima se koriste sintagme „specijalne vojne operacije” ili „vojna intervencija” preuzete iz zvaničnog ruskog

narativa kojima se suprotno definišu ciljevi i dimenzije ratnog plana (oslobađanje), čime se protežira naklonjenost prema Rusiji. U izveštajima obe televizije u upotrebi je i pojam „genocid” i u dvostrukoj je uzročnoj vezi (tj. odnosa počinitelj–pogođeni). Koriste ga uglavnom zvaničnici i jedne i druge strane za međusobne teške optužbe: **1a**) „cilj je zaštita ljudi koji su osam godina bili izloženi maltretiranju i *genocidu* od strane Ukrajinskog režima” (N1, 27. 2.); **1b**) Zločinačke akcije Rusije protiv Ukrajine imaju znake *genocida*” (RTS 27. 4.); **1c**) „Ovo je *genocid* nad ukrajinskim narodom” (N1 12. 3.). Kako bi se dočarale razmere rata u opisu pojedinih ratnih akcija, pojačavaju se negativne kvalifikacije događaja i one se na sličan način koriste u vestima obe televizije. Novinarski diskurs obiluje ratnom frazeologijom i ekspresivima poput „žestoke borbe” „snažne eksplozije”, „strašno razaranje”: **2a**) „situacija u Ukrajini je sve *dramatičnija*“ (RTS, 3. 3.); **2b**) „rat iz dana u dan postaje sve *krvaviji*” (N1, 3. 3.). Pojačavanje značenja karaktera sukoba uočeno je i u brojnim izjavama zvaničnika, kao i običnih građana u anketama kao sastavnim elementima TV priloga: **2c**) „svet je sinoć za *dlaku izbegao katastrofu*” (RTS, 4. 3.); **2d**) „ovo je *monstruozna provokacija*” (N1, 4. 3.); **2e**) „*brutalni ratni čin*” (N1, 24. 2.). Ovom vrstom intenzifikacije podižu se napetost i pretnja, koje mogu imati uznemiravajući efekat na gledaoce. S druge strane, u brojkama se predstavljaju pripadnici oružanih formacija ili izbeglica: **2g**) „*nekoliko hiljada* vojnika razmeštenih...” (N1, 24. 2.); **2e**) „*oko 100 hiljada* dobrovoljaca se prijavilo...” (N1, 8. 3.); **2f**) „*hiljade i hiljade* ljudi pristižu u talasima i u kolonama...”. Strategija normalizacije koju karakteriše specifičan način na koji mediji brojevima predstavljaju srazmere problema (Van Dijk 2000) često se primenjuje u ratnom izveštavanju.

6.2. Analiza leksičkih izbora za identifikaciju aktera

Rezultati analize leksike kojom se predstavljaju akteri ukazuju na stereotipnu reprezentaciju kojom se „redukuju, esencijalizuju i naturalizuju pojedine osobine, razdvaja normalnog od nenormalnog i simbolički se fiksiraju granice i isključuje se sve izvan njih” (Hall 1997: 258) naročito u naglašavanju negativnog predstavljanja Drugog. Ekspresivi negativnih moralnih osobina zastupljeni su uglavnom u izjavama zvaničnika koje se direktno (forma izjave) ili indirektno (u novinarskom ofu) citiraju. Pripisuju se jednoj ili drugoj strani u odnosu na poziciju govornika, i pokazuju kako se jezičke strukture mogu podjednako koristiti u svrhu pozitivnog samoprikazivanja, kao i negativnog prikazivanja Drugog bilo koje (ideološke) društvene grupe (Van Dijk 2006: 399). Za ukrajinske državnike i građane, kao i zvaničnike SAD, EU i NATO, ruski

predsednik Putin glavni je negativac, koji personifikuje i celokupnu rusku vojsku: 3a) „Putin je počeo rat svi patimo” (N1, 4. 3.); 3b) „američki narod će zadati snažan udarac *ratnoj mašineriji Vladimira Putina* (RTS 8. 3.); 3c) „nevini ljudi ginu zbog *gada koji sedi u bunkeru* i šalje u smrt svoje ljude” (N1 4. 3.). Sa druge strane, Rusi sebe predstavljaju kao spasitelje i superiornije od drugih: 4a) „Bravo za Ruse! Oni nam pomažu. Bog ih blagoslovio” (N1, 24. 2.); 4b) „Rusija je zaštitila svoj narod i podržala borbu za slobodu [...] što zaslužuje svako poštovanje” (RTS 4. 3.); 4c) „Rusija ostaje *jedna od najmoćnijih nukleranih sila na planeti* (RTS 24. 3.). U negativnim prikazima Ukrajinici su *nepromišljeni* i *nedorasli po snazi* svom protivniku: 5a) „Stalno su *srljali* u sukob. S kim želite da uđete u rat, sa nuklearnom silom?” (N1, 24. 2.), ili *nerealni* u svojim zahtevima: 5b) „Shvatam da je predsednik Zelenski *očajan*” (RTS, 12. 3.). U pozitivnim predstavama unutar svoje grupe Ukrajinici su *hrabri* i *odvažni* u otporu ruskoj invaziji: 6a) „*Branićemo se golim rukama do kraja*” (RTS, 2. 3.).

U analizi je uočena upotreba leksike čije se značenje formira u odnosu na istorijsku konotaciju, a koji u ratnim diskursu uglavnom „asociraju na podrugljiva značenja” (Pankov 2016: 294). U diskursu ruskih zvaničnika i građana Ukrajinici se označavaju pejorativnim kvalifikacijama, naročito u izveštajima RTS-a: 7a) „Zašto su dozvolili *neonacistima i banderovcima* da nas godinama teroriju” (RTS, 2. 3.); 7b) „*Banderovci, obični nacionalistički bataljoni*, moramo ih se otarasiti. To su pravi *neonacisti*, koji su mučili, streljali ljude...” (RTS, 2. 3.). Uočeni diskursno-istorijski pristup, kojim se uspostavlja analogija sa kontroverznim istorijskim ličnostima⁶, te problematičnim pokretima i ideologijama iz prošlosti, smatra se tipičnom propagandnom matricom, kojom se pojačava „dejstvo na primaoce poruka medija u skladu sa njihovim prethodno usvojenim stavovima i shvatanjima” (Wodak, Reisigl 2009: 99), i povećava neprijateljstvo prema suprotstavljenoj grupi. Zastupljen je i na nivou novinarskog govorenog teksta u delovima gde se indirektno prenose citati ruskih zvaničnika: 7c) „Moskva kaže da će kazniti i likvidirati *ukrajinske neonaciste* za ratne zločine da bi se obezbedila *denacifikacija* Ukrajine” (RTS 2. 3.).

⁶ Stepan Bandera je istorijska ličnost oko čije simbolike se sve vreme vode rasprave u javnosti. Smatra se i herojem i zlikovcem, potencijalnim oslobodiocem potlačene nacije, kao i teroristom i saradnikom Hitlerovog režima. Smatrao je Rusiju glavnim neprijateljem Ukrajine i izražavao je netrpeljivost prema Poljacima i Židovima koji su nastanjivali ukrajinsku teritoriju. S druge strane, u gradovima i selima zapadne Ukrajine podignuti su mu spomenici i ulice su nazvane po njemu u čast borbe za nezavisnost Ukrajine. Za njegove sledbenike koristi se pogrdan naziv *banderovci* (Marples 2006: 565).

Uočena je i prekomerna upotreba sinonima koji se koriste za identifikaciju jedne od strana u sukobu, ali i drugih aktera koji su indirektno uključeni, a to su metonimični oblici *Moskva*, *Kijev*, *Brisel*, *Vašington* itd. Nazivi gradova, kao administrativna sedišta zemalja, upotrebljavaju se kao subjekti koji u ovom slučaju na osnovu prostorne povezanosti označavaju zamenu za zvaničnike i tela koja donose odluke i u dvostrukoj su ulozi – agensa i pacijensa: 8a) „*Brisel* najavljuje najoštrije sankcije *Rusiji*” (N1 24. 3.); 8c) „Trgovinske povlastice *Rusiji* ukida i *Vašington*” (RTS 12. 3.). Ova vrsta simboličke identifikacije česta je praksa u TV izveštavanju zbog ograničenosti prostora.

Upotrebom metafora, kojima se opisuju relacije između direktnih i indirektnih aktera, stvaraju se puno jače ideološke predstave: 9a) „gde Zapad dolazi da uspostavlja svoj poredak *ostaju krvave otvorene rane*” (RTS 24. 2.); 9b) „dok Rusija *steže obruč oko Ukrajine*, veliki deo sveta *steže obruč* oko nje” (RTS 2.3.); 9c) „zato što ih *rat gura s leđa sa bajonetom u stražnjicu*” (N1 24. 2.); ili u slučaju opisa stava Srbije prema uvođenju sankcija Rusiji: 9d) „pokušaj *da žonglira između Zapada, Rusije i svojih interesa*” (telop opasno žongliranje) (N1 4. 3). Metafore imaju ubeđivačku moć i smatra se da sugerišu pristrasno tumačenje situacija i događaja. „Time što putem metafora biraju koje će aspekte nekog pojma istaći, tvorci teksta manje-više svesno otkrivaju svoje vrednosne sudove i ideološke stavove (Silaški i dr. 2009: 60).

6.3. Analiza izvora i stavova

Dominantni izvori vesti na obe televizije bili su globalne agencije i televizije, kao i obraćanja zvaničnika na društvenim mrežama. U prvim danima TV N1 (zagrebački ogranak) imala je reportera u Ukrajini, ali samo u Kijevu i oblastima koje nisu bile u blizini fronta. Obe televizije imale su samo reportere u Moskvi i u zemljama (Rumuniji, Mađarskoj, Poljskoj) odakle su izveštavale o izbegličkoj krizi, te su se u vestima sa ratišta uglavnom oslanjale na interpretacije posrednih izvora. Iako su imale zastupljene glasove i sa jedne i sa druge sukobljene strane, eksplicitne razlike su se očitovale kroz selekciju delova istih izjava zvaničnika koje su se prenosile u izveštajima, u kojima je pojačavana ili ublažavana odgovornost aktera. Novinari, pod izgovorom uravnoteženog izveštavanja i u predstavljanju neutralnih činjenica, mogu ostaviti otvorenim pitanje odgovornosti za određene radnje u događajima, što rezultira zamagljivanjem činjenica (Moustafa 2013). Inače i sama činjenica da je određenim glasovima omogućen pristup vestima, dok su drugi zanemareni ili nedovoljno zastupljeni, može biti pokazatelj u otkrivanju ideologije koju su usvojili mediji

(Van Dijk 1998). Polazeći od toga da se upotrebom različitih indikatorskih reči može odrediti pokazno (deiktičko) središte, tj. polazna tačka s koje se piše/govori određeni medijski tekst i da se sugerise, u ovom slučaju gledaocima, kako da se postave unutar grupe predstavljene u tekstu ili izvan nje (Pankov 2016). U izveštavanju, naročito reportera sa lica mesta, uočen je eksplicitan nivo pristrasnosti jednoj od strana u sukobu. U prilogu emitovanom na TV N1 (preuzet sa televizije *Skaj njuz*) reporterka se upotrebom prostornog indikatora stavlja na stranu Ukrajinaca i nagađa o ratnim ciljevima Rusije: **10a**) „eksplozije su izazvale bes [...] i pojačale [...] želju za osvetom [...] Ova mesta su očigledno bila planirani cilj ruske ratne mašinerije” (N1, 8. 3.). U prilog su integrisane i preteče izjave ukrajinskih vojnika sa fantomkama na glavi: **10b**) „*Nećemo ostaviti nijednog živog. Ubićemo svakog okupatora.*” Da je neutralnost na terenu teško zadržati ilustruju i primeri saosećanja i podrške novinara određenom akteru u odnosu na poziciju govornog lica: **10c**) „Bilo nam je zanimljivo [...] svi putokazi su ili prešarani ili presvučeni crnim vrećama. Na taj način domaće stanovništvo želi bar malo *uzdrmati* i *zbuniti* Ruse” (N1, 8. 3.). Takođe, oni su vidljivi i u različitim zapažanjima reporterke iz Moskve, koja nisu ilustrovana slikom niti anketom koja bi ih potkrepila: **10d**) „Moram da primetim da u Moskvi ne vidim nikakvo *ura raspoloženje* [...] naprotiv, svi su nekako *zamišljeni, tužni* (N1, 2. 3.); **10e**) „Koliko smo mi danas mogli da vidimo [...] ovde se život odvijao *potpuno normalno* [...] *ne deluje kao da se Ukrajini vode borbe* i *kao da su sankcije u zemlji sve veće i sa više strana*” (RTS 2. 3.). U izveštajima reportera primetna je i predikacija koja se koristi u funkciji predstavljanja izbeglica, za izražavanje saosećanja prema njima: **11a**) „*dramatične, tužne i potresne scene* su ono što gledamo” (N1 2. 3.), ali s druge strane, i empatije sa ruskim narodom: **11c**) „*neophodno da se obustavi antiruska propaganda*” (RTS 4. 3.).

7. ZAKLJUČAK

Zbog ograničenosti prostora, u radu se mogla predstaviti analiza sa nekolicinom upečatljivih primera diskursa televizijskih vesti. Rezultati analize jezičke reprezentacije pokazuju da uprkos pokušajima neutralnosti poput ustupanja prostora obema stranama u sukobu, te reprezentacije konstruisane različitim ideologijama (na osnovu kojih je moguće odrediti i naklonost prema jednoj ili drugoj strani u sukobu) i na eksplicitan i na implicitan način sugerisu gledaocu određenu sliku rata. Ona se očitava kako odabirom leksike za identifikaciju događaja i aktera, tako i primenom različitih diskursnih strategija u njihovom

predstavljanju. Najzastupljenije strategije u predstavljanju (negativnog ili pozitivnog) aktera i apsekata rata u Ukrajini jesu: *intenzifikacija*, *stereotipizacija*, *predikacija*, *nominalizacija* i *istorijski pristup*. Na njihov intenzitet uticao je veoma kompleksan širi kontekst sukoba, uključenost brojnih aktera i preuzimanje informacija sa društvenih mreža (Tviter-naloga političkih i vojnih zvaničnika) i globalnih medija (TV mreža i agencija) koji, inače, drže monopol i centralizuju distribuciju informacija o velikim međunarodnim događajima diktirajući dnevni red („agenda setting”) vesti. Eksplicitna naklonjenost jednoj ili drugoj strani (direktno ili indirektno uključenim akterima) vidljiva je kroz upotrebu ekspresivne leksike i ocenjivačkih atributa u novinarskom diskursu, koji doprinose slikovitijem i sugestivnijem predstavljanju određenih političkih interpretacija, tako da se dejstvo onoga što je njima označeno pojačava, kao i putem zauzimanja pozicije deiksa unutar određene grupe sa kojom se uspostavlja identifikacija putem reporterskog govora.

Ubeđivački diskurs usmeren je ka posledicama više nego ka objašnjenju uzroka sukoba – na utvrđivanju ko je krivac a ko žrtva, na njihovoj karakterizaciji, zatim na vidljivim posledicama nasilja (ubijeni, ranjeni, materijalna šteta, izbegli), te na postupcima elita. Publika se, dakle, navodi na pojedine aspekte sukoba i pretnje, koji izazivaju pojačane emocije sa kojima se lakše manipuliše. Zbog velike zastupljenosti kontrolisanih informacija iz centara moći prilagođavanih za jednu odnosno drugu javnost sukobljenih strana (direktnih i indirektnih), posmatrane televizije svedene su na poziciju megafona propagandnih matrica obe strane. Lokalni kontekst uticao je na eksplicitnost najviše kroz diskurs selektovanih delova izjava zvaničnika i političara (RTS je prenosio izjave desno orijentisanih političara u Srbiji koji otvoreno podržavaju rusku invaziju, dok je *N1* ustupao više prostora kritičkim glasovima i u sopstvenim interpretacijama implicitno usvajao njihove stavove o osudi postupaka vlasti u odnosu prema Rusiji). Polazeći od van Dejкове tvrdnje, da je davanje prednosti određenim glasovima manipulativna strategija kojom se pojedinačni interesi centara moći predstavljaju kao opšti (Van Dejk 2001), može se zaključiti da posmatrane televizije, konstruisanjem predstava (negativnih ili pozitivnih) o akterima i aspektima rata kojima legitimizuju određena politička stanovišta, zapravo navode svoju publiku „da shvate određenu ideologiju kao 'stanje stvari'” (Kelner 2004: 101).

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Brankica Drašković

REPRESENTATION OF THE WAR IN UKRAIN: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF TV NEWS REPORTING

Summary

The subject of the research in the paper is the discourse presentation of the war in Ukraine in prime-time television news broadcasts. Relying on the concept of representation and methods of critical analysis of discourse, the aim of the paper was to determine which dominant discourse strategies were used by observed TV channels for identification of the main aspects (causes and consequences) and actors (direct and indirect) of the war as well as to see the ways in which similar or different representations constructed by certain ideologies can explicitly or implicitly influence and shape the perception of viewers. The corpus for analysis was collected in the prime-time news broadcasts of two televisions: the public media service Radio-television of Serbia and cable television N1 during the period from February 24 to March 14, 2022.

Key words: war in Ukraine, representations, critical discourse analysis, TV news, Serbia

INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND RESISTANCE: EMOTIONS AND MORAL FRAMEWORKS IN THE MEDIA CONSUMPTION OF SERBIAN YOUTH²

Media consumption should not be understood as taking place in a rational public sphere, but instead as invoking and resulting from various emotions and moral frameworks carried by media consumers. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork among Serbian youth and media professionals, this article describes the sense of “information overload” that prompts many young people to avoid news, carefully curate their sources, and quit certain platforms, or even social media altogether. The invocation of images of disgust and pollution to describe genres like reality TV reveals the moral and emotional charge of the media environment. Moral frameworks for media consumption rely heavily on juxtaposed ideas of passivity and resistance. Considering these emotional and moral elements provides context for understanding the generational differences in news media consumption.

Key words: media consumption, social media, Serbia, youth, emotion, moral framework, resistance

1. INTRODUCTION

“Zabrinutost.” “Worry.” This was the emotion that our spinning “emotion wheel” landed on. After spinning another wheel to land on a news site *Nova.rs* we were instructed to combine the two results by going to the news site to find an article that occasioned the feeling of “worry.” This wasn’t hard to do, and the participants in the online media literacy training freely shared examples of articles they found on the *Nova.rs* website, explaining why they prompted feelings of worry. This exercise was important, the media literacy trainers explained, because media can manipulate and work on our emotions. Therefore, “when we consume news media, we should pay attention first and foremost to the emotions that arise.”

To take this contention at face value has important implications for the study of media consumption more broadly. News media consumption is often broken down by gender, race/ethnicity, age, class, and interest category. As a

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practice, it is traditionally understood to belong to a rational “public sphere” (Habermas 1991) of debate shaped by and shaping political preference, as well as social, cultural, economic, and religious viewpoints. But of course, it is also shaped by, and shapes, a world of affect and emotion (as described in work on the “emotional turn” in journalism studies, e.g. Wahl-Jorgensen and Pantti 2021). Here I am thinking particularly of the problem posed by Anthony Giddens regarding the consumption of information in modernity; “the sense many of us have of being caught up in a universe of events we do not fully understand, and which seems in large part out of our control (Giddens 1990: 2). The newspaper, he notes, drawing on Benedict Anderson (1991) and others, was revolutionary because of its visual display of news from a large area on one page. Suddenly you could see what was happening in Chile, East Africa, North China, and Russia—and you were expected to care about all of them. Giddens makes the argument that this change had a disorienting effect, disembedding people from their local communities. I would argue that it also overwhelms media consumers with the number of events for which they, as moral citizens, are supposed to feel concern. If this is the case for the newspaper, what might we say about the effects of social media consumption brought about by the digital world in which we find ourselves today?

This paper attempts to address that question using preliminary data from an ethnographic research project with Serbian youth, focusing on institutional distrust, social media use, and news consumption. I have argued previously that Serbian youth inhabit an “environment of disbelief” (Brandt 2020), in which skepticism is the default approach to both institutions and media; they fact-check information with Google, “average” different viewpoints for objectivity, and rely primarily on un-mediated information to bypass these suspect institutions. Additionally, political moods of disengagement, absurdism, and conspiracy theory tend to dominate youth discussion of media. This work also builds on scholarship on informality and institutional distrust in post-socialist environments (Rubić 2013) as well as youth apathy and disillusionment in Serbia in particular (Greenberg 2014, 2010). Additionally, given that Serbian young people’s top concerns tend to be corruption, economic stagnation, and media censorship, this research draws on scholarship of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian public spheres (Wedeen 2019, Roudakova 2017), as well as on disgust and hatred in relation to media institutions in particular (Shin et al. 2021, Siapera and Papadopoulou 2021). Putting this line of thought into conversation with work on digital media and news consumption (Lane 2019, Boczkowski and Mitchelstein

2013), which has tended to focus primarily on Western Europe and the United States yields particular insights about youth media practices in non-democratic media environments.

“Zabrinutost,” or worry, certainly resonated with the youth participants in the media literacy training referenced at the opening of this article. So did the reason for which the organizers opted to use the wheel of feelings: as they emphasized, it is important to understand emotions in order to resist media manipulation. If emotions play a key role in shaping responses to media consumption, what moral valences do those emotions have? In what way do the emotions occasioned by media environments constitute (or resist) a moral framework for navigating them? This paper will explore a preliminary response to this question.

2. METODOLOGY

This paper is based on ethnographic research conducted between December 2021 and September 2022, focused on young people’s media consumption in Serbia. Relying on snowball sampling, I carried out over 50 interviews with both young people and media/media literacy professionals during the research period.³ Interviews, which took place in Serbian or English according to the preference of the participant, took place in a location (café, office, classroom, park, etc.) chosen by the participant, and ran about an hour on average. Additionally, I conducted observation, complete with extensive field notes, at media literacy trainings, media panels, cultural festivals, and other relevant events.⁴ All research received IRB approval.

Interviews often included interactive activities, such as a “digital walkthrough,” involving scrolling together through an app of the respondent’s choice while discussing items that arose in the feed. During other interviews I presented respondents with an array of 3 articles from Serbian media and asked them for their opinion.⁵ The sample was overwhelmingly college-educated young

³ If not otherwise noted, interview quotes are from young people who do not work professionally on media literacy issues.

⁴ While some media literacy workers that I interviewed participated in organizing and presenting these events, I did not recruit for interviews at these events, nor do I believe any of my non-professional interviewees were participants at these events.

⁵ I developed and refined both of these activities over the course of the research period, and sometimes use of them was limited by factors such as lack of internet access or

people, hailing from a wide variety of locations in Serbia: Belgrade, Kragujevac, Pančevo, Niš, Novi Pazar, and Novi Sad. Efforts were taken to diversify the sample, though it may exhibit a bias by virtue of the fact that all respondents were willing and interested in participating in a study run by an American scholar from a US-based university. The results in this paper are preliminary reflections on the initial period of fieldwork and an extended dialogue that took place at the Bridges of Media Education Conference hosted by the Communication Department at the University of Novi Sad in May 2022.

3. FINDINGS

The findings fall into three primary sections. The first describes the emotional sense of overwhelm felt by young people, and how they respond by curating their media consumption, opting for certain forms of media over others, and sometimes quitting types of media altogether. The second describes the emotion of disgust applied by young people and media workers to certain types of media, especially television, reality television, and social media. This leads into the third section, which describes the moral frameworks connected to these emotions, and specifically addresses ideas of passivity and resistance surfaced by respondents.

3.1. *Overwhelm*

Young people repeatedly described media—news in particular, especially as conveyed through social media—as a deeply overwhelming experience, often using metaphors such as “flood,” bombardment,” and “storm” to describe the flow of information. This overwhelm was a primary motivation to restrict their media consumption in some way, whether that was through deleting certain apps, curating their use of media content in specific ways, or attempting to avoid news altogether. The sense of “overwhelm” was often associated with TV news and print tabloid media, both of which were stereotypically keyed to older generations by participants—the parents and grandparents of the young people in this study. News avoidance, curation, and engaging with news solely through social media were all understood to be, in some way, generational responses, characteristic of a

participants not consenting to complete the activity (i.e. the digital walkthrough). I would ask for consent separately for the digital walkthrough in particular, and some participants, understandably, did not wish to participate in that portion of the interview.

wider group of young people. Deliberately not following the news was as much a generational characteristic of media use as was using TikTok.

Many used the phrase “information overload” to describe this perception of being exposed to too much media. While young people acknowledged understanding the guidelines on how to responsibly consume, fact-check, and compare media that media literacy trainings taught, they deemed these practices unrealistic for everyday life. “These standards and skills are perhaps of limited use,” one young media worker told me. Specifically, respondents worried about the effect of so much media, especially social media, on their cognitive function or mental health; many cited concerns raised by the documentary *The Social Dilemma* (2020) and similar works critiquing the psychological and social effects of social media. Though attitudes toward social media certainly varied, many young people were critical of these platforms and concerned about their effect on both themselves and their generation as a whole.

Many young people, responding to these concerns, emphasized the value of *curation* when it came to media consumption. It was very common for interviewees to speak to me about “changing their routine to be healthier” or to describe spending time online as a form of laziness or compulsion that they were trying to alter. Several described the habit of “unconsciously scrolling” as a particularly pernicious one that they were trying to change. For example, they might open their phone to do a Duolingo lesson (an implicitly “good” use of technology, because educational) and end up following a notification to a much longer period of scrolling. One young woman told me that she likes to keep her list of Facebook friends smaller because less friends means less stress—less followers also means less stress, she told me, speaking about some local “influencers” that she knew.

“Curation” was also a value in the larger news/information consumption ecosystem; several identified the importance of carefully selecting information sources. One opposition-oriented young man said that Facebook pages tend to have better information than TV, but you need to select carefully because everything is so polarized. A regime-oriented woman emphasized instead the importance of “official sources”—the government website, the president’s website—rather than implicitly less reliable journalistic takes on the same material. Outside of the realm of media, one student identified the problem with her studies as the fact that the instructors did not curate carefully enough when judging students’ participation—they gave the same points to unhelpful comments made by “tiny Nazis” as to those students who spoke up on behalf of human

rights. Curation was key to being a responsible, ethical, healthy citizen/consumer of information.

This emphasis on curation often extended to entire forms of media that might be characterized positively or negatively in a variety of ways: healthy vs. unhealthy, overwhelming vs. not overwhelming, interesting vs. exhausting, uplifting vs. demoralizing. For instance, many young people appreciated YouTube in particular as a source of knowledge. They taught themselves how to play guitar, train horses, speak foreign languages, and more through videos on the platform. It was also widely used as a source of music. But perhaps most interestingly, YouTube was deemed a far better source of information (political, scientific, philosophical, etc.) than news media, due to its comparatively lower level of immediacy. Whereas “following the news” implied a stressful, constant flow of (often negative) information, young people could watch YouTube during their leisure time to learn about topics that interested them. The platform was a way of being informed that didn’t overwhelm and fit better with the rhythms of daily life.

Generally, YouTube was not considered to be a form of “social media”—people didn’t mention it when I asked what forms of social media they used, and when I asked about it, they would say, “Oh, I guess it is a type of social media too . . .” Social media, unlike YouTube, was understood to be negative, emotionally overwhelming, and to have a detrimental impact on society; one person disparagingly described the practice of newscasters calling people names in their news coverage as a “social media effect,” implying that social media had polluted the TV news format. Often, social media was equated to or linked with reality shows (by far the most vilified form of media content in my research) in its promotion of bad moral values, especially to children and teens. These views were articulated by a range of people, very often in their late teens and early twenties, and thus cannot be attributed to the intergenerational judgment so commonly applied to younger generations by older ones.

Indeed, this rejection of social media as a social ill leads into the next point; curation often extended to avoiding excising whole forms of media altogether; that, is quitting. I was surprised, during my research, at how many young people mentioned that they had quit either social media as a whole or removed certain apps because of the negative effect they were noticing that they had in their lives. One young history student told me that that the influence of the media on popular understandings of history is the worst part, that there is so much ignorance; because of this, he preferred official sources and decided not to have any social media apps a while ago. Another young woman had made a similar

choice; she had previously been a member of 150 groups on Facebook, and if she had tried to keep up with what was happening in all of them, it would take her all day, she narrated. Although she described herself as apolitical, she kept herself informed using “electronic and paper formats,” especially YouTube clips. She maintained only Viber (a messaging app) and email on her phone.

One person I interviewed had actually bought a non-smart phone because he felt he had been spending too much time online. This basic phone allowed him to restrict his media consumption, as whatever he accessed had to be done on the computer. While the amount of young people I met restricting their use of social media was probably inflated due to selection bias (those who are already concerned about media might be more likely to participate in a study about media), it was a significant trend among the young people I spoke to. The fact that social media was perceived to have such a negative effect that a number of people were making choices to restrict or get rid of it was a significant element of young people’s emotional response to information and media consumption.

3.2. *Disgust*

In addition to a general sense of “overwhelm,” the primary emotion reported by young people in relation to media was “disgust.” In several media literacy trainings I attended, the facilitators asked participants to describe the emotion that a headline or snippet of news (often from a Serbian tabloid) occasioned. For instance, an article might quote a Roma child musician as saying he didn’t want to go to school or compare a teenage vlogger to Dostoevsky. The responses were remarkably similar: “disgust,” or “sadness,” often paired with some addition like “that our society is on this level.” I often heard the word “*nažalost*” (“unfortunately”) when people spoke about the news we were looking at together or the media environment in general. This stylized response by “educated” media consumers is par for the course among young Serbians. For instance, rock/alternative fans might tell you that most of the faculties in the city listen to “*naša muzika*” (domestic music); only English students, for the most part, listen to foreign music. And whole genres, or mediums, are seen as suspect or “trashy;” as an audience member said at a debate on reality TV I attended, “*Ja to [rijaliti] ne pratim uopšte, ne kupim novine, dobijem informacije kroz portala.*” (“I don’t follow that [reality TV] at all, I don’t buy newspapers, I get information through [web] portals.”)

In my previous research, in 2017 and 2019, people often highlighted tabloid newspapers as the most problematic genre of content, as referenced in the

quote above. In 2022, I found that TV, reality TV in particular—and the links of this genre to social media—took pride of place. “TV,” as a medium, was often referenced to explain the [bad] state of the Serbian media environment. “The current state of media literacy in Serbia? A catastrophe. Just look at the TV,” one interviewee told me. Specifically, people took issues with the national frequency (the 5 channels broadcast for free on all TVs), specifically the channels Pink and Happy, which were seen to be most egregious with respect to both reality-show antics and aggressive support of the ruling party. (The positive emotional affect implied by the English-language titles “Pink” and “Happy” is a story for another paper.) TV was also denigrated in other ways: the problem with Instagram is that influencers were spreading ads that “should be on TV,” Serbian television was characterized as stupid because they always want you to have an interlocutor, and one older woman assured me that she didn’t watch news on TV, that “sranje” (bullshit.)

Reality TV, in particular, provoked strong emotions of disgust that were accompanied by and inextricable from moral judgments. At a panel I attended on the impact of reality TV in Serbia, the moderator opened the event by announcing that we were going to discuss “the last 18 years of violence and vulgarity on our national television” and then proceeded to describe these programs as a “danger.” One panelist compared the public who appreciated this content to a flock of sheep. Perhaps people who are “so media illiterate, [who] have nothing to do in life” but to enjoy this content, they added, should pay extra for it, rather than having this content publicly available. All agreed that the availability of this content to children was a major problem of the media ecosystem; “what’s worse, they don’t watch plays, not even films or series. They watch TikTok and games,” one panelist observed. (The moderator followed this up with a question on whether TikTok had become a form of reality show, emphasizing the connections between social media and reality TV in the public imaginary.) The lack of moral curation of content on reality programs—that we might expect to next see pedophilia, necrophilia, or death on TV, in order to shock the public—was widely lamented. Reality TV’s problematic nature was emphasized through links to other morally problematic genres in other mediums—turbofolk in music, tabloids in printed journalism. Meanwhile, quality TV programs were those which highlighted morally acceptable genres—“serious music” (i.e. rock and roll), or showed high-quality domestic films.

Reality TV, like social media, was problematic because it was unregulated and uncured; something as dangerous as suicide might be shown

without context or explanation. People were seen to be in danger of mistaking this “rijaliti” for actual reality. People need to understand that this is not real, the panelists emphasized, connecting it to the theme of mental health. “What is real is your love for your family and friends—reality is not on the telephone,” as one put it. This problem of belief—that people were believing too much in social media—was raised in my research a number of times. Young people (children, for youth, and youth, for adults) were understood to have less tools, skills, and context for understanding media, and thus were at risk of coming away with the wrong belief, or the wrong moral values. Just as older people might be concerned about younger people’s media use, many of the young people I spoke to were concerned about children’s media use. The disgusting, polluted media environment posed clear moral dangers.

3.3. Moral Framework/Obligations

Indeed, a framework of moral obligation structured many of the discussions I had during research about media consumption, particularly with media professionals, but also with young people writ large. On one panel I observed about the media environment, a media worker advised listeners to “always have that quiet voice in your head that asks: ‘Why did this come to me?’” He was speaking about the importance of algorithmic literacy; and for people to understand the power of the algorithms that governed the content that they saw each day. This notion echoed the many calls for “critical thinking” or “critique” that permeated these kind of discussions—one professional made a point of differentiating this “critique” from what young people might call “haters”. “Bez kritika nema napred,” she said, or “without critique there can be no progress.” Another panelist said that “Today they are all competing for our attention . . . these virtual classrooms that exist today on TikTok.” The sheer overwhelm of the social media environment necessitated that young people become more aware, educated citizens and media consumers. At one youth-focused NGO I visited, the employees showed me a deck of cards they had created for young people, with the images of Serbian politicians on them. As an educational tool, the politicians were assigned card ranks relative to their power in the state apparatus. I examined the cards, fanned out on the table, and then pulled back, after which the worker shuffled them back together. “It’s to help young people know they can change them,” he explained. “They can shuffle them out.” All of these interventions

attempted to shape (imagined) young people's affects and judgements into moral actions—to make them into active citizens.

The emphasis on action as a moral framework extended through a variety of domains I encountered in my research. A good government was framed, by activist organizations and ruling-party supporters alike, as one that is responsive—a government that fixes potholes or builds playgrounds in local communities. The difference is that ruling-party supporters framed the government as already responsive, whereas activist organizations tended to highlight their efforts to induce responsiveness from the government. The emphasis on action extended to individuals, as well; both young people and those who professionally engage with young people often told me that the problem with youth is that they were not engaged enough, not politically active enough. Even those young people who were engaged, in activism, student politics, or local organizations, particularly emphasized that they were not like the majority of young people in Serbia. If the majority of young people were active, they thought, they would be able to accomplish big change, but “unfortunately” (*nažalost*) this is not the case.

“*Nažalost*” (“sadly” or “unfortunately”) also recurred in these discussions about the engagement or activity level of young people as citizens and media consumers. “We are, unfortunately, passive consumers,” was one example from a media-focused event. (“*Jesmo pasivni, nažalost, konzumenti.*”) This quote also surfaces the use of the word “passive”, or “*pasivni*,” which was contrasted to the ideal of engagement or activity. “Raise your voice when something is wrong [in the media],” exhorted one media professional. “Don’t be a passive observer when they are talking about your area of expertise.” Passivity was also contrasted with resistance, critical thinking, and the questioning of institutions. The moral framework people used to discuss media was most often structured by these twin poles of action and inaction, passivity and resistance.

4. DISCUSSION

Young people experienced the flood of media they were exposed to—on various social media platforms, from various outlets and perspectives, and at various times of day—as deeply overwhelming. Not only the sheer amount of media content, but the addictive nature of these feeds, the powerful algorithms that kept users “mindlessly scrolling,” were perceived as a social ill that required response. This response came in a variety of forms, from curation—of platforms, of sources, of topics, of genres—to quitting—platforms, news in general, or even

smartphones altogether. In addition to this sense of overwhelm, the media environment—and specific forms of media, such as reality television—was experienced as disgusting, polluted, and shameful. Given this highly emotionally charged experience of engaging with an overwhelming flow of powerful media, it is not surprising how engagement was often characterized using a moral framework of passivity—just letting it wash over you—and resistance—doing something about it, whether that be becoming a media-literate information consumer or speaking up about something problematic in media coverage.

These narratives of passivity and resistance, with their associated emotional overtones, have complicated generational histories. A woman in her late 30s, Maja⁶, who had been involved with the Otpor protests in the 1990s, described the cancellation of the talk show *Utisak Nedelje*, “Weekly Impressions,” as a turning point in the transition from the relatively more open media and political environment she grew up in, characterized by a feeling of optimism, to a more censored and restricted one. That was when, she said, “you started feeling helpless,” describing her emotions of despair and anger. Meanwhile, Jelena, a woman in her 20s, described her experience of being on a student exchange program abroad. The students had been asked to create an exercise on the theme of “freedom of speech;” she suggested one based on the book *1984*, which she had recently read and enjoyed. She explained one aspect of the novel’s dystopian world to me: “Words are deleted from the language every day, so in a couple of generations, people won’t even be able to think about these topics.” The exercise she designed involved roleplaying, for instance, a student complaining about their teacher to the principal, but without being able to use words like “teacher” or synonyms like “educator.”

These two anecdotes speak to the different vocabularies that my interlocutors drew upon in order to articulate their emotional and intellectual experiences of the media worlds they inhabited. While Maja utilized a language of emotion to characterize her own personal, historical experiences of engaging with the media environment, Jelena, some 10 to 15 years younger, did not have an identifiable personal experience with protest, resistance and media freedoms. Instead, she drew on Orwell’s dystopian portrayal of an authoritarian media environment to think about silences in a media environment, silences that have played out in the different political and educational experiences she has had. Narratives about how people engage with media cannot be reduced to a simple

⁶ All respondents have been given pseudonyms.

matter of information transfer, but must consider the moral frameworks and emotional responses that shape how individuals experience information. This repertoire of responses and moral rubrics, moreover, are not static, but shift across generations and over time. Better understanding the emotional and moral stakes of news consumption can help contextualize the choices people make about how they consume.

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PERCEPTION OF IMPLICIT MARKETING MESSAGES AMONG THE STUDENT POPULATION

Implicit marketing messages (hidden advertisements) are intertwined with and hidden in media content (music, movies, photos, texts, etc). They are difficult to ignore and dismiss than explicit ones, as users are usually unaware of being affected. As young people are potentially susceptible to media manipulation and indoctrination, given their limited critical capacities, the main topic of this paper is the perception of hidden advertisements of the student population. The main aim of this paper is to examine the level of perception of hidden advertisements from traditional and digital media among the student population. The paper also investigates the impact of advertisements on students' purchases and the creation of their needs and the differences in perception of hidden advertisements in relation to students' gender and field of education, in relation to the media source (traditional vs. digital media). The quantitative research was conducted in 2021 among the student population of Serbia involving 292 respondents. The results indicate that the respondents partially recognize hidden advertisements, mainly from visual media content (movies and photography), and mainly from digital media. There are no statistically significant differences in perception of implicit marketing messages in relation to gender, educational field, or media source from which they come, even though students oriented in humanities and social sciences observe them more than students of engineering and technology sciences. According to respondents' answers, advertisements have no impact on their purchases or the creation of their needs. The results indicate the importance of reconsideration of media competencies at the individual level in terms of a purposeful, functional acquisition and development of (new) media literacy of young people.

Key words: implicit marketing messages, advertisement, digital media, young people, perception.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Media and information-communication technologies enable new dimensions of connectivity among people, their interaction, communication and cooperation. Mass media, especially digital media, are an integral part of young people's lives and have a great role in their growth and development, in the manifestation and articulation of their perception of the world, in their cultural reasoning, (self)socialization, and above all, in shaping their identity (Arsenijević & Andevski 2015). Young people are an integral part of the global online community, they can skilfully, functionally and creatively use media and can be creators of media content. However, there is a negative side of media as well (Twenge 2017). Young people can become mere consumers of media content, caught up in hidden messages and intentions of the media that manipulate and spread pseudo-values and the spirit of consumerism.

The digital world is becoming a dominant, affordable and attractive platform for marketing through direct communication and interaction with consumers of different products and services. "Since its inception, the digital space and the digital community have been an accessible and attractive marketing platform" (Arsenijević & Andevski 2018: 52). Thanks to the new media, marketing as a discipline reaches a completely new dimension, becoming a digital, viral marketing. The aim is to use propulsive digital media in order to gain as many users as possible, and can be used for the purpose of mass advertising, persuasion and even manipulation (Šušnjić 1984; Jovanović 2016). Depending on whom they are intended for, advertisements cause different experiences and feelings, represent a source of information and strongly suggest and impose what is desirable and coveted in given focus groups (Banić 2015). "Most of the information about people, space and time, which is not firsthand, is received from the media. Media satisfy most of our entertainment needs" (Erjavec & Zgrabljic 2000: 89-90). Advertisements abound with enhanced sound and music effects, interesting characters, strong, attractive colours and dynamical content (Banić 2015; Košir, Zgrabljic & Ranfl 1999). According to the generally accepted definition, advertisements are "deliberate, organized information through mass media and planned popularization of industrial products and services. Many advertisements are specifically targeted to children and young people, since they are recognized as easily susceptible target groups" (Miliša & Zloković 2008: 72).

In order to capture the youth population, advertisement creators focus on their taste. In doing so, creators of advertisements strongly affect youth's attitudes,

choices, behaviour, taste and lifestyle. Advertisements in some way shape, design and change their value system. James Potter argues that Americans spend more time shopping than residents of any other country and that it is primarily a direct influence of the media that constantly insist on certain patterns of behaviour until these patterns become automatic habits (Potter 2004). Common users allow media to program their habits, taste, needs as well as their intentions. In other words: the media affect their worldview - expectations regarding interpersonal relationships, desirability, success, fame, and health.

Media messages for marketing and propaganda purposes are of two main types. The first type has an explicit form: they are visible, noticeable, direct, persuasive and in a form of advertisement. The second type is implicit, they do not come in a form of advertisement, they are often seamlessly included in other media content (in other words – hidden) and in that way have a more subtle form, but sometimes they are even more effective (Trappey 1996; Lakhani 2008; Ruch et al. 2016). In both explicit and implicit (especially through advertisements) content, the media subtly intertwine consumers' intentions and expectations, which invisibly tends to shape the lives of their users. One of the most profound media (mis)usage is practiced through implicit marketing messages, in this paper also called "hidden advertisements". Their main characteristic is that they are "hidden" in other media content (music, movie, photography, fiction, etc.). Such a form enables them to draw attention to certain products or services. Implicit advertisements do not have an obvious influence on consumers and, therefore, people are usually unaware of their manipulation, as they do not feel persuaded or compelled (Šušnjić 1984, Ruch et al. 2016; Singh & Nayyar 2017). The main characteristic of hidden advertisements is that they do not persuade in a blatant way – they draw attention and instill ideas, needs, desires and standards.

Young people access mass media and, ever more so, digital media content. Many studies show that digital media is being used ever more progressively, and is having increasingly adverse effects on youth (Arsenijević & Andevski 2013; Twenge 2017; Office of National Statistics 2018; Eurostat 2019). Young people, using this media, easily become objects of manipulation. Manipulation has been attributed with the characteristics of "chameleon nature" (Kolev 2012: 56), which changes according to the properties of individuals being manipulated (years, habits, preferences, weak points...). Manipulation can be related to the availability of information, technical competencies as well as participation on social networks that become "a dark age of mediocrity, manipulation and narcissism" (Ružić 2013).

The general aim of the research presented in this paper is to examine do young people perceive hidden media messages. Research results would provide possible directions on how to help young people to shape their critical thinking and reflect on advertisements, and thus prevent media messages from manipulating and managing their lives. The operationalization of media literacy is based on the ideas of Henry Jenkins, a well-known author in the field of media theory. Jenkins describes the basic multimedia competencies as preconditions for media literacy and successful participation in multimedia participatory processes (Jenkins et al. 2009). Jenkins highlights the social, educational and political significance of media participatory culture and creates a model of 12 new skills in interaction with new media: Play, Performance, Perspective, Appropriation, Multitasking, Collective Intelligence, Judgment, Transmedia Navigation, Networking, Negotiation, Distributed Cognition and Visualization.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. Research goals

The general goal of the research is to determine the level of perception of implicit marketing messages from various media sources among the student population. Specific research goals are to examine:

- the differences in perception of implicit marketing messages in relation to the field of education and gender,
- sources of implicit marketing messages (traditional and digital media),
- the differences in perception of implicit marketing messages in relation to the type of the media,
- the impact of advertisements on the purchase of products or services and
- the impact of advertisements on the creation of young people's needs.

In this way, research would provide more general insights if young people recognize the enormous possibilities of media communication. Can they protect themselves from media manipulation and can they grow from mere media consumers to become reflexive critics and creators of media and virtual space?

2.2. Research instrument

The research instrument is designed for the purpose of this paper and consists of close-ended questions, with categorical or numerical answers. The first part of the instrument is oriented on the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents. The second part was focused on the respondents' perception of

implicit advertisements, the source of these messages and the impact of marketing messages on the respondents' behaviour and needs. The responses offered for the second part of the questionnaire were mainly numerical (Likert scale from 1 to 5)³, except for one question, which had categorical responses.

The research was based on self-reported data provided by the respondents. Prior to the investigation of the respondents' perception of hidden marketing messages, the instrument provided their brief interpretation, as follows: Hidden marketing messages are not obvious and are not in a form of advertisements, but seamlessly integrated into other media content. They come in different forms and can draw attention to the name, product, slogan or logo of the company. We can find them in a music video or lyrics, in a movie or a book, in a blog or a tweet. Respondents were then asked to express their degree of agreement with the statement: I perceive marketing messages (for brands or products) in media content that are not in the form of advertisements.

The next statement was related to the type of media as the source of these advertisements, and the exact phrasing was the following: I perceive marketing messages that are not in the form of advertisements from the following media content:

- traditional media (TV, print media, radio, books),
- digital media (internet and social networks),
- I don't notice such messages.

Finally, the last part of the questionnaire was oriented on the effects of advertisements on respondents' behavior and needs. Two following statements with numerical answers were included.

- Advertisements draw my attention to what I need.
- Advertisements influence which product brands or service brands I buy.

All the results obtained from this research were analysed in the programme SPSS and connected with socio-demographic characteristics.

2.3. Research sample and procedure

The survey was conducted in 2021 among the student population in Serbia, specifically at the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Technical Sciences, University of Novi Sad. The students from the Faculty of Philosophy were oriented toward social sciences and humanities as the educational field, while

³ 1 - completely disagree, 2 - mostly disagree, 3 - not sure, 4 - mostly agree, 5 - completely agree.

students from the Faculty of Technical Sciences were oriented toward engineering and technology. Convenient sampling was used in this research. The results were obtained from 292 respondents, 106 males and 186 females, 144 of which were students of humanities and social sciences, and 148 studied engineering and technology. This distribution of respondents points to an even division and an objective sample of the student population (Table 1). The research data was processed in the SPSS program for statistical analysis. The research implemented descriptive statistics (arithmetic mean, standard deviation, frequencies). For analysing differences in the perception of implicit marketing messages in relation to sociodemographic characteristics of respondents, the one-way analysis of variance ANOVA and t-test were used.

The sociocultural and educational context of the research sample (Table 1) is interesting, since the results obtained on this sample are indicative in terms of students' adaptation to global technological changes. Having in mind that the research subject - implicit (hidden) marketing messages - is often found in music, movies, books, photographs and other media content – it was determined that the research sample should comprise students, as the young population that still does not have responsibilities which includes work and family, and have more spare time to track various media content. Furthermore, the education level and the age of the sample are deliberately chosen, on the assumption that the academic background is a fair representation of media competence among young people as a prerequisite for recognizing implicit advertisements.

Table 1. Distribution of respondents in relation to gender and field of education

		Field of education		Total
		Humanities and social sciences	Engineering and technology	
Gender	Male	34	72	106
	Female	110	73	183
Total		142	144	289

There are more female than male respondents (108 vs. 34) in the humanities and social sciences (hereinafter referred to as H&S), while in the technical-technological field (referred to as E&T), the gender distribution is almost equal (72 female and 73 male respondents, Table 1).

Table 2. Distribution of respondents in relation to the year of the study

	Number of respondents	Percent
3 rd year of undergraduate studies	131	45.60
4 th year of undergraduate studies	156	54.40
Total	287	100.00

Respondents were attending either the third or the fourth year of undergraduate studies. The groups of respondents regarding the year of the study were approximately equal (Table 2).

3. RESULTS

3.1. Perception of implicit marketing messages

According to the general goal of the research, the level of perception of implicit marketing messages from various media sources among the student population was presented in the following table.

Table 3. Perception of implicit marketing messages from various media sources

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
In music	1	5	3.28	1.40
In movies and TV shows	1	5	3.70	1.14
In photography	1	5	3.54	1.15
In books	1	5	2.76	1.32
Average	1	5	3.31	0.91

The general perception of implicit marketing messages from media is moderate - the score is 3.31 (Table 2). The respondents perceive them best in visual sources: movies and TV shows and in photography – the scores are high (above 3.51). Music and books as media sources scored lower. The standard deviation is higher for the options movie and photography than for the options music and books.

3.2. Perception of implicit marketing messages concerning sociodemographic gender and the field of education

According to the first specific research goal, the differences in the perception of implicit marketing messages in relation to sociodemographic characteristics of respondents were identified. The independent samples t-test was used to check the difference in relation to the respondents' gender. It was found

that there are no statistically significant differences in the perception of hidden advertisements in relation to gender, i.e. there is no significant difference in results between men ($M=3.29$; $SD=0.87$) and women ($M=3.33$; $SD=0.94$); $t(287)=-0.34$; $p=0.73$. There are no statistically significant differences in relation to the field of education, either. Respondents studying social sciences and humanities ($M=3.41$; $SD=0.88$) perceive hidden advertisements more than respondents oriented of engineering and technology ($M=3.23$; $SD=0.94$), but this difference is not statistically significant: $t(287)=1.57$; $p=0.118$.

3.3. Perception of implicit marketing messages in relation to the type of the media

The second specific research goal was to determine the representation of media types as sources of hidden advertisements. Results are presented in the following table.

Table 4. Sources of implicit marketing messages

	Frequency	Percent
Traditional media	57	19.70
Digital media	196	67.80
Not noticing	36	12.50
Total	289	100.00

The perception of implicit marketing messages is categorized into two groups: from the traditional media (TV, print media, radio, books), and from the digital media (Internet and social networks), and are shown in the first row of Table 3. The digital media dominate as the source in which students encounter implicit marketing messages. The next source is the traditional media, while 12.50% of respondents do not notice such messages at all (Table 4).

After revealing from what type of media – traditional or digital – the respondents claim they perceive them, the fourth specific research goal was to determine if there are any differences in perception of hidden advertisements in relation to their media source. The one-factor analysis of variance ANOVA was used. In the beginning, descriptive statistics was conducted, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Descriptive statistic

	N	Mean	SD	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Min	Max	Between-Component Variance
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
Traditional media	57	3.65	0.81	0.11	3.44	3.86	2	5.00	
Digital media	196	3.51	0.70	0.05	3.41	3.61	2	5.00	
Not noticing	36	1.76	0.44	0.07	1.61	1.91	1	2.25	
Total	289	3.32	0.91	0.05	3.21	3.42	1	5.00	
Model									
Fixed Effects			0.69	0.04	3.24	3.40			
Random Effects				0.61	0.71	5.93			0.71

The subjects were divided into three groups: the first group consists of respondents claiming to perceive hidden advertisements when they come from traditional media (N=57), then respondents perceiving hidden advertisements from digital media (N=196), while the third group consists of respondents claiming that they do not perceive these advertisements (N=36). The first and the second group have a high level of perception of hidden advertisements (above 3.51), while the third group, which does not notice these advertisements, has a low score of perception.

Table 6 shows the test of homogeneity of variances (Levene's test). This test was used to examine the equality of variances in the results in all three groups of subjects.

Table 6. Test of homogeneity of variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Based on Mean	8.98	2	286.00	0.000
Based on the Median	6.13	2	286.00	0.002
Based on the Median and with adjusted df	6.13	2	233.21	0.003
Based on trimmed mean	8.90	2	286.00	0.000

The value of Sig. 0.000 is less than 0.05, which means that the assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated (Table 6). Therefore, additional Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests were performed. The results are shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Welch and Brown-Forsythe test

	Statistic ^a	df1	df2	Sig.
Welch	210.19	2	91.02	0
Brown-Forsythe	118.68	2	124.51	0

a. Asymptotically F distributed.

Based on the value of Sig. For both tests (Table 7), it is determined that there is a significant statistical difference between the groups.

Table 8. One-factor analysis of variance ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	100.93	2	50.47	103.49	0
Within Groups	139.47	286	0.49		
Total	240.41	288			

A statistically significant difference was found at the $p < 0.05$ level in the perception of hidden advertisements in relation to three groups of respondents $F(2, 286) = 103.49$, $p = 0.00$ (Table 8). Based on Table 9, the statistical significance of the differences between each pair of groups is given.

Table 9. Multiple comparisons

		Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Traditional media	digital media	0.14	0.11	0.36	-0.15	0.39
	not noticing	1.89*	0.15	0.00	1.50	2.24
Digital media	traditional media	-0.14	0.11	0.36	-0.39	0.10
	not noticing	1.75*	0.13	0.00	1.45	2.04
Not noticing	traditional media	-1.89*	0.15	0.00	-2.24	-1.54
	digital media	-1.75*	0.13	0.00	-2.05	-1.45

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Post hoc comparisons using Tukey's HSD test, however, show that this statistically significant difference is achieved between not noticing hidden advertisements and perceiving them, regardless of whether they come from traditional media or digital media. However, there is no statistically significant difference between the average scores of respondents who perceive advertisements from traditional media and those from digital media (Table 9). To determine the size of the effect, eta squared was calculated by dividing the 216umo f squared deviations of the different groups by the total 216umo f squares. The value of eta square is 0.42, which according to Cohen (1977) is classified as a large effect.

3.4. *Impact of marketing messages*

An influence of advertisements on a purchasing practice or on creating respondents' needs has been analysed and results are shown in the following tables.

Table 10. Impact of advertisements on the purchase and creating needs

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
The impact of implicit advertising on purchasing	287	1	5	2.58	1.23
The effect of implicit advertising on the creation of needs	285	1	5	2.33	1.15

The results presented in Table 10 indicate that respondents' perception of the impact of advertisements on their purchase practice is low, while the impact of advertising on the creation of their needs is very low.

4. DISCUSSION

The results of the survey show that respondents on average perceive implicit marketing messages in media content moderately (Table 2). Specifically, the perception of hidden advertisements is high when they come from visual media content: from movies and TV shows and from photography, whereas it is moderate when they come from music and books. Digital media dominate with 69.1% as a source in which students encounter those messages (Table 3). There are no statistically significant differences in perception of hidden advertisements in relation to gender, the field of education or their media source. Finally, respondents perceive that impact of advertisements on their purchase practice is low, while the impact of advertising on the creation of their needs is very low.

The visual aspect of perception and communication has always been extremely important, but with the rapid growth of online communication, it is becoming indispensable. Moreover, visual communication is an irreplaceable part of every modern marketing strategy (Manic 2015). Hence, the results of this survey are logical and expected. It is, however, interesting that the standard deviation is higher for the options music and books (they are more spread out around the mean), than for the options movies and photography. Respondents have more coherent answers regarding movies and photography as the source of hidden

advertisements than regarding books and music. More variation in responses is probably a consequence of the fact that, in the dominance of visual messages on digital media, music and books are less dominant media sources. Moreover, the findings that the dominant source of hidden advertisements are the digital media, while there is no statistically significant difference between the perception of hidden advertisements from traditional and digital media is interesting. This means that the effectiveness of implicit marketing messages from new media is not more effective, but rather that they are more common, as digital media is much more widespread among young people these days.

Media content, both traditional and digital media, are abundant sources of advertisements (Banić 2015, Miliša & Zloković 2008). Explicit marketing messages, in a form of advertisements, are broadcasted in carefully chosen moments and places, when the attention and concentration of a specific target group of consumers are the highest. Implicit marketing messages are intertwined with, and hidden in media content (music, movies, photos, texts, etc.), and are more subtle, but no less powerful. They are therefore more difficult to ignore and dismiss than the explicit ones, as users are usually not aware of being affected.

When it comes to young people, they still do not have a fully developed capacity for critical thinking and are therefore highly susceptible to media manipulation and indoctrination (Jenkins et al. 2009; Literat 2013; Arsenijević & Andevski 2015). Unconscious that they are under the influence of advertisements, young people can lose their attitudes and take in the intent of the media as their own. Media have the power to turn the public into powerless and incompetent consumers, reducing their desire to move by their own, internal forces into innovations, changes and reforms.

The results of this study suggest that respondents partially recognize implicit marketing messages, which is not a satisfactory finding, given the educational structure of the sample. If students as the intellectual elite of Serbia do not fully develop the ability to perceive manipulative techniques used by the media - the question arises as to how these skills are developed in other youth categories, and even in the whole population. This is precisely why the ability of media literacy of young people is extremely important, such as mastering skills and competencies to recognize commercial, social, ideological, political and other elements of media messages that have a manipulative effect in terms of persuading about certain attitudes or behaviours (Potter 2004). This is especially the case with implicit, less obvious marketing messages. Having in mind that digital media is

proven to be the dominant source of hidden advertisements, it is even more important to develop those skills as a part of new media literacy for young people.

Research results should be analysed and interpreted in light of the complex research of media literacy which was also conducted among students in Serbia. This survey we conducted in 2013, indicated that the academic and educational population in Serbia have insufficiently developed media competencies. These competencies reflect the capability to experiment with problem-solving strategies, the skill to take alternative identities with the purpose of improvisation and discovery, the capacity to (re)construct models of real-life processes, the ability to create collective knowledge to achieve a common goal, the ability to meaningfully and creatively process media content, as well as the ability to effectively participate in different online communities (Arsenijević & Andevski 2013; 2015).

Considering this, the research results presented in this paper are logical. The users lacking multimedia competencies cannot possibly develop the ability to recognize implicit marketing messages in media content. Hence the ability of the media to manipulate those phenomena to which young people are especially related, to manipulate the aspects constituting not only general social identity but also so-called particular identities (Ratković 2015). With a reservation due to the possible social desirability of the response, it can be said that the results are more encouraging regarding the impact of advertisements on young peoples' purchases and the forming of their needs. The respondents perceive that advertisements have a low impact on their purchases and do not create their needs (Table 4). It is, however, necessary to be careful in interpreting the results obtained. A possible explanation is that young people are often financially dependent on their parents. The fact that young people do not buy goods that are imposed on them through advertisements could not be because marketing practices failed to persuade them, but rather because they lack their own financial resources.

The logical direction for further research is examining the effects of implicit marketing messages - changing the respondents' attitudes on the products and services promoted, on creating and shaping their needs, as well as the changes in respondents' practice (purchasing). In this sense, the research methodology should be carefully developed, and the research procedure and sample should be competently planned, as the impact of implicit and subliminal marketing messages on consumers purchasing practices and preferences are objects of continuous and intense research, proclaimed to be from strong to insignificant - still to be determined (Sur 2015; Ruch et al. 2016; Singh & Nayyar 2017; Sofi et al. 2018).

5. CONCLUSION

This paper follows subtle forms of implicit action of media content that become more attractive to a real, rational and explicit part of the reality that surrounds the most sensitive media audience - young people. The real question is not how to protect them, as the new media is becoming ever more present in their everyday lives. The question is how to improve their new media literacy, make them less susceptible to media manipulations, and be able to fully participate in the contemporary media flows (Andevski, Arsenijević & Banić 2018).

First and foremost, a new form of media literacy should represent the ability to apply critical thinking in the evaluation of media content; but also it should promote values of the new humanism, such as understanding, tolerance and respect for diversity and ethics - set in the framework of "global citizenship" (Tornero & Varis 2010: 120). It is important to educate users (especially the young ones) not to accept messages that jeopardize their authenticity and their free choices, and not to follow the paths that media pursues, but to seek realization in real (and not only in a virtual) environment. The focus is on media literacy, and media competencies (Potter 2004; Jenkins 2009).

The critique of current media practices is an important step in media literacy. The roles of the family, educational institutions, and society as a whole is important, as well as the support of certain governmental institutions and appropriate legal regulations. There is an interesting example in Belgium, where advertisements of products intended for "the needs of young people" are forbidden ten minutes before and after broadcasting the content intended for them (Miliša & Zloković 2008).

Young people should be encouraged to have an active attitude toward reality – to develop self-determination, to shape attitudes, but also to stand behind their own choices and decisions. Higher levels of media literacy will enable them to understand better the boundaries between the real world and the world shaped by media. Only media-literate people will find clear indications of how to navigate the world of the media, reach the desired information and experiences, and build the life they want - not the kind that media impose on them (Potter 2004).

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DIGITALNO NASILJE MEĐU UČENICIMA – DA LI SU UČENICI SA INVALIDITETOM, RAZVOJNIM SMETNJAMA I TEŠKOĆAMA NAROČITO RANJIVA GRUPA?²

Vršnjačko nasilje u školi predstavlja ozbiljan obrazovni problem koji može imati značajne posledice po uključene učenike. Korišćenjem digitalnih medija, koji su danas postali jedno od dominantnih sredstava komunikacije dece i mladih, povećava se verovatnoća njihove zloupotrebe u cilju viktimizacije vršnjaka. Istovremeno, anonimnost koju pružaju digitalni mediji doprinosi tome da nasilnici često ne moraju da se plaše posledica takvog ponašanja. S druge strane, žrtve nisu izložene ovom obliku neadekvatne socijalne interakcije samo kada su u školi, već stalno i na bilo kom mestu. Digitalno nasilje, koje podrazumeva korišćenje digitalnih medija u cilju nanošenja štete drugim učenicima, posebno je aktuelan oblik vršnjačkog nasilja upravo zbog svakodnevne upotrebe digitalnih uređaja od strane učenika. Rad ima za cilj da ukaže na specifičnosti digitalnog nasilja među učenicima, faktore rizika koji povećavaju verovatnoću izloženosti učenika ovom obliku nasilja, kao i posledice koje ono ostavlja. Posebna pažnja je posvećena razmatranju da li su invaliditet, razvojne smetnje i teškoće faktori rizika za digitalno nasilje, odnosno da li učenici sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama predstavljaju posebno ranjivu grupu dece. U nastojanju da se doprinese ostvarivanju inkluzivnog obrazovanja, od posebnog značaja su naporu škole na smanjenju učestalosti digitalnog nasilja između svih učenika, a posebno prema učenicima sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama. Posebna pažnja u radu posvećena je ukazivanju na mogućnosti preventivnog delovanja škole u cilju smanjenja učestalosti digitalnog nasilja među učenicima.

Ključne reči: digitalno nasilje, faktori rizika, učenici sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama, škola, prevencija.

1. UVOD

Vršnjačko nasilje predstavlja značajan problem obrazovnog sistema koji može ostaviti brojne negativne posledice po učenike. Klasično nasilje prevashodno je vezano za školski kontekst i uglavnom se dešava kada su učenici u školi. Danas, s

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obzirom na sveprisutnost digitalnih medija u životima dece i mladih, fenomen vršnjačkog nasilja poprima novi oblik, pri čemu se pojavljuju novi načini viktimizacije žrtava. Čini se da je digitalno nasilje u porastu među adolescentima, što se delom može pripisati povećanom pristupu digitalnim uređajima i manjem nadzoru odraslih u onlajn okruženju (Stathopoulou et al. 2018; Waasdorp & Bradshaw 2015).

Među faktorima koji pogoduju učestalosti digitalnog nasilja mogu se izdvojiti: povećana upotreba mobilnih tehnologija, pojava društvenih mreža, brojne aplikacije koje omogućavaju socijalno povezivanje u onlajn prostoru, anonimnost koju internet nudi, kao i kontinuirani porast dezinhibicije (smanjenje inhibicija koje bi inače sprečile pojedince da nanose štetu drugima) zbog anonimnosti koju internet omogućava (Aboujaoude et al. 2015). Anonimnost doprinosi tome da se nasilnik ne mora bojati posledica ispoljenog neadekvatnog ponašanja. S druge strane, anonimnost može doprineti tome da žrtva oseća veću ugroženost kada ne zna ko je počinitelj digitalnog nasilja i od koga bi konkretno trebalo da se zaštiti, kao i veću zabrinutost zbog toga što je nepoznato ko bi sve mogao biti publika (Aboujaoude et al. 2015; Ansary 2020; Slonje et al. 2013). Karakteristike poput anonimnosti, pristupačnosti elektronske komunikacije i brzog širenja publike, rezultiraju neograničenim brojem pojedinaca na koje može uticati digitalno nasilje (Peled 2019). Ovaj oblik vršnjačkog nasilja može se doživljavati kada je učenik u školi, ali i izvan škole (Tokunaga 2010), što doprinosi tome da učenik koji je žrtva tokom čitavog dana bude izložen viktimizaciji od strane vršnjaka.

Cilj rada je usmeren na ukazivanje na specifičnosti digitalnog nasilja među učenicima, identifikovanje faktora rizika koji povećavaju verovatnoću izloženosti učenika ovom obliku nasilja, kao i ukazivanje na posledice koje ono ostavlja. Naročita pažnja u radu biće posvećena razmatranju da li su invaliditet, razvojne smetnje i teškoće faktori rizika za digitalno nasilje, tj. da li učenici sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama predstavljaju posebno ranjivu grupu dece. Ukazuje se i na mogućnosti preventivnog delovanja škole u cilju smanjenja učestalosti digitalnog nasilja među učenicima.

2. SPECIFIČNOSTI DIGITALNOG NASILJA

Vršnjačko nasilje definiše se kao „ponovljeno agresivno ponašanje fizičke, relacione i verbalne prirode od strane pojedinaca koji imaju veću moć u okviru vršnjačke grupe i svesno zloupotrebljavaju tu moć zarad povređivanja

osobe koja je nemoćna da se suprotstavi, pri čemu žrtva ničim nije izazvala takvo ponašanje nasilnika” (Marković 2020: 14). Navedena definicija odnosi se na tzv. klasično vršnjačko nasilje, koje se odvija u neposrednom kontaktu, licem u lice, između učenika. Ipak, ustanovljeno je da digitalno nasilje ima određene specifičnosti u odnosu na klasično, zbog čega se ne može definisati na isti način. Digitalno nasilje može se definisati kao „svako ponašanje koje se izvodi putem elektronskih ili digitalnih medija od strane pojedinaca ili grupa koje neprestano komuniciraju neprijateljske ili agresivne poruke s ciljem da nanesu štetu ili nelagodu drugima” (Tokunaga, 2010: 278). Pritom, identitet nasilnika može, ali i ne mora, biti poznat žrtvi (Ansary 2020; Jenaro et al. 2018; Tokunaga 2010).

Određene karakteristike digitalnog nasilja čine ga funkcionalno drugačijim od tradicionalnog nasilja. Smit (Smith 2012 prema Slonje et al. 2013: 28) je opisao sedam karakteristika po kojima se digitalno nasilje razlikuje od klasičnog: (1) zavisi od određenog stepena tehnološke ekspertize; (2) prvenstveno je indirektno, a ne licem u lice, i stoga može biti anonimno; (3) počinitelj obično ne vidi reakciju žrtve, barem ne odmah; (4) raznovrsnost uloga posmatrača u digitalnom nasilju složenija je nego u većini klasičnog nasilja (primalac može biti sa počiniocem kada je materijal poslat ili objavljen, sa žrtvom kada je primljen, ili ni sa jednim od njih, kada žrtva prima poruku ili poseti internet sajt); (5) smatra se da je jedan od motiva klasičnog nasilja vršnjački status stečen ispoljavanjem (na zlonameran način) moći nad drugima, pred posmatračima, što nije slučaj kod digitalnog nasilja; (6) brojnost potencijalnih posmatrača je povećana, pošto digitalno nasilje može dosegnuti posebno veliku publiku iz vršnjačke grupe u poređenju sa malim grupama koje su obično posmatrači klasičnog nasilja; (7) teško je pobeći od digitalnog nasilja (ne postoji „sigurno utočište”), jer se žrtvi mogu slati poruke na mobilni telefon ili računar ili linkovi ka neprikladnim komentarima na veb-sajtu, gde god da se ona u trenutku nalazila.

Aspekt ponavljanja je drugačiji u odnosu na klasično nasilje. Iako se digitalno nasilje može ponoviti tokom vremena, jedan incident se može ponoviti ako se materijal (poruka, snimak i sl.) prosledi različitim ljudima ili se objavi na internetu i tu objavu pogleda više ljudi (Aboujaoude et al. 2015; Ansary 2020; Slonje et al. 2013; Waasdorp & Bradshaw 2015). Takođe, aspekt razlike u pogledu moći između nasilnika i žrtve nije istovetan kao kod klasičnog nasilja. Kod digitalnog nasilja nije neophodno da nasilnik bude fizički, psihički ili na neki drugi način moćniji i uticajniji u okviru vršnjačke grupe u odnosu na žrtvu. Mogućnost anonimnosti na internetu i mogućnost da oni koji nisu socijalno uticajni mogu biti

tehnološki vešti menjaju pojam moći (Abdelrazek & Eltantawy 2020; Aboujaoude et al. 2015; Ansary 2020; Slonje et al. 2013; Waasdorp & Bradshaw 2015).

Pojedinci mogu istovremeno biti počinioci digitalnog i klasičnog nasilja (Bauman & Pero 2011; Dehue et al. 2008; Slonje et al. 2013), kao što i isti učenici mogu biti istovremeno žrtve klasičnog i digitalnog nasilja (Bauman & Pero 2011; Eldridge et al. 2021; Waasdorp & Bradshaw 2015). Međutim, često se dešava da učenici koji su žrtve klasičnog nasilja, a tehnološki su vešti, u digitalnom svetu preuzimaju ulogu nasilnika nastojeći da se osvete za sopstvenu viktimizaciju u realnom svetu (Ansary 2020; Aboujaoude et al. 2015; Eldridge et al. 2021; Slonje et al. 2013; Waasdorp & Bradshaw 2015).

Digitalno nasilje podrazumeva nasilje putem korišćenja elektronskih mesta, kao što su sajtovi za društveno umrežavanje, e-pošta, sobe za ćaskanje, razmena instant poruka, veb-lokacije, onlajn igre i razmena tekstualnih poruka (Kowalski & Limber 2013, prema Yen et al. 2014: 3544; Peled 2019). Može se pojaviti u različitim oblicima. Ovaj oblik nasilja karakterišu slanje uvreda, pretnji, širenje lažnih glasina, manipulisanje fotografijama, kršenje privatnosti krađom lozinki kako bi se omogućio pristup ličnim podacima, imejlovima, porukama itd. (Lanzillotti & Korman 2014 prema Jenaro et al. 2018: 266). Očekuje se da će se u narednom periodu, kako se tehnologija razvija, pojavljivati novi oblici digitalnog nasilja (Slonje et al. 2013). Ispoljena agresija može biti *direktna* (npr. slanje uvredljivih poruka) ili *indirektna* (npr. širenje glasina ili isključivanje nekoga iz onlajn grupe vršnjaka) (Doolei et al. 2009 prema Tsitsika et al. 2015: 2). Takođe, moguće je razlikovati forme *tekstualnog* ili *verbalnog uznemiravanja* u odnosu na *vizuelno uznemiravanje* (kompromitujuće fotografije ili video-snimci). Prema vrsti ponašanja koje se ispoljava moguće je razlikovati sledeće vrste digitalnog nasilja: *vredanje* (flaming), *uznemiravanje* (online harassment), *uhodjenje* (cyberstalking), *klevetanje* (denigration), *krađu identiteta* (masquerading), *obmanjivanje* (trickery), *razotkrivanje tajni* (outing) i *isključivanje* (exclusion) (Eldridge et al. 2021; Peled 2019; Slonje et al. 2013).

Ustanovljeno je da je, u poređenju sa učenicima koji su bili žrtve samo tradicionalnog nasilja, kod onih koji su bili izloženi digitalnom nasilju prisutna veća verovatnoća da će imati eksternalizovane i internalizovane poremećaje u ponašanju (Waasdorp & Bradshaw 2015). Kao najčešće posledice digitalnog nasilja mogu se javiti: visok nivo emocionalnog stresa (koji izaziva osećaj bespomoćnosti, bes, strah, tugu, zabrinutost, usamljenost i sl.), socijalno povlačenje, depresija, anksioznost, aleksitimija, somatske tegobe i ugroženo fizičko zdravlje, simptomi posttraumatskog stresnog poremećaja, poremećaji u

ponašanju, delinkvencija, zloupotreba droga i alkohola, akademski problemi (izostajanje sa nastave, opadanje školskog uspeha, niska posvećenost učenju, slabija koncentracija; školske fobije i sl.), niže samopouzdanje, samopovređivanje, samoubistvo itd. (Abdelrazek & Eltantawy 2020; Aboujaoude et al. 2015; Ansary 2020; Eldridge et al. 2021; Gardella et al. 2017; Kowalski et al. 2016; Peled 2019; Slonje et al. 2013; Sourander et al. 2010; Tsitsika et al. 2015; Wright & Wachs 2020; Yen et al. 2014). Međutim, iako klasično i digitalno nasilje nezavisno izazivaju psihički stres, negativne posledice mogu biti najizraženije kod pojedinaca koji doživljavaju oba oblika nasilja (Waasdorp & Bradshaw 2015).

Čini se da su posledice viktimizacije digitalnim nasiljem (npr. nisko samopoštovanje, intenzivnija depresija) posebno izraženi kod osoba sa invaliditetom (Eldridge et al. 2021; Kowalski et al. 2016). Na primer, za adolescente muškog pola sa ADHD-om uočen je viši nivo depresije i samoubistava kao posledica izloženosti digitalnom nasilju (Yen et al. 2014). Pritom, neki činioci mogu ublažiti negativne posledice viktimizacije učenika sa intelektualnim i razvojnim smetnjama. Ustanovljeno je, na primer, da socijalna podrška od strane roditelja dece sa intelektualnim teškoćama i razvojnim smetnjama može ublažiti negativne efekte, koje viktimizacija digitalnim nasiljem ili posmatranje digitalnog nasilja kod njih može izazvati, poput subjektivnih zdravstvenih pritužbi, suicidalnih ideja i nesuicidalnog samopovređivanja (Wright & Wachs, 2020).

Digitalno nasilje izaziva negativne posledice i kod učenika koji se tako ponašaju (tzv. digitalnih nasilnika) kao što su: viši nivo usamljenosti, depresije i anksioznosti, niže samopoštovanje, zloupotreba droga i/ili alkohola, antisocijalno ponašanje, niži nivo akademskog postignuća u poređenju sa onima koji nisu uključeni u digitalno nasilje i sl. (Kowalski et al., 2016; Sourander et al. 2010).

3. RIZIČNI FAKTORI ZA DIGITALNO NASILJE

Moguće je razlikovati više faktora individualnog nivoa za koje je utvrđeno da su povezani sa digitalnim nasiljem i/ili viktimizacijom. Kada je reč o uzrastu kao individualnom faktoru, ustanovljeno je da je najkritičniji period za viktimizaciju digitalnim nasiljem na uzrastu oko 13–15 godina, odnosno u periodu ulaska u adolescenciju (Aboujaoude et al. 2015; Slonje et al. 2013). Osim toga, uključenost u digitalno nasilje nastavlja se i u odraslom dobu, ali se njegov intenzitet smanjuje nakon starije adolescencije (Ševciková & Šmahel 2009 prema Slonje et al. 2013: 28).

Varijabla pol, takođe, može predstavljati rizični faktor, pri čemu je u većem broju studija ustanovljeno da je digitalno nasilje prisutnije među devojkama u poređenju sa dečacima (Ansary 2020; Aboujaoude et al. 2015; Slonje et al. 2013; Waasdorp & Bradshaw 2015). Takav nalaz objašnjava se većom važnošću koju devojčice pridaju socijalnim odnosima u poređenju sa dečacima. Međutim, ne potvrđuju nalazi svih studija takav zaključak (npr. Dehue et al. 2008).

Ustanovljeno je da je visoka učestalost korišćenja interneta i tekstualnih (SMS) poruka (tj. više od dva sata dnevno) značajno povezana sa viktimizacijom digitalnim nasiljem (Ansary 2020; Peker 2015; Tsitsika et al. 2015). Za visok nivo anksioznosti i nisko samopoštovanje kao osobine ličnosti je pokazano da su rizični faktori za viktimizaciju digitalnim nasiljem (Ansary 2020; Kowalski et al. 2016). Nivo empatije pojedinca predstavlja, takođe, rizični faktor. Pritom, pokazalo se da sa porastom nivoa empatije opada uključenost u digitalno nasilje i obrnuto (Ansary 2020; Stathopoulou et al. 2018). Od ostalih faktora individualnog nivoa mogu se izdvojiti: drugačije seksualno opredeljenje (Ansary 2020; Aboujaoude et al. 2015; Eldridge et al. 2021; MacDonald & Roberts-Pittman 2010; Mishna et al. 2020), etnička pripadnost (Ansary 2020; Mishna et al. 2020), fizički izgled ili sposobnosti pojedinca (Mishna et al. 2020), neadekvatna socijalizacija kao faktor rizika za digitalno nasilje i/ili viktimizaciju (Peker 2015) i dr.

Kada je reč o sredinskim faktorima, od vršnjačkih faktora izdvajaju se: niska vršnjačka podrška, vršnjačka odbačenost, nedostatak prosocijalnih vršnjaka (Ansary 2020), vršnjačke norme koje se odnose na odobravanje ili neodobravanje učešća u digitalnom nasilju (Stathopoulou et al. 2018) i sl. Rizični faktori na nivou porodice su: život u jednoroditeljskoj porodici, negativno porodično okruženje, seksualno zlostavljanje (Ansary 2020), nedovoljna uključenost roditelja (Kowalski et al. 2016), neadekvatan nadzor/nadgledanje odraslih nad onlajn aktivnostima dece (Eldridge et al. 2021; Peker 2015), nizak socioekonomski status porodice (Mishna et al. 2020) i sl. Faktori škole i zajednice koji su rizični faktori za digitalno nasilje i/ili viktimizaciju su: neadekvatna školska klima, nizak nivo bezbednosti, nezadovoljstvo školom i nebezbedno susedstvo (Ansary 2020) i sl. Ustanovljene su izvesne razlike između država u pogledu učestalosti digitalnog nasilja (Abdelrazek & Eltantawy 2020; Tsitsika et al. 2015), što ukazuje i na kulturološke razlike kao mogući faktor rizika.

4. INVALIDITET, RAZVOJNE SMETNJE I TEŠKOĆE KAO RIZIČNI FAKTORI INDIVIDUALNOG NIVOA

Individualni faktori rizika za viktimizaciju mogu uključivati težinu invaliditeta (tj. uočljivije karakteristike invaliditeta) (Eldridge et al. 2021; Plichta et al. 2018), loše socijalne veštine i loše veštine suočavanja (Eldridge et al. 2021). S druge strane, faktori rizika na individualnom nivou za ispoljavanje digitalnog nasilja uključuju postojanje invaliditeta visoke incidence, kao što su smetnje u učenju ili emocionalni poremećaji (Eldridge et al. 2021). Same karakteristike vezane za invaliditet, razvojne smetnje i teškoće mogu biti u interakciji sa okruženjem pri uticaju na digitalno nasilje (npr. impulsivnost) (Eldridge et al. 2021). Izraženije smetnje u domenu emocionalnog razvoja i smetnje u učenju, takođe, predstavljaju rizični faktor za vršenje ili viktimizaciju digitalnim nasiljem (Barringer-Brown 2015). Učenici sa poremećajima iz spektra autizma mogu biti u većem riziku od viktimizacije digitalnim nasiljem, a pokazalo se da podjednako dobro kao i vršnjaci urednog razvoja razumeju i prepoznaju oblike klasičnog i digitalnog nasilja (Hwang et al. 2018).

U studiji koja je realizovana na uzorku od 251 adolescenta muškog pola sa dijagnozom poremećaja pažnje/hiperaktivnosti (ADHD) na Tajvanu ustanovljeno je da je 48 (19,1%) učesnika prijavilo da su žrtve, a 36 (14,3%) da su izvršioци digitalnog nasilja. Dakle, rizik od uključenosti u digitalno nasilje može biti veći za adolescente sa ADHD-om (Yen et al., 2014). Takav nalaz potvrđen je i kod studentske populacije (Abdelrazek & Eltantawy 2020). Deca sa intelektualnim i razvojnim teškoćama mogu biti posebno ranjiva grupa u pogledu izloženosti digitalnom nasilju od strane vršnjaka urednog razvoja (McHugh & Howard 2017). Ustanovljeno je, takođe, da u odraslom dobu osobe sa ovakvom vrstom smetnji i teškoća mogu biti u većem riziku od viktimizacije. Na primer, u istraživanju koje je realizovano na uzorku od 269 osoba sa intelektualnim teškoćama koje su pohađale centre za obuku odraslih pokazalo se da intelektualne teškoće u odraslom dobu mogu predstavljati rizični faktor za viktimizaciju digitalnim nasiljem. Intelektualna ometenost je razvojna smetnja koju karakterišu ograničenja u intelektualnom funkcionisanju i adaptivnom ponašanju, što rezultira potrebom za dodatnom podrškom ovim osobama u uobičajenim životnim aktivnostima (Jenaro et al. 2018), zbog čega nailaze na značajne teškoće i bivaju izloženi raznim opasnostima u digitalnom svetu.

Rezultati istraživanja koje su sproveli Kovalski i sar. (Kowalski et al. 2016) na uzorku od 205 studenata pokazuju da su, kao i kod klasičnog nasilja,

pojedinci sa invaliditetom bili posebno izloženi riziku od viktimizacije digitalnim nasiljem. Prediktori viktimizacije uključivali su viktimizaciju klasičnim nasiljem, korišćenje interneta i uočljivost invaliditeta. Za razliku od navedenih razvojnih poremećaja i smetnji, istraživanje u kome je poređena uključenost u digitalno nasilje u statusu nasilnika ili žrtve kod učenika sa oštećenja sluha (gluvih i nagluvih učenika) i bez njega nisu ustanovljene statistički značajne razlike između navedenih kategorija učenika (Bauman & Pero 2011). Vreme provedeno na internetu je značajan rizični faktor, koji u interakciji sa invaliditetom, intelektualnim teškoćama ili razvojnim smetnjama povećava verovatnoću za ispoljavanje digitalnog nasilja i/ili viktimizaciju digitalnim nasiljem ovih učenika (Barringer-Brown 2015; Didden et al. 2009; Eldridge et al. 2021).

Kada je reč o sredinskim faktorima, pokazalo se da specifičnosti sredine mogu biti jedan od faktora koji doprinosi viktimizaciji učenika sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama putem klasičnog i/ili digitalnog nasilja. Naime, ustanovljeno je da su deca sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama, koja se u okviru inkluzije školuju u redovnim školama, u većem riziku od viktimizacije u poređenju sa vršnjacima koji se školuju u specijalnim školama (Chan et al. 2018; Eldridge et al. 2021). Takođe, ustanovljeno je da je digitalno nasilje u značajnoj meri prisutno među učenicima sa intelektualnim i razvojnim smetnjama koji pohađaju specijalne obrazovne ustanove (Didden et al. 2009). Dalje, nizak nivo socijalne podrške može se smatrati značajnim sredinskim rizičnim faktorom za digitalno nasilje i viktimizaciju osoba sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama (Eldridge et al. 2021), dok se kao naročito značajan faktor individualnog nivoa za učenike sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama izdvaja nadzor odraslih prilikom korišćenja interneta, naročito za učenike sa sniženim intelektualnim sposobnostima (Eldridge et al. 2021).

5. PREVENCIJA DIGITALNOG NASILJA MEĐU UČENICIMA

Prevenција digitalnog nasilja, koja se kao i kod klasičnog nasilja zasniva na sistemskom pristupu, može dati značajne pozitivne efekte (Aboujaoude et al. 2015; Mishna et al. 2020; Slonje et al. 2013; Waasdorp & Bradshaw 2015). Takav pristup zasniva se na primeni različitih mera i aktivnosti, ne samo u školi nego i izvan nje – u porodici, lokalnoj zajednici, medijima i društvu u celini. Neke od tih mera i aktivnosti odnose se na: medijske kampanje edukacije stanovništva, primenu školskih programa prevencije digitalnog i klasičnog nasilja, roditeljski

nadzor i uključivanje, donošenje odgovarajućih pravnih akata, uključivanje zdravstvenih radnika (posebno pedijatar i stručnjaka za mentalno zdravlje) u prevenciju itd. (Aboujaoude et al. 2015; Ansary 2020; Barringer-Brown 2015).

Škola može primeniti neki od gotovih programa prevencije digitalnog nasilja (za pregled videti Tanrikulu 2018) ili doneti školski program prevencije koji će obuhvatati niz mera i aktivnosti za koje je procenjeno da odgovaraju specifičnim potrebama učenika koji tu školu pohađaju. U školi se, između ostalog, može: raditi na razvoju empatije kod učenika za žrtve digitalnog nasilja, mogu se angažovati vršnjaci na prevenciji digitalnog nasilja (krugovi kvaliteta, vršnjačka podrška, vršnjačko mentorstvo i sl.) (Ansary, 2020; Slonje et al. 2013), raditi na uspostavljanju saradnje sa roditeljima, na edukaciji roditelja, negovanju pozitivne školske klime, (Ansary 2020), razvoju nastavničkih kompetencija za adekvatno preventivno delovanje (Ansary 2020; Marković et al., 2020), razvoju tolerancije kod učenika (Barringer-Brown 2015), razvoju socio-emocionalnih veština učenika (Eldridge et al. 2021), razvoju digitalne pismenosti kod učenika (Didden et al. 2009) i sl.

6. ZAKLJUČAK

Usled neprestanog razvoja digitalnih tehnologija, kao i sve veće upotrebe tehnologije od strane učenika, digitalno nasilje predstavlja važan školski i širi društveni problem, koji zahteva pravovremenu i adekvatnu reakciju. Rad je imao za cilj da ukaže na specifičnosti digitalnog nasilja među učenicima, rizične faktore koji povećavaju verovatnoću izloženosti učenika ovom obliku nasilja, kao i na posledice koje ono ostavlja. Naročita pažnja u radu posvećena je razmatranju da li su invaliditet, razvojne smetnje i teškoće faktori rizika za digitalno nasilje, odnosno da li učenici sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama predstavljaju posebno ranjivu grupu dece.

Ustanovljeno je da digitalno nasilje ima određene specifičnosti u poređenju sa klasičnim vršnjačkim nasiljem, kao i da učenici mogu imati iste, ali i različite uloge u klasičnom i digitalnom nasilju. Digitalno nasilje može se javiti u različitim oblicima koji podrazumevaju zloupotrebu digitalnih tehnologija radi povređivanja ciljane žrtve. Pokazalo se da digitalno nasilje ostavlja značajnije posledice po učenike u poređenju sa klasičnim nasiljem, zbog neprestane izloženosti pojedinca ovoj formi vršnjačkog nasilja, pri čemu su posledice najizraženije kod pojedinaca koji istovremeno doživljavaju klasično i digitalno nasilje. Takođe, digitalno nasilje ostavlja značajne posledice i po same nasilnike.

Ustanovljeno je da su posledice viktimizacije digitalnim nasiljem posebno izražene kod osoba sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama, ali i da ih određeni činioci mogu ublažiti.

Pokazalo se da različiti pojedinci, sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama ili bez njih, mogu biti izloženi riziku od viktimizacije ili vršenja digitalnog nasilja. Različiti rizični faktori, individualni ali i na drugim nivoima, mogu doprineti digitalnom nasilju i/ili viktimizaciji pojedinca. Stoga je potrebno usmeriti napore prevencije, u nastojanju da se smanji njegova učestalost i da se učenici osposobe za adekvatno korišćenje digitalnih uređaja, kao i za to da se sami zaštite i pruže podršku drugima koji su viktimizirani na internetu. Pritom, posebnu pažnju treba posvetiti pružanju podrške učenicima sa invaliditetom, razvojnim smetnjama i teškoćama, s obzirom na to da je ustanovljeno da predstavljaju naročito ranjivu grupu.

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CYBERBULLYING AMONG STUDENTS – ARE STUDENTS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS A PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE GROUP?

Summary

School bullying represents a serious educational problem that can have significant consequences for involved students. With the use of digital media, which have nowadays become one of the most dominant means of communication between children and young people, the probability of its abuse in order to victimize peers increases. At the same time, the anonymity provided by digital media contributes to the fact that bullies often do not have to be frightened about the consequences of such behavior. On the other hand, victims are not only exposed to this form of inadequate social interaction when they are in school, but constantly and at any place. Cyberbullying, which involves the use of digital media in order to harm other students, is a particularly current form of bullying precisely because of the daily use of digital devices by students. The paper aims to point out the specifics of cyberbullying among students, risk factors that increase the likelihood of exposure of students to this form of bullying, as well as the consequences it leaves. Special attention is paid to the consideration of whether disabilities are a risk factor for cyberbullying, i.e. whether students with disabilities represent a particularly vulnerable group of children. In an effort to contribute to inclusive education, the school efforts on reducing the incidence of cyberbullying among all students, and especially towards students with disabilities, is of particular importance. Special attention in the paper is paid to pointing out the possibilities of preventive action of the school in order to reduce the frequency of cyberbullying among students.

Key words: cyberbullying, risk factors, students with disabilities, school, prevention.

ODVAŽNI LJUDI: OD NEGATIVNOG DO POZITIVNOG MEDIJSKOG DISKURSA O INVALIDNOSTI U MEDIJIMA UJEDINJENIH ARAPSKIH EMIRATA

Mediji u Ujedinjenim Arapskim Emiratima prvi su mediji u svetu koji aktivno učestvuju u oblikovanju dominantno pozitivnog medijskog diskursa o invaliditetu i osobama sa invaliditetom. Uz podršku državnog aparata, terminologija koja se koristi pri izveštavanju o osobama sa invaliditetom je promenjena, pa se sada isključivo pominju pod terminom *odvažni ljudi*. U ovom radu daćemo pregled specifičnosti u vezi s izveštavanjem o osobama sa invaliditetom, odnosno odvažnim ljudima u medijima Ujedinjenih Arapskih Emirata. Ukazaćemo na pozitivne aspekte ovakvog izveštavanja i pokušati da damo nacrt modela izveštavanja koji se može koristiti u drugim medijskim sistemima.

Ključne reči: medijski diskurs, odvažni ljudi, invaliditet, UAE.

1. UVOD

Uloga medija kao posrednika u masovnom komuniciranju, procesu u kojem se odvija informisanje javnosti i izazivanje određene reakcije (Fisk, 2001), posebno je važna kada je reč o izveštavanju o osobama sa invaliditetom. Medijski tretman osoba sa invaliditetom, ima važnu ulogu u formiranju upravljanju stavovima javnog mnjenja o pitanjima invalidnosti u društvu, a utiče i na pojedinačni doživljaj invaliditeta, kako kod osoba sa invaliditetom i njihovih porodica, tako i kod publike.

Polazeći od premise da su svi medijski sadržaji konstruisani narativi koji utiču na percepciju javnosti o različitim temama od važnosti za život ljudi, u ovom radu predstavimo svojevrsni državni projekat izmene stručne, institucionalne, a time i medijske terminologije koja se odnosi na osobe sa invaliditetom.

Pristup temi dominantno je određen pretpostavkom da su svi javni diskursi, dakle i medijski diskurs, pod neupitnim uticajem centara moći. Prema Van Dejku, oni koji poseduju moć imaju kontrolu nad javnim diskursom i to u odnosu na mnoge teme čine svesno i planski, dok pojedine teme nesvesno smeštaju u drugi

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plan (prema Van Dijk, 2008). Van Dejk ističe da je diskurse o temama koje su od značaja za društvo, a posebno za osetljive društvene grupe, neophodno iznova proveravati, ispitivati i kontrolisati. U tom smislu, posebno je zanimljivo istraživati primere praktičnog delovanja centara moći sa ciljem da se konstruiše što objektivniji i pozitivniji diskurs o određenoj osetljivoj temi.

Jedna od danas najrazvijenijih država arapskog područja, Ujedinjeni Arapski Emirati (UAE), sprovela je sistemsku promenu diskursa o osobama sa invaliditetom. Kao deo napora da doprinese razvoju emiratskog društva, Vlada UAE pokrenula je Nacionalnu strategiju za osnaživanje odvažnih ljudi kojom se kroz pet polja društvenog delovanja (transformacija zdravstvenog pristupa osobama sa invaliditetom, prilagođavanje obrazovnog sistema, karijerna obuka i povećanje stepena zaposlenosti, dostupnost prostora i usluga za osobe sa invaliditetom i poboljšanje javnog, kulturnog i sportskog života) reguliše bolji status osoba sa invaliditetom u društvu. Sam termin *odvažni ljudi*², od 2017. godine, kada je šaik Muhamed bin Rašid Al Maktum uveo ovaj termin u javnu upotrebu, odnosi se na sve osobe sa invaliditetom (Emirates News Agency WAM, 2017). Šaik Muhamed ukazao je na termin *odvažni ljudi* da bi opisao ljude koji su do tada formalno nazivani ljudima sa posebnim potrebama, odnosno osobama sa invaliditetom, kako je navedeno u Federalnom zakonu br. 29. iz 2006. godine. Pomenuti zakon definisao je osobu sa posebnim potrebama kao osobu koja pati od privremenog ili trajnog, potpunog ili delimičnog nedostatka ili slabosti u svojim fizičkim, čulnim, mentalnim, komunikacionim, obrazovnim ili psihičkim sposobnostima u meri koja ograničava njegovu mogućnost obavljanja uobičajenih zahteva. Ovaj zakon štiti prava osoba sa invaliditetom i garantuje im pravo da žive dostojanstveno. U nameri da se ostvari takav način života svim osobama sa invaliditetom, Vlada UAE na čelu sa šaikom Al Maktumom doprinela je razvijanju okvira koji omogućava promenu percepcije javnosti o invaliditetu. Ukazivanjem na mogućnosti koje se u UAE pružaju osobama sa invaliditetom, a istovremeno ističući potencijale ove društvene grupe, napravljen je doprinos u

² Termin *odvažni ljudi* dolazi iz engleskog jezika, a u izvornom obliku glasi „people of determination”. Nevolje sa prevođenjem ovog termina na srpski jezik ogledaju se u razlozima upotrebe direktno prevedenih reči. Naime, logični prevod termina „people of determination” bio bi „odlučni ljudi”, ali to „odlučni ljudi” teško bi bilo upotrebljavati u duhu srpskog jezika radi formiranja novog načina oslovljavanja osoba sa invaliditetom, odnosno osoba sa posebnim potrebama. Iz tih razloga, potraženi su sinonimi reči „odlučan” i strani termin u prevodu glasi „odvažni ljudi”. Time je pronađeno jezičko, odnosno prevodilačko rešenje koje najbliže predstavlja emiratski koncept reimenovanja osoba sa invaliditetom kao grupe.

načinu predstavljanja invaliditeta. Za emiratsko društvo, invaliditet više nije prepreka, on postaje poziv na odvažno delovanje. Takvu sliku najlakše je moguće uočiti u medijskim sadržajima koji su kreirani radi ohrabrenja, podrške i motivacije osoba sa invaliditetom, odnosno društva u celini.

Cilj ovog rada je da predstavi transformaciju dominantno medicinskog diskursa o invaliditetu u medijima u diskurs koji se zasniva na izrazitoj društvenoj podršci, kakav je medijski diskurs medija u Ujedinjenim Arapskim Emiratima, te da ukaže na primere medijskog izveštavanja, koje pomaže oblikovanje novog medijskog i društvenog diskursa o invaliditetu, radi razmatranja primene slične strategije u drugim medijskim sistemima širom sveta.

2. MEDIJI I IZVEŠTAVANJE O ZDRAVSTVENO UGROŽENIM GRUPAMA

Globalni mediji poslednjih decenija postaju sve otvoreniji za osetljive teme i izveštavanje o zdravstveno ugroženim grupama (Čigoja Piper, 2018). Nekadašnje medicinske stigme (Gofman, 2009), koje su podrazumevale isključivanje teških psiholoških i fizičkih oboljenja, kao i telesnih nedostataka iz dnevnih medijskih tema, danas su prevaziđene. Razvoj ovih sadržaja u velikoj meri podstaknut je angažovanjem farmaceutske industrije (prema Ratković Njegovan i Šolak, 2013) u formiranju medijske agende, kojom se omogućava predstavljanje različitih oboljenja i medicinskih stanja radi kojih je neophodno koristiti odgovarajuće farmaceutske proizvode. Tako su se vremenom razvijale različite rubrike koje se odnose na mentalna oboljenja, hronične bolesti i zdrav život (Gosden & Beder, 2001). Zdravstvene teme tako su često prisutne u formi vesti koje se odnose na nekoliko užih tema. „Najčešće su to: objavljivanje nove vladine politike koja utiče na ustrojstvo zdravstvenog sistema i zbivanja u njemu, nova naučna proučavanja bolesti ili nekog postupka zdravstvene zaštite, promene u trendovima bolesti, posebna razmatranja ugroženih grupa u pogledu nekih specifičnih problema (žena, dece, etničkih grupa), najnoviji trendovi i modeli zdravstvenog ponašanja, građanska prava u vezi sa zdravljem, obeležavanje posebnih datuma vezanih za određene bolesti i dr.” (Ratković Njegovan i Šolak, 2013: 49). I druge novinarske forme nalaze se u upotrebi kada je reč o temama iz oblasti zdravstva, s tim da se pojedine forme koriste radi maskiranja promocije određenog proizvoda ili usluge. Prema Kljajiću, najčešće se posredstvom intervjua ostvaruje publicitet koji omogućava prodaju i to tako što je intervjuisana osoba popularna ličnost ili ličnost sa kredibilitetom kada je reč o zdravstvu, poput lekara, vlasnika privatnih klinika i sl. (Kljajić, 2009). „Jedan od sve učestalijih primera

intervjua u funkciji reklame jesu intervjui u specijalizovanoj štampi (iako se povremeno primeri mogu naći i u dnevnim listovima) gde se na kraju intervjua daje adresa i telefon stručnjaka iz određene oblasti, najčešće medicine najšire” (Kljajić, 2009: 386).

U istraživanjima medijskog predstavljanja zdravstvenih tema uočava se značajan broj medijskih izveštaja (prema Ratković Njegovan i Šolak, 2013) o zdravstvenim problemima poput dijabetesa, seksualno prenosivih bolesti, brojnih kancerogenih oboljenja, a u poslednje dve godine tom izveštavanju pridružila se i tematizacija pandemije virusa korona. S druge strane, istraživanja medijskog predstavljanja osoba sa invaliditetom i različitih vidova invaliditeta kao teme najčešće pokazuju da je medijski prostor ograničen za ovu temu, a posebno za prikazivanje pojedinaca i grupa sa invalidetom; one se, kako ističu Brigs i Kobli, najčešće prikazuju u ograničenom broju društvenih uloga (Brigs i Kobli, 2005). Te društvene uloge uglavnom se vezuju za invaliditet kao deo identiteta osobe, a medijske poruke se oslanjaju na invaliditet kao temu. Tako su osobe sa fizičkim invaliditetom uglavnom akteri medijskih objava koje govore o invaliditetu kao temi i životu sa invaliditetom, a ređe su akteri priča koje ne tematizuju invaliditet. Pored toga, medijsko predstavljanje osoba sa invaliditetom uglavnom odlikuju stereotipizacija i diskriminacija, a neretko i senzacionalizam; takve priče su često oblikovane naglašeno sentimentalno, prikazujući aktore sa invaliditetom kao nesposobne i izrazito ranjive (prema Adams, 2006). Da je to slučaj i sa medijskim sadržajima u Srbiji pokazuju ranije analize medijskog izveštavanja o osobama sa invaliditetom. Prema Ružičić-Novković, mediji su fokusirani na temu invaliditeta uglavnom kada je reč o trenutno aktuelnim i atraktivnim temama, a osobe sa invaliditetom najčešće su predstavljene kao nemoćne, osetljive i socijalno ugrožene. Otežavajuću okolnost pri izveštavanju o različitim vrstama invaliditeta i osobama sa invaliditetom predstavlja i nedostatak specijalizacije novinara i novinarki za teme o kojima bi trebalo da izveštavaju. „Površnost u izveštavanju stvara pogrešnu sliku o bolestima i često se zasniva na nepoštenim asocijacijama” (Janjić, 2017: 127). S obzirom na to da je izostanak informisanosti i edukacije novinara o temi čest slučaj kada je u pitanju izveštavanje o zdravstvenim stanjima koji dovode do invaliditeta, dominantno je izveštavanje koje ima za cilj da izazove burne emotivne reakcije publike, pre nego da prenese informacije od značaja za zainteresovanu javnost. „Atmosfera i osnovno osećanje [u medijskim sadržajima o osoba sa invaliditetom] upućuju na brigu, tugu i patnju, što implicira to da osobe s toliko problema samo produkuju probleme društvu” (Ružičić-Novković, 2014: 18). Upravo zbog ovakvog medijskog tretmana invaliditeta i medijske slike osoba

sa invaliditetom u medijima, potrebno je promišljati nove načine predstavljanja i konstruisati narative koji su vid podsticaja za osobe sa invaliditetom, a ujedno su i adekvatan izvor informacija za širu javnost.

3. MEDIJI U UJEDINJENIM ARAPSKIM EMIRATIMA I IZGRADNJA POZITIVNOG DISKURSA O INVALIDITETU

Medijska agenda svih nacionalnih medija u Ujedinjenim Arapskim Emiratima dominantno je određena državnim medijskom politikom. Reč je o ustavnoj federaciji sedam emirata (UAE GOV, 2022) sa odlikama apsolutne monarhije u kojoj se ne sprovode izbori (BTI, 2022). Svakim od sedam pojedinačnih emirata vlada nasledna porodica sa vođom izabranim među članovima plemena. Građani nemaju pravo da menjaju vladu, koju čine vladari svih sedam emirata. „S obzirom na to da vladajuće porodice u UAE uživaju visok stepen legitimeteta, bilo je malo podsticaja za diverzifikaciju političkog sistema i proširenje participativnih mehanizama za stanovništvo Emirata” (BTI, 2022). U skladu sa ustavom, UAE garantuju svim građanima „slobodu govora i mišljenja”, kao i „slobodu komuniciranja”, što je deo i etičkog kodeksa nacionalnih i inostranih medija koji posluju u ovoj zemlji. Međutim, način izveštavanja nacionalnih medija razlikuje se od izveštavanja koje je svojstveno zapadnim medijima. Svakodnevnom uvidom u medijski sadržaj nacionalnih medija, zaključuje se da je njihov autentični medijski sadržaj usmeren na izveštavanje o aktivnostima emiratske vlade, uz dominantno pozitivan pristup izveštavanju o nacionalnim pitanjima, političkim liderima i postignućima države na geopolitičkom, ekonomskom, tehnološkom i drugim planovima. Praćenjem dnevnog izveštavanja nacionalnih medijskih kuća, uočava se i prisustvo neutralnog izveštavanja o temama koje su od manjeg značaja za UAE, kao i verodostojno preuzimanje izveštaja stranih medija i novinskih agencija. U tako konstruisanom medijskom prostoru, država ima vodeću ulogu u pokretanju mnogih promena u procesu medijskog izveštavanja. Država nastoji da sve teme od značaja za razvoj emiratskog društva budu pokrivene na način koji odgovara što objektivnijem izveštavanju. Među takvim temama najprisutnije su one koje se tiču kvaliteta života ljudi i zdravstvenih pitanja (dijabetes, kancerogena oboljenja, retke bolesti, život sa invaliditetom i drugo). Primetno je da Nacionalna strategija za osnaživanje odvažnih ljudi UAE ima za cilj stvaranje inkluzivnog društva za osobe sa invaliditetom, odnosno odvažne ljude, i članove njihove porodice, kroz usluge i institucije koji zadovoljavaju njihove potrebe. Kako bi konkretne institucije i usluge bile vidljivije i dostupnije građanima sa invaliditetom, mediji imaju ulogu

blagovremenog i tačnog izveštavanja o tome. Uz to, ova inicijativa postavila je pred brojne institucije i građane zadatak da promene okvire u koje su do tada smestale osobe sa invaliditetom. Poslednjih godina to više nisu osobe koje su predstavljene kao slabe, u nepravednom položaju, bez izgleda za svetlu budućnost. Naprotiv, u emiratskim okvirima, reč je o osobama koje su odvažne po svakom životnom pitanju.

Medijska uloga posebno je važna u ovom procesu, te se, u skladu sa usvojenom Nacionalnom strategijom, očekuje da mediji promovišu inkluziju, podstiču jednake mogućnosti za sve građane i da prikazuju aktivno učešće odvažnih ljudi u svakodnevnim životnim aktivnostima. Krajnji cilj je transformacija dominantno medicinskog diskursa u diskurs izraženog podsticaja koji omogućava da se invaliditet ne označava kao nedostatak, već kao većinskim članovima društva ravnopravna drugost.

Predložena transformacija društvenog i medijskog diskursa o invaliditetu izgleda ovako (prema *The National Policy to empower People of Determination*, 2017):

Tabela 1. Transformacija društvenog i medijskog diskursa o invaliditetu u UAE

Termini i koncepti svojstveni periodu pre donošenja Nacionalne strategije za osnaživanje odvažnih ljudi	Termini i koncepti koji važe u institucionalnom i društvenom delovanju nakon Nacionalne strategije za osnaživanje odvažnih ljudi
Pacijent	Član zajednice/društva
Nepromenljivost zajednice	Zajednica u razvoju
Invaliditet kao problem pojedinca	Invaliditet kao problem zajednice/društva
Koncept milostinje	Koncept prava
Fokus na invaliditetu	Fokus na snagama i mogućnostima
Isključenost iz društvenog života	Prepoznavanje i integracija u društvo
Nemogućnost izbora karijere	Mogućnost izbora i promene karijere
Medicina kao jedino polje organizacije života osoba sa invaliditetom	Društvo kao izvor znanja i napretka u oblasti poboljšanja života odvažnih ljudi
Koncept (ne)mogućeg izlečenja kao vodeći koncept	Prevazilaženje prepreka, poboljšavanje procedura i promena ponašanja

Predstavljeni termini i koncepti uticali su na medijske sadržaje na način da se vesti, reportaže i intervjui, koji se tiču osoba sa invaliditetom, u medijima Ujedinjenih Arapskih Emirata oblikuju tako da promovišu nove postulate o životu sa invaliditetom, odnosno o odvažnim osobama.

Ispitujući sadržaj 227 tekstova vesti o odvažnim ljudima koji su objavljeni u periodu od januara 2018. godine do juna 2022. na onlajn portalima u UAE, utvrđeno je da je više od 88% uzorkovanih tekstova pisano u izrazito pozitivnom

okviru. Korpus tekstova je formiran na osnovu uzorkovanja sadržaja posredstvom pretrage arhive onlajn portala uz upotrebu ključnih reči *odvažni ljudi* (*people of determination*) i vremenskih odrednica za uzorkovanje tekstova od januara 2018. godine, zaključno sa junom 2022. U datim tekstovima prepoznate su sledeće karakteristike izveštavanja: upotreba pozitivne terminologije, informativni pristup izveštavanju, topla ljudska priča kao motiv izveštavanja i prisustvo okvira direktne podrške.

Informativni pristup izveštavanju ogleda se u dnevnim izveštajima, koji su najčešće u formi vesti o proteklim događajima i pokrenutim inicijativama za poboljšanje uslova života osoba sa invaliditetom, ili je reč o prenetim saopštenjima o budućim događajima. Takvi medijski tekstovi oslanjaju se na činjenice i važnost blagovremenog i tačnog informisanja javnosti.

Prenošenje ličnih iskustava osoba sa invaliditetom, u formi toplih ljudskih priča, ogleda se u predstavljanju invaliditeta, načinu kako akteri priče prevazilaze različite prepreke i u ulozi institucija UAE i organizacija u podršci odvažnim ljudima. Primer za to je hibridna onlajn vest sa portala *Nacional* (*The National*) čiji naslov glasi „Portreti: 12 mladih odvažnih ljudi koji UAE zovu domom”. U ovom medijskom tekstu među odvažnim mladim ljudima nalaze se Emiraćani i rezidenti UAE, koji su u ovu državu došli iz različitih zemalja, a neki su i rođeni u Emiratima. Autor teksta koristi jezik pripovedanja, predstavljajući aktore priče kao junake u romanima i ističući da za njih invaliditet nije nepremostiva prepreka u životu. Odvažnost se jasno ističe u sledećim delovima teksta:

„Odlučnost je nešto što Abdul Salam pokazuje u svim delovima svog života – odlučnost da nađe posao, da se jednog dana oženi, da bude poznat, i što je najvažnije, da se obrazuje.” (*The National*, 2019)

„Abdula (12) je uvek gledao vedru stranu života i odlučan je da donese svoju viziju do naših ekrana.” (*The National*, 2019)

U tekstu se navode institucije i organizacije koje su uključene u proces transformacije odnosa zajednice prema osobama sa invaliditetom i to uglavnom kroz zapošljavanje, edukaciju i prilike za volonterski rad (Emiratska fondacija (*The Emirates foundation*), Abu Dabi Medija (*Abu Dhabi Media*), Fondacija za inkluziju SEDRA (*SEDRA Foundation for inclusion*), visokoškolske ustanove, različite sportske organizacije i druge).

Direktna podrška države i političkih lidera ogleda se u sledećim primerima:

„Njegovo Visočanstvo šeik Mohamed bin Zajed Al Nahjan, prestolonaslednik Abu Dabija i zamenik vrhovnog komandanta oružanih snaga UAE, i šeik Hamdan bin Mohamed bin Rašid Al Maktum, prestolonaslednik Dubajja, danas su se pridružili članovima zajednice u maršu 'Hodajte zajedno', u organizaciji Višeg komiteta za Svetske igre Specijalne olimpijade 2019, u parku Um Al Emarat u Abu Dabiju.” (*Khaleej Times*, 2018)

„Glavni cilj inicijative bio je da se stvori svest o važnoj ulozi koju sport igra u životima odvažnih ljudi. Želimo da povećamo mogućnosti i pristup ovde u UAE za zdrav aktivan život.” (*Khaleej Times*, 2018)

Navedeni citati sadržani su u vestima koje imaju za cilj da podrže odlučne ljude i osnaže ih da se integrišu u zajednicu, posebno u sportu, uz podizanje svesti o značaju dobrovoljnog rada.

„Više od 28 lokalnih i federalnih vladinih subjekata će učestvovati u ovoj težnji ka inkluzivnosti, u skladu sa planom Abu Dabija za socijalni sektor za 2030. Novi plan ima pet glavnih ciljeva: osnažiti odvažne ljude, potpuno ih integrisati u društvo, dati im više prava, osigurati im pristup kvalitetnim uslugama i razviti održivu zajednicu.” (*Gulf Today*, 2020)

U vestima o odvažnim osobama istaknuta je i podrška države koja, prema navodima medija, direktno utiče na poimanje sopstva odvažnih osoba:

„Osnivanje novog centra za autizam Al Ain kao podružnice Više organizacije Zajed za odvažne ljude je u skladu sa opredeljenjem našeg rukovodstva da unapredi pružanje socijalne podrške i zdravstvenih ustanova, kao i razvoj odgovarajućih objekata za osobe odlučnost koja uključuje specijaliste i namenske resurse na način koji im pomaže da ih osnaže i omogući njihovu socijalnu inkluziju.” (*The National*, 2020)

„Takve inicijative čine da se osobe sa posebnim potrebama osećaju kao vredne i kao deo društva.” (*Khaleej Times*, 2018a)

„Bilo je to putovanje čiste otpornosti, upornosti i odlučnosti da se oživi vizija 'Ja sam inkluzivan' (*ImInclusive*). Ono što je počelo sa mojim bratom i sa mnom u Abu Dabiju danas je dirnulo srca hiljada ljudi. 'Ja sam inkluzivan' će nastaviti da probija sve barijere: prisutni smo kao dokaz da kada postoji volja, postoji i način. Naše rešenje je efikasno, jer imamo odlučne ljude kao većinu našeg tima.” (*Khaleej Times*, 2022)

Sve vesti karakteriše uniformno promenjena terminologija i osobe sa invaliditetom se bez izuzetka navode pod terminom *odvažne osobe*. Važnost promene terminologije i načina predstavljanja osoba sa invaliditetom ogleda se u

pretpostavci inicijatora promene medijskog diskursa o invalidnosti, da su osobe sa invaliditetom ograničene negativnim stavovima i barijerama oko sebe, koje ometaju njihovu nezavisnost i učešće u društvu.

Ispitujući načine predstavljanja osoba sa invaliditetom kroz prizmu odvažnosti, uočeno je da postoje obrasci koji mogu biti začetak modela medijskog izveštavanja koje se zasniva na motivaciji osoba sa invaliditetom i njihovog okruženja. Primer Ujedinjenih Arapskih Emirata pokazuje da je takav model moguće konstruisati kroz: (1) postavljanje pitanja šta je sve potrebno osobama sa invaliditetom, a može biti deo medijskog izveštavanja, (2) promenu terminologije i (3) edukaciju novinara i novinarki i uspešnu transformaciju načina na koje oni izveštavaju o osobama sa invaliditetom. Osvrt na potrebe osoba sa invaliditetom prvi je korak u izgradnji novog modela izveštavanja. Utvrđivanje tema od značaja za osobe sa invaliditetom i uključivanje osoba sa invaliditetom u kreiranje medijskih sadržaja predstavlja preduslov za uspešnost ovog modela. Drugi deo temelja ovog modela jesu terminološke promene. Ove promene počinju isključivanjem invalidnosti iz fokusa izveštavanja i adekvatnom promenom imenovanja, odnosno oslovljavanja aktera sa invaliditetom u medijskim sadržajima. Ujedno je važno razmotriti načine imenovanja osoba sa invaliditetom u različitim jezicima, tako da takvo imenovanje odgovara kontekstu koji pruža termin *odvažni ljudi*. Naredni koraci u izgradnji modela izveštavanja podrazumevaju edukaciju novinara i novinarki o različitim pristupima izveštavanju o osobama sa invaliditetom, odnosno o odvažnim ljudima. Model bi podrazumevao i obavezno uključivanje osoba sa invaliditetom, odnosno odvažnih ljudi, u monitoring medijskih sadržaja o invaliditetu.

4. ZAKLJUČAK

Razmatrajući temu promene medijskog diskursa o invaliditetu i osobama sa invaliditetom u medijima širom sveta, jedan od važnih zaključaka do kojih dolazimo jeste da je neophodno da postoji sistemska podrška takvim promenama. Iako u državama čije je uređenje demokratsko postoji preduslov da država ne može vršiti uticaj na uredništvo medijskih kuća i izveštavanje novinara i novinarki, postoje teme čiji bi medijski tretman država trebalo da usmerava i nadgleda, jer su one od značaja obezbeđivanje osnovnih uslova za život i dostojanstvenu svakodnevnicu mnogih individua. Jedna od takvih tematskih oblasti je i izveštavanje o osoba sa invaliditetom. Naime, potrebno je da postoji odgovarajući pravni okvir, kao i podrška državnog aparata koji bi, zapravo,

otpočeo značajnu izmenu celokupnog društvenog odnosa prema invaliditetu. Na tom putu, mediji bi mogli da budu među inicijatorima datih promena, a zatim i jedan od najvažnijih saveznika u realizaciji promene. Upravo zbog rasprostranjenosti medijskog uticaja, uloga medija je nezamenljiva kada je reč o u izgradnji nove percepcije javnosti o određenoj temi.

Kada je reč o pristupu novinara temama koje su u vezi sa izveštavanjem o osobama sa invaliditetom, važno je da se u procesu razvoja pozitivnog diskursa o invaliditetu ne prevagne u krajnost koja bi temu banalizovala i predstavila isključivo kroz nametnute ružičaste naočare. Kako ističe Ružičić-Novković, u nameri da izveštavaju iz pozitivnog ugla o temi invaliditeta, novinari i novinarke često insistiraju na fenomenu superheroja ili superbogalja, „pri čemu se većina postupaka i rezultata koji se kod ljudi bez oštećenja smatraju uobičajenim, ovde tretiraju kao uspeh zbog uloženog napora koji vrlo često nema nikakvih dodirnih tačaka s oštećenjem, već sa uslovima u okruženju koji su upravo uzrokovani ovim stereotipom” (Ružičić-Novković, 2014: 15). Adekvatnim edukativnim programima moguće je ukazati novinarima na negativne efekte takvih medijskih sadržaja i ponuditi im drugačije pristupe izveštavanju o ovoj temi (predstavljanje sistemskih rešenja koja poboljšavaju uslove života osoba sa invaliditetom, izveštavanje o autentičnim pozitivnim iskustvima osoba sa invaliditetom, intervjuje sa kredibilnim stručnjacima i slično).

U zaključnom delu važno je pomenuti i nevolje sa prenošenjem medijske matrice Ujedinjenih Arapskih Emirata u medije drugih država. Ukoliko bismo se, recimo, u Srbiji ili bilo kojoj drugoj državi na Zapadnom Balkanu, oslonili na puko kopiranje svih medijskih strategija i tehnika kojima se novinari i novinarke služe pri izveštavanju o osobama sa invaliditetom, našli bismo se u klopci, jer sistemi koji postoje u regionu imaju bitne razlike u odnosu na sistem u UAE. Pod sistemom podrazumevamo već objašnjeno političko uređenje, kao i ulogu države i institucija u različitim društvenim delovanjima. Istovremeno, finansijske mogućnosti UAE i većine drugih država na svetu, time i država kao što je Srbija, bitno se razlikuju. Ta činjenica direktno utiče i na način kako će mediji pokriti i predstaviti temu invalidnosti i slične teme. Na primer, nije moguće dati dominantno pozitivnu sliku invalidnosti u medijima u Srbiji, kada znamo da mnoge osobe sa invaliditetom u našoj državi nemaju dohodak, niti dostupnost školovanja, te da su takvi i drugi egzistencijalni problemi važne medijske teme. Zato je neophodno da se iniciraju značajnije društvene promene i pomaci u obezbeđivanju kvalitetnog života osoba sa invaliditetom, kako bi ujedno i medijski sadržaji mogli biti fokusirani na teme koje sa sobom nose pozitivnu konotaciju.

Bez sistemskih promena i institucionalne podrške razvoju prilika za obrazovanje i zapošljavanje osoba sa invaliditetom, kao i reformisane vidove zdravstvene zaštite, u državama poput balkanskih, možemo računati samo na to da termin *odvažni ljudi* i dalje koristimo iz ugla odvažnosti u procesu preživljavanja od danas do sutra, a tu i medijska uloga ostaje krajnje ograničena.

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Danica Cigoja Piper

**PEOPLE OF DETERMINATION: FROM NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE
DISCOURSE ABOUT DISABILITY IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES MEDIA**

Summary

The media in the United Arab Emirates are the first in the world to actively participate in shaping a dominantly positive media discourse on disability and people with disabilities. With the support of the state apparatus, the terminology used in reporting on persons with disabilities has changed, so they are now exclusively referred to as persons of determination. In this paper, we will provide a review of specifics related to media coverage of persons with disabilities/people of determination in the UAE media. We will point out the positive aspects of such reporting and try to build up a model of reporting that can be used in other media systems.

Key words: Media discourse, people of determination, disability, UAE

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