

DIGITALNE MEDIJSKE TEHNOLOGIJE I DRUŠTVENO- OBRAZOVNE PROMENE 9



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**DIGITALNE MEDIJSKE TEHNOLOGIJE I
DRUŠTVENO-OBRAZOVNE PROMENE 9**

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Uvodnik

11. MOSTOVI MEDIJSKOG OBRAZOVANJA

Zbornik radova *Digitalne medijske tehnologije i društveno-obrazovne promene* 9 rezultat je odabira radova, sa pozitivnim recenzijama, koji su predstavljeni na 11. međunarodnoj naučnoj konferenciji *Mostovi medijskog obrazovanja*, održanoj na Filozofskom fakultetu u Novom Sadu 13. i 14. septembra 2019.

Na konferenciji je svoje radove predstavilo 35 izlagača – nastavnika, saradnika, studenata doktorskih i master studija, kao i samostalnih istraživača koji su došli iz 10 zemalja: Bosne i Hercegovine, Bugarske, Crne Gore, Grčke, Hrvatske, Mađarske, Rumunije, Severne Makedonije, Slovenije i Srbije. Autori su se u svojim istraživanjima u *Zborniku* bavili temama kao što su: *Promene političke komunikacije u digitalnom okruženju*, *Obrazovanje novinara u savremenom medijskom okruženju*, *Javna sfera*, *medijski uticaji i manipulacije*, *Učenje i digitalni mediji*, *Mediji*, *društvo i obrazovanje* i *Novinarska etika i medijska kultura*.

Zbog aktuelnih medijskih tema i naučnih pristupa, ovaj *Zbornik* kako u štampanoj verziji, tako i u digitalnom formatu, predstavlja veoma korisno štivo naučnoj i stručnoj javnosti i dobru referencu za dalji istraživački rad. *Zbornik* je rezultat istraživanja i devete (produžene) godine realizacije projekta (šifra III 47020) koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije od 2010. i kategorizovan je kao tematski zbornik međunarodnog značaja (M14).

Urednici se zahvaljuju Pokrajinskom sekretarijatu za visoko obrazovanje i naučnoistraživački delatnost na podršci za organizaciju konferencije i Ministarstvu prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije na podršci za štampanje *Zbornika*.

U Novom Sadu, decembra 2019.

Glavni i odgovorni urednici
vanr. prof. dr Dejan Pralica
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Preface

THE 11th BRIDGES OF MEDIA EDUCATION

The Book of Proceedings Digital Media Technologies And Socio-Educational Changes IX is the result of the selection of the papers with the positive reviews, which were presented at the 11th International scientific conference *The Bridges of Media Education*, held at the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad on 13th and 14th September 2019.

The papers were presented by 35 teachers, assistants, PhD and MA students, as well as researchers from ten countries: Bosnia-Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia. The authors of these *Proceedings* addressed the following topics: *Changing political communication in digital environment, Educating journalists for contemporary media landscape, Public sphere, media effects and manipulation, Learning and digital media, Media, citizenship and education and Journalism ethics and media cultures.*

Due to current media topics and their scientific approach, these *Proceedings*, in both print and digital forms, represent a very useful read to academic and professional communities and good reference for further researches. *The Book of Proceedings* is the result of the ninth (additional) year of the realization of the project (III 47020) funded by The Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia since 2010, and it is classified as M14.

The editors would like to thank the Provincial Secretary for Higher Education for their support during the organization of this conference, as well as the Serbian Ministry of Education for their support for publishing *The Book of Proceedings*.

In Novi Sad, December 2019

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ONLINE POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT OF MONTENEGRIN VOTERS IN ELECTORAL CONTEXT

The intense growth of the popularity of social media sites in the political context raised attention of many researchers and scholars. Nowadays, candidates or political parties can easily bypass old forms of media to reach their potential voters, and maintain good relationship with existing ones, through social media sites. Social media pages can show that they have thousands of fans, which can be a beginning of an entire news conference and most importantly, allow them a totally unfiltered way of speaking out their ideas and politics. This is not the case only in the U.S. as one of the most developed countries, but all over the world. But nothing of this would be possible if people did not have the will to engage in politics on social media platforms, and this is why the research on political participation on social media sites is extremely important.

This study examines the relationship between the uses of social media such as: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat and different forms of political participation, in an electoral context in a developing country like Montenegro. The research is based on a quantitative analysis of the results obtained through an online survey (N=210), examining the extent to which Montenegrin mature population use social media to engage in online and offline political discussion and participation. The data obtained from this research are then compared with the secondary data from the similar researches in the U.S.

Key words: social media, politics, engagement of voters

INTRODUCTION

Every technological advance brings impact on everyday lives of people. The Internet has become an enormously important tool for people all around the globe not only to gain political information and knowledge, but also to engage in the political process itself. It is now obvious that people who consume more news media have a higher probability of being civically and politically engaged.

For the people who are interested in politics and political environment, the online world, especially social media, offers an irresistible environment for engaging with the news, information and discussions about a wide range of

political issues. Elections play a vital role in democracy because they ensure representation of the popular will and enhance the legitimacy of political systems (Esser and de Vreese, 2007). An election can be defined as the ‘contest for the highest stakes in national politics’.

The electoral system is a set of predetermined rules for conducting elections and determining their outcome (Chinnasamy and Roslan, 2015). Montenegro’s unicameral parliament consists of 81 members elected directly for a four-year term from a single nationwide constituency under a proportional representation system with closed lists. The Constitution provides for free, universal and equal suffrage by secret ballot. Candidate lists are eligible for mandates if they surpass the threshold of three percent of valid votes. Special rules apply for candidate lists representing national minority communities. If no minority list passes the 3 percent threshold, but some lists gain 0.7 percent or more of the valid votes, they are entitled to participate in the distribution of up to 3 mandates as a cumulative list of candidates based on the total number of valid votes (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2017).

This paper will analyze in the further text how Montenegrin voters take part in campaign activities online and furthermore, provide the comparison of collected data with other countries.

POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Political engagement has been regarded as political participation. And in that way “both political engagement and political participation are not static; they are very dynamic and evolving social phenomenon; at various times, people are more likely to be more or less politically active” (Lamprianou, 2012). In their article “The case for ‘everyday politics’: Evaluating neotribal theory as a way to understand alternative forms of political participation, using electronic dance music culture as an example”, Riley et al. (2010) have argued that political engagement has traditionally been thought of as “a set of rights and duties that involve formally organized civic and political activities (e.g., voting or joining a political party)”.

According to Scaff (1975: 454-455), there are two concepts of political participation:

- “participation as interaction”, which is focusing on the way the individual identifies and engages with the interests of the community and works with others to achieve a common goal, and
- “participation as instrumental action”, which is related to the idea of influence and power and advancing individual interests while attempting to “influence the distribution of power”.

The first concept is defined as the process of political communication between citizens and groups “especially those organized around interests or issues that are general to the community”.

This communication according to Scaff (1975) is carried out through “speech, political argument and persuasion”. The instrumental action process, on the other hand, concerns “gaining influence with elites” and exercising citizenship through the deployment of power and this kind of participation is linked to “self-interest and the need for legitimacy” (Scaff, 1975, p. 459). An example of this kind of participation according to him is voting, as citizens exercise their right to decide about the distribution of power by selecting a party or candidate on the basis of their own interests.

The level of political participation is a phenomenon that differs from country to country, but also based on some other factors. Moreover, Vecchione and Caprara (2009) found that gender, education and age are significant factors affecting participation levels. According to them, more educated people, as well as males and older people are more likely to engage into political activities than other groups. However, in their research they found that income rate was not significantly related to political participation. In last decade, many researchers have noticed a widening gap within younger demographic in US between educated youth from middle-to-upper income households who according to Sander and Putnam (2010) tend to be more civically engaged than those from lower-income households who have either little or no post-secondary education.

ONLINE POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

In the recent years political engagement of voters in electoral context is more and more related to online platforms. Most popular platforms for online political engagement are emails and social media.

According to Antony Mayfield (2008: 5), social media can best be understood as a group of new types of media on online platforms, which share most of the following characteristics:

1. Participation – social media encourages contributions and feedback from everyone who is interested. It blurs the line between media and audience.
2. Openness – most social media services are open to feedback and participation. They encourage voting, comments and the sharing of information. There are rarely any barriers to accessing and making use of content – password-protected content is frowned upon.
3. Conversation – whereas traditional media are about “broadcast” (content transmitted or distributed to an audience) social media are better seen as a two-way conversation.
4. Community – social media allow communities to form quickly and communicate effectively. Communities share common interests, such as a love of photography, a political issue or a favorite TV show.
5. Connectedness – most types of social media thrive on their connectivity, making use of links to other sites, resources and people.

From this theory we can conclude that social media are definitely the platforms that should be used for political matters. Recently, the social media such as SNS, weblogs and micro blogging increasingly play more important role in political processes all around the world. If we observe the remarkable growth of social media services, more specifically Twitter and Facebook, social media are recently being used in political context progressively by citizens, politicians and political institutions. In other words, social media made a fundamental change in the traditional public communication, which has been completely designed and managed by specific actors, such as: politicians, companies and journalists. Many scholars are observing and coming to conclusion, that in a relatively short period of time, politicians in contemporary democratic states all over the world have enthusiastically adopted social media for entering into direct dialog with citizens and enabling of intense political discussions (Hong and Nadler, 2015). One more interesting feature of social media is that they have great potential for

strengthening political participation and discussions among citizens as well as between politicians and citizens.

Email as well plays an enormous role in political engagement nowadays. According to some authors, Email could be considered a part of social media, but, according to others, it cannot. The predominant reasons why Email is not considered a social media, according to Bradley (2010), are as follows:

- a) Email is a distribution mechanism whereas Social Media is a collective mechanism and
- b) Mass communication is different from Mass collaboration. But Email certainly qualifies if we go by the simple definition that “social media is conversations that happen online”.

Given the rapid growth of online platforms, people are enabled to express their views, opinions or emotions on almost anything in forums, blogs, and on social media more than ever before (Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan, 2012).

METHODOLOGY

After reviewing all the literature findings related to the topic, for the purpose of this study a quantitative research method was used, and the strategy of inquiry is survey research. Based on a literature review of relevant existing studies within online platforms use and political participation, a questionnaire is designed for collecting data from people from Montenegro that have legal right to vote (all people over 18 years).

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objective of the study is to give answer to the following research questions:

- Is there a difference in political participation of voters on social media in developed countries like the U.S. and in a developing country like Montenegro?
- Is there a gender difference in political participation of voters on online platforms in Montenegro?

- To which extent are voters active in online political engagement in Montenegro?

CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

With regard to the existing studies in this field, it is expected that this study will primarily broaden poor discussion about online political engagement of voters in Montenegro in electoral context. Considering that Montenegro lacks information of current situation about, online voter's engagement, this study can provide fertile ground for many individuals interested in that filed as well as for the politicians and political parties who are interested in setting their campaigns on some of the online platforms that are mostly used in Montenegro.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The key purpose of this paper is to create completely new insights into research questions formulated, that is why we used exploratory design. The research design made for the purpose of this thesis is regularly used when new theories are created, and when research needs systematic investigation. For the given reasons, exploratory design merely explores specific research problem about online political engagement, by leaving space for further research on this or similar topics. The study uses this type of research design because it is flexible and can answer research questions of any type. In this case, new research questions are created, with the combination of questions from other authors, which are relevant to the topic of online political engagement of Montenegrin voters in electoral context.

In order this paper to be relevant, the purpose was to reach statistically a relevant sample group from entire population and to make conclusions based on that examined group. The technique for constructing representative sample group was probability sampling in the form of simple random sampling method.

METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

For the purpose of this paper, we used self-administered survey as an instrument to obtain necessary data. For a more organized and easier way to collect necessary data, Google forms tool for making surveys is used, because it allows an unlimited number of questions, and unlimited number of responses. A

questionnaire was delivered to participants through e-mail and social media sites from 5 January 2018 through 20 February 2018. The questionnaire is designed in a way that link can be opened and questions answered on various devices such as: computers, tablets or smart phones, which made it easy for respondents to participate. With the use of this method, participation in the study was voluntary, and anonymity has been guaranteed since there was no question that can personally identify any individual. Since the survey is delivered randomly, without interviewer presence, there were no problems with bias in the way how questions are asked.

Participants were able to answer questions by choosing the proposed category, multiple choice and short answer types of questions. The questionnaire was created in English and was purposefully translated into the Montenegrin language. The translation was done by an expert who possesses knowledge of both languages and respective cultures. The survey was distributed in both Montenegrin and English versions. From the total 350 survey samples sent, 210 answers are obtained, from which 205 are measurable and useful, since 5 people who completed the survey are not using social media sites. Those 205 answers formed the sample to represent the population of Montenegro in this study of political engagement of voters on social media sites in this country.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Age limit for this survey was from 18 years and above (all people that have the legal right to vote). An overview of the participants that participated in the survey, regarding gender, age and educational level is shown in the following Tables.

Initially, demographic questions were evaluated to describe sample characteristics. As we can see from the table below that from the sample that participated in this survey 54.8% of the participants were female and 45.2% male.

Table 1. The Gender overview of the participants that participated in the survey

Total Number of Participants	Female	Male
210	115	95

While analyzing data from the survey we can conclude that, 60% of our sample aged from 18 to 29, then 24.8 % aged 30-49, 11.4 % aged from 50-64 and

only 3.8% is over 65 years old. We can conclude that our sample consists of young population.

Table 2. *The age overview of the participants that participated in the survey*

Total Number of Participants	18-29	30-49	50-64	65-and above
210	126	52	24	8

Social media play an important role in the circulation of news and articles about activities and issues of politicians and political parties in particular and politics in general. In order the news to circulate on these kinds of platforms, it is important to know whether people are willing to post or share certain links or articles that are somehow connected with political issues they are faced with. Based on this, people included in this research were able to answer the question whether they use social networking sites to post links to political stories or articles for others to read. More than half of the participants (57.1%) said that they never share this kind of posts on their profiles, while 30.2% occasionally and 12.7% never did any of these activities on their social media profiles. From the total number of participants that claimed they always use social media sites to share links and article related to politics in order other people to read them, we can see that only 10 females and 16 male participants perform this type of action; furthermore, 28 female and 34 male participants claimed that they do this occasionally and 77 female and 40 male participants never do any of these activities on social media sites. From here we can conclude that males are more active on social media sites when it comes to sharing links and articles related to politics than females.

The popularity of posts that are shared by ordinary people, in other words, how many people shared, liked or commented them, directly affect the trust in the content shared. In that manner, Figure 2, shows how trust in person that posted or shared certain article actually has effect on trust in social content. In order to understand how the news are spread and if the sharing ideas and thoughts about political issues on social media sites is influencing participation on these platforms the questionnaire made for the purpose of this study also contains a question: Do you use social networking sites to post your own thoughts or comments on political issues? Many people see social media as platform where they can say things they probably would never say in an eye to eye conversation.




Figure 1. *Summarized answers for the question: Do you use social media to post links or articles about political stories for others to read?*

The participants in this survey had three options for answering the question whether they use social media sites to post their own thoughts and ideas about politics, and they vary from person to person. According to the answers obtained from the questionnaire, 11.9% of the participants said that they always post their thoughts or comments on political issues on social media sites, 31.2% said that they do it occasionally and 56.9% of them said that they never perform this kind of actions on social media sites. And interesting fact is that only for this question we have a small percentage (3.7%) of participants who did not provide an answer to the question.

The difference in answers also vary between male and female participants, and based on this research, we can conclude that male population in Montenegro is more active on social media sites when it comes to posting their own thoughts or comments on some political issues they are interested in. However, in Table 3 we can see the detailed results and difference between male and female respondents when it comes to this question.

Table 3. *Gender difference for the question: Do you use social networking sites to post your own thoughts or comments on political issues?*

		Posting Thoughts and Comments			Total
		Always	Occasionally	Never	
Gender	Male	19	34	36	89
	Female	5	29	79	113
Total		24	63	115	202

With the assistance of social media services, even regular citizens can become agents of persuasion and influencers to any target group they decide for, especially when politics comes out as a topic. Call for action for social and political issues is one of the ways in which citizens can and should engage through social media, because through actions we can actually change something, and social media is actually making these things much easier. On the question whether they use social media sites to encourage other people to take action on a political issue that is important to them, people that participated in the research done for the purpose of this study answered as seen on Figure 2.




Figure 2. *Summarized answers for the question: Do you use social media sites to encourage other people to take action on a political issue that is important to you?*

In order to understand political participation of voters on social media sites, it is of enormous importance to see if citizens of certain country are using these platforms in order to encourage other people to vote. In this sense, the participants in this survey were asked the question if they use social media sites to

encourage other people to vote. Based on their answers we can conclude that only a small number of people, but not negligible (14.6%, 30 participants), always use these platforms to encourage others to vote, 22% of them (45 participants) occasionally and 63.4% (130 participants) never perform this kind of activities on social media sites. At the same time, this survey finds that there is small difference between males and females when it comes to this question.




Figure 3. *Summarized answers for the question: Do you use social media sites to encourage other people to vote?*

Political news are not generally perceived to be a retweeting or sharing subject, except during the period of elections, and when people share this kind of content, they mostly share or retweet articles or posts that they agree with or that come from the same political orientation as their own. The answers collected from this research show that the number of people in Montenegro who always share political content that someone else posted before is very small; only 17 out of 205 participants that answered this question, 60 of them do this occasionally and 128 participants never perform this kind of activity on social media sites. Gender plays small role in deciding whether to repost content related to political or social issues that was originally posted by someone else on social media sites. As we can conclude from this research, 13 out of 90 males said that they always repost this kind of content on social media sites, while 4 out of 115 females do the same activities on social media site.




Figure 4. *Summarized answers for the question: Do you ever use social networking sites to repost content related to political or social issues that was originally posted by someone else?*

The incredible popularity of social media has provided many opportunities for people's online political participation all around the world. Social media users with political interest can share their political views with friends, forward political videos or ads through YouTube or other SNS, follow political figures on these platforms, retweet or share any political comment or article, publish blogs about important social and economic issues, etc. Nevertheless, they can also like or promote material related to political issues that others have posted. In order to find out whether people use social media sites to perform these activities, a question in the survey was created: Do you ever use social media sites to "Like" or promote material related to political issues that others have posted? According to the answers obtained from the survey and presented in Figure 5, we can see that from the total number of participants participated in this survey males are seen as more active in political participation on social media.




Figure 5. *Summarized answers for the question: Do you ever use social media sites to “Like” or Promote material related to political issues that others have posted?*

On the other hand, many users tend to ignore political arguments and posts on social media sites if they can. But in some cases, this is impossible, and when their friends post or share something on social media that they don’t agree with, they in many cases respond with comment or their own post. In Montenegro (see Figure 6), people are more eager to ignore the post they don’t like, than to respond with comment or their own post or even to remove or block that friend.

Moreover, when asked about the reactions on their friends posts that they disagree with, this research shows that females participant (88) would rather ignore the post, while small amount of them (23) would respond with a comment or post of their own, there is also the small amount (4) of females who delete or block friends because they posted something about politics that they disagree with. The situation is similar with male population.




Figure 6. Summarized answers for the question: When one of your friends posts something about politics on social media that you disagree with, how do you usually respond?

Table 4. Gender differences for the question: When one of your friends posts something about politics on social media that you disagree with, how do you usually respond?

		Replaying on comments they disagree with			Total
		Ignore the post	Respond with a comment or post of your own	Delete or block that friend	
Gender	Male	55	32	3	90
	Female	88	23	4	115
Total		143	55	7	205

CONCLUSION

The ever-increasing use of online platforms, and the continuous influence they have on the everyday life and especially the fact that social media platforms are providing politicians with a tool to interact with voters and post news, without any information filter including the journalists, the effect of voters' engagement through social media is far-reaching. Since social media have many positive effects on the political campaigns all over the world, candidates have been using variety of social media services to gain higher positions in the online world, while

expecting that their digital campaign strategy will transfer and influence voter's opinion in the offline world as well.

In the literature review part, social media terms are discussed as well as the political participation both online and offline. We had opportunity to see that all online media services constantly develop new tools to simplify and improve these platforms for easier usage, which is making them suitable for all age groups. Based on the obtained results from literature review as well as from the primary data collected for the purpose of this study, we found that social media use has important impact on political participation of people all around the world including Montenegro. Despite the limitations of this research, the results obtained bring a larger contribution to existing research in political communication.

One of the important aspects of this research is the comparison made between a developed country (the United States of America) and a developing country (the Republic of Montenegro) in political participation on social media. From the results of this research we can conclude that people are more eager to actively participate in all of the political activities in developed countries than in a developing country such as Montenegro, and that social media is playing more important role in the lives of the people in developed countries like the U.S. compared to a small country like Montenegro.

And finally, regarding the gender aspects of political (voter) engagement of social media users in Montenegro, from the results of this research we can see that the male population of Montenegro is far more active on social media sites than female, in all aspects of political participation. This only mirrors the overall involvement of women in social and political processes in that country.

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THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND HYBRID REGIMES IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE OF CONTEMPORARY SERBIA¹

Using a descriptive approach in interpreting the development of the public sphere in Serbia after the establishment of multipartism, the paper focuses on the institutional transformation of arenas in which the most important social issues are discussed. It highlights the intention with which the current ruling elite implements symbolic politics in Serbia, the key problems characteristic of the public sphere, and the factors that can determine its further transformation. Among them, digitalization and internetization have been recognized as the most important. The conclusion casts doubt that technological changes can lead to the transformation of the public sphere before the weaknesses of political institutions are overcome.

Key words: public sphere, symbolic politics, media, hybrid regime, Serbia

Since the establishment of the multi-party system, the political order in Serbia, by its parameters, in this sense and in terms of public communication, could not be classified as an ideal-type framework of democracy. It is about alternating from a competitive authoritarian order to electoral democracy and back to a hybrid regime (Pavlović, AntoniĆ 2007; Jovanović Vučićević 2010; Vladislavljević 2016). However, this kind of order as well, and not just the democratic one, closely observes public opinion. Although it seeks to reduce the direct influence of society on the way of governing, it holds to the importance of public opinion (which is what makes it different from totally authoritarian - totalitarian orders), since public opinion, even under the conditions of such a rule, has autonomy over the government and tends to view relations with it as, in a

¹ This paper originated within the framework of a scientific project of the University of Belgrade - Faculty of Political Science, "Political identity of Serbia in the regional and global context", (record number: 179076), funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

sense, “contractual” (Поров, 2010:9). That is why the work of devising different forms of interpretation of social reality is important for political subjects even when it does not directly affect the citizens’ political choice. This contributes to shaping the conceptual and symbolic space that must be considered in the analysis of processes and institutions. In doing so, it is necessary to explore not only the content of ideological alternatives presented in public space, but also the institutional conditions in which they develop and in which they compete with each other. The purpose of this paper is to highlight precisely the changes regarding the institutional capacity for articulating and expanding competitive discourses in Serbia since the re-establishment of the multi-party system in the early 1990s.

The broader significance of the public sphere research is that it is a space in which the so-called “symbolic politics” is realized, the type of politics we perceive as a kind of a “real politics” surrogate, i.e. as a “conscious use of aesthetically-symbolic resources of government for its own legitimation and consolidation by creating symbolic surrogates of political activities and solutions” (Малинова 2013:12). At the basis of this approach is the representation of the activities of political actors in the public space, and above all in the mass media, which may differ from the non-public (but not less real) politics. In other words, the symbolic element of politics is considered to be what political elites intentionally create, considering that it can affect people's consciousness.

THE RESEARCH APPROACH

Approaches to the interpretation and analysis of the public sphere are different. Prevailing is the normative model of J. Habermas (Habermas 1969) which serves as an instrument of criticism and potential improvement of existing democratic practices. Although the Habermas’s model of the public sphere has become widely used in political communication, it is also exposed to numerous criticisms that most often boil down to the idealization of the bourgeois public sphere, which represents a narrow social base (of the middle class) rather than the general interest (Lou 2013:166). In addition to the aforementioned normative, a descriptive approach to the exploration of different types of public sphere is also possible, which implies those that are fundamentally different from the ideal model presented by Habermas. Malinova finds examples of this approach in the work of researchers (Eisentadt, Schluchter 2001) who elaborated the concept of the public sphere in the context of modernization research in non-Western

societies. According to this approach, the public sphere, which does not necessarily refer to “civil society”, develops in every more or less complex community with a certain level of literacy. It is a space between private and official, which expands and collapses, depending on the extent to which it includes a professional carrier stratum who does not form a part of the ruling class. The notion of the public sphere indicates the existence of platforms where issues of general interest are discussed. It is assumed that these scenes are not only autonomous with respect to the sphere of government, but are more or less open to different society sectors and have their own dynamics which, although related to events and processes taking place in the political arena, do not coincide with them and are not determined by the dynamics of the latter (Малинова 2013:99). The influence of the public sphere depends on its institutional structure. It is important whether it is diverse or unified, focused on the center or open to the periphery, predominantly based on oral or written communication, whether it implies an interpretation of the common good in relation to those exercising power or in relation to those in the private environment, etc. (Ibidem).

The descriptive approach seems more fruitful in analyzing political transformation in post-communist societies. Namely, while normative conception serves as an instrument of criticism of the reality observed and enables to identify and analyze the “deviation from ideals”, the descriptive approach gives the opportunity to follow real changes in the public sphere. At the same time, it helps to determine the criteria for assessing the situation and changes in the public sphere in a particular society, and in this sense we can talk about the degree of independence of the public sphere from the private and official ones, its openness to different segments of society, the degree of its fragmentation, the structure of channels of communication, and so on.

The purpose of this paper is to point out the path of development of the public sphere in Serbia after the establishment of the multi-party system, focusing on the institutional transformation of arenas in which the most important social issues were discussed, as well as on changes in the structure and strategies of the entities that acted therein.

PUBLIC SPHERE IN SERBIA FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MULTY-PARTY SYSTEM TO NOWDAYS: *CENTER VS PERIPHERY* IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SYMBOLIC POLITICS

At the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century and the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the borders of the official and unofficial public space

in Serbia had already been very porous. What made them such were, on the one hand, changed rules of functioning of the former (introduction of multiparty and then change of the political system) and expansion of boundaries of the latter (introducing informal organizations into the public political process and removing the boundaries between “intellectuals’ kitchens” and public gatherings) on the other. Mass media are becoming places of “dislocation” of space, which, upon the transition to a pluralistic society, will still not become public in the full meaning of the word, despite the changed style of behavior of the officials towards the audience, the appearance of political parties and the activities of citizens - journalists, scientists, writers, cinéastes and other artists towards public life. First, the main mechanisms of political control over socially owned media were preserved by legislation, and the government, subsequently, did nothing to stimulate the pluralization and privatization of the media sphere. Obstacles to the development of new media were, on the one hand, the precedence of the existing media and, on the other, an economic crisis that discouraged potential producers-advertisers and brought down the purchasing power of the population. (Matić 2007:57). The main features of the changed media system in Serbia during the 1990s were its centralization and state control (carried out by the adoption of new laws on public information and radio-television) and the primacy of television as a media. The latter was a consequence of the former, that is, of the regime’s understanding of the electronic media as one of its pillars (Ibidem, p. 101) and the “melting” of the readership, due to its impoverishment caused by high inflation. Images of the world produced by the state media, on the one hand, and the few alternative media, on the other, had no touching points. The market for political ideas until 2000 was characterized by sharp polarization and there were two opponents in the public space - the “patriots” and the “traitors”, the former being dominant. In addition, the gap between political communication channels in terms of audience coverage was very deep until year 2000. The state television channel, in this sense, held a monopoly. Its audience was significantly larger than the audience of all alternative media combined.²

The dominance of television as a means of political communication in Serbia during the 1990s and the transformation of its audience into a community of television viewers had significant consequences in terms of the quality of the

² More about the growing importance of television in political and electoral communication in Serbia from 1990 to 2000 in Matić, 2007.

public sphere. The shortcomings were particularly pronounced in the second half of the 1990s with the establishment of privately owned commercial televisions that had a “narcotizing function” (Matić 2007:181, Slavujević 2017:18) with a large entertainment offer, thus contributing to the impression of normalizing general social life.

In an attempt to summarize the above, it could be argued that, as a consequence of political and economic changes, a public space of a specific configuration was formed in Serbia in the 1990s, much like in other post-communist societies.³ It distinguished the *center*, represented by television, more specifically the state television channel, and the *periphery*, which consisted of several local television channels, radio stations and print media. There are two consequences of this circumstance: First, the chance for a particular discourse to become “popular” depended on how much it was represented in the center of the public sphere. Second, in order to manage the social “agenda”, it was sufficient to control the biggest mass channels of communication. The social arenas that made up the periphery of public space were few and could not make a significant impact. In the 1990s, the government's strategy for communication was to exclude, as far as practicable (legal decisions, financial pressures, editorial decisions), the discourses that did not support it.

The establishment of state control over the mass media and the mechanisms of public opinion management in contemporary Serbia is still present even after the political changes in 2000, to this day, in spite of the fact that the highest resolutions that enable the realization of human rights in the field of information are accepted by legal solutions and, as such, supported by European experts and institutions (Veljanovski 2012:128). Political actors (mostly always, those in opposition) and the professional community express dissatisfaction with the role of mass electronic media in the political life of a society. The shortcomings in their work, which contribute to the unequal visibility of different actors in everyday political life, are being pointed out, resulting in their unequal recognition in the electoral race and, after the elections, unequal representation in the authorities or inability to exercise power. The focus in this criticism is on television, both on the public broadcasting and then on the regulation of media behavior in election campaigns, that is, on the supervisory body that should regulate the work of electronic media, but which does not fully exercise its role. (Атлагић, Сурчулија Милојевић 2018). The process of managing public opinion

³ More about the public sphere in post-Soviet Russia in Malinova, 2013:96-126

in Serbia has been similar all the time, from the 1990s to the present, in terms of restricting the physical access of the opposition to the communication channels that form the *center* of public space. (Radojković 2011:36, Slavujević, 2017:20, Атлагић, Сурчулија Милојевић 2018). Currently, the main difference is that the mobilizing role of “traditional” media has been transferred from public broadcasting to national-frequency commercial television and to cheap daily newspapers. Weekly magazines have protected freedom more than television has. They are, along with a few cable channels, the *periphery* of the public sphere. Therefore, it would be wrong to talk about the ban on free speech in Serbia. It is simply pushed out to the periphery of public space.

Before we address the role of new communication technologies in changes in the public sphere, let us return briefly to the importance of public sphere research highlighted in the introduction. The control of the authorities over the most important mass media in Serbia is currently being carried out with the aim of realizing a symbolic politics, which, in turn, is being realized with the intention to execute a value consolidation of society. It consists of a new discourse on collective identity, partly taken over from the leaders between 2000 and 2012 (in terms of foreign policy orientation) and overcoming the intense confrontation (between “patriots” and “traitors”) of the 1990s, understood as a mistake leading to deepening of the conflict. A special new ideology was marketed and offered primarily to television viewers to help them understand the new rules of social behavior (orientation to work and discipline versus laziness and irresponsibility) and a chance to rebuild a sense of unity and pride lost during the 1990s and in the period from 2000 to 2012. The concepts around which the discourse of the modern ruling elite is built are strong country and modernization. The realization of these ideas employs the entire arsenal of symbolic means in which traditional Serbian values are eclectically combined with devotion to the democracy and market ideals. Elected after the regime change in 2012, this strategy has yielded some results: it did not lead to the desired agreement, but it did provide a basis for consolidating the majority with a related image of the reigning president and a real political powerholder as a strong and capable leader around rather broad and not quite defined ideas which can be interpreted in different ways.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES, INTERNATIZATION AND PUBLIC SPHERE PERSPECTIVES IN SERBIA

The question that arises after this relatively brief overview of changes in the public sphere in Serbia from 1990 to the present is, as expected - what is the perspective of the public sphere in Serbia? Its transformation, as in other societies, should be determined by two factors - socio-demographic changes and the pace of development and application of new communication technologies.

When it comes to socio-demographic changes, the question that arises is whether it is reasonable to expect that, sticking to the Habermas's definition of the notion of the public sphere, the growth of the "middle class" will cause an increase in the frequency of civic initiatives and that a new stylistics of political communication will be formed. Can protest activity on the declaratively city-wide and democratic platform of ideologically diverse political forces in Serbia, at the time of writing this, be interpreted as a manifestation of the activities of the new "middle class"? These are questions that may possibly be of interest to local researchers. However, regardless of the potential results, what seems to be the case is that, given the "specific gravity" of protesters, rapid changes in the behavior of the majority are unlikely.

In relation to technological changes, digitalization and internetization, the most important question regarding the topic of this paper is whether the expansion of new technologies will lead to changes in the structure of the public sphere and reduce the gap between its *center* and *periphery*. Making predictions regarding this issue seems even more delicate than doing it regarding the previous one. This is due to the lack of empirical research on media audiences (Нинковић Славнић 2016:139). The general picture of how people in Serbia are informed is inadequate, as there is only general information on the use of particular media for this purpose. There is no research on the use of the Internet to get informed on socially relevant topics in Serbia. The news audience is not researched, not even in the context of traditional media, there is only data on the ratings of certain TV shows, including the main news programs (Ibidem). In addition, general data is considerably different in various studies, which are few. However, according to all findings, television is still the media with the largest audience and is the most influential media. This was the case in the last decade (Matić 2014:5) and so is in

this one.⁴ Undoubtedly, these changes redefine the news preferences of the population. This is also shown by the number of Internet users for information purposes in Serbia. However, it seems too early to say that getting informed on day-to-day events seriously calls into question the superiority of television as the main channel of public communication, and not television in the broader sense but public broadcasting. This is in line with the findings of Gripsrud who writes about how in the Western Europe and also elsewhere “we are a long way from the death of an overarching, central public sphere” because there is still “a sense of central focus provided by the national political institutions and the still dominant... handful of broadcasting channels” (Gripsrud 2015:13). Despite the strong mistrust of citizens in the mainstream media, the findings of the research in Serbia can still be interpreted in the way that citizens attach great importance to the so-called editorial media.

On the other hand, the development of new communication technologies also leads to the differentiation of channels of involvement in the public sphere, which could lead to less visibility, “blurring” of its *center*. The more numerous and diverse sources of information, the more difficult it is to control them, so “conquering” the internet would force the ruling elite to fight for sense in a more competitive and fragmented public sphere. However, further fragmentation of the public sphere in Serbia (bearing in mind the aforementioned section) leads to the separation of “like-minded audiences” who, as part of the *periphery* of the public space, would have to compete with its *center* controlled by the regime. Still, the communication practices of these audiences have clearly not yet formed effective

⁴ According to 2015 data, television is known to be the main source of information among the general population (61.9%), while the Internet is in the second place (30%), with it being dominant among the population between 12 and 29 years of age (66%) and fairly equated with television for people up to 39 years of age (45% vs. television’s 47%) (Нинковић Славнић 2016: 139). Data from the end of last year issued by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and Ipsos indicate that television is as dominant as it was in 2015. Almost half of citizens are informed by public broadcasting (49%), 12% by commercial tv stations and 22% by online media. Citizens have the utmost confidence in public broadcasting (36%). The same percentage expresses distrust in the major media, stating that the priority for these media is not true reporting but the promotion of certain interests. One third of respondents (33%) use social networks on a daily or almost daily basis, but as many as 40% never use social networks as a source of daily news. Finally, half of the citizens are informed about the breaking news by talking to friends, almost one fifth (18%) are informed about important events by following the mainstream media and only 12% are informed by alternative sources (<https://talas.rs/2019/05/07/iri-istrazivanje-mediji/>).

channels for opinion aggregation. Although the approach openness is a key feature of Internet-based communication, in this case, it is a matter of considering ideas in a relatively closed space in which the interlocutors are only the ones inspired by mutual trust. The problem with opinion aggregation, however, can simply be attributed to the inability of the Internet to create the public due to a change in the representative mode of political communication. The point is that “whereas in the traditional national public sphere, distinguished representative acts were performed in front of a large audience, the Internet allows every single user to make a public performance. This results in a loss of distinction and publicness. The Internet publishes, but does not necessarily create publics. It multiplies claims for publicness and representation but minimizes the spaces of public resonance. The role of the many information providers thus shifts from giving inputs to public reasoning and deliberations to self-representation, self-advertisement and image politics.” (Trenz 2009:44). The emphasized personalization of politics, the personalization of the relationship between politicians and citizens (Manin 1997), the importance of image in political communication (Lou 2013) lead to communicative practices on the Internet, which are “more performative than informative and more expressive than rational...” (Enjolras, Steen-Johnsen 2017:114) and representative elements of Habermas’s refeudalization of the public sphere. In the fragmentation of the public sphere in the case of Serbia, Petrović recognizes the highly developed so-called computational propaganda that otherwise infuses information chaos into the public space of the Internet, and the effect it achieves is the polarization of users of digital platforms (Petrović 2019:27). Petrović, however, adds that the current regime began experimenting with this form of propaganda while in opposition, with the aim of breaking the information blockade in which it found itself (2019:19).

Petrović's observation about the current regime’s propaganda activities on the internet at the time when they were the opposition is very indicative because, with all of the above, it could be concluded that the reasons for the current state of the public sphere in Serbia should be sought in symbolic politics, above all, in its periphery. Such a conclusion would additionally be contributed by the fact that communicative practice in which parties communicate with citizens almost exclusively through their leaders, by organizing the so-called pseudo-events, is prevailing (Radojković 2011:34), and that the image of political entities is a more significant motivating factor in making electoral decisions than issues raised in campaigns (Slavujević, Atlagić 2015:165). In other words, how to expect changes in the public sphere when its symbolic structure is dominated by the image

(including communication style) of political entities that have been present on the political scene for a very long time, some of them since the establishment of the multi-party system? The conclusion, though, is a little bit different and not just black and white. The prerequisite for changes in the public sphere in contemporary Serbia is, of course, a higher level of quality of symbolic politics in general, and especially in the current periphery of the public space. Yet, before that, it is necessary to overcome the weaknesses of political institutions - political parties and the electoral process. Once parties are better defined in terms of their ideologies and programs, with stronger social foundations and more efficient infrastructure, then party identification will also be stronger, electoral volatility will be smaller and leaders will not be the most important element of a political offer, or they will have less importance. Overcoming the shortcomings of the party system is, however, largely linked to the symbolic politics of parties. The weaknesses of the electoral process are more of a "technical" character and overcoming them implies consistent application of the law, prevention of misuse of public resources for party purposes, proactive action of key institutions (Regulatory Body for Electronic Media, Republican Electoral Commission, Anti-Corruption Agency), prevention of pressures on voters, professionalization of electoral administration... What is the connection between overcoming these weaknesses of political institutions and the state of the public sphere? Without overcoming them, there is no mechanism for the aggregation of ideas and their transformation into an instrument of collective action. With all the benefits that digitalization and the Internet provide to an individual as a subject of political communication, the restrictions currently existing in the public sphere in Serbia will only be partially compensated.

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MEDIJSKI SIMULAKRUM KAO PARADIGMA SAVREMENE EGZISTENCIJE U ERI DIGITALIZACIJE

U radu se iznosi ideja simulakruma kao fenomena savremene medijske egzistencije, kojim se mogu objasniti različite pojave u našem društvenom kontekstu. Ideja simulakruma u našem istraživanju ima ulogu reperne tačke za dokazivanje egzistencije paralelnih stvarnosti koje postoje u različitim medijima. Cilj istraživanja je da se analiziraju sve naslovnice informativno-političkih medija na njihovim onlajn stranicama, koji na dnevnom nivou izlaze u Republici Srbiji. U istraživanju se kompariraju naslovne stranice *mejnstrim* medija na onlajn platformama, a njihovim ukrštanjem može se zaključiti da egzistiramo u specifičnom medijskom simulakrumu. Metodologija koja se koristi u istraživanju podrazumeva korišćenje: statističkog i komparativnog metoda, te analize medijskog diskursa. Ograničenja istraživanja sadržana su u činjenici da se analiziraju dnevni informativno-politički *mejnstrim*, tokom jedne sedmice, kada po teoriji verovatnoće nije bilo događaja, procesa i ličnosti koje bi značajnije uticali na zaključke istraživanja. Generalni zaključak istraživanja jeste da naslovnice imaju veliku ulogu u očima čitalaca, a zloupotreba medija ide do namernog proizvođenja afera i pseudodogađaja koji stvaraju specifičan model medijskog simulakruma koji postaje paradigma savremene štampe. Na osnovu naslovnica može se zaključiti da u medijima egzistira populizam, demagogija, skrivanje istine, omalovažavanje, vredanje i govor mržnje. Opravdanost istraživanja sadržana je u ideji da dokažemo da li je medijski simulakrum paradigma naše medijske egzistencije u eri digitalizacije. Postavlja se pitanje kako da savremeni konzument informacija opstane u tom medijskom ubrzanju, koje u krajnjoj liniji proizvodi nepoverenje u medije. Tim postupkom kredibilitet gube *mejnstrim* mediji, a ne samo oni koji kreiraju virtuelnu realnost. Opravdanost istraživanja sadržana je u potrebi da se ispituju granice propagande i etički utemeljenog novinarstva u eri digitalizacije i novih tehnologija.

Ključne reči: simulakrum, mediji, nove tehnologije, digitalizacija, naslovnice, manipulacija, novinari.

UVOD

Termin koji se neretko u nauci koristi jeste *simulakrum*, koji je latinskog porekla i na tom jeziku označava sliku ili san. U prenesenom značenju,

simulakrum znači priviđenje, avet, lažnu sliku, privid ili utvaru i u tom kontekstu neretko se koristi, posebno u medijskim komparacijama i za potrebe eksplikacije medijske zbilje (prema Maširević 2010: 134). Taj termin skoristi se i u kritici postmoderne kulture u kojoj je veoma teško razgraničiti realnost, kao čulno opažanje savremenog moralnog subjekta to jest svakog svesnog pojedinca u društvu i kopija te *realnosti* koje su oličene u plasiranju medijskih sadržaja čiji smo u ulozi konzumenata informacija svedoci. *Simulakrum* ima svoje određenje u različitim oblastima kulture, umetnosti, filma i pozorišta (prem Đerić 1992). *Simulakrum* je strukturalan i višeslojan termin koji je u različitim svojstvima i tumačenjima prisutan u raznim oblastima ljudskog duhovnog stvaralašva (prema Petrović 2004).

Postoje tri nivoa simulakruma: prvi je refleksija stvarnosti, drugi stvarnost koja se izokreće i maskira je i treći jeste nepostojanje stvarnosti, odnosno njeno odsustvo. U tumačenju i eksplikaciji *simulakruma* posebno se istakao Žan Bodrijar koji smatra da je simulacija podražavanje realnosti koja u suštini ima određeni objekat, proces, ličnost, dok je simulakrum simulacija koja je sam objekat, proces ili ličnost, simulacija koja stoji na mestu stvarnog, koja kao takva i nije prepoznata, odnosno percipirana od savremenog moralnog subjekta odnosno konzumenta informacija. „Ne radi se više o imitaciji, ni o dupliranju, pa čak ni parodiji. Radi se o zamenjivanju stvarnog njegovim znacima, to jest, o jednoj operaciji odvrćanja od svakog stvarnog procesa njegovim operativnim dvojnikom, metastabilnom, programatskom, nepogrešivom označavajućom mašinom, koja nudi sve oznake stvarnog i ostvaruje kratke spojeve svih njegovih peripetija. Stvarno neće imati nikada više priliku da se proizvede (...)“ (Bodrijar 1991:6). Pojedini autori koji su se bavili idejom *simulakruma* iz različitih uglova kritički primećuju revolucionarnost Bodrijarove misli i značaj njegove teorije, upravo za medije: „U savremeno doba, koje on (Bodrijar – prim. aut.) ne naziva direktno postmodernim, ušli smo simulacijom stvarnosti, dobijajući na taj način svet hiperrealnosti. Ne postoji više predstavljanje kakvo smo znali ranije, stvari koje su bile projektovane psihološki i mentalno sada se nalaze u hipersvetu“ (Maširević 2010:134) .

Interesantno je da Bodrijar ideju virtuelne realnosti razrađuje i eksplicira na zanimljiv način, kada u delu *Savršen zločin* piše: „Ali, slika više ne može da predstavlja realno, jer je ona sama to realno. Ne može više ni da ga sanja, jer je ona njegova virtuelna realnost. Kao da su stvari progutale sopstveno ogledalo i postale prozirne samima sebi, potpuno vidljive samima sebi, u punoj svetlosti, u realnom vremenu, u nemilosrdnom preslikavanju. Umesto da su kroz iluziju same

sebi odsutne, one su prinuđene da se ispisuju na milionima ekrana na čijim horizontima nestaje ne samo realno, već i sama slika. Realnost je prognana iz realnosti“ (Bodrijar 1998:14). Razumevajući potrebu da slikovito predstavi svoju tezu, Bodrijar nalazi paradigmu *simulakrura* u *Diznilendu* i njegovoj ulozi koju ima u životu prosečnog konzumenta informacija, koji je fasciniran i očaran mogućnošću bekstva iz sumorne svakodnevice, odlaskom u svet mašte: „*Diznilend* (*Disneyland*) je savršen model svih vrsta isprepletanih simulakrura. To je pre svega jedna igra iluzija i fantazma: tu su gusari, *Granica*, *Budući svet*, itd. Taj imaginarni svet je navodno uzrok poslovnog uspeha. Ali masu sveta, bez sumnje, mnogo više privlači društveni mikrokosmos, religiozno, minijaturizovano uživanje Amerike, njenih ograničenja i njenih radosti (...) Jednom izvanrednom koincidencijom (koja je bez sumnje, rezultat čarobnosti svojstvene tom univerzumu), taj zamrznuti svet detinjstva zamislio je i ostvario jedan čovek koji je danas i sam duboko zamrznut: Volt Dizni, koji očekuje svoje uskrsnuće na 180 stepeni ispod nule“ (Bodrijar 1991:15-16).

Tu se postavlja pitanje uticaja i sadržaja savremenih medija na stvarnost, ukoliko je moguće govoriti o stvarnosti ili je umesnije istaći egzistenciju medijske stvarnosti kao realne pretpostavke i kategorije iz koje se može izvesti distinkcija između više kategorija stvarnosti. Snažna simbolika medija odavno je prepoznata i u tom kontekstu važno je istaći da svi znamo šta je bio povod izbijanja Prvog svetskog rata¹, ali veoma malo se zna šta je bio povod za izbijanje Drugog svetskog rata. Čak i 1939. smatralo se da je za *casus belli* sasvim dovoljan razlog fingirani napad na jedan medij, tačnije na nemačku radio-stanicu *Glajvic*, koji su izveli *esesovci* preobučeni u poljske vojne uniforme. Nakon tog izmišljenog napada², Hitler je napao Poljsku, odnosno otpočeo rat do tada neviđenih razmera u ljudskoj istoriji (prema Group of authors 2004).

MEDIJSKI SIMULAKRUM

U teorijskim razmatranjima često se ističe da mediji treba uvek da zastupaju javni interes i da sugerišu svojoj publici markantne političke, socijalne, kulturne i druge probleme čije rešavanje je u javnom interesu, te objavljuju informacije o svim aspektima društvene zbilje. Da li je to tako ili mediji (ne)svesno razvijaju i do *orvelovskih* dimenzija promovišu *simulakrum* kao

¹ Atentat na Franca Ferdinanda.

² U kom su nacisti pobili logoraše preobučene u nemačke uniforme.

postmoderni obrazac i model možemo uvideti analizirajući primere koji su svakodnevno prisutni u svetu medija. Eklatantan primer teze da egzistiramo u medijskom *simulakrumu* može se eksplicirati na globalnom medijskom polju. Zemlja koja se uzima za model jedne od najrazvijenijih medijskih sistema po kom se svi ugledaju jesu SAD, ali i tamo ima pokazatelja medijskog *simulakruma*. „Iako je droga u 2016. pobila 65.000 Amerikanaca, od čega više od 4.000 duša u Ohaju, šef *Bele kuće* nijednom nije zapretio da će se obračunati sa tim masovnim ubicom. Sa regularnim teroristima, koji su u poslednjih 15 godina odneli oko 150 života, misli da zna kako će – poslaće im dronove, pobiće im i članove porodice, sravnice ih sa zemljom (...) Narkomanska epidemija ne smatra se pretnjom po nacionalnu bezbednost, jer za razliku od terorizma, rešavanje ovog problema ne omogućava basnoslovno bogaćenje vojno-industrijskog kompleksa (...) Iako su politički nemotivisane pucnjave veliki rizik po živote američkih civila, u zavisnosti od godine strada između 15.000 i 30.000 ljudi, administracija nije objavila ‘rat protiv oružja’ već radi na slabljenju ionako labavih pravila za kupovinu i nošenje vatrenog oružja“ (Stevanović 2017)³. Američki mediji, posebno veliki, bogati, uticajni i moćni medijski sistemi, izveštavaju svoje konzumente informacija u skladu sa medijskom mantrom da je terorizam neverovatna opasnost za čije suzbijanje treba izdvojiti ogromne sume novca, jer američka vojska troši više novca od sledećih po snazi osam armija zajedno, a nova administracija povećava ta davanja za više od 80% ukupnog budžeta od recimo ruske vojske. Iz navedenih razloga je potreban medijski *simulakrum*, a slično stanje je i u evropskim medijima gde i pored učestalih terorističkih napada po evropskim gradovima, po analizi *Kejto institute*, rizik od stradanja u terorističkom napadu u Francuskoj iznosi jedan prema pet miliona (prema Stevanović 2017).

Stvaranje konstantnog vanrednog stanja u smislu terorističke opasnosti u svetskim medijima, zaklanja globalnu sliku koliko ljudi umre od raka, narkomanije, pogine u saobraćajnim nezgodama, umre od gladi, bolesti koje su izlečive i slično. Targetiranje terorizma kao strašnog problema, dovodi konzumente informacija u stanje *simulakruma*, gde je realnost ono što se tog dana plasira u medijima, promoviše u digitalnom svetu – na društvenim mrežama i onlajn platformama. Usled opšteg ubrzanja u kom živimo prosečan građanin nema previše vremena a čini se ni želje i volje, da sam kritički razmišlja i kao posledicu toga donosi (ne)samostalne zaključke. Taj momenat prepušta se medijima,

³ Izvor: <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/385376/Bin-Laden-za-koga-nikad-niste-culi> (pristupljeno: 01.12.2019).

analitičarima, a u vreme opšte digitalizacije sve više su uposleni *spin* doktori, koji umeju da koriste razne sisteme manipulacije, od uticaja putem društvenih mreža do mejnstrim medija (prema Foa 2017).

Sam Bodrijar bio je kritičan prema medijima: „*Votergejt*. Isti scenario kao i u *Diznilendu* (imaginarni efekat koji prikrija da ne postoji više stvarnosti izvan nego unutar granica veštačkog okvira): u tom slučaju to je efekat skandala koji krije da ne postoji nikakva razlika između činjenice i njenog razotkrivanja (identične metode ljudi iz *CIA-e* i novinara *Vašington posta*). Ista operacija, koja nastoji da putem skandala oživi jedan moralni i politički princip, putem imaginarnog – jedan princip stvarnosti koji tone“ (Bodrijar 1991:18).

SIMULAKRUM NA DOMAĆOJ MEDIJSKOJ SCENI

U modernoj političkoj istoriji poznati italijanski političar-populista Silvio Berlusconi sa svojom partijom *Napred Italijo* (ital. *Forza Italia*), ušao je u politiku 1994. i uspeo da u tri izborna ciklusa pobedi zahvaljujući kombinaciji populizma i kontrole medija. Upravo je medijska manipulacija bila usmerena na kreiranje svojevrsnog *simulakruma* koji je vešto uobličen kombinacijom zabave, medijske dokolice i (dez)informisanja, kao „recepta“ koji uspešno može usudirati javnost, kako se društvo razvija i napreduje (posebno se hvali napredak na ekonomskom području) iako je realnost značajno drugačija (prema Foa 2017).

Ipak, najprizemniji oblik *simulakruma* na našoj medijskoj sceni svakako odražavaju tabloidi koji se ne libe da otvoreno uvode svoje čitaoce u svet iskrivljene realnosti što se, kako primećuje Neda Todorović, reflektuje u mnogim simboličkim postupcima: „Mediji, prema Pjetru Pizariju (*Dimni signali*), sve više funkcionišu kao ogromne mašine za proizvodnju i preradu događaja. Na sceni je postnovinarstvo čiji je osnovni medij internet sa laičkim novinarstvom, a ostali mediji su samo pojedinačni glasovi u poplavi ponude informacija. Postnovinarstvo počiva na pseudodogađajima i pseudoličnostima, na pričanju priča konstruisanih u skladu s potrebama medija, njihovih vlasnika i oglašivača, a ne u skladu sa najznačajnijim događajima (...) Kao svaka bajka, koristeći izražajna sredstva fikcije, narativno novinarstvo igra više na kartu emocija nego na kartu razuma. *Preljubnici* u kojima glumci, statisti, naturšćici *tumače likove* ljudi iz realnosti, ne dajući nedovoljno obrazovanom gledaocu jasan signal da situacije nisu stvarne, odličan su primer *storitelinga*. (...) Sličan primer su tekstovi u tabloidima u kojima su glavne ličnosti likovi iz turskih serija ili *celetoidi* (poznati dok šou traje), koji borave na *Farmi* ili *Velikom bratu*. Kada se govori o starnim

dogadajima u kojima učestvuju glumci iz tih serija, o njihovim udajama i razvodima, te se ličnosti u tabloidima nazivaju imenima junaka iz serija, a ne svojim pravim imenima!“ (Todorović 2013)⁴

Autori koji su do sada analizirali naslovnice smatraju da u značajnoj meri postoji izmenjena slika realnosti i da naslovne strane neretko poseduju elemente svojevrsnog *simulakrums*, koji se nakon analize može ustanoviti. „Osobi koja redovno gleda naslovne stranice dnevnih novina u Srbiji i veruje svemu što vidi ne preostaje ništa drugo nego da pripremi dugogodišnje zalihe hrane, lekova i oružja. Jer neki ratovi već traju, neki samo što nisu počeli, a kataklizma je neizbežna“ (Jahić 2017)⁵ To je zanimljiva konstatacija, ali da bi ustanovili koliko se razlikuje realnost u pojedinim medijima koji imaju dijametralno suprotne uređivačke politike, potrebno je analizirati naslovnice, odnosno posmatrati njihov sadržaj.

SIMULAKRUM SA NASLOVNICA

Istraživanje je sprovedeno na uzorku koji je obuhvatio monitoring naslovnih strana u trajanju od nedelju dana (avgust 2019. godine) sledećih dnevnih informativno-političkih štampanih medija: *Srpskog telegrafa*, *Politike*, *Informera*, *Danasa*, *Večernjih novosti*, *Blica* i lista *Alo*.

Komparirane su naslovne stranice u digitalnom formatu skinute sa onlajn platformi - sajtova medija koji su analizirani i to u periodu od 15. do 22. avgusta 2019. Navedeni vremenski period uzet je po sistemu slučajnog uzorka. Izvršena je komparacija po sistemu koja tema je dominantna na analiziranim naslovnica, zatim koja tema je po važnosti sekundarna odnosno tercijalna. Za kriterijum prioriteta uzeta je veličina naslova, font, nadnaslov, fotografija i položaj naslova na stranici.

Prvog dana istraživanja 15. avgusta 2019. najupečatljiviji događaj za *Informera*, *Alo* i *Večernje novosti* bila je pobeda fudbalskog kluba *Crvena zvezda* odnosno odbrana golmana Borjana; za *Blic* je centralna tema bilo izbegavanje suđenja (uz pomoć advokata) od strane Milutina Jeličića Jutke; dok je na naslovnoj stranici *Danasa* dominantan naslov: *Kobre nemaju šta da traže tokom*

⁴ Izvor: <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/255067/IIIта-би-данас-о-нама-мислио-Цорц-Орвел> (pristupljeno:01.12.2019).

⁵ Izvor: <https://www.cenzolovka.rs/scena/naslovnice-dnevnih-novina-u-srbiji-horor-strah-uzas-kraj/> (pristupljeno:01.12.2019).

građanskog protesta“. *Srpski telegraf* je preko čitave naslovnice doneo navodnu izjavu Trampa: *Rok za podelu Kosova 25.08.2020*, dok je *Kurir* na naslovnoj centralnu pažnju posvetio Bokiju 13 koji je, po njihovim izvorima, odneo estradnom menadžeru Bašanoviću 1,5 miliona evra od reketa. *Politika* je za centralnu temu svoje nasovnice izdvojila naslov: *Kvinta gura Srbiju u NATO*.

Narednog dana 16. avgusta u *Informeru* dominira naslov: *Bivši šef CIA Stiven Majer: Srbiji dati sever Kosova*, u *Srpskom telegrafu* je takođe glavna tema Kosovo samo je kod njih naslov: *Putin upozorio: Angela ruši podelu Kosova – huška Šiptare na Srbe*. U *Večernjim novostima* takođe se piše o Kosovu jer je centralni naslov: *Sraman potez Mogerinijeve: Na kraju mandata ugurala Kosovo*. *Blic* ima za centralni naslov izjavu ministra Ivica Dačića: *Vlast u Podgorici ima krizu identiteta*, a u *Kuriru* je uz foto-montaže predsednika Crne Gore Mila Đukanovića sa šubarom i kokardom prisutan naslov: *Milo lumpovao uz četničke pesme*. U listu *Alo* dominantan je sukob pevačice Nadežde Biljić i njenog emotivnog partnera uz naslov: *Toma me mlatio čim je stigao*, dok je u *Politici* glavna vest uspeh jednog pripadnika Vojske Srbije na vojnom takmičenju u Belorusiji uz naslov: *Oko sokolovo snajperiste ‘Sokolova’*. Centralni naslov u *Danasu* glasi: *Nedostaje 7.000 vozača iz GSP-a Beograd odlazi 350*.

Po navedenom sistemu analizirana je svaka naslovna stranica kako bi se se uočili dominantni naslovi, koji su dati u tabelarnom prikazu sa ciljem lakše komparacije. Kada pogledamo naslove koji su dominantni u pojedinim medijima, možemo zaključiti da postoji samo delimičan konsenzus oko *tema dana*, jer svaka redakcija je spram svoje uređivačke koncepcije i procene važnosti tema od strane glavnog urednika pozicionirala određene naslove kao najvažnije.

	15.08.	16.08.	17.08.	18.08.	19.08.	20.08.	21.08.	22.08.
<i>Informer</i>	Pobeda Crvene zvezde	Srbiji dati sever Kosova	I Daut (Haradinaj) ide u Hag	Isto	<i>Miloš Veliki</i> menja Srbiju	Trump ima plan za Kosovo	Trump protiv Šiptara?!	Amerika uslovno za podelu
<i>Alo</i>	Pobeda Crvene zvezde	Toma me mlatio čim je stigao	Ovo je Vučićev leteći tenk	Đilase, koliko to imaš džipova?	Miloš i Karadorde će spojiti Srbiju	Manijak vozio sa 4 promila	Unuk Milića od Mačve ubio brata	Vučić oteo Trampa od Albanaca
<i>Kurir</i>	Boki 13 i afera u Makedoniji	Milo lumpovao uz četničke pesme	Zoran imao dva telefona – ubistvo pevačice Jelene Marjanović	Ucenjena porno glumica	Vučić: Ovaj put je ponos Srbije	Mržnja kvazielite	Nemački vojnici tuže NATO	Trump: Srbija neće biti ponižena
<i>Srpski telegraf</i>	Trump i podela Kosova	Putin upozorio: Angela ruši podelu	Boki 13 orgijao sa političarem iz Srbije	Isto	Stižu vojne zveri	Klintonu za orgije podvodili decu sa	Trumpove poruke Vučiću	Legija iz zatvora napao generala

Kosova					Kosova			
<i>Danas</i>	Stop za <i>Kobre</i> na protestima	Nedostaje 7.000 vozača	Lažna dilema – kada proglasiti bojkot	Isto	<i>Kobre</i> “odbranile” predsedništvo	Kao da je Vučić iz svog džepa platio auto-put	Vučić rekorder u otvaranju svega	Neverovatna cena auto- puta do Surčina
<i>Politika</i>	Kvinta gura Srbiju u NATO	Oko sokolovo snajperiste Sokolova	Priština neće moći u UN ni kao posmatrač	Više od dve plate za đake prvake	Ponos cele Srbije (auto- put)	Mediji posvađali vlast i opoziciju	Za stolom tuđe istorije (Politika na Kosovu)	Svi putevi vode u Grčku
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Pobeda Crvene zvezde	Mogerinijeva ugurala Kosovo	Pijan za volanom dužan do groba	Tačijeva mafija htela da me ubije	Otvoren Miloš Veliki: putkaz zrelosi države	Profa iz podruma vukao nas ka eliti	Vašington ruši takse Prištini	Sestrama povišica 15%?
<i>Blic</i>	Suđenje Jutki	Dačić o vlastima u Podgorici	Baštovanu dala 1600 evra da joj ubije muža	Teslini govori iz Beograda	Srpkinja oteta u Torinu zbog prevare	Ključan sastanak za Kosovo	Štrahe vredao Anu Brnabić	Po Kosovu se kreće 250 džihadista

Na osnovu analize posmatranog materijala može se zaključiti da postoje dani kada je više redakcija markiralo jedan događaj kao dominantan za taj dan. Na primer pobeda FK *Crvena zvezda*“ markirana je za dan 15.08.2019. kao centralna tema u *Večernjim novostima*, *Inforeru* i listu *Alo*. Ista situacija je sa otvaranjem auto puta *Miloš Veliki*, što je kao centralnu temu 19.08. na naslovnica postavio: *Informer*, *Alo*, *Kurir*, *Politika* i *Večernje novosti*.

Ako analiziramo dan kada nije dat isti priroitet jednoj temi od na primer dve redakcije onda je to 17.08. kada je svaki medij imao svoju temu koju je favorizovao: na primer *Danas* piše o opozicionom bojkotu predstojećih izbora, dok *Politika* kao centralnu temu postavlja nemogućnost Prištine da uđe u UN. *Večernje novosti* kao centralnu temu imaju opasnosti koje prete onima koji pod dejstvom alkohola izazovu saobraćajnu nezgodu, dok se *Alo* bavi novim ruskim borbenim helikopterom, *Kurir* ubistvom Jelene Marjanović (po ko zna koji put), a *Srpski telegraf* navodnim orgijama Bokija 13 sa anonimnim srpskim političarem. Možemo zaključiti da posmatrani dan najviše simbolizuje tezu da čitaoci medija u Srbiji ako čitaju samo jedne novine žive u specifičnom *simulakrmu*, koji ih u medijskom smislu okupira i drži u određenom manje ili više anestetiziranom miljeu nedostatka viđenja *druge* stvarnosti ili prave realnosti.

ZAKLJUČAK

Mediji u Srbiji nalaze se u ozbiljnoj krizi i to etičkoj, kadrovskoj i finansijskoj, jer kada pogledamo naslovne stranice ne radi se samo o *simulakrumu*

u izboru tema za naslovne stranice, već i u osnovnim novinarskim/uredničkim standardima da neka informacija postane vest (i to za naslovnicu). To nije ništa novo, jer rezultati istraživanja izveštavanja srpskih tabloida o poplavama od 2014. sugerišu da postoji kontinuitet neetičkog rada i izveštavanja, koje se može determinisati kao namerno i sistematsko kreiranje specifičnog *simulakrums* (uporedi Barović 2015: 97).

Generalni zaključak istraživanja jeste da naslovnice imaju veliku ulogu u očima čitalaca, a zloupotreba medija ide do namernog proizvođenja afere i pseudodogađaja koji smišljeno i sistematski stvaraju specifičan model medijskog *simulakrums* koji postaje paradigma savremenih medija u eri digitalizacije. Mediji imaju moć da (iako po istraživanjima opada poverenje u njih), i dalje imaju značajan uticaj na javnost i stvaranje mišljenja o nekoj pojavi, procesu ili ličnosti (prema Hol 2013). Na osnovu ponuda naslovnica može se zaključiti da u medijima egzistira populizam, demagogija, skrivanje istine, omalovažavanje, vređanje i govor mržnje. Svi ti elementi mogu se naći čak i na naslovnicama (posebno tabloida), koji se takmiče u plasiranju etički neprihvatljivih elemenata (npr. *Informer* 21.08.2019. naslov: *Tramp protiv Šiptara*). Na osnovu komparacije različitih medija i njihovih naslovnih stranica možemo zaključiti da je sveprisutni medijski *simulakrum* paradigma naše medijske egzistencije u eri digitalizacije. Postavlja se pitanje kako da savremeni konzument informacija opstane u tom medijskom ubrzanju, koje u krajnjoj liniji proizvodi nepoverenje u medije, koji u digitalnom okruženju stalno iznose novo viđenje *realnosti*. Tim postupkom kredibilitet gube *mejnstrim* mediji, dok ostaju prikriveni oni koji kreiraju virtuelnu realnost, i to od spin doktora do tradicionalnih propagandista koji metode propagande uz neznatne izmene usavršavaju čitav vek (prema Bernajs 2014).

Pošto smo ustanovili da postoje tri nivoa *simulakrums* (prvi je refleksija stvarnosti, drugi koji stvarnost izokreće i maskira je i treći nepostojanje stvarnosti, odnosno njeno odsustvo), možemo zaključiti da u eri digitalizacije u srpskim medijima u značajnoj meri egzistira drugi nivo *simulakrums*. Ako pogledamo našu medijsku scenu, fenomen simulakrums se najbolje može protumačiti i eksplicirati Bodrijarovim kratkim, ali veoma upečatljivim citatom: „Realnost je prognana iz realnosti“ (Bodrijar 1998:14). Medijski *simulacrum*, čini se, sve više egzistira u našim medijima što više odmiče era digitalizacije, kao medijsko doba u kom vlada postmodenistički pristup selektivne difuzije informacija. Same informacije gube ekskluzivitet, ali je problem u selektivnom davanju prioriteta u mejnstrim medijima koji prave glavne vesti od pseudodogađaja, izmišljenih skandala, *fejknjuza* i slično. Zbog toga se može konstatovati da će *simulakrum* još dugo

vremena biti naša medijska realnost u eri digitalizacije, ma koliko ta sentenca paradokslano zvučala i činila se kontradiktornom.

Vladimir Barović

MEDIA SIMULACRUM AS A PARADIGM OF CONTEMPORARY EXISTENCE IN THE ERA OF DIGITALIZATION

Summary

The paper presents the idea of simulacrum as a phenomenon of contemporary media existence, which can explain different phenomena in our social context. The idea of the simulacrum in our research has the role of a benchmark for proving the existence of parallel realities which exist in different media. The aim of the research is to analyze all the covers of informative-political media on their online pages, which are published daily in the Republic of Serbia. The research compares the front pages of the mainstream media on online platforms, and by crossing them, we can come to the conclusion that we exist in a specific media simulacrum. The methodology used in the research involves the use of: statistical and comparative methods, and analysis of media discourse. The limitations of the research lie in the fact that the information-political mainstream media that come out on a daily basis are analyzed over the course of two weeks, when according to the theory of probability there were no events, processes and personalities that would significantly influence the conclusions of the research. The general conclusion of the research is that covers play a major role in the eyes of readers and the misuse of the media goes all the way to the deliberate production of affair and pseudo-events that create a specific model of the media simulacrum that becomes the paradigm of modern press. Based on the covers, it can be concluded that populism, demagoguery, concealing the truth, humiliation, insults and hate speech exist in the media. The justification of the research lies in the idea to prove that the media simulacrum is the paradigm of our media existence in the era of digitalization. The question arises as to how a modern consumer of information survives in this media acceleration, which ultimately produces distrust in the media. In this process credibility is lost for the mainstream media, not only for those who create virtual reality. The justification of the research lies in the need to examine the limits of propaganda and ethically grounded journalism in the era of digitalization and new technologies.

Key words: simulacrum, media, new technologies, digitalization, headlines, manipulation, journalists.

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PERSPEKTIVE INTERNETA I NOVIH MEDIJA U RAZOTKRIVANJU LAŽNIH VESTI

Fenomen lažnih vesti (eng. *fake news*) sve je prisutniji u globalnoj sferi i neretko je posmatran kao novi pojam, svojstven isključivo digitalnom dobu. Pregledom razvoja prisustva lažnih vesti u medijima, kroz primere tipičnih medijskih formi manipulacije i dezinformacije, kao i ispitivanjem hipoteze da internet svojim vodećim karakteristikama doprinosi bržem i lakšem razotkrivanju lažnih vesti, daju se na uvid perspektive i značaj interneta i novih medija u borbi protiv dezinformacija i (ne)namernih medijskih manipulacija. Digitalna medijska pismenost predložena je kao efikasan metod pripreme društva za kretanje u prostorima novih medija, gde se mogu sretati sa lažnim vestima.

Ključne reči: lažne vesti, internet, novi mediji, digitalna medijska pismenost

1. UVOD

„Živimo u eri lažnih vesti”¹, sve je češća maksima koja se pojavljuje u medijskoj sferi, a prisutna je i u savremenim naučnim radovima u oblasti teorije medija. Tako se u globalnoj medijskoj mreži gradi slika o lažnim vestima kao jednoj od najvećih pretnji informisanja današnjice. Međutim, ova tvrdnja dovodi se u pitanje kada se postavi hipoteza kojom se pretpostavlja da *internet i novi mediji, zapravo, predstavljaju uvod u eru u kojoj je teže širiti dezinformacije, zbog vodećih karakteristika koje odlikuju digitalni svet – mnoštva povezanih izvora informacija, lake pretrage, dominantnog prisustva referentnih medijskih kuća u digitalnom izdanju*. Pretpostavka od koje polazimo je, dakle, da internet omogućuje pretragu izvora svake objavljene informacije i detaljno istraživanje određene teme na relevantnim sajtovima, ponekad i olakšanu komunikaciju sa stručnjacima u određenoj oblasti, te da tako dolazi do sužavanja prostora medijske manipulacije i pojave dezinformacija. Navedeni potencijal interneta i posebno novih medija čije je „prirodno stanište“ internet (internet informativni portali sa

¹ Problem „lažnih vesti“ zahvata sve više zemalja (PC PRESS, 27. 9. 2019. pristup tekstu: <https://pcpress.rs/problem-laznih-vesti-zahvata-sve-vise-zemalja/> (1. 2. 2019)).

jasno određenom vlasničkom i uredničkom strukturom i društvene mreže) značajno može uticati na smanjivanje broja lažnih vesti, mada će za takav ishod biti neophodno masovnije digitalno medijsko opismenjavanje korisnika interneta i novih medija kao izvora informisanja, o čemu će biti reči dalje u radu. Takođe, ovim radom ne iskazuje se namera odbacivanja značajnog niza empirijski potvrđenih efekata lažnih vesti u onlajn okruženju, već se daje nova interpretacija teme, iz do sada ređe zauzetog ugla posmatranja iste.

2. PREDMET, CILJ I METODOLOGIJA RADA

Predmet istraživanja ovog rada jeste fenomen lažnih vesti u aktuelnoj globalnoj javnoj sferi.

Cilj rada je da ukaže na prednosti novih medija i interneta kao globalne medijske platforme, u sprečavanju dezinformisanja do kojeg dolazi posredstvom lažnih vesti.

Metodologija rada zasniva se na sledećim naučnim metodama: (1) eksplikativnoj analizi koja doprinosi slojevitijem razumevanju teme i kreativnijoj naučnoj diskusiji; (2) sintezi kao jednoj od osnovnih metoda u društvenim naukama i (3) analizi sadržaja koja ima za cilj da predstavi medijske interakcije i kvalitativno i/ili kvantitativno ukaže na određene komunikacijske, odnosno medijske, poruke i veze između njih.

3. RAZVOJ LAŽNIH VESTI U MEDIJIMA

Dok se vest kao osnovna jedinica informisanja u medijima definiše kao prenošenje tačne i činjenično utemeljene informacije, čije su određujuće „karakteristike aktuelnost, važnost/značaj i zanimljivost“ (Todorović, 2002: 64), termin lažne vesti (eng. *fake news*) predstavlja oksimoron kojim, ako ga doslovno preuzmemo u upotrebu, kao vest možemo okarakterisati svaku informaciju, pa i onu koja je namerno neutemeljena u proverenim činjenicama (Tandoc, Wei Lim and Ling, 2017: 4). Lažne vesti mnogi autori definišu opštim iskazom da je reč o informacijama „koje su namerno i utvrđeno neistinite i mogu dezinformisati čitaoce“ (Allcott i Gentzkow, 2017: 213). Istraživanja o lažnim vestima ukazuju na činjenicu da lažne vesti „često sadrže neku dimenziju istinitosti, te na taj način postaju još teže uočljive“ (Vidaković i Vidaković, 2019: 423).

Uporedno istraživanje 34 naučna rada koji tematizuju lažne vesti (Tandoc, Wei Lim and Ling, 2017) za rezultat ima tipologiju žanrova u kojima se javljaju

lažne vesti. Tako se, prema ovom istraživanju, tipovi lažnih vesti dele na: satiru, parodiju, fabrikovanje, manipulaciju, oglašavanje i propagandu (Tandoc, Wei Lim and Ling, 2017). Da li je reč o novim pojmovima, svojstvenim isključivo digitalnom dobu? Jasno je da to nije slučaj. Lažne vesti zaista nisu novi pojam i u značajnoj meri jesu iste kao i, recimo, pre deceniju ili dve, odnosno pre stotinu godina, ali razliku u interpretaciji ovog pojma čine način i kanali predstavljanja neistinitih informacija. „Savremeni diskurs, posebno medijski, pojam lažne vesti najčešće vezuje za viralne objave na lažnim novinarskim profilima na društvenim mrežama“ (Tandoc, Wei Lim and Ling, 2017: 2). Pored toga, lažne vesti često se pronalaze i u primerima građanskog novinarstva (recimo, na našim prostorima najčešće je reč o brojnim pozivima za *lajkovanje* (eng. *like*; način potvrde o viđenom sadržaju na društvenim mrežama) različitih vidova objava o izmišljenim postignućima mladih, sukobima u gradskom prevozu i na javnim mestima, podvizima u društvu koji ukazuju na humanost osobe koja je određenu objavu napisala i slično), česte su i na internet portalima bez impresuma i na satiričnim portalima koje ovakav vid sadržaja podrazumevaju, ali takav vid umetničko-medijske slobode nije poznat svim korisnicima medijskih sadržaja na internetu. U tom smislu, lažne vesti mogu poslužiti za dobijanje velikog broja klikova, koji donose određenu dobit kreatoru datog sadržaja, a pored toga mogu biti kanal zabave i kanal širenja određene ideološke poruke jasno određenoj ciljnoj grupi.

Ko su mediji koji puštaju lažne vesti? Ima li lažnih vesti na medijskim platformama kredibilnih medijskih kuća koje su, pored tradicionalnog, pokrenule i onlajn izdanje? Prema Milivojević, „urušio se poslovni model na kojem postoji medijska industrija kakvu poznajemo“ (Milivojević, 2012: 30), odnosno kakvu smo do skoro znali, a samim tim i novinari prestaju da budu jedini proizvođači i pošiljaoci (medijskih) informacija (Milivojević, 2012). Novinari danas postaju svojevrsni filteri za proveru autentičnosti vesti koje su rezultat javne razmene informacija različitih internet aktera. Njihov zadatak više nije (samo) izveštavanje, već proveravanje pouzdanosti određene informacije, pre stručne obrade iste (Kovač i Rozenstil, 2006).

U skladu sa navedenom praksom „novih novinara“, zaposleni medijski radnici u redakcijama profesionalnih medijskih organizacija poput *Njujork Tajmsa* (*The New York Times*), *Vašington posta* (*The Washington Post*), agencije *Rojters* (*Royters*), *AP* (*Associated Press*), *BBC* mreže, američke *CNN* i *NBC* mreže kanala, u nemačkom *Špiglu* (*Der Spiegel*), ili u italijanskom *Korijere dela sera* (*Corriere della Sera*), svaku informaciju i njen izvor provere temeljno, te je gotovo nemoguće podleći objavljivanju lažnih vesti. To ne sprečava brojne aktere na

društvenim mrežama, pa i aktuelnog predsednika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država Donalda Trampa da ukažu na to da i mediji sa tradicijom jesu prenosnici informacija koje za cilj imaju manipulaciju javnog mnjenja. Tramp² je tako više puta, putem Tvitera, iskazivao da su uređivačke politike medijskih kuća *CNN* i *NBC* u potpunosti bazirane na lažnim vestima.

Kao što je već navedeno, sadržaji koje možemo obeležiti karakteristikama svojstvenim lažnim vestima najčešće se mogu pronaći na društvenim mrežama Fejsbuk (Facebook), Tviter (Twitter) i Instagram (Instagram), gde se uglavnom javljaju u formama satire i parodije na određeni validni medijski sadržaj, umetničku formu, ličnost, stereotip i slično. I zaista, veliki broj prosečnih korisnika društvenih mreža biva „upecan“ u mrežu deljenja ovakvih sadržaja, to se može utvrditi jednostavnim pregledom nekoliko aktivnih profila na mrežama. Međutim, to ne znači da će lažne vesti ugroziti informisanje u meri koju pojedini istraživači predviđaju. Jačanjem procesa digitalnog medijskog opismenjavanja korisnika medijskih sadržaja (kroz obrazovni sistem i direktno putem interneta) umanjivaće se i prisutnost ovakvih informacija. Taj proces ujedno omogućava i kritičko praćenje svih vidova medijskih sadržaja, bez obzira na vrstu medija, medijski žanr i druge odlike rada, što doprinosi i umanjivanju efekata koje imaju i „stari“ vidovi lažnih vesti.

4. LAŽNE VESTI KAO SASTAVNI DEO SADRŽAJA TRADICIONALNIH MEDIJA

Dvadeseti vek veoma je sadržajan kada je reč o medijskim sadržajima koji mogu biti predstavljeni u kontekstu analize medijske manipulacije posredstvom lažnih vesti. Tu se, pored eksperimenta Orsona Velsa (Orson Welles: 1938; radio drama zasnovana na fikciji o navodno stvarnom ratu svetova između Zemljana i vanzemaljaca koji je prenošen u živom programu), nacističke propagande i brojnih primera ciljane političke komunikacije posredstvom medija (na primer, Severna Koreja, Rumunija, Istočna Nemačka, SSSR, i druge države koje su koristile aktivne medijske kuće, odnosno državne medije – jedina dostupna glasila, u svrhe propagande i kao stubove vlasti), posebno ističu događaji sa Balkana, o kojima je aktivno izveštavano u stranim i ovdašnjim medijima tokom njihovog odvijanja, odnosno tokom devedesetih godina. Kasnije, početkom 21. veka, lažne vesti

² Detaljnije videti: <https://www.newsweek.com/fake-news-word-year-collins-dictionary-699740> (1. 2. 2020).

poprimaju obrise namernog političkog komuniciranja na osnovu neproverenih ili namerno fabrikovanih vesti. Dalje u tekstu, vođeni tipologijom navedenom u trećem poglavlju, predstavimo tipične primere lažnih vesti u odabranim formama medijskih aktivnosti u tradicionalnim medijima; reč je o primeru propagandnog izveštavanja u okolnostima političkog sukoba i primeru medijske manipulacije zarad postizanja određenog političkog cilja.

4.1. Slučaj Račak kao primer skupa lažnih vesti sa propagandnim dejstvom

Selo Račak je tokom devedesetih godina 20. veka bilo sedište takozvane Oslobođilačke vojske Kosova (OVK) i u njemu se krajem 1998. godine i početkom 1999. godine nalazilo oko 130 pripadnika te oružane formacije. Posle ubistva srpskog policajca, doneta je odluka da srpska vojska uđe u selo. Prilikom ulaska u selo na policiju je pucano iz automatskog oružja, minobacača i ručnih bacača, ali se OVK, nakon pretrpljenih gubitaka, ubrzo povukla na brda južno od sela. U sukobima je poginulo nekoliko desetina pripadnika OVK.

Odmah nakon toga, reagovala je Misija OEBS-a koja se nalazila na Kosovu i Metohiji, a predvodio ju je američki ambasador Vilijam Voker, poznat po pučističkim akcijama u Centralnoj Americi osamdesetih godina.³ Oni su tvrdili da su u pitanju civili i da se u Račku dogodio ratni zločin.

Prema izveštaju organizacije *Human Rights Watch*, policija je u Račku pucala u civile, mučila zarobljenike i ubijala ih po kratkom postupku. Prema izjavama očevidaca datih stranim novinarima, „srpski vojnici su ubijali i sakatili svoje žrtve, a šestočasovne orgije nasilja su završene pevanjem nacionalističkih pesama“.⁴

Kasnije je utvrđeno da su ovde korišćene metode falsifikovanja i diskvalifikacije, pošto se radilo o prelomnom momentu u kosovskoj krizi. Ove dve metode koriste se kao sredstva za oblikovanje i predstavljanje činjenica u željenom kontekstu sa jasnim ciljem – obmanuti protivnika i javno mnjenje:

„Metoda falsifikovanja u propagandi koristi se kada propagandista želi falsifikovati događaje i činjenice radi ostvarivanja željenih ciljeva. Falsifikovane činjenice podmeću se u sadržaj i služe zbunjivanju

³ Detaljnije videti: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/recak-marks-massacre-anniversary-01-15-2016> (1. 2. 2020)

⁴ Detaljnije videti: <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/kosovo98/racak.shtml> (1. 2. 2020)

protivnika, ali i vlastite javnosti. Tu je i metoda diskvalifikacije, koja teži da protivnika diskvalifikuje podmetanjem podataka i predočavanjem netačnih činjenica u javnosti“ (Milutinović, 2010: 112).

Takođe, isticanje „Pevanja nacionalističkih pesama“, govori da je cilj bio da se tehnikom orkestracije satanizuju Srbi kao strana koja je bila „u zasluženom karantinu“.⁵ Tehnika orkestracije podrazumeva intenzivno nametanje mišljenja od strane autoriteta. „U okviru propagandnih kampanja kroz koncentraciju dejstava postižu se snažni efekti na ljude, posebno u kriznim i nejasnim situacijama“ (Milutinović, 2010: 112).

Tim Evropske unije, na čelu sa finskim patologom dr Helenom Ranta, počeo je obdukciju 21. januara 1999. godine. Ovaj tim je objavio svoje preliminarne nalaze 17. marta 1999. godine. Izveštaj Evropske unije⁶ zaključuje da nema dokaza da su žrtve bile uniformisane, navedeno je i da su verovatno bile ubijene na mestu gde su kasnije pronađene od strane međunarodnih posmatrača. Srpska strana tvrdila je da su žrtve nosile uniforme OVK, a da su iste kasnije zamenjene civilnom odećom, međutim – u izveštaju Evropske unije navedeno je da odeća nađena na telima poginulih nije imala oznake bilo koje vojne jedinice.⁷

Dve činjenice padaju u oči: vreme izdavanja izveštaja (sedam dana pred početak NATO agresije) i neprihvatanje istražnih nalaza srpskih organa. Radi se o metodi zastrašivanja („Evo vidite šta ste uradili, sad sledi odmazda“) i o metodi koja podrazumeva korišćenje tehnike emocije i uzbuđenja za zapadnoevropsku i američku javnost, koju je navodnim masakrom trebalo pripremiti za početak napada na SRJ.

Helena Ranta je kasnije svedočila na suđenju Slobodanu Miloševiću u Haškom tribunalu, rekavši da su Vilijam Voker i Finsko ministarstvo spoljnih poslova vršili pritisak na nju da promeni izveštaj u smislu eksplicitnije odgovornosti srpskih trupa, ali ona je to odbila.

Tri ekipe forenzičara – jugoslovenska, beloruska i finska – utvrdile su da su na telima poginulih u selu Račak pronađene samo rane iz vatrenog oružja, i to iz daljine. Na šakama 37 od 40 tela metodom parafinske rukavice otkrivene su

⁵ Videti: <http://www.autonomija.info/sejdinovic-srbija-je-devedesetih-bila-u-zasluzenom-karantinu.html> (1. 2. 2020)

⁶ „Report of the EU Forensic Team on the Račak Incident“, 17 March 1999, European Union Official Document.

⁷ Isto kao 6.

barutne čestice, što je dokaz da su poginuli neposredno pre smrti rukovali vatrenim oružjem, odnosno da su učestvovali u borbi.⁸

Sve to nije imalo nikakvog uticaja na dalje događaje. Dva meseca posle isfabrikovanog masakra u selu Račak počelo je bombardovanje SR Jugoslavije, koje je trajalo 78 dana.

Završeno je 10. juna, usvajanjem Rezolucije 1244 Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija i potpisivanjem Kumanovskog sporazuma, kojim je vlast na Kosmetu preuzela međunarodna vojna uprava. U NATO agresiji ubijeno je nekoliko hiljada ljudi, većinom civila. Privremene vlasti u Pokrajini, jednostrano su proglasile nezavisnost 17. februara 2008. godine.

Upotrebom raznih tehnika, od direktne propagande, pa i do fabrikovanih dokaza i tehnike falsifikovanja, stvorena je osnova u slučaju Račak, da se pokrene vojna mašinerija protiv Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, samo sa jednim ciljem – odvajanjem Kosova i Metohije iz sastava Srbije.

Na osnovu konkretne analize tehnika i metoda pomoću kojih se putem medija realizuje određeni cilj interesnih grupa, možemo zaključiti da teorijske postavke o medijskoj propagandi i medijskom ratovanju imaju svoje uporište i u empiriji – proaktivno delovanje aktera potvrđuje moć medija kao vodećeg sredstva u kreiranju atmosfere straha, sukoba i neophodnosti izvršenja agresije.

4.2. Povod za rat u Iraku – hemijsko oružje, plod medijske manipulacije

Amerikanci su 2002. godine otpočeli oblikovanje medijskog diskursa o Iraku kao pretnji za bezbednost sveta⁹. Tvrdili su da Irak ima hemijsko oružje. Centralna informativna agencija (CIA) navodno je obavestila tadašnjeg predsednika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država Džordža Buša da Irak poseduje navedeno naoružanje.

Krenula je jaka medijska hajka, preko *CNN* mreže i drugih zapadnih medija, koja je uveravala javnost da je to istinita informacija. Za to vreme Irčani su govorili da to nije tačno i pozvali su predstavnike Međunarodne agencije za hemijsko oružje da dođu i da posete sva mesta koja su navedena kao potencijalna mesta gde se hemijsko oružje čuva. Medijska manipulacija trajala je mesecima, da bi na kraju, bez odluke Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija, Sjedinjene Američke Države donele odluku da će intervenisati u Iraku, kako bi svrgla Sadama

⁸ Videti: <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/racak-jedanaest-godina-posle/lfed5ew> (1. 2. 2020).

⁹ Detaljnije videti: <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/04/med-a25.html> (1. 2. 2020).

Huseina, a naravno, javnosti je to predstavljeno kao borba za slobodu i demokratiju, te zaštitu arapskog sveta od iračkog hemijskog oružja.

Kad su Amerikanci, nakon mesec dana, okupirali Irak, počinje višemesečna potraga za hemijskim oružjem, da bi, na kraju, i Amerikanci, priznali da Sadam Husein, u stvari, nije imao to oružje. Reč je o političkoj i medijskoj laži koja je dovela do okupacije Iraka i nestabilnosti koja traje već 17 godina (sukobi Šiita i Sunita, formiranje Islamske države, ekonomski problemi koji nastaju i pored velikih rezervi nafte).

5. DIGITALNA MEDIJSKA PISMENOST – ALAT U BORBI PROTIV LAŽNIH VESTI

5.1. Značajne karakteristike interneta i novih medija u kontekstu razotkrivanja lažnih vesti

Razvoj novih medija i transformacija novinarstva u onlajn sferi nepovratno menjaju načine izveštavanja, medijske forme i medije u celini. „Tehnologija je omogućila dopisnicima i novinskim organizacijama da gotovo trenutno prenesu informacije, a publika je počela da očekuje neposredno izveštavanje o najnovijem događaju“ (Krejš, 2010: 22). Internet postaje vodeći izvor informisanja širom sveta, pa i u našem društvu, zbog čega je uloga društvenih mreža i internet portala sve značajnija (prema Bešić, 2016: 5). „Internet je tu ponudio nove mogućnosti, daleko veće [od tradicionalnih medija] jer na mreži nema problema sa prostorom, a svaki pojedinačni korisnik može sam da odredi koje će informacije da konzumira“ (Bajić, 2012: 160).

Prostor interneta, dakle, nudi nam neprekidne izvore informacija, koji su često umreženi jedni sa drugima. Koncept novih medija tako se oslanja na tri principa prenosa informacija: hipertekst, interaktivnost i multimedijalnost (Kljajić, 2008; prema Ward, 2002).

Pojam hipertekst označava pomenutu umreženost informacija, povezivanje informacija putem mrežne strukture nalik rizomu – ovakav način razumevanja umreženosti posredstvom hiperteksta oslanja se na ideju da je povezanost neumitna, jer se „ma koja tačka nekog rizoma može (...) i mora povezati sa ma kojom drugom tačkom“ (Delez i Gatari, 2012: 8). Digitalno okruženje tako čine informacije koje upućuju jedna ka drugoj i nalaze se svuda po površini internet platforme omogućavajući tako korisnicima da se informišu. Prema Levu Manoviču, internet čini nepregledna količina podataka i preduslov za informisanje na osnovu te digitalne arhive jeste upravo hipertekst (Manovich,

2001). Povezanost ovih podataka neprekidno utiče na stvaranje novih hipertekstova potvrđujući tako tezu o rizomskoj strukturi interneta.

Drugi princip, interaktivnost, uključuje javnost u proces medijskog izveštavanja. U praksi, to znači da se interaktivnost razume kao učešće publike u komentarisanju i eventualnom kreiranju medijskih sadržaja. Komunikacija tako postaje dvosmerna (Kljajić, 2008) ili barem pruža iluziju o dvosmernosti, ali ona je uvek kontrolisana od strane medijske kuće koja je vlasnik medijskog prostora.

Dalje, pojam multimedijalnost odnosi se na spajanje različitih medijskih formi i različitih vrsta medija u novi medijski pojavni oblik (proces medijske konvergencije) i definiše se kao „publikovanje novinarskih tekstova koji prate ili mogu pratiti ostali audio-vizuelni sadržaji, kao što su grafike, tabele, animacija, pa čak i audio i video programi“ (Kljajić, 2008: 284).

Tri navedena principa čine onlajn informisanje pogodnim za proveru lažnih vesti i razotkrivanje istih u nekoliko brzih i, za korisnike interneta, lakih koraka koji se razvijaju uz digitalne veštine koje će biti predstavljene u narednom potpoglavlju.

5.2. Digitalna medijska pismenost i razotkrivanje lažnih vesti

Novinarstvo u savremenom svetu ne transformišu samo medijski radnici, već aktivnu ulogu u tom procesu imaju i korisnici medija. Prema Milivojević, „sve brža penetracija interneta omogućuje učešće svih kompjuterski pismenih pojedinaca u javnoj debati“ (Milivojević, 2012: 29). Tehnološka uslovljenost medijskih promena zahteva i kritičko opismenjavanje korisnika interneta. To znači da nije dovoljno da korisnici novih tehnologija, a time i novih medija, budu kompjuterski pismeni (umeju da koriste hardver i softver računara), već je neophodno da se razvije odgovarajući način edukacije korisnika u sferi kritičkog promišljanja sadržaja sa kojima se susreću. Samo takav način praćenja medija može doprineti smanjenju uticaja lažnih vesti u javnoj sferi. Važnu ulogu u ovom procesu imaju vladine i nevladine organizacije širom sveta, predstavnici nauke, ali i svi medijski akteri (vlasnici medija, novinari, urednici, javne ličnosti).

Generacije današnje dece i omladine, kao i generacije budućnosti, ali i stariji građani koji prate medije u internet sferi, munjevitom brzinom stiču naviku informisanja putem interneta kao primarnog izvora informisanja. Ovakav položaj i potencijalni stepen uticaja novih medija, nalaže svima koji se na različite načine bave medijima da osveste ulogu novinara i urednika u „uniformi“ čuvara prolaza (eng. *gatekeeper*) validnih informacija. Drugi zadatak medijskih stručnjaka odnosi se na kreiranje realno izvodljivih nacionalnih planova digitalnog medijskog

opismenjivanja građana koji bi uključivali korake na osnovu kojih bi deca i mladi na svim nivoima obrazovanja i stariji posredstvom individualnih i grupnih besplatnih programa, mogli da steknu znanja o kritičkom mišljenju, veštine kritičkog promišljanja medijskih sadržaja i tehničke veštine internet pretrage izvora informacija kako bi se sprečile dezinformacije posredstvom lažnih vesti.

6. ZAKLJUČNA RAZMATRANJA

Tokom jeseni 2018. godine odjeknula je vest da je predsednik Republike Srbije Aleksandar Vučić sopstvenim propustom zbog umora, ali prvenstveno greškom Informativne službe Predsedništva, izjavio da na svakih deset sekundi u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama pogine jedan perač prozora.¹⁰ Izvor ove vesti je satirični portal „The Onion“¹¹, a kao validnu informaciju predsedniku su istu priredili i prosledili savetnici za komunikaciju sa medijima. Ovaj primer može biti jasna potvrda lažnih vesti kao pretnje za tačnost u informisanju (što najviše odgovara empirijskim analizama uticaja lažnih vesti na informisanje koje su pomenute u uvodnom delu rada), ali ovde će biti uzet kao signal za isticanje važnosti uvođenja digitalnog medijskog opismenjavanja društva, a posebno profesionalaca u svim vidovima medijskog delovanja. Kritičkim pogledom na medijske sadržaje, proverom izvora informacija i praćenjem što većeg broja medijskih platformi, umanjuje se mogućnost za dezinformisanje i podložnost propagandnim i manipulativnim medijskim uticajima. Upravo takav način upotrebe novih medija može biti efikasan u procesu razotkrivanja lažnih vesti i umanjivanja njihovog prisustva i uticaja kako na internetu i u novim medijima, tako i u svim drugim (tradicionalnim) medijskim pojavnim oblicima.

¹⁰Detaljnije videti: <http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a420135/Vucic-se-izvinio-zbog-netacne-izjave-o-peracima-prozora.html> (3. 2. 2019).

¹¹ Link ka satiričnoj vesti: https://www.theonion.com/study-every-10-seconds-a-skyscraper-window-washer-fall-1819572451/amp?_twitter_impression=true (4. 2. 2019).

Danica Čigoja Piper

PERSPECTIVES OF THE INTERNET AND NEW MEDIA IN COUNTERING FAKE
NEWS

Summary

The aim of this paper is to show potential of the Internet and new media in combating misinformation in digital age. The phenomenon of fake news is increasingly present in the global sphere and is often viewed as a new term, inherent exclusively in the digital age. By reviewing the development of the presence of fake news in the media, through examples of typical media forms of manipulation and misinformation it is explained that the term fake news is not related only to the digital space and that internet can be a platform for easier and faster check for the background and fact of any news. Related to that, the main hypothesis is that the Internet contributes to the faster and easier disclosure of fake news by its leading features. Also, digital media literacy has been suggested as an effective method of preparing society to move around in new media spaces, where they can encounter fake news.

Key words: fake news, internet, new media, digital media literacy

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OPEN CLASSROOM FOR OPEN JOURNALISM

Today more than ever digital classrooms are requested. The paper presents an example of best practice started as a project at the Master program in Mass Media and Public Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Philosophy and Communication Sciences, West University of Timisoara, Romania. The courses in Open Journalism for the first-year-master-students have been organized for the past two years in collaboration with Prof. Dr. Magagnotti, the president of the European Journalists Association, who facilitated the participation of several experts, members of the association. These were invited to give insights of their work and have discussions with the master students via Skype. The paper gives an overview of the functioning of these methods as well as the results achieved.

Key words: open journalism, open classroom, Skype, communication sciences, journalist, European Journalism Association, West-University of Timisoara

Digital classrooms or the inclusion of digital methods in the instruction process are at great request these days. Digital methods are especially for the young generation of students of great interest and haven't reached their potential yet. The present paper shows the success of using Skype as a means of communication and a digital tool in the courses of first year master students at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Philosophy and Communication Sciences, West University of Timisoara Romania in the past couple of years.

The paper shows how the courses on Open Journalism at the Master of Mass Media and Public Relations were shaped when the collaboration between the undersigned and prof. dr. Paolo Magagnotti, the president of the European Journalists Association, started and the Skype sessions were introduced in the curricula.

Open Journalism is a fairly new domain both for journalists and newsrooms adopting it as well as for researchers analyzing this trend. Open Journalism stands for a new trend in journalism, exercised on a smaller or larger scale and more or less successfully by several newsrooms, from which the one of the British paper "The Guardian" stands out. One of its former editors, Alan Rusbridger, also outlined ten principles of open journalism the very first of them

being supporting participation and made this trend to a working method in the newsroom (2012).

A definition of open journalism proposed in expert meetings of the OSCE states that “Open Journalism is an umbrella term that covers a variety of collaborative and cooperative forms of journalism, for instance between professional journalists and recognized experts on the topics they are covering, or between professional journalists and members of the general public. There is no fixed or authoritative definition of the term, but the notion of participation is key” (McGonagle 2018: 6). Further the definition goes in showing the people engaged in this type of journalism and the main points where they cooperate: “The term also denotes an opening up of journalism and the recognition that a growing number of actors engage in the activity of journalism. What has changed is the nature of the relationship between journalists and the public. Journalism is no longer the preserve of professional journalists and there can be interaction with the public during all stages of the news production process. That interaction can continue after the publication of the news item, for example by posting comments about the item or by post-publication verification and fact-checking” (Ibidem).

Teaching Open Journalism has been a challenge from several points of view: First, Open Journalism is a new phenomenon. In Romania it is in an early stage, as the case study of the OSCE from which we depicted the definition shows, but also when we look at the results of a study conducted by us with our students on local media in Timisoara, a study which is going to be presented below. Second, in the curricula academica, Open Journalism usually only appears as a module or two, not as a course of one semester. Third, when we started it there was practically no bibliography in Romanian language.

Therefore, the course was built on a few keywords and debates on them, also having noticed that the current situation of the media in Romania and Europe, challenging to journalism, makes the discussion about this phenomenon even more interesting and timely.

It was essential to talk first above all about democracy, and related to this topic, about human rights. In this context, it was important to discuss freedom of expression, diversity of opinions and the right to access information, so to say, looking at communication in the whole process, from the rights and liberties of the communicator to the ones of the receptor. Further we debated on the principle of mass-media as the fourth power in the state looking at this statement from today's reality. We talked about the impact of technology on media, especially regarding new technologies and the radical transformations media has undergone during the

past twenty years. On the same time, we discussed the preferred media to access information today from the young users' (20-30 years' age span) perspective. After all, Open Journalism is a possible trend in journalism because of the new media and by using the interaction between the journalist and the reader, who becomes more engaged in the communication process, leaving the comfort zone of the receptor aside and becoming a co-communicator. He/she does not only express his/her views on an article he/she reads, but contributes, posts, participates by providing material that grows under other reader's eyes.

The description might to some extent resemble what is called citizen journalism, when people post something, because they feel the impetus to do it. But in the case of open journalism, the situation is more complex because in its core it is all about the collaboration between professionals, meaning the journalists and contributors. It is about interactivity. This interactivity is only possible and it is facilitated by the new technologies. Hence the idea of discussing what the journalistic guild means today, how it defines itself, how it has changed, what it means to open up and also what it needs to build trust with readers. It is the discussion about the relationship with the contributing public, the relationship between us, the journalists, and them, members of the public getting engaged, stepping up, co-working. This also needs a look at opinion formers and influencers today.

Another discussion topic was on fake news as a sign of a crisis and a dangerous phenomenon when it grows. Further topics were on quality journalism, slow journalism and ethics, all of these with the intention to show what can be done to restore the confidence in media, a confidence much needed in order to have the public on the side of the professionals.

Last but not least, the discussion about educating the public came up, educating it on handling new media and the new communication environments. Topics like the following raised: How can this be done? Or: Who should provide this education? The general belief was that an educated public is a public who will make the difference between correct news and fake news and will claim quality. In the words I used on the preface of the study already mentioned above: "Thus, a circle of success will be achieved. [Education is] about empowering the reader, not the public in general, but the individual, that is, the active citizen. It is the most democratic exercise in the world, and only authoritarian regimes fear this" (Ciortea-Neamtiu, Magagnotti 2019: 143). Of course, it is important who provides this education and how, and most important if journalists themselves can get engaged in providing this education.

Using terminology from gastronomy tried to give an image about how information is consumed today: “Certainly, the newspaper reading culture has changed, the newspapers are no longer read in tranquility, with time, while sipping coffee and having a critical discussion, today the news, whether written, video or audio, is consumed on the go, meaning often “in a hurry” but also “half read”. That’s why the information already comes packed to go and is often just the electronic, fast-food-information. It doesn’t promise anything more than that. Information is shorter, more standardized and lacking in quality. It ticks our need for information but doesn’t satisfy deeper needs. It often fails in what it should do, that is correct, complete information. The context of the events, but also the consequences, are ignored. There is a risk in this consumption. Last but not least, as in the above gastronomic example, there is a risk of bulimia of information, a concept I proposed for the overconsumption of information we are exposed to. It is not surprising that a movement called slow journalism (like the slow-food movement) has emerged, promoting the idea of extensive and profound, thoroughly conducted documentation. But readers are niche, just like journalists who adopt this kind of journalism” (Ciortea Neamtiu, Magagnotti2019: 143f.).

Both hasty, breaking-news-journalism as well as fast, surface-reading are lacking thoroughness, and in the end is the quality of information, the correctness of information is lacking. But: Correct information, quality information is the meaning of journalism understood as “the fourth power in the state” and “a watchdog of democracy” and an informed, educated public should be the goal.

Starting with this palette of topics discussed in the classroom, master students also were engaged in discussions in a virtual classroom via Skype with experts from all around Europe courtesy to the president of the European Journalist’s Association, Prof. dr. Paolo Magagnotti.

The first year this method was implemented was 2018/2019. With four contacts per semester it was considered a winning situation for the master students. We agreed on English as language for the classes and it grew to an international class indeed, having also two Erasmus plus students from France joining our classes. English was understood and spoken from moderate to high level by most of the participating students, with one exception. In this case, translation for the student was provided by one of her fellow colleagues.

In the following year, the winter semester 2019/2020, all the participants were good to very good English users, and this boosted discussion even more. There were six Skype sessions with professionals from different European

countries spanning from Austria to Belgium and Germany, with backgrounds in journalism, PR and coaching.

The additional value added to the course was linked to the direct relation and communication with professionals working in the field of communication, some of them having decades of experience in this métier. The presentations given by the professionals on topics related to the overall theme of Open Journalism and on Open Journalism itself as they understand and use it today, but, moreover, the questions and answers sessions afterwards gave our master students the possibility to gain in a short time a much larger overview of the subjects discussed. It opened the classroom to the world of practicing journalism and it brought practitioners, experts from the distance into the classroom. Distances didn't count anymore, barriers fell. As in the case of collaboration in Open Journalism, technology, but especially cooperation between individuals, the willingness to engage in discussion made it possible.

A major output of the very first semester using collaboration was the bilingual volume, Romanian and English: *On Open Journalism. Academic Talks and a Case Study in Timisoara Media*. This volume includes a number of speeches that international experts have held in front of first year master students enrolled in the Mass Media and Public Relations program, in the winter semester 2018-2019, experts who have entered into interaction with students in the Open Journalism courses. Prof. dr. Paolo Magagnotti opens the list of these true keynote-speeches. The volume also includes interviews conducted by the master students at the seminar under my coordination with some of the teaching staff at the Department of Philosophy and Communication Sciences and with journalists from Timișoara. There were interviewed journalists from the printed press and online media, from radio and television, working in the local media or as local or regional correspondents. 80-90 percent of the media in Timișoara were covered, which makes us consider the publishing of the interviews in this book a possible case study for the attentive reader. The idea behind these interviews was to make the master students interact with journalists, many of them experienced journalists, many journalism graduates, to learn from the dialogues about how local journalism is being done in Timișoara today compared to 10-20 years ago, what impact did the internet have on journalism, to learn about fake news and all the other concepts debated with the master students earlier in the classes. It results that, by reading the interviews on how journalists from Timișoara see their own job today, and from the interviews with communication specialists on how they see and analyze the phenomenon today, the reader has a mirror of the

contemporary media phenomenon from the point of view of those who are makers and from the point of view of those who analyze media.

If in the beginning the idea was to offer our readers some ideas about open journalism, given the lack of a consistent Romanian bibliography on this subject, while working on this book, it became clear that it may also be interesting for a public abroad because of this case study about the local media in Timișoara. This is how the decision to publish the English version was taken.

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AKTIVIZAM KAO ODBRANA: GRAĐANSKO NOVINARSTVO I NJEGOVI KORELATI NA PRIMJERU STUDENTSKE POPULACIJE U CRNOJ GORI

Građansko novinarstvo je važna odbrambena strategija od medijske manipulacije, čija nerazvijenost ukazuje na pasivnu, nezainteresovanu i anksioznu javnost. U ovom radu, metodom anketnog istraživanja, analiziramo tendenciju ka građanskom novinarstvu u studentskoj populaciji u Crnoj Gori. Istraživali smo dva važna korelata građanskog novinarstva – povjerenje u medije i aktivizam na društvenim mrežama. Nalazi ovog rada ukazuju na generalnu pasivnost studentske populacije – 80% anketiranih studenata i studentkinja nije praktikovalo građansko novinarstvo, od čega je 34,28% u potpunosti nezainteresovano za taj vid aktivizma. Kao važni uzroci pasivnosti navedeni su i strah od zloupotrebe informacija, te nedostatak anonimnosti. Daljim analizama smo utvrdili da povjerenje u medije pozitivno korelira sa građanskim novinarstvom, dok aktivizam na društvenim mrežama nije pokazao uticaj na zavisnu varijablu. Rezultati ovog istraživanja time postavljaju implikacije za medijsku scenu postkomunističkih društava, gdje medijski skepticizam i strah od zloupotrebe informacija ukazuju na nedovoljan nivo profesionalizma i inkluzivnosti medija. Nalazi ovog rada su takođe relevantni za medijsku i informacionu pismenost u Crnoj Gori, kao i participativne mehanizme postkomunističkih društava, u kojima je dugo vrednovano isključivo konvencionalno učešće.

Ključne riječi: građansko novinarstvo, medijsko povjerenje, aktivizam na društvenim mrežama, medijska i informacijska pismenost, Crna Gora

UVOD

Građansko novinarstvo je proces uključivanja „običnih građana” (Goode, 2009: 1288) u kreiranje i prenošenje informacija medijima. Kontinuiranim angažovanjem publike medijski sadržaj postaje raznovrsniji, uravnoteženiji i osjetljiviji ka marginalizovanim članovima društva (Bruns, 2010). Upravo su ova svojstva medijskih proizvoda sporna, u kontekstu medijskih manipulacija, koje nameću diskusiju o načinu odbrane od netačnog, nepoštenog i neuravnoteženog izvještavanja. Jedna od dobro utemeljenih strategija odbrane je medijska i

informaciona pismenost (Media and Information Literacy – MIL)¹¹, čiji je važan segment građansko novinarstvo, kao indikator aktivizma i osviještenosti konzumenata medija.

Dilema od koje ovaj rad polazi je da li možemo imati efektivne mehanizme odbrane od medijske manipulacije, ukoliko je publika koju taj sadržaj pogađa letargična i onesposobljena za prepoznavanje, bilježenje i distribuiranje informacije. Imajući u vidu važnost građanskog novinarstva za cjelokupni medijski razvoj, ovim radom postavljamo dva cilja:

Prvo, metodom anketnog istraživanja istražujemo da li u studentskoj populaciji u Crnoj Gori postoji tendencija ka građanskom novinarstvu. Studentski uzorak je izabran iz dva razloga. Prije svega, riječ je o populaciji čija tehnološka opremljenost dozvoljava stvaranje i distribuiranje sadržaja medijima, što je preduslov za građansko novinarstvo (Rosenberry i John, 2009). Drugo, studentska populacija je u središtu procesa edukacije i vannastavnog angažovanja. Ovaj dio društva je nosilac promjena, stoga nepostojanje aktivizma u njemu problematizuje tendenciju ka angažovanju u drugim slojevima društva (Flanagan i Levine, 2010).

Drugi cilj ovog rada je da istraži dva važna korelata građanskog novinarstva – povjerenje u medije i aktivizam na društvenim mrežama. Analiziramo da li je medijsko povjerenje ohrabrujuće kada je riječ o građanskom novinarstvu. U konačnom, istražujemo kako aktivizam na društvenim mrežama utiče na građansko novinarstvo, imajući u vidu tezu o „lijenom aktivizmu” (Hinton i Hjorth, 2012: 4), prema kojoj aktivnosti na društvenim mrežama destimulišu aktivizam van virtuelnog prostora.

1. ODREĐENJE GRAĐANSKOG NOVINARSTVA

Pojava građanskog novinarstva (GN) se u jednom dijelu vezuje za krizne događaje u 20. vijeku (Allan i Thorsen, 2009), dok u drugom predstavlja derivat digitalnih tehnologija (Fenton, 2010) i pojave Web-a 2.0 kao komercijalnog i participativnog onlajn prostora (Chung, Nah & Yamamoto, 2018). Istovremeno, postoji tendencija da se građansko novinarstvo odredi kao skup aktivnosti koje nijesu isključivo vezane za onlajn sferu (Goode, 2009: 1288), već su zastupljene i u tradicionalnim medijima, poput televizije, novina i radija (Goode, 2009: 1288–1289).

¹¹ Vidi: <https://en.unesco.org/themes/media-and-information-literacy>, posjećeno: 25. januara, 2019. godine.

Saglasnost, međutim, postoji oko inkluzivne prirode građanskog novinarstva. Naime, ovim konceptom se pravi svojevrsno pomjeranje od pasivnosti konzumenata medija, ka njihovom aktivnom učešću u kreaciji i distribuiranju sadržaja (Lewis, Kaufhold & Lasorsa, 2010).

Stoga, građansko novinarstvo u ovom radu primarno definišemo kroz njegovu participativnu i kritičku komponentu (Rosen, 2008), kao „direktno prikupljanje vijesti i izvještavanje običnih građana” (Min, 2016: 570), koje ima informativnu vrijednost i čini „kritički medijski sadržaj” (Fuchs, 2010: 180, prema Harcup, 2015: 3), a objavljen je na „(...) bilo kojoj medijskoj platformi, uz korišćenje bilo koje tehnologije(...)” (Moeller, 2009: 6). Ova definicija građanskog novinarstva u užem smislu ne uključuje tzv. primjere „metanovinarstva” (Goode, 2009: 1288), odnosno interakciju na društvenim mrežama, imajući u vidu problematičnu kredibilnost i informativnu vrijednost sadržaja na tim platformama (Kalyanaraman i Sundar, 2008). Dakle, građansko novinarstvo predstavlja distribuiranje sadržaja u okviru *tradicionalnih* i *onlajn* medija, gdje se pojedinci koji nijesu novinari, uključuju u proces kreiranja i diseminacije sadržaja.

Razvijeno građansko novinarstvo se u velikoj mjeri pripisuje deliberativnoj političkoj kulturi i sklonosti ka demokratskom progresu (Dzur, 2002). Međutim, polazeći od činjenice da je u GN-u riječ o sadržaju koji kreiraju konzumenti medija, a ne novinari, kritike su odmah formulisane. Naime, diskutabilno je da li informacije koje prikupljaju građani mogu biti validne, ukoliko nijesu nastale na osnovama profesionalnog novinarstva, naučenih u novinarskoj edukaciji (Hinton i Hjorth, 2012). Naime, informacije koje mediji objavljuju prolaze kroz niz filtera oblikovanih profesionalnim načelima, dok u građanskom novinarstvu važi obrnuta logika – „objavi, pa filtriraj” (Bowman i Willis, 2013, prema Moretzsohn 2014: 243). Dakle, upitno je da li građansko novinarstvo ugrožava „novinarski autoritet” (Ornebring, 2014: 37), definisan kao „moć koju imaju novinari i novinarske organizacije koja im omogućava da svoje interpretacije stvarnosti predstavljaju kao tačne, istinite i politički važne” (Andreson, 2008: 250, prema Ornebring, 2014: 37). Međutim, iako je tačno da građansko novinarstvo karakteriše drugačija logika u odnosu na profesionalno novinarstvo (PN), odnos GN-a i PN-a se prvenstveno može definisati kao saradnja, a ne međusobno ugrožavanje. Građansko novinarstvo ne počiva samo na individualnoj težnji konzumenata da se informacija zabilježi i proslijedi, već i na spremnosti medija da „otvore vrata” (Lewis i drugi, 2010: 4), filtriraju i objave sadržaj (Lewis i drugi, 2010: 4). Nadalje, mediji djeluju u jednom kolektivnom

etičkom, pravnom i finansijskom okviru. Profesionalni novinari su dio „šireg institucionalnog i organizacionog konteksta(...)" (Ornebring, 2014: 48), van kojeg se nalaze „građanski novinari".

Izložene kritike upućuju na kompleksnost koncepta građanskog novinarstva i na činjenicu da je uloga građanskih novinara ograničena, te da veza između GN-a i medija, sa jedne, te demokratije, sa druge strane, nije jednosmjerna. Međutim, građansko novinarstvo jeste varijabla koja u velikoj mjeri pokazuje medijsku, političku i sociološku razvijenost društva, odnosno ukazuje na njegove disfunkcionalne mehanizme.

1.1. Korelati građanskog novinarstva

Medijska i informaciona pismenost (MIL) jedan je od najvažnijih korelata građanskog novinarstva. Naime, prema UNESCO-vom (2012) jedinstvenom pristupu, MIL predstavlja sposobnost konzumenata medija da „tumače i donose informativne zaključke, kao korisnici informacija i medija, da postanu *samostalni kreatori i proizvođači* informacija i medijskih poruka"² (kurziv J. D.). Vidljivo je da je važan segment MIL-a upravo građansko novinarstvo, odnosno sadržaj koji kreira publika. Razvijeno građansko novinarstvo ukazuje na to da među konzumentima medija postoji svijest da su oni aktivni učesnici u društvenom životu, te da je njihov doprinos relevantan u odbrani od medijske manipulacije. Takođe, imajući u vidu da je karakteristika medijske manipulacije subjektivnost i neuravnoteženost, građansko novinarstvo pruža „različita gledišta, nezavisna od komercijalnih imperativa" (Bruns, 2010: 16), čime se postiže diverzifikacija medijskog sadržaja.

Sljedeći važan korelat građanskog novinarstva predstavlja povjerenje u medije. Ovaj segment analize naročito je važan imajući u vidu da građansko novinarstvo ne može postojati u izolaciji. Povjerenje je bazirano na „očekivanju da se na nekoga možemo osloniti i da ćemo u odnosu sa nekim više dobiti nego izgubiti" (Coleman, 1990, prema Tsfaty i Cappella, 2005: 253). Medijsko povjerenje nam prvenstveno sugerise kako konzumenti poimaju medije i njihovu ulogu u društvu (Khoring i Matthes, 2007). Dok je veza između povjerenja u medije i vrste medija dobro utemeljena (Tsfaty i Cappella, 2003; Jakob, 2010), odnos između medijskog povjerenja i GN-a još uvijek nije dovoljno istražen

² Vidi: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000187160>, str. 10.

(Ardèvol-Abreu, Hooker & Gil de Zúñiga, 2018). U ovom radu testiramo da li povjerenje u medije utiče na građansko novinarstvo, imajući u vidu teorijski utemeljenu pretpostavku da su skeptični pojedinci manje skloni društvenoj interakciji i aktivizmu (Putnam, 2000).

U konačnom, ovim istraživanjem ispitujemo vezu između aktivizma na društvenim mrežama i građanskog novinarstva. Definicija građanskog novinarstva koju smo prethodno predstavili³ izuzima aktivizam na društvenim mrežama kao jedan njegov oblik. Društvene mreže jesu otvoren i personalizovan forum za izražavanje stavova koji može imati snažan uticaj na nekonvencionalne oblike participacije⁴. Međutim, banalnost objavljenog sadržaja (Cann, 2011: 11) i problem stvarne angažovanosti pojedinaca, stvaraju dileme oko participativnog i kritičkog aspekta građanskog novinarstva, koje smo naveli kao važne. Diskutabilno je da li društvene mreže stvaraju jednu novu formu „lijenog aktivizma” (Hinton i Hjorth, 2012: 4) u kojoj se pojedinci „osjećaju dobro jer su zauzeli stav, ali su u suštini uradili vrlo malo ili su čak nanijeli štetu“ (Hinton i Hjorth, 2012: 4). Dakle, pojedinci su demotivisani za aktivizam van društvenih mreža zbog iluzije da su u onlajn prostoru već uložili određeni napor. Dok je hipoteza o mobilizatorskoj ulozi društvenih mreža empirijski testirana (Weber, Loumakis & Bergman, 2003; Bakker i De Vreese, 2011; Kahne i Bowyer, 2018), teza o negativnoj vezi između aktivizma na društvenim mrežama i građanskog novinarstva zahtijeva dodatnu empirijsku potvrdu.

Imajući u vidu eksplorativni karakter ovog istraživanja i izloženi teorijski okvir u odnosu na građansko novinarstvo, povjerenje u medije i društvene mreže, u ovom radu formulišemo sljedeća istraživačka pitanja:

IP 1: Da li je tendencija ka građanskom novinarstvu prisutna u ispitanom uzorku?

IP 2: Da li povjerenje u medije ima uticaj na individualnu sklonost ka građanskom novinarstvu?

IP 3: Kakva je veza aktivizma na društvenim mrežama i građanskog novinarstva?

³ Vidi str. 3.

⁴ Primjer Arapskog proljeća.

2. METODOLOGIJA

Za potrebe analize ovog rada prikupljeni su podaci na uzorku studentske populacije u Crnoj Gori. Anketiranje je urađeno u periodu od 20. do 28. decembra 2018. godine, na Fakultetu političkih nauka, Univerziteta Crne Gore. Uzorak je činilo 107 studenata/kinja osnovnih i specijalističkih studija Novinarstva, Politikologije i Međunarodnih odnosa.

Imajući u vidu da je tema istraživanja građansko novinarstvo, namjeravali smo da provjerimo da li postoji razlika u rezultatima među studentima/kinjama koji su na različitim smjerovima (studenti/kinje sa Novinarstva u poređenju sa studentima/kinjama sa Politikologije i Međunarodnih odnosa) i na različitim nivoima studija (osnovne i specijalističke).

Kada je riječ o demografskoj strukturi, polna kompozicija uzorka je neuravnotežena sa 80,5% žena i 19,5% muškaraca. Ovakva distribucija polazi od generalne polne strukture studentske populacije na Fakultetu političkih nauka, na kojem je zastupljeniji ženski pol. Međutim, imajući u vidu da ne postoji naučni osnov prema kojem bi pol kao takav bio determinanta sklonosti ka građanskom novinarstvu, ne očekujemo da će polna distribucija značajno uticati na analizu. Starosna struktura studentske populacije je očekivana – dominiraju mladi ispitanici, starosti od 18 do 30 godina, 47,66% uzorka čine studenti/kinje na prvoj godini studija, a 52,34% studenti/kinje specijalističkih studija. Studenata/kinja na Novinarstvu je 41,12%, a preostalih 58,8% čine studenti/kinje sa ostalih smjerova.

2.1. Mjere

Centralne varijable u ovom istraživanju predstavljaju *građansko novinarstvo, povjerenje u medije i aktivizam na društvenim mrežama*. Ispitanici su upitani da li su upoznati sa konceptom građanskog novinarstva (*da, ne ili donekle*). Potom su se izjašnjavali o tome da li su ikada poslali fotografiju ili audio-vizuelni sadržaj mediju i da li je taj sadržaj bio objavljen. Ispitanici su takođe isticali vrstu sadržaja koju su slali medijima (*informacije sa mjesta događaja o kriznim situacijama, informacije/fotografije koje predstavljaju javni interes ili neku drugu vrstu informacije*). U konačnom, u formi otvorenog pitanja, ispitanici su navodili dominantne razloge za pasivnost građana u pogledu slanja informacija medijima.

U analizu smo uključili dvije kontrolne varijable: *tehnološku opremljenost* (posjedovanje mobilnih telefona) i *sedmičnu upotrebu medija* kao izvora informacija, imajući u vidu da posjedovanje adekvatne opreme i nivo

zastupljenosti medija u informisanju pojedinca, može značajno uticati na praktikovanje građanskog novinarstva (Fenton, 2010).

Za povjerenje u medije smo konstruisali aditivni indeks od tri stavke: opšti nivo povjerenja u medije, nivo povjerenja u tradicionalne medije (radio, TV, štampa) i onlajn izdanja tradicionalnih medija (poput internet portala). Ispitanici su izražavali nivo povjerenja od 1 (*imam veliko povjerenje*) do 4 (*uopšte nemam povjerenja*).

Za aktivizam na društvenim mrežama korišćena je skala iz Crnogorske nacionalne izborne studije (Montenegrin National Elections Study – MNES) 2016–2017⁵, koju sačinjava deset stavki, na kojima su ispitanici na Likertovoj skali od 1 (veoma često) do 5 (nikad) izražavali koliko često su praktikovali sljedeće aktivnosti:

Tabela 1: *Skala društvenog aktivizma*

1.	Komentarisa/la političke i društvene teme na društvenim mrežama i informativnim portalima
2.	Informisao/la se o politici putem društvenih mreža
3.	Pisao/la o političkim i društvenim temama na svom profile
4.	Osnovao/la ili se priključio/la političkim grupama na društvenim mrežama
5.	Postao/la prijatelj/zapratio/la političare na društvenim mrežama
6.	Dijelio/la političke članke/vijesti preko svog profila na društvenim mrežama
7.	Postavio/la slike/videa o društvenim i političkim pitanjima na svom profilu
8.	Upustio/la se u diskusiju sa političkim neistomišljenicima
9.	Radije bih podijelio/la svoje političke stavove na internetu/društvenim mrežama, nego urazgovoru sa prijateljima, porodicom ili kolegama
10.	Informisao/la se o politici putem društvenih mreža

2.2. Rezultati

Prvi rezultati predstavljeni u Tabeli 2. pokazuju da većina ispitanika nije pokazala tendenciju ka građanskom novinarstvu:

Tabela 2: *Građansko novinarstvo – frekvencije*

⁵ Vidi: <http://mnes.defacto.me/>, posjećeno: 27. januara, 2019. godine.

1. Nikada nisam zabilježio/la niti poslao/la takav material	80%
2. Poslao/la sam zabilježeni materijal medijima i bio je objavljen	10,20%
3. Jesam fotografisao/la i/ili snimio/la neki materijal, ali ga nisam poslao/la	7,14%
4. Poslao/la sam zabilježeni materijal medijima, ali nije bio objavljen	1,02

Naime, 80% ispitanika nikada nije zabilježilo niti poslalo fotografiju ili audio-vizuelni materijal medijima, 10,20% ispitanika je poslalo zabilježeni materijal medijima, koji je bio objavljen, 7,14% ispitanika je zabilježilo materijal, ali ga nikada nije prosljedilo mediju, dok je svega jedan ispitanik poslao zabilježeni materijal, ali ga medij nikada nije objavio. Kao dominantno objašnjenje za pasivnost građana po pitanju slanja informacija medijima, ispitanici su navodili: nezainteresovanost (34,28%), strah od otkrivanja identiteta i zloupotrebe materijala (20%), odnosno nepovjerenje u medije (18,57%), neinformisanost o takvom načinu aktivizma (8,57%) i preokupiranost sopstvenim problemima (7,16%). Zanimljivo je da 10% ispitanika smatra da je takva vrsta angažovanja isključivo lični izbor i da „svako ima pravo na pasivnost“. Samo jedan ispitanik je konstatovao da građani zauzimaju aktivan stav prema medijima.

Među onima koji su pokazali najviše sklonosti ka građanskom novinarstvu, najbrojniji su studenti/kinje sa novinarskih smjerova:

Tabela 3. *Građansko novinarstvo na različitim smjerovima*

Smjer	Godina studija	%
Medijske studije i novinarstvo	I	35,29
Politikologija i međunarodni odnosi	I	17,64
Novinarstvo	IV	41,17
Međunarodni odnosi	IV	5,88
Politikologija	IV	5,88

Dakle, oni ispitanici koji su u novinarskoj edukaciji, bilo na prvoj (35,29%) ili na završnoj godini studija (41,17%), pokazuju najveći aktivizam u domenu građanskog novinarstva. Praktikovanje građanskog novinarstva je znatno manje zastupljeno na drugim smjerovima, naročito na završnoj godini Politikologije (5,88%) i Međunarodnih odnosa (5,88%). Ovi rezultati ukazuju na intuitivnu pretpostavku da će oni studenti/kinje koji se obrazuju u oblasti novinarstva i biraju novinarstvo kao svoj budući poziv, pokazati veću osviješćenost o značaju GN-a, u poređenju sa ispitanicima iz drugih oblasti. Međutim, tendencija ka građanskom novinarstvu bi trebalo da bude univerzalna, a ne isključivo posredovana vrstom edukacije.

Istovremeno, bez obzira na oblast studiranja, većina ispitanika navodi da ima jasnu percepciju o tome šta je građansko novinarstvo. Naime, 49,51% ispitanika tvrdi da je donekle upoznato sa konceptom građanskog novinarstva, 40,77% u potpunosti, a svega 9,70% da nije. Dalje analize su takođe pokazale da 28,84% ispitanika sebe smatra aktivnim građanima, 51,92% donekle, a 19,23% ne smatra uopšte. Kao najčešći oblik aktivizma istaknuto je članstvo u nevladinim organizacijama i volonterske aktivnosti (41,07%), dok nijedan ispitanik nije naveo građansko novinarstvo kao potencijalni vid aktivizma.

Kada je riječ o drugom istraživačkom pitanju, odnosno vezi između povjerenja u medije i građanskog novinarstva, rezultati ukazuju na pozitivnu asocijaciju:

Tabela 4: Rezultati linearne regresije-građansko novinarstvo i povjerenje u medije

	<i>Zavisna varijabla</i>	
	Građansko novinarstvo	
Indeks povjerenja u medije	0.645***	
	(0.254)	
Posjedovanje telefona	0.254	
	(0.353)	
Upotreba medija	-0.006	
	(0.156)	
Konstanta	-0.352	
	(0.801)	
N		60
F-statistik (p-vrijednost)	2.25(0.05)	
Adj. R ²		0.11

*Napomena: *** $p < 0.05$ Standardne greške su uzgrađama*

Naime, svakim rastom u indeksu povjerenja u medije za 1 (na skali od 1 do 4), tendencija ka građanskom novinarstvu raste za 0.64. Uprkos tome što ovi rezultati pokazuju pozitivnu vezu između povjerenja i građanskog novinarstva, važno je naglasiti da bi ih trebalo pažljivo interpretirati, imajući u vidu veličinu uzorka i ograničeni postotak varijacije u zavisnoj varijabli (11%) koji je objašnjen ovom analizom. Međutim, Personovom korelacijom smo dodatno provjerili odnos između indeksa povjerenja i građanskog novinarstva, te utvrdili da postoji umjerena, ali pozitivna korelacija ($r=0.20$, $p=0.06$), koja implicira da oni pojedinci koji vjeruju medijima, istovremeno pokazuju sklonost ka aktivnom praktikovanju građanskog novinarstva.

U konačnom, u analizi trećeg istraživačkog pitanja, odnosno vezi između aktivizma na društvenim mrežama i građanskog novinarstva, nije utvrđena statistički značajna korelacija ($r=-0.10$, $p=0.34$). Dakle, u ovom istraživanju, aktivizam na društvenim mrežama ne igra važnu eksplanatornu ulogu kada je u pitanju tendencija ka građanskom novinarstvu. Aktivizam na društvenim mrežama je uglavnom ograničen na informisanje o politici, gdje za 52,38% ispitanika društvene mreže predstavljaju glavni izvor informacija.

3. ZAKLJUČAK

Rezultati ovog rada pokazuju da u anketiranoj studentskoj populaciji postoji generalan trend pasivnosti po pitanju građanskog novinarstva. Aktivizam na društvenim mrežama nije pokazao uticaj na građansko novinarstvo, dok je povjerenje u medije u pozitivnoj korelaciji sa zavisnom varijablom. Istovremeno, većina anketiranih ispitanika smatra da je građanski aktivna, ali se taj aktivizam u najvećoj mjeri ogleda u volonterskom radu i članstvu u nevladinim organizacijama. Neprepoznatost i nezastupljenost sklonosti ka građanskom novinarstvu može se tumačiti na više načina.

Prije svega, ispitanici su u velikoj mjeri identifikovali probleme nezainteresovanosti, nedostatka anonimnosti, straha od zloupotrebe, odnosno nepovjerenja u medije, kao glavne razloge za pasivnost. Ova analiza ukazuje na to da je nedostatak sklonosti ka građanskom novinarstvu dominantno sociološke i kulturološke prirode. Naime, tranziciona društva, koja je karakterisala podanička politička kultura (Stojiljković, 2014), pokazuju sporiju tendenciju ka nekonvencionalnoj participaciji.

Identitetske dileme i ekonomski izazovi predstavljaju dugotrajne prioritete u bivšim komunističkim društvima. Nezainteresovanost koju su ispitanici naveli kao razlog za pasivnost, možemo tumačiti kroz činjenicu da studentska populacija ne vidi direktnu korist u ovakvim oblicima aktivnosti, odnosno da aktivizam u domenu građanskog novinarstva nije primaran za njih. Takođe, strah od zloupotrebe i otkrivanja identiteta, te medijski skepticizam, ukazuju na to da crnogorska medijska scena nije prepoznata kao demokratska i inkluzivna. Činjenica da ispitanici u značajnoj mjeri problematizuju povjerenje u medije, govori u prilog nalazu ovog istraživanja – da će visok nivo medijskog povjerenja pozitivno korelirati sa građanskim novinarstvom.

Važno je naglasiti da ovi rezultati imaju direktne implikacije za medijsku i informacionu pismenost. Dometi MIL-a u velikoj mjeri zavise od zainteresovanosti

pojedinaца da budu angažovani, odnosno da kritički i dubinski analiziraju medije i njihov sadržaj. Ukoliko ne postoji interesovanje konzumenata za participaciju, primjena strategija opismenjavanja će biti značajno otežana, naročito ukoliko imamo u vidu da je Crna Gora među evropskim zemljama na 31. mjestu (od mogućih 35) u medijskoj pismenosti, prema Institutu za otvoreno društvo u Sofiji.⁶

U konačnom, ova analiza sadrži implikacije za teorijski okvir onlajn medija koji svjedoči o visokom aktivizmu mladih, naročito na onlajn platformama (Howard i drugi, 2011; Farnham i drugi, 2012; Valenzuela, 2013). Rad demonstrira da veza između godišta, tehnološke opremljenosti i aktivizma nije jednosmjerna. Konstantna onlajn komunikacija mladih građana i građanki, ne implicira nužno veći aktivizam.

Proces podizanja individualne zainteresovanosti ka građanskom novinarstvu počiva na zajedničkoj sposobnosti medijske i akademske zajednice da mehanizme GN-a učini dostupnim, vrednovanim i vjerodostojnim. Podatak da su ispitanici sa novinarskih smjerova bili najaktivniji u pogledu građanskog novinarstva, govori u prilog tome da edukacija ima realne i opipljive efekte. Međutim, suština građanskog novinarstva je da postane univerzalan trend, te je glavni zadatak medijskog i akademskog dijela društva da približi ovu formu aktivizma onima koji nemaju formalan dodir sa novinarstvom.

Imajući u vidu da je pasivnost publike višedimenzionalan sociološki, kulturološki i politikološki problem, strategije opismenjavanja i uključivanja publike u kritičku evaluaciju medija, bi trebalo usmjeravati na sloj društva na kojem počivaju promjene – mlade.

Rezultati ovog rada postavljaju izazov za medijsku zajednicu koja nepoštovanjem profesionalnih standarda u velikoj mjeri utiče na percepciju povjerenja i kredibilitnosti. Takođe, na političkoj i akademskoj zajednici je da, u saradnji sa medijskim i civilnim sektorom, radi na osvježavanju mladih ljudi, dok su još uvijek u formativnoj fazi. Uključenost velikog broja aktera u rješavanje ovakvih izazova neophodna je, upravo zbog kompleksnosti problema o kojem govorimo. Pasivnost publike zahtijeva odozdo ka gore (*bottom-up*) i odozgo ka dolje (*top-down*) princip, to jest i političku i civilnu strategiju (Stojiljković, 2014).

Iako su u ovom radu formulisani značajni zaključci u domenu građanskog novinarstva i njegovih korelata, važno je naglasiti njegove nedostatke.

Prvo ograničenje se odnosi na eksternu validnost. Istraživanje je urađeno na uzorku studentske populacije, koja ne predstavlja reprezentativan uzorak. Međutim,

⁶ Vidi: http://osi.bg/downloads/File/2018/MediaLiteracyIndex2018_publishENG.pdf, posjećeno: 28. januara, 2019. godine.

kako je i naglašeno u uvodnom dijelu ovog rada, studentska populacija služi kao jedna vrsta „ekstremnog“ uzorka, koji je po obrazovnoj i starosnoj strukturi progresivniji od ostatka populacije. Stoga, ukoliko tendencije ka građanskom novinarstvu ne funkcionišu u dijelu društva koji je u središtu edukacije i aktivizma, intuitivno je sumnjati da će funkcionisati na drugačijem uzorku. Sugestija za buduća istraživanja je da koncept građanskog aktivizma bude obrađen na nivou nacionalno reprezentativnog uzorka.

Drugo, ovaj rad je orijentisan na publiku, odnosno na konzumente medija. Imajući u vidu da je razvoj građanskog novinarstva nemoguć bez uključivanja predstavnika novinarske profesije, buduća istraživanja bi trebalo da provjere način na koji novinari i urednici percipiraju ovaj vid aktivizma. Takođe, dalje analize bi trebalo da istraže da li u medijima postoje inkluzivni mehanizmi za učestvovanje publike, koji se ne svode isključivo na komentarisanje objavljenog materijala.

Jovana Davidović

ACTIVISM AS DEFENSE: CIVIL JOURNALISM AND ITS CORRELATES ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE STUDENT POPULATION IN MONTENEGRO

Summary

Civic journalism is an important defense strategy against media manipulation, whose underdevelopment indicates a passive, disinterested and anxious public. In this paper, using a survey method, we analyze the tendency towards citizen journalism in the student population in Montenegro. We researched two important correlates of citizen journalism - trust in the media and activism on social networks. The findings indicate the general passivity of the student population - 80% of the surveyed students did not practice civic journalism, while 34.28% of them are completely uninterested in this type of activism. Further analyzes of fear of misuse of information and lack of anonymity were cited as important causes. Further analysis found that trust in the media is positively correlated with citizen journalism, while activism on social networks did not show an impact on the dependent variable. The results of this research thus set implications for the media scene of post-communist societies, where media skepticism and fear of misuse of information point to an insufficient level of media professionalism and inclusion. The findings of this paper are also relevant for media and information literacy in Montenegro, as well as the participatory mechanisms of post-communist societies, in which only conventional participation has long been valued.

Keywords: citizen journalism, media trust, activism on social networks, media and information literacy, Montenegro

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DISCOURSE IN SERBIAN ONLINE MEDIA: GLOBAL EXPECTATIONS VS. LOCAL REALITY

Serbia's application to join the European Union has instigated closer and more in-depth scrutiny regarding EU values. One of the crucial expectations includes the freedom of speech. However, both the European Commission and *Reporters Without Borders* have confirmed that the reality is that Serbia fails to meet EU press freedom standards. With more than 2000 media outlets registered in the Serbian Business Registry Agency, the media in Serbia face the same existential crisis as global media. In order to survive, the Serbian media turn to the state for financial support, which makes them dependent on the state budget and exposes them to political influence. Such climate has resulted in discourse which lacks the quality of objective journalism and fails to meet the freedom of speech standard. The aim of the present research is to explore the extent to which discourse in Serbian online media is motivated by the need to abide by the political affiliation of the government in order to ensure survival. The study compares headlines and leads from news articles published by four Serbian online news outlets during a fifteen-day period (1-15 February 2018). Based on the discursive strategy of argumentation, the objective of the research is to identify and analyse the pragmatic function of the headlines and the meanings of the frames attributed to the leads. The analysis reveals that the discourse published by certain online news outlets reflects the tendency to confirm their political affiliation to the government.

Key words: Online media, discourse, discursive strategies, global vs. local, Serbia.

1. INTRODUCTION

Both the European Commission (*Annual Progress Report* 2019) and *Reporters Without Borders* (2019) have expressed their concern regarding the freedom of expression in Serbia, a value considered crucial in the European Union. Journalists and news readers alike coexist in a climate which does not encourage the freedom of speech. On the contrary, as confirmed by the European Commission, "no progress was made on freedom of expression" which is now "a matter of serious concern" (*Annual Progress Report* 2019: 6). Similarly, *Reporters without Borders* (2019) warn that journalists in Serbia are "unsafe" and that the "number of attacks on media is on the rise, including death threats and

inflammatory rhetoric targeting journalists [which] is increasingly coming from the governing officials". Additional aggravating facts are stated by *Freedom House* (2019) indicating that Serbia is only partly free as far as crucial freedom scores are concerned (freedom rating 3/7, political rights 3/7 and civil liberties 3/7).

The main issues related to the freedom of expression highlighted in the *Annual Progress Report* (2019) are cases of threat, intimidation and violence against journalists, no full implementation of the legislation on the media and the necessity that the co-financing of media content meets public interest obligation needs which "requires transparent and fair procedures without interference by the state administration, especially at local level" (2019: 26). The most obvious result of the unfavourable position of the media in Serbia is discourse which lacks the quality of objective journalism and fails to meet the freedom of speech standard. Moreover, journalists resort to self-censoring which has been reported by 73% of journalists (Valić Nedeljković 2017), indicating that the "government does not have to forbid anything" since journalists choose to protect the "interests of political power centres" (2017: 3).

Such a climate necessitates the (re)evaluation of the relationship between global expectations versus the local reality regarding the Serbian media. In circumstances where the freedom of expression as one of the most crucial value at a global level is guaranteed, the discourse in the media is objective and trustworthy. Since the media in Serbia do not enjoy such freedom, it may be expected that the discourse in the media will reflect such state. Therefore, the present research is aimed at exploring the extent to which discourse in Serbian online media is motivated by the need to abide by the political affiliation of the government in order to ensure survival, an undeniable local reality in total opposition to the global expectations suggested by the European Union. The study compares headlines and leads from news articles published by four Serbian online news outlets. Based on the discursive strategy of argumentation, the objective of the research is to identify and analyse the pragmatic function of the headlines and the meanings of the frames attributed to the leads so as to find evidence of the implied need of some media outlets to endorse the political affiliation of the government.

2. THE MEDIA REALITY IN SERBIA

Serbia has also had to face the results of the global trend reflected in the collapse of the traditional financial model in the media as a direct result of digitization so that revenues generated from advertising are now flowing into online platforms (Fisher 2018). Consequently, lower returns have imposed redundancies and restructuring (Picard 2014) which are leading to an existential crisis (McNair 2006) for traditionally trained journalists. Finally, easy access to the internet nowadays enables almost everybody to be a publisher, which “has resulted in a blurring of professional boundaries between reporters and bloggers, citizen journalists and other communication roles” (Fisher 2018: 21).

With more than 2000 media outlets registered in the Serbian Business Registry Agency, the media in Serbia have to struggle for a place on the media market. In order to survive, the media turn to the state for financial support, which makes them dependent on the state budget and exposes them to political influence (Matić 2014). The state manages to control the media in many different ways (Kišjuhas 2017), e.g. through different models of state funding whereby public funds are “distributed arbitrarily”, “in a nontransparent manner” and “usually in favour of pro-government media outlets” (*Reporters Without Borders*, 2018). The state also exerts pressure on the media market through the selective enforcement of tax laws. Newspapers critical of the government are accused of unpaid income taxes while pro-government outlets “may stay untouched although owing millions of Euros in unpaid taxes” which has resulted in “a high risk of political affiliations of the media” (2018).

To conclude, the media reality in Serbia contributes to a general lack of trust in the media, but it also raises serious questions regarding the credibility of the information presented in the media. Newspapers have to find ways to survive the bad economy, editors are pressured by the necessity to find financial means to support the daily operation and journalists have to battle the daily challenges of hostility and violence. In the context of the Serbian media, the solution to most of these problems seems to be a closer affiliation to the government, i.e. employing strategies through which the news will be perceived as trustworthy and objective although not openly critical of the government and its main actors (Đorđević 2019).

3. THE DISCURSIVE STRATEGY OF ARGUMENTATION, HEADLINES AND LEADS

In order to reveal and understand the subtle meanings of news texts, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) suggest the study of the discursive strategies of texts because they “permit the identification of manifest and latent discriminatory meanings of texts and discourses” (2001: xi). Discursive strategies are located at different levels of linguistic organization and complexity and they depend on the context (2001: 43). Argumentation is one of five strategies determined by Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 44-45) and it involves the assignment of positive and negative attributions by providing argumentative justification for claims of truth based on various types of arguments. Argumentation relies on *topoi*, which are defined as the components of argument schemes that can connect the premise of an argument to its conclusion (Kwon, Clarke & Wodak 2014). Common *topoi* reflect authority, burden, reality, threat and urgency.

When using *topoi* as tools of analysis (Đorđević 2019), all the attitudes, values and predispositions elicited in an argument are reconstructed based on lexical items that refer to a certain *topos*. The lexical items are identified either as individual instances clearly referring to a certain *topos* or within a broader context where an argument may be suspected. For instance, an argument may contain lexical items referring to social actors (e.g. politicians, victims, attackers, police, government officials, etc.) or their representation in a context (e.g. individual, collective or impersonal), thus indicating authority or burden. The mentioning or description of a social event may refer to the *topos* of reality (e.g. demonstrations, riots, elections, etc.) while lexical items indicating evaluative and emotional representations may refer to the *topoi* of threat or urgency (e.g. verbs, such as *urge*, *warn*, *state*, etc. or adjectives, such as *important*, *imperative*, *dangerous*, etc.). Therefore, the analysis is aimed at establishing the argumentation scheme (i.e. *topoi*) that is relevant to a certain content by discovering the links between the lexical item, the context and the argument implied (Krzyżanowski 2010).

Headlines have received considerable attention in research (Molek-Kozakowska 2013; Sidiropoulou 1995; Zhang 2013) and they may have a semantic function regarding the referential text, and a pragmatic function regarding the intended effect on the reader (or receiver) (Bonyadi & Samuel 2013; Dor 2003; Iarovici & Amel 1989). In general, it may be argued that the main function of the headline “is to alert the reader (receiver) to the nature or the content of the text” and to enable “the reader to grasp the meaning of the text” (Iarovici & Amel 1989: 443) so that the headline is urging, warning and

informing. Regarding leads, research has been drawing on framing theory (Goffman, 1974) when studying the significance of leads. The underlying conclusion is that the way information is presented to the audience, i.e. the way it is framed, influences the particular choices that potential readers make regarding the way they process that information (Chong & Druckman 2007; Scheufele 2000). News articles mainly rely on attributing the frames of responsibility, conflict, human interest, economic consequences and morality (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000).

4. THE RESEARCH

4.1. Hypothesis and aim

The present research is based on the primary assumption that pro-government and anti-government media employ the discursive strategy of argumentation to attribute importance to news presenting activities of social actors. However, anti-government media employ the strategy to prove their objective and factual reporting while pro-government media seem to resort to the strategy to confirm their political affiliation to the state which basically means that the government can trust them to be their faithful advocates. A corpus of discourse compiled from four Serbian news websites, two of which are perceived pro-government and two anti-government, has been analysed to pursue two research objectives. The first is to establish the extent to which the topos of authority has been applied in the corpus. The second objective is to determine whether the topos can be identified as an admission of the outlets' tendency to confirm their political affiliation to the government.

4.2. Methodology and corpus

As stated above (Section 3) the analytical method employed in this research was based on the strategy of argumentation (Reisigl & Wodak 2001) whereby the main focus was on the identification of topoi (Kwon, Clarke & Wodak 2014). Given the fact that rather common topoi in the news are authority and burden, it was assumed that the analysis of the corpus in this research would reflect these topoi to a significant extent.

Based on the topos of authority an "action is legitimate if mandated by someone in authority" (Kwon, Clarke & Wodak 2014: 271). The argument contains lexical items that refer to a social actor or their representation in a context. Usually politicians, victims, attackers, police, government officials, etc.

are represented as individuals or a group who have been given authority to perform an action. Quite frequently, the topos of authority is accompanied by the topos of burden which is similar to the topos of authority in the sense that an argument also contains lexical items referring to social actors or their representation in a context. However, the topos of burden may be regarded “as a specific causal topos (a topos of consequence)” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 78) as it indicates that a “problem needs to be acted on if a person or institution is burdened by it” (Kwon et al., 2014, p. 271). In other words, the argument implies that if a social actor is burdened by specific problems, they should act accordingly to diminish the burden which implies that the social actor has been forced into a decision (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001).

For the purpose of analysis in this research, 200 articles from the sections “Politics” and “Society” in the news outlet *politika.rs* published in the period from 1 to 15 February were first read with the aim to identify the most frequently mentioned social actor. The period was chosen randomly. The analysis showed that 36 articles mentioned President Vučić in those two sections (approximately two articles per day) and in each article the topoi of authority and burden were the dominant ones. In the second step, the same news item was searched in *blic.rs*, *n1info.com* and *danas.rs*. The final corpus comprised 36 headlines and leads, i.e. 12 per source which clearly reflected the same topoi of authority and burden. However, as will be presented in the next section, despite the same topoi, the different news outlets did not pursue the same pragmatic functions in the respective news items.

The decision to use *politika.rs* as a primary source for the corpus was based on the fact that *Politika* is the oldest newspaper in Serbia with a rather long tradition in news publication. The print edition has a circulation of about 100,000 copies a day whereas the readership of the online edition is estimated at almost 50,000 a day (*Gemius Audience* 2019). The readers are mainly highly educated middle-class members who have been loyal to *Politika* for decades. The second source *blic.rs* was chosen primarily because it has the largest readership, about 893,000 average real daily users (*Gemius Audience* 2019). The choice to use *n1info.com* and *danas.rs* was based on the fact that both outlets declare themselves as being neutral, but are perceived as anti-government as they are privately owned with no obvious political affiliations, they express open criticism and tend to be more objective in their reports. Government officials, especially the President of Serbia, refer to both outlets as supporting the opposition. What is more, the

President tends to avoid questions posed by journalists from these outlets and often tries to discredit their trustworthiness and credibility.

4.3 Analysis and discussion

The topoi of authority and burden in the analysed corpus are mainly represented by quoting the President's words indicating his specific activity in the first person singular, such as *idem*, *razgovaraću*, *rekao sam*, [I am going, I will be talking, I said] signifying authority and *prihvatio sam*, *nisam imao izbora*, *moram* [I accepted, I had no choice, I have to] signifying burden. The frame of responsibility is pursued with the same lexical items so that the leads in each of the mentioned cases support the topoi employed in the headlines. Frequently, the President's words are presented in indirect speech. In that way the authority and burden as well as the frame of responsibility are expressed by clearly referring to the President by stating *Predsednik Srbije*, *Predsednik Vučić*, *Predsednik Srbije Aleksandar Vučić* [The President of Serbia, President Vučić, The President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić].

The pragmatic function (PF) based on the topoi of authority and burden expressed in the headlines as well as the frame of responsibility attributed to the leads is evident in the choice of lexical items within each respective context. Considering the limited scope of this article, this discussion is limited to eight examples, i.e. four headlines and four leads which are referring to two news items presented in four sources each. The lexical items referring to the topoi of authority and burden as well as the frame of responsibility are underlined with a single line if assumed to reflect the PF indicating the outlet's need to confirm their political affiliation to the government and a double line if reflecting the PF of being factual and objective. In order to avoid an excessive word count, the headlines are presented in Serbian with a gloss translation in English whereas the leads are presented only in English.

News item 1

Date of publication: 1 February 2018

Context: Upon being invited by the Croatian President, Vučić announced that he was travelling to Zagreb. Considering that this was his first visit to Croatia as the President of Serbia, Vučić used every possible opportunity to point out that his intentions were good despite the hostility Croatia might feel for Serbia. Such rhetoric is perceived as inflammatory among Vučić's opponents and he is often

criticized for it. Vučić is also criticized for his theatricality when referring to the unfavourable position Serbia has as well as his own contribution and achievements directed towards improving such state.

[1] *politika.rs*

Vučić: Idem u Zagreb da uradimo nešto dobro za našu decu

[Vučić: I am going to Zagreb so that we can do something good for our children.]

[I will be talking to all Croatian officials, but also to the representatives of the Serbian people, the president of Serbia said announcing the two-day visit to Croatia planned on 12 and 13 February.]

[2] *blic.rs*

"IDEM U NAJBOLJOJ VERI" Vučić prihvatio poziv Kolinde Grabar Kitarović da poseti Hrvatsku

["I AM GOING IN BEST FAITH" Vučić accepted Kolinda Grabar Kitarović's invitation to visit Croatia]

[The president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić accepted the Croatian president's (N. fem. sg.) invitation to visit that country.]

Both pro-government outlets have employed the topoi of authority [I am going] and burden [do something good for our children] as well as the frame of responsibility [accepted the invitation] with the PF to confirm their political affiliation to the government. Though obviously theatrical [talking to all Croatian officials, in best faith], the outlets quote the President's words faithfully which supports the argument that the outlets want to ensure their affiliation is recognized.

[3] *n1info.com*

Vučić: Prihvatam poziv, idem u dvodnevnu posetu Hrvatskoj

[Vučić: I am accepting the invitation, I am visiting Croatia for two days.]

[The president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić stated that he is accepting the Croatian president (N. fem. sg.) Kolinda Grabar Kitarović's invitation to visit Zagreb.]

[4] *danas.rs*

Vučić putuje u Zagreb 12. februara

[Vučić travelling to Zagreb on 12 February]

[The president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić stated he accepted the Croatian president (N. fem. sg.) Kolinda Grabar Kitarović's invitation to meet her and he specified he would be visiting Croatia on 12 and 13 February.]

In the case of the two anti-government outlets the PF of the headlines and the frame of responsibility in the leads are representative of the outlets' intention to be objective and factual.

News item 2

Date of publication: 15 February 2018

Context: The government has authorized a substantial increase of scholarships that the best students in Serbia are granted. Just as in the previous example, the announcement was made by the President. Again the rhetoric in his statements was theatrical and inflammatory and he pointed out that he himself was responsible for the increase of the scholarships.

[5] *politika.rs*

Vučić: Stipendije duplirane, i dalje učite i volite Srbiju

[Vučić: Scholarships have been doubled, continue to study and love Serbia]

[When presenting talented students with their scholarship contracts at today's ceremony, the president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić invited the young to continue to study and to educate themselves and to stay in Serbia and do for her everything they can because there is nothing more beautiful, bigger and more important than that.]

[6] *blic.rs*

Vučić dodelio stipendije nadarenim učenicima: Ostanite u Srbiji i uradite za nju sve što možete

[Vučić granted scholarships to talented students: Stay in Serbia and do whatever you can for her]

[When presenting talented students with their scholarship contracts at today's ceremony, the president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić invited the young to continue to study and to educate themselves and to stay in Serbia and do for her everything they can because there is nothing more beautiful, bigger and more important than that.]

In both pro-government outlets the PF of the headline is to confirm the support of the government. Again both outlets faithfully quote Vučić's inflammatory rhetoric to ensure that the public sees the President's sincere intentions. The frame of responsibility is accompanied by the frame of morality in the leads in both outlets to add significance to the President's words. Most importantly, the leads in both outlets are the same indicating the same PF – to ensure that the government recognizes their support.

[7] *n1info.com*

Udvostručene sretenjske stipendije za đake i studente

[Statehood Day scholarships have been doubled for pupils and students]

[The president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić stated that it had been decided that the scholarships for exceptionally talented pupils and students, granted on Statehood Day, were going to be doubled.]

[8] *danas.rs*

Vučić: Dogovorio da iznos stipendija bude dupliran

[Vučić: Arranged (V., m. 3rd pers. sg.) that the scholarship amount be doubled]

[The Ministry of Education today granted scholarships to 150 talented pupils and 362 students as well as to those pursuing MA and PhD studies while the president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić stated at the beginning of the ceremony that he had arranged with the Prime Minister (N. fem. sg.) Ana Brnabić that the amounts were to be doubled.]

The headline and the lead in the anti-government outlet n1info.com is confirming their inclination to factual and objective journalism by using the passive voice both in the headline and the lead. Unlike that, danas.rs seems to be

following the same pattern as the pro-government outlets by pointing out that it was Vučić who arranged the scholarship increase. However, given that the outlet *danas.rs* is known for their open criticism of Vučić and the Serbian government, the PF of the headline is meant to express sarcasm by referring to Vučić's need to always stress his own involvement and contribution regarding every aspect of life in Serbia.

The analysis of the context of each article published in *politika.rs* and *blic.rs* clearly indicates that the topoi of authority and burden in the headlines as well as the frame of responsibility in the leads reflect the same PF – to present the President's activities in the most favourable way. Such presentation may be assumed to be evidence of the outlets' need to confirm their political affiliation. In other words, President Vučić is presented as the sole authority who is the only person capable of resolving a certain issue. Given that the President often resorts to theatricality, especially when highlighting his own achievements, the topos of burden is an additional means to ensure that the outlet will be perceived as supporting the government, thus contribute to the survival of the outlet.

Such tendency cannot be identified in *n1info.com* or *danas.rs*. However, despite the fact that these two news outlets are presumed anti-government, they do not in any way undermine the President's authority nor do they diminish the value of his responsibility. On the contrary, they remain objective and state the facts, they provide accounts of all the activities but they avoid the dramatic, even theatrical presentation that Vučić is often criticized for by his opponents. Therefore, it may be concluded that the pragmatic function of the headlines in the anti-government outlets is to pursue objectivity and present trustworthy information while the pro-government outlets are trying to confirm their affiliation to the government.

5. CONCLUSION

The present research was limited to a small number of headlines and leads (36) in four news outlets. Further research is needed with news from different sources to verify the hypothesis that discourse in Serbian online media is motivated by the need to abide by the political affiliation of the government to ensure survival on the media market. In addition, a more detailed quantitative analysis is needed to provide in-depth analysis of the number of outlets showing such tendency. Finally, a more detailed qualitative analysis is needed to determine and categorize the types of news that motivate the need to confirm political

affiliation. Neither such analysis was possible in this research due to the limited scope of the paper.

Nevertheless, this research shows that news in pro-government media reflect the outlets' need to confirm their affiliation to the government. The findings indicate that these media tend to present government officials' activities in the most favourable light possible. The research has also shown that the discursive strategy of argumentation, the topos of authority in particular, is a rather common strategy in the discourse presented in the Serbian media. Therefore, the results speak in favour of the conclusion that the topos of authority, accompanied by the frame of responsibility, is a convenient way for pro-government media to prove their loyalty to the government. Given that such agenda is far from the recommendations posed by EU standards, this research indicates that the reality in the Serbian media is not meeting global expectations.

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SAMOPERCEPCIJA I IDENTITET KREATORA SADRŽAJA MEDIJA CIVILNOG SEKTORA U SRBIJI¹

Predmet istraživanja ovog rada su samopercepcija i identitet koji diskurzivno konstruišu novinari u alternativnom medijskom prostoru definišući sebe i svoje prakse u odnosu na ostale aktere u medijskom sistemu Srbije. Ima za cilj unapređenje rasprava u utvrđivanju karakteristika medija civilnog sektora u lokalnom kontekstu, ali i u razgraničavanju same terminologije koja je sa novim tehnološkim praksama proizvodnje i distribucije medijskih sadržaja dobila novo značenje. Istraživanje se oslanja na metodu polustrukturiranog dubinskog intervjua. Intervjuisano je 10 pojedinaca koji u onlajn sferi samostalno ili u redakcijama medija civilnog sektora stvaraju različite medijske sadržaje. Analiza istraživačkih nalaza pokazuje da predstavnici medija civilnog sektora u Srbiji definišu svoju praksu u odnosu na ostale aktere u aktuelnom medijskom sistemu kao ključnu, pre svega u očuvanju standarda novinarske profesije, odbrani slobode medija, zaštiti javnog interesa i u osnaživanju participativne kulture. Osim novinarskog, obavljaju i druge poslove koji zahtevaju kreativnu svestranost, multimedijalne veštine i visprenost u samopromociji na društvenim mrežama što čini njihov identitet složenim. Njihovu ulogu treba posmatrati kao novu medijsko-aktivističku praksu u digitalnom okruženju.

Ključne reči: mediji civilnog sektora, onlajn sfera, samopercepcija novinara, Srbija

1. UVOD

Kako preusmeriti sve ono što se događa na globalnom polju komunikacija iz pravca potencijalnog haosa prema kojem se kreće u promene na bolje, jedno je od ključnih pitanja savremenih medijskih studija u eri lažnih informacija (*fake news*) i društvu postistine. Sve izraženiji pritisci političara i drugih interesnih grupa na medije u težnji da kontrolišu javni diskurs, uglavnom plasirajući lažne informacije koje pokušavaju sve agresivnije okrenuti u svoju korist i manipulirati javnošću, nepoštovanje etičkih kodeksa i negovanje trenda trivijalizacije u

¹ Rad je nastao u okviru projekta III 47020 „Digitalne medijske tehnologije i društveno-obrazovne promene“, koji se realizuje uz podršku Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

principima poslovanja medija (*click-bait* novinarstvo, senzacionalizam), te brojne promene u navikama publike u digitalnom kontekstu na koje sve više utiču društvene mreže, samo su neke od žarišnih tačaka koje posmatranje uloge mas-medija u demokratskom procesu čine sve zamršenijom kako za pogled spolja – teorijske perspektive, tako i za pogled iznutra – novinarsku praksu. Aktuelne prilike na medijskoj sceni u Srbiji poslednjih godina su prema brojnim pokazateljima veoma kompleksne i zabrinjavajuće. Osim navedenih karakteristika negativnog trenda koji se preliiva sa globalnog nivoa, sve mračnijoj slici doprinosi i porast broja napada na novinare, jačanje propagandnog novinarstva prorežimskih medija, sunovrat projektnog finansiranja u kojem se protežiraju mediji lojalni vladajućim strukturama, a tu su još uvek i neki stari problemi poput velikog broja medija² čija posledica je nefunkcionalnost ionako nerazvijenog medijskog tržišta i dr.

S druge strane, indikativan je porast broja medija koji dolaze iz civilnog sektora³ i njihovog osnaživanja analitičkog i istraživačkog novinarstva na onlajn platformama.⁴ Njihovi sadržaji sve više dobijaju na važnosti o čemu svedoče brojna istraživačka otkrića o korupciji među javnim službenicima, organizovanom kriminalu, ekologiji i dr. Na njih se sve više gleda kao na „nove medijske prakse u borbi protiv populizma – populističkih strategija i populističkih sadržaja koji dominiraju *mainstream* medijima“ (Martinoli, 2019) koje se u teorijskim konceptualizacijama dimenzija civilnog sektora u medijskoj sferi posmatraju na temelju razvijanja kritičko-emancipatorskog pristupa publici. Medije civilnog sektora već godinama sve više pokreću profesionalci koji su napustili tradicionalne medije, a ne isključivo, kao što je to bio slučaj u prvobitnoj fazi njihovog razvoja „angažovani građani, članovi grupa, predstavnici manjina, aktivisti društvenih pokreta odnosno tzv. novinari-amateri“ (Pajnik, 2010: 56). Vidljivo je s jedne strane njihovo udruživanje i formiranje različitih platformi za očuvanje

² Prema istraživanju UNS-a u okviru projekta „Novinari i mediji – koliko nas zaista ima“, sredinom 2018. godine u Registar medija bilo je upisano 2.142, dve godine ranije 1.788, a 2014. godine bilo je upisano 1.440 medija. <http://www.uns.org.rs/sr/desk/UNS-news/83769/skoro-cetvrtina-medija-upisanih-u-registar-medija-ugaseni.html>

³ Od 67 koliko ih je bilo 2014. godine broj registrovanih neprofitnih medija u 2019. godini porastao je na 500 medija. Više od polovine osnovano je u protekle tri godine. <http://voice.org.rs/voice-u-srbiji-registrovano-500-medija-civilnog-drustva/>.

⁴ U Srbiji se posebno ističu Istraživačke mreže *KRIK* (Mreža za istraživanje kriminala i korupcije), *CINS* (Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo Srbije) i *BIRN* (Balkanska istraživačka mreža).

kredibiliteta novinarske profesionalnosti, poštovanje etičkih standarda, kao i u zalaganju za bolji zakonski položaj medija⁵, a sa druge strane porast tzv. „gongo“⁶ medijskih organizacija putem kojih vladajuće strukture u državi nastoje da uruše alternativni medijski prostor, što takođe, nije bio slučaj u dosadašnjim praksama. Namera ovog eksplorativnog istraživanja upravo jeste u tome da ponudi uvide u samo-percepciju i identitet novinara medija civilnog sektora koji diskurzivno konstruišu u Srbiji, definišući sebe i svoje prakse u odnosu na ostale aktere u aktuelnom medijskom sistemu.

2. TEORIJSKI OKVIR

Rasprave o medijima koji nastaju „izvan utvrđenih medijskih institucija i mreža“ (Atton, 2002) i vezuju se za sektor civilnog društva u akademskim krugovima sve više dobijaju na značaju jer je u digitalnom kontekstu njihov broj, ali i uticaj u javnoj sferi u znatnoj meri porastao. Međutim, teorijske koncepte o njima i dalje karakteriše neusaglašenost oko definisanja, te se otud za njihovo određenje u teoriji i praksi koriste različiti nazivi: *alternativni mediji*, *građanski mediji*, *autonomni mediji* ili *samonikli mediji*, *radikalni mediji*, *participativni mediji*, *mediji zajednice*, *neprofitni mediji*, *mediji civilnog društva*⁷, *mediji trećeg sektora* itd. Disperzivno označavanje kao i nemogućnost teorijskog uopštavanja smatra se posledicom dominantne metodološke usmerenosti istraživačkih praksi prema studijama slučaja (Drašković & Kleut, 2016) u kojima su se njihove karakteristike uglavnom utvrđivale „prema vremenu i mestu, kao i po teorijskom i socijalnom kontekstu u okviru kojeg su nastajali“ (Drašković, 2014: 73). Zbog toga su izostajali i jednoznačni odgovori na brojna suštinska pitanja: „jesu li ovi

⁵ Zajednička platforma „Neformalne mreže medija civilnog društva“ usvojena je u maju 2018. godine. <http://www.ndnv.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Platforma-za-saradnju-medija-civilnog-drustva.pdf>

⁶ GONGO je skraćenica od *Government-organized non governmental organization*, odnosno vladine-nevladine organizacije čiji cilj je da u prostoru namenjenom organizacijama civilnog društva nametnu uticaj države, odnosno vlasti.

⁷ U zakonskoj regulativi Srbije koristi se termin mediji civilnog sektora. Prvi put se pominje 1993. godine kada je grupa teoretičara (Plavšić, Radojković, Veljanovski) koncipirala predlog funkcionisanja radio i televizijskih stanica civilnog sektora, koji je odgovarao teorijskom pristupu medija zajednice (prema Radojković, 2008), ali je tek Zakon o radiodifuziji iz 2002. godine (sa kasnijim izmenama i dopunama) garantovao da osnivači medija civilnog sektora mogu da budu nevladine organizacije i druga udruženja građana.

mediji nužno povezani s levim političkim opcijama i usmereni aktivistički na određen oblik društvene promene; da li su za njihovo delovanje važniji procesi produkcije i relacije među akterima ili sadržaj koji proizvode; mogu li u procesima produkcije učestvovati isključivo amateri novinari ili nužno uključuju medijske profesionalce; te da li se u pogledu pozicioniranja u kapitalističkom sistemu u ovu kategoriju isključivo uključuju neprofitne organizacije“ (Popović, 2016: 30).

Uvidom u dosadašnje sistematizacije teorijskih pristupa⁸ evidentno je da su se mediji zajednice ili alternativni mediji – što su i najčešći nazivi – od samog nastanka i prvobitnih formi (pamfleti, revolucionarna štampa itd...) određivali u relaciji spram tradicionalnih medija čije prakse se globalno šire odgore 'na dole' za razliku od medija zajednice koje nastaju 'od dole' (Drašković & Kleut, 2016). Na njih se generalno gledalo kao na 'druge medije' koji se razlikuju od tradicionalnih „u smislu teksta (forme/sadržine), ali i na drugim nivoima, kao što su proizvodnja, organizacija, upotreba tehnologije, publike, svrha“ (Hadl, 2008: 14). Dakle, ustrojeni su, uglavnom, „nehijerarhično, kolektivistički-demokratski i nekomercijalno“, opiru se svakoj vrsti institucionalizacije i pokušavaju sačuvati nezavisnost od tržišta (Atton, 2007: 2). Deluju u javnom interesu podstičući društvene promene i kritičko mišljenje s ciljem emancipacije građana. Njihova uloga na nivou lokalnih zajednica smatra se naročito važnom jer svojim članovima (kao publici) nude širok dijapazon „alternativnih diskursa i reprezentacija“ (Bailey, Cammerts & Carpentier, 2008: 134). Za razliku od one tipične mas-medijske potrošačke publike, njihova publika je profilisanija, zahtevnija i neguje kritičku recepciju. Zbog toga se povezuju i sa formiranjem alternativnih javnosti, odnosno „tzv. kontra-javnosti (engl. *counterpublics*)“ (Fraser, 1990: 67) i osnaživanjem alternativnih diskursa marginalizovanih društvenih grupa. Njihov razvoj u digitalnom kontekstu nametnuo je nove perspektive. „Ne radi se samo o tome da je to slepo ili idealističko pružanje otpora masovnim medijima, nego je

⁸ Bailey, Cammaerts & Carpentier uočavaju četiri pristupa: *služba zajednici, alternativa mejnstrimu, deo civilnog društva i rizom* (2008: 7). Hadl definiše četiri tradicije (2008: 15). „Prva, *razvojno komuniciranje*, povezano je sa širenjem medija zajednica van zapadnog prostora sa idejom modernizacije. Druga, *komuniciranje zajednice*, ističe učešće 'običnih građana' u proizvodnji sadržaja i lokalni karakter medija. Treća tradicija, *komunikaciona alternativa*, nastaje u zemljama Latinske Amerike u okrilju društvenih pokreta – kao opozicija neokolonijalnom sistemu transnacionalnih korporacija i autokratskim vladama. Četvrta tradicija, *radikalno alternativni mediji*, insistira na tome da sadržaj nije samo drugačiji od mejnstrima već da ga angažovano kritikuje i osporava“ (Drašković & Kleut, 2016: 42–43).

reč o drugačijoj novinarskoj praksi, koju treba analizirati kao takvu“ (Pajnik, 2010: 46). Tehnološki razvoj i ekspanzija interneta postavili su nove izazove za njihov razvoj. Pojednostavili su produkciju i distribuciju medijskih sadržaja, te omogućili njihovu brojnost, raznovrsnost formi (internet portale, audio i video podcaste i dr.), izraza (korišćenjem brojnih digitalnih alatki), senzibiliteta i ideologija. Njihova održivost se sve više fokusira na alternativne modele finansiranja poput kraudfandinga⁹ koji, kako se ističe, podstiče aktivizam, ali i „emocionalnu vezu koja se ostvaruje na relaciji publika-producenti-medijski sadržaj“ (Martinoli, 2019). Umesto građanima sa oskudnim novinarskim iskustvom, ovi mediji godinama unazad postaju utočište sve većem broj profesionalca (Dražković & Kleut, 2016). Zato se u ovom radu oslanjamo na koncepte koji ih posmatraju kao alternativne sisteme koji omogućuju „(samo)pristup građanima, pokreću estetska pitanja, kontriraju javnosti i imaju kritičko-emancipatorski pristup“ (Mowbroy, 2015: 23).

3. METODOLOGIJA ISTRAŽIVANJA

Istraživanje je sprovedeno kvalitativnom metodom polustrukturisanog intervjua kako bi se iz prve ruke saznali relevantni stavovi i mišljenja o zadatoj problematici. Intervjuisano je 10 pojedinaca, odnosno novinara, koji stvaraju različite medijske sadržaje (tekstove, audio i video podcaste) i osnažuju slobodu izražavanja na medijskoj sceni Srbije. Uzorkom su obuhvaćeni i pojedinci koji rade u registrovanim medijima, ali i oni koji stvaraju sadržaje mimo ustaljenih obrazaca medijskih organizacija. Vodilo se računa da budu zastupljeni pojedinci koji kreiraju sadržaje namenjene različitim ciljnim grupama. Među njima su se našli novinari portala koji se bave istraživačkim novinarstvom kao što su *Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo Srbije (CINS)* i *Vojvođanski istraživačko-analitički centar (VOICE)*, potom *Autonomije*, *Talasa* i *Znaš ti zašto*, usmerenih ka analitičkim formama izražavanja. U uzorak su uvršteni i autori dva radio podcasta *Alarm (na zabavan i ironičan način kritički pretresaju aktuelne teme u Srbiji i svetu)* i *Kulturno um(j)etnički program edukativnog karaktera K.U.P.E.K (usmeren na promociju kulturne saradnje nezavisne umetničke scene na prostoru*

⁹ Strategija kraudfandinga (*crowdfunding*) stavlja konzumente medijskih sadržaja u poziciju participacije. Oni koji se odlučuju da na ovaj način podrže rad medija nisu ni investitori ni donatori, jer ne ostvaruju profit od svog ulaganja, ali ipak dobijaju zauzvrat sadržaje u čijem stvaranju su finansijski učestvovali (Aitamurto, 2011: 432).

bivše Jugoslavije), te urednice dvojezičnog srpsko-slovačkog portala *Storyteller* i Portala za kulturu jugoistočne Evrope *SEEcult.org*, kao i urednik *Fake News Tragača* koji je najspecifičniji od svih platformi jer se bavi otkrivanjem dezinformacija u domaćim medijima i njihovom analizom. Pitanja su formulisana u nekoliko blokova. Prvi blok se odnosio na pitanja koja su u vezi sa samom motivacijom i ciljem pokretanja platformi, jer je upravo ključna stavka za ocenjivanje neke alternativne medijske platforme motivacija zbog koje nastala (Pajnik, 2010). Drugi blok obuhvatio je pitanja o specifičnosti sadržaja koje produciraju, modele finansiranja i načine na koje kreiraju odnos sa publikom, budući da „participativna kultura“ (Jenkins, 2004) obostrano podiže motivaciju za učešće u ovako koncipiranoj produkciji i korišćenju medijskih sadržaja i jača osećaj odgovornosti novinara na drugačiji način nego u tradicionalnim medijima (Aitamurto, 2011). U trećem bloku pitanja su bila fokusirana na stavove o samodefinisanju svoje prakse (novinara ili aktiviste) u odnosu prema ostalim akterima u medijskom sistemu (država, političari, grupe građana, oglašivači), zatim na stavove o fenomenu „gongo“ organizacija i medija sa kojima dele isti prostor. Intervju su urađeni u vremenskom periodu od maja do septembra 2019. godine, sa izuzetkom u slučaju portala *Seecult.org* i *Alarma* koji su napravljeni za potrebe ranijih istraživanja studija slučaja.

4. ODBRANA DOSTOJANSTVA PROFESIJE I JAVNOG INTERESA

Istraživački nalazi pokazuju da su osnovnu motivaciju ispitanika za pokretanje sopstvenih medijskih platformi odredili pre svega politički i ekonomski pritisci odnosno ograničavanje slobode izražavanja kojem su bili izloženi u mejnstrim medijima. Kao drugi razlog ističe se nepristajanje na propagandističku i spektakularizovanu matricu izveštavanja već težnja onoj koja služi interesima javnosti, ne samo u izveštavanju o ključnim događajima i pojavama u društvu, već i u rasvetljavanju okolnosti koje određuju društvene tokove i delovanje donosioca odluka. Neke platforme inicirane su sa veoma specifičnim ciljevima u određenim oblastima. Na primer portali *VOICE* i *Autonomija* kako bi se doprinelo transparentnijem radu lokalnih samouprava u Vojvodini i otvaranju „bolnih tema o suočavanju sa prošlošću i ratnim zločinima na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije“ (BD), portal *Seecult.org* s ciljem „unapređenja razvoja otvorene kulturne i umetničke scene u Srbiji i regionu Jugoistočne Evrope, doprinosa saradnji u regionu i njegovoj integraciji u Evropu (VM), dvojezični (slovačko-srpski) portal *Storyteller* pokrenut je radi „razbijanja stereotipa o getoizaciji manjinskih zajednica, odnosno

konkretnije manjinskih medija“(VDV), a *Fake News Tragač* kako bi se medijskim profesionalcima pružila pomoć u oblasti provere podataka, ali je vremenom „preusmeren“ na „kratke analize dezinformacija“ (SJ) namenjene široj javnosti. Svi ispitanici su medijski profesionalci sa manje ili više iskustva. Većina je imala višegodišnji angažman u tradicionalnim medijima, neki i veoma uspešan, te kako kažu: „Ne bismo otišli sa mejnstrim radija da nismo morali“ (MU). Odluka da se upustite u neizvesnu priču sa razvojem sopstvene medijske platforme bila je inicirana otkazima uglavnom ideološke prirode („Radio sam 18 godina u mejnstrim medijima. Presudili su politički progon, gubitak posla i nemogućnost da se zaposlim u pristojnim mejnstrim medijima“ (IM)) ili samovoljnim napuštanjem redakcija zbog nezadovoljstva uslovima rada, neodgovornim i rigidnim odnosom kolega prema profesiji. („Nisam shvatala kako ne žele i nemaju hrabrosti da budu kritični, da prihvataju promene“ (VDV)). U uzorku su evidentirani i oni koji paralelno rade u obe sfere što je indikativan istraživački nalaz koji ukazuje na podvojenost njihovog identiteta. „Nakon političkih čistki 2016. godine sklonjena sam neformalno s pozicije zamenika glavnog urednika veb redakcije RTV-a, te osam meseci nisam dobijala niti obavljala nikakve poslove. Nakon toga sam prebačena na *Radio Novi Sad*. Urednički posao na portalima *Autonomija* i *VOICE* radim paralelno“ (BD). Dvostruki angažman nekih od njih posledica je ne samo ideološkog nego i dispariteta sopstvenih afiniteta. „Radim kao dopisnik za *Federalnu TV*, ali pošto u mejnstrim medijima ne postoji prostor za teme koje mene interesuju, radim i ovo“ (DK).

Nalazi pokazuju da se stavovi ispitanika uklapaju u osnovnu matricu medija civilnog sektora – da svojim konzumentima nude „mišljenja za koja u mejnstrim medijima ili nema mesta ili je njihovo izražavanje ograničeno“ (Atton, 2002: 12). Samodefinišu se kao „alternativa režimskim i komercijalnim medijima“ u Srbiji jer otvaraju važne teme koje su marginalizovane ili se o njima ne govori poput koruptivnih afera, ali i konfliktne prošlosti. „*Autonomija* je specifična i usamljena na medijskoj sceni u Srbiji, jer većina medija, ne samo da nema kritički odnos prema prošlosti i drugim bolnim temama koje otvara naš portal, već su zapravo deo dominantnog političko-medijskog ešalona koji aktivno podstiče govor mržnje, nasilje i sukobe u regionu“ (BD). Antinacionalistički diskurs iz spektra tema normalizacije odnosa i kulturne saradnje na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije neguju i *Seecult.org*, *K.U.P.E.K.* kao i *Alarm* okupljajući zajednicu čitalaca/slušalaca/gledalaca izvan nacionalnih političkih narativa koji na prostoru Balkana i dalje neguju konfliktnu retoriku. Ovi nalazi govore da njihova misija

nije teritorijalno usmerena na lokalnu zajednicu, već eksteritorijalno i nadnacionalno.

Osim kritičko-emancipatorskog pristupa u selekciji tema, insistiraju i na drugačijim formama i pristupima u produkciji sadržaja. Izuzev portala *Seecult.org* koji od samog nastanka predstavlja neku vrstu servisa vesti iz kulture na prostoru regiona i uglavnom neguje tradicionalne novinarske forme i portala *Autonomija* koji uz analitičke žanrove, često prenosi agencijske vesti i tekstove iz drugih medija, ostali se ne bave produkcijom vesti na dnevnom nivou. Negujući „kritičku recepciju među svojom publikom“ (Fuchs, 2010: 178) portali *Talas.rs*, *Znaš ti zašto* uglavnom se bave kritičkim osvrtima na relevantna društveno-politička dešavanja, *VOICE* i *CINS* produkuju istraživačke tekstove, *K.U.P.E.K.* intervjuje, *Fake news tragač* uz analize dezinformacija nudi i edukativne sadržaje, blogove o manipulacijama i intervjuje sa medijskim ekspertima, a autori *Alarma*, u svakodnevnom trosatnom audio-formatu razgovornog tipa, komentarišu aktuelne teme u zemlji i svetu. Veliki broj njih koristi se brojnim i različitim digitalnim alatima (foto i video forenzika, infografike, itd.) u kreiranju sadržaja za svoju publiku. Interesantan je primer novinara *CINS*-a, koji su nakon istraživanja o problemima u sistemu javnih nabavki u Srbiji napravili onlajn igru pod nazivom „Dobar, loš, korumpiran“ kako bi javnosti „na zabavan i edukativan približili na koji način se nabavke nameštaju nauštrb budžeta i o trošku građana“ (AM).

5. PRAKSE ODRŽIVOSTI I INTERAKCIJA SA PUBLIKOM

Većina medijskih platformi izrasla je iz okvira projektnih aktivnosti strukovnih udruženja poput *CINS*-a (Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije), *Autonomije* i *VOICE*-a (Nezavisno društvo novinara Vojvodine), zatim udruženja građana profilisanih za medije *Fake News Tragač* (NVO Novosadska novinarska škola), kulturu *Seecult.org* (NVO SEEcult.org) i politiku *Talas* (NVO Libek Libertarijanski klub), dok su *Alarm*, *Znaš ti zašto*, *Storyteller*, *K.U.P.E.K.* samostalne inicijative pojedinaca. Upravo ovi podaci preslikavaju se i na broj registrovanih među njima i odnos koji imaju prema praksama održivosti. Upis u Registar medija Agencije za privredne registre Srbije zakonski nije obaveza za civilni sektor, ali se smatra poželjnim zbog dostupnosti sredstava iz javnih fondova i transparentnosti podataka o državnom novcu usmerenom na pomoć medijskom sektoru. Većina ispitanika upravo je to navela kao glavni razlog formalizacije statusa. „Budući da se bavimo kredibilitetom drugih medija, prirodno je da se pridržavamo svih standarda koje bismo očekivali i od drugih“

(SJ). Sa druge strane, oni koji nisu registrovani uglavnom ističu da to nisu uradili zbog „opšte neuređenosti oblasti projektnog finansiranja i činjenice da to ne bi ništa promenilo“ (IM), odnosno da svakako ne bi dobili sredstva na konkursima za sadržaje koje kreiraju jer, kako jedan ispitanik ističe, „ovu državu takav kakav je, K.U.P.E.K ne zanima“ (DK). Na takav način, smatraju, pošteđeni su i brojnih administrativnih troškova. „Ako bismo se registrovali, morali bismo plaćati razne namete. Na primer, visoke nadoknade za korišćenje muzike“ (MU). Kada je u pitanju finansijska održivost, treba napomenuti i to da uz pomoć u sufinansiranja projekata država u okvirima zakona kao jedinu olakšicu medijima civilnog sektora omogućuje da ne plaćaju naknadu za pružanje medijske usluge, dok u ostalim segmentima uglavnom „nisu jasne ni njihove obaveze, ni prava“ (VM). Nisu razvijeni ni mehanizmi kojima bi se olakšao rad novinara. „Pošto nismo zaposleni za stalno, na primer u CINS-u, a slična je situacija i u BIRN-u i KRIK-u, 90 odsto nas prima novac kroz autorske ugovore. Mi smo osakaćeni za sva prava koji imaju novinari zaposleni kroz ugovor o radu, naše organizacije ne mogu da priušte plaćanje visokih poreza na honorare“ (AM).

Većina ispitanika se izdržava od donacija iz domaćih i stranih fondova dok kraudfanding kao sve popularniji alternativni vid finansiranja proizvodnje medijskih sadržaja, preko sajta *patreon.com* ili jednokratnim uplatama donatora na račune praktikuje tek mali deo njih. „Imam osećaj da tu mogućnost nismo dovoljno iskoristili, a značilo bi nam. Na primer, često nemamo pare da platimo ilustratore tekstova ili grafičkog dizajnera, to ne možeš da budžetiraš jer donatori nemaju sluha da daju novce za te stavke“ (AM). Praksa u svetu pokazuje da je potrebno uložiti dosta truda i vremena da bi ovaj vid finansiranja doneo održivost odnosno da je neophodno motivisati publiku da uplaćuju donacije. Stepem razvijenosti „participativne kulture“ odnosno procesa u kojem se krajnji korisnici medijskih proizvoda osećaju osnaženo i ohrabreno da se uključe u njihovu produkciju i distribuciju (Jenkins, 2014) razvijen je samo u slučaju *Alarma* koji je, inače, „najbolji primer uspešnosti ove prakse u Srbiji“ (Drašković & Prodanović, 2017). Drugima koji izvan nevladinih organizacija održavaju svoje medijske platforme za razvijanje kreiranja odnosa sa publikom uglavnom nedostaju vreme „iskreno od ostalih obaveza ne stižem baš da se fokusiram na kampanju pa to sve ide čak i sporije nego kod ostalih“ (DK). Jedan od ispitanika priznaje da je razlog i nedovoljno poznavanje samoreklamerskih veština: „plan postoji i vrlo je rudimentaran – radim najbolje što mogu i trudim se da održavam kvalitetnu komunikaciju sa publikom, posebno onim delom koji ne deli moje mišljenje. Za kvalitetniji i pristup široj publici nemam dovoljno znanja iz marketinga“ (IM).

Strukturu njihove publike uglavnom čine visokoobrazovani građani, starosti između 25 i 50 godina, odnosno „pojedinci sa višim nivoom medijske pismenosti“ (SJ), iz različitih delova Srbije, regiona, ali i dijaspora poput *Storyteller*a (slovačka) ili *Alarma*, koga, inače, ta publika bukvalno izdržava „To je ona dijaspora koju je rat poterao, prijateljska emigracija, izbeglice iz besmisla. Oni su nam finansijska kičma, stalni donatori. Preko 80 odsto sredstava oni doniraju“ (DM). Iako su postigli pristojnu održivost (jedan deo koriste za plate, drugi ulažu u amortizaciju opreme) autori *Alarma* odlučni su u doslednom odnosu koji su izgradili sa svojom publikom kroz ideološku misiju blisku levim idejama i pokretima. „Sad kad imamo dobru slušanost, a i dobru plaćenost, javljaju nam se ljudi i pitaju da li tokom naše emisije može da ide prava komercijalna reklama. Odbijamo, jer to ne bi bilo fer prema ljudima koji nas plaćaju. Sve što proizvedemo je besplatno, a ko želi može da podrži. Idealni socijalistički model – da oni koji imaju više daju više i da oni koji nemaju ništa dobiju nešto“ (DM).

6. TIPIČAN NOVINARSKI RAD U NETIPIČNOM FORMATU

Većina ispitanika doživljava svoj profesionalni angažman kao „tipičan novinarski rad u netipičnom formatu“ (AM) usmeren aktivistički ne samo na određen oblik društvene promene već i sopstvenog delovanja. S jedne strane „institucije i društvo su do te mere razoreni da ljudi svaku dobru priču tumače i kao društveni aktivizam“ (AM), pa čak i „samo poštivanje osnovnih novinarskih načela i kodeksa mu dođe kao aktivizam“ zbog čega neki kažu „ovo što ja radim je onda radikalni aktivizam“ (IM). Razliku između običnog novinarskog i aktivističkog rada vide u tome što se obični novinari bore za priče, a novinari koji su aktivisti se istovremeno bore i za priče i za to da ih negde objave. „Da bi neko mogao da se bavi profesionalnim novinarstvom, on pre svega mora da stvori uslove i prostor za to, a onda, ako i kad ih stvori, mora konstantno da ih održava i štiti od različitih i brojnih pritisaka“ (BD).

Njihov aktivizam očitava se i u konstantnoj borbi sa sve izraženijom antinovinarskom retorikom javnih službenika čije koruptivne aktivnosti i zloupotrebe položaja raskrinkavaju u istraživačkim tekstovima, ali i raznim oblicima zastrašivanja poput praćenja njihovih mobilnih telefona, elektronske pošte, pa i samog fizičkog kretanja „Tvoj privatan život ne može da teče normalno, ne možeš da odeš opušteno ni na piće sa prijateljima jer nikad ne znaš da li te neko prati“ (AM). Otežan im je i pristup informacijama od javnog značaja,

jer predstavnici državnih/pokrajinskih/lokalnih organa ne žele da ih učine dostupnim.

Prema njima se neprijateljski odnose i prorežimski mediji, naročito tabloidi, a u poslednje vreme velika pretnja im je i fenomen „gongo“. Na državnim konkursima većina sredstava namenjena civilnom sektoru odlazi na njihove račune i zbog toga sumnjaju da su gongo mediji „produžena ruka vlasti“ (DK). Fenomen „gongo“ otvorio je pitanje o tradicionalnoj povezanosti ovih medija „s levim političkim opcijama“ (Popović, 2016) jer se, kako primećuju ispitanici, „pokazuju kao veoma čest izvor nacionalističkih i pseudonaučnih narativa, sa velikim brojem opskurnih sagovornika i teoretičara zavere“ (SJ) na razne teme. Nametanje desničarskog diskursa prema mišljenju ispitanika ne definiše se samo kao „legitimna uređivačka politika“ ovih organizacija, već „kao nacionalno-etničko-religijski narativ za ispiranje mozga i brisanje svake vrste lične odgovornosti. Sve to odgovara isključivo ljudima prljavih ruku i namera“ (IM). Ovakav stav ispitanika potkrepljuju primeri kampanja koju „gongo“ mediji vode u interesu vladajućih struktura. „Postoji onaj portal *Istraga* koji istražuje nas 'nepodobne' i pokušava da ubedi javnost kako nismo mi pravi istraživački novinari nego oni. To je zblunjujuće i mnogo nezgodno za publiku“ (AM).

Zbog specifičnosti konteksta u kojem deluju smatraju da pojam „antinovinarstvo adekvatnije definiše takve medije od pojma alternativni“ (BD). Jedna od ispitanica smatra da bi trebalo praviti distinkciju između medija koji nastaju u okrilju NVO i onih koje novinari samostalno pokreću. „Mi ne radimo projekte sa državnim institucijama, ne pristajemo ni da nam donator postavlja uslove i tematske okvire za naše tekstove... Jedino koristimo isti model finansiranja“ (AM), te da bi zbog toga pojam „nezavisni mediji“ bolje označavao njihovu poziciju od alternativni ili građanski mediji za koji je većina ispitanika saglasna da opisuje njihov rad.

7. ZAKLJUČNE NAPOMENE

Analiza istraživačkih nalaza pokazuje da predstavnici medija civilnog sektora u Srbiji definišu svoju praksu u odnosu na ostale aktere u aktuelnom medijskom sistemu kao ključnu, pre svega u očuvanju standarda novinarske profesije, odbrani slobode medija, zaštiti javnog interesa, kao i u osnaživanju participativne kulture. Medijski sadržaji koje proizvode tematski, ali i po pragu značaja sve više se tiču šire javnosti, ne samo ranjivih društvenih grupa. Njihovoj proizvodnji pristupaju na ozbiljan, sveobuhvatan i angažovan način ukazujući sve

više na važnost istraživačkog novinarstva. Osnažujući profesionalno novinarstvo koje pomaže građanima da razumeju glavne izazove i mogućnosti s kojima se susreću, od svakodnevnih lokalnih događaja do globalnih problema polako „preuzimaju“ informativnu funkciju tradicionalnih medija u koje je publika skoro potpuno izgubila poverenje. Tome u prilog ide i činjenica o visokom stepenu ispitivanja u interakciji sa publikom koja, prepoznajući važnost uloge ovih medija u zadovoljavanju njihovih potreba i interesovanja, sve više participira u njihovoj održivosti. Svest o neophodnosti alternativnih vidova finansiranja poput kraudfanding modela temelji na principu „sam sebi i drugima pokazuješ koliko si potreban nekome“. Obostrana motivacija za učešće u ovako koncipiranoj produkciji i korišćenju medijskih sadržaja jača im i osećaj odgovornosti prema publici. Tako da ovaj nalaz potvrđuje ranija istraživanja u kojima su novinari opisivali taj odnos kao „kombinaciju lične i profesionalne motivacije u kojem oni prema davaocima novčanih priloga osećaju i zahvalnost i neku vrstu obaveze zbog poverenja koje im je na ovaj način ukazano“ (Drašković Prodanović, 2017 : 64). Dakle, vidljive su sve izraženije aktivističke težnje ne samo prema društvenim promenama i osnaživanju kritičko-emancipatorske uloge (Mowbroy, 2015) u mobilizaciji publike ka doživljaju sebe kao pojedinca „koji nije redukovan na puki objekat medijskih ili političkih elita“ (Pajnik, 2010: 45), nego i u njihovoj potpuno drugačijoj novinarskoj praksi. U pitanju je praksa koja njihov identitet sve više bazira na načelu odgovornosti umesto na načelu nepristrasnosti u kreiranju novinarskog proizvoda.

Činjenica da iza njih sve više stoje strukovna udruženja, kao i utvrđeni dvostruki identitet kroz disparitet ideoloških i profesionalnih afiniteta nekih novinara koji rade paralelno u obe sfere ukazuje da se na medije civilnog sektora ne može gledati kao na organizacije u kojima amateri-novinari proizvode sadržaje za svoju zajednicu, već na samonikle medijske platforme putem kojih se novinari profesionalci bore i za ličnu egzistenciju. Ovakvo pozicioniranje otvara suštinsko identitetsko pitanje „postavljanja granica i diskurzivnog oivičavanja društvenih praksi“ (Drašković & Kleut, 2016: 49) kroz koje se reflektuju i određene društvene predstave. Iako i dalje imaju marginalnu poziciju u odnosu na mejnstrim medije, njihov društveni uticaj je u porastu, a jedna od pokazatelja je i njihovo sve čvršće povezivanje i međusobna solidarnost koja prevazilazi „diskurzivnu izolaciju“ (Carpentier i dr, 2003) utvrđenu u ranijim istraživanjima.

S druge strane, trend pokretanja sve većeg broja medija civilnog sektora u Srbiji treba pratiti s oprezom budući da on nije samo odgovor na njihov značaj u očuvanju javnog interesa i porast nepoverenja građana u tradicionalne medije već i

rezultat sve perfidnije populističke borbe vlasti koja sektoru civilnog sektora, prema svim pokazateljima, želi da naruši stečeni kredibilitet i uticaj. Medijski aktivizam u digitalnom okruženju, kao što je i ranije utvrđeno, nije doveo samo do progresivne akcije demokratizacije medija, jer su se nove tehnologije pokazale takođe i kao „alat za podsticanje rasizma, ksenofobije i drugih oblika isključenja“ (Pajnik, 2010: 47). Neka buduća istraživanja trebalo bi usmeriti ka njima i njihovom pozicioniranju unutar scene medija civilnog sektora jer ozbiljno dovode u pitanje suštinsku tradiciju a to je da su od samog nastanka bili povezani s levim političkim opcijama i usmereni aktivistički na određen oblik društvene promene.

Brankica Drašković

SELF-PERCEPTION AND IDENTITY OF CIVIL SECTOR MEDIA CONTENT
CREATORS IN SERBIA

Summary

The subject of this study is self-perception and identity, which is discursively constructed in an alternative media space by journalists who define themselves and their practices in relation to other actors in the Serbian media system. It aims to advance discussions in identifying the characteristics of the civil sector media in the local context, but also in demarcating the terminology itself because it has gained new meaning with new technological practices in the production and distribution of media content. The research method semi-structured in-depth interview is applied. Ten individuals who independently or in the editorial offices of civil sector media are creating various media content in the online sphere were interviewed. An analysis of the research findings shows that representatives of the civil sector media in Serbia define their practice in relation with other actors in the current media system as crucial, above all, in maintaining the standards of the journalistic profession, defending media freedom, protecting the public interest and in fostering a participatory culture. In addition to journalism, they perform other tasks that require creative versatility, multimedia skills and self-promotion in social networks, which makes their identity complex. Their role should be viewed as a new media activist practice in the digital environment.

Key words: civil sector media, online sphere, self-perception of journalists, Serbia

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INFORMATION FILTERING AND DISINFORMATION IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL MEDIA

The rapid development of the communication technologies has led to a great increase of information production and circulation. This ongoing process is changing both the communication and the culture. One of the main issues within this change is information management in the mass media, i.e. how information is being collected, filtered and circulated for mass audience, and how this affects the public opinion and other related processes in the democratic societies, including Macedonia.

Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky offered the s.c. propaganda model, which describes how information is being filtered in the mass media in the United States, and how this process is influencing the media work, politics, and the public opinion. The model is based on research of the cultural and economic factors that determine communication and the functioning of the media. The model puts into focus the mass media as part of the socio-economic structures that control the flow of information in the society. When the model proposed by Herman and Chomsky is applied in various social and economic contexts, it offers insight in the deeper processes of mass communication that can result in both information pluralism, but also in propaganda and information control that suits the centers of political and economic power in many societies.

In analytical comparison with the classical filtering model of Herman and Chomsky, the paper will examine the issues of social media and processes of viral communication, and how this affects the spread of the disinformation through online media. In the new digital era, the process of filtering of information is drastically changed.

Key words: information, propaganda, communication, filters, mass media, culture, public opinion, digital media, viral communication.

INTRODUCTION

*“Shall I tell You why we have brought You here?
To make You better. Your crimes do not interest us.
Your actions do not interest us. We are interested in Your thoughts.
We do not destroy our enemies, we change them.
We change their thoughts” (Orwell, 2003, v).*

This passage from the novel "1984" by George Orwell reflects, through its characters and the storyline, the uncertainty after the end of the Second World War regarding the preservation of freedom and the strong possibility that life for millions of people could become a jail. That imprisonment and threat to the West was Communism. The rise of communism in the post-World War II period in the eastern European countries, Asia and in South America, fed the free world's fear of communism and illiberal system which it was representing. Communism was perceived as a dark threat that could potentially overwhelm the free western societies. If established, such “prison” would involve constant control of all communication. This would mean not only control over the public word, control of the public appearance, the contents of the press, the electronic media, the publishing, but also a strong control of thoughts, feelings, actions, in one word, everyday activities of the people. Control of such magnitude in modern societies would be rather elusive without the use of propaganda, which in such a prison society is a crucial tool for power.

From today's perspective, this vision of such a potential dark future looks exaggerated and hyperbolic. The year 1984 passed long time ago and such a vision and a representation of human life did not become the reality as vividly outlined in the Orwell's book. Today's world lives with a dominant impression that it won a victory over communism and other types of totalitarianism, while dictators have been overwhelmed and with the exception of a few cases, freedom and democracy have become the model for development of the former socialist states. The doctrine of propaganda, viewed within the scope of achieved freedoms and democratization, should probably belong to the past.

Unfortunately, as advocated by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky in their joint works, the propaganda today lives and operates dynamically. Its role in the modern democratic world and modern cultures is still crucial and it continues to shape the reality and determine prospects of the human freedom well into the 21st century. How today's propaganda works is the topic of much of the work of the authors mentioned above, but also of an entire intellectual movement that

criticizes the globalization and expansion of the modern capitalism. The authors acknowledge that to perceive, detect and analyze propaganda in democratic societies is a much more difficult task than in other type of societies:

In this context, according to authors, it becomes clearer that the propaganda models in democratic societies rely on various systems of filtering of information. Analysing the process of information filtering gives an insight into the real nature of the media system and how it operates in terms of serving the public interest and supporting representational democracy.

THE PROPAGANDA MODEL AS A SYSTEM OF FILTERS

According to Chomsky and Herman, propaganda is a phenomenon that is in a close and unbreakable relationship with mass media. These media are "systems for communicating messages and symbols to the wider population" (Herman and Chomsky 2002: 1). The media through the involvement of message recipients (viewers, listeners, readers) in information and entertainment processes actually "transfer the values, beliefs and ways of behavior that integrate them into the institutional structures of society." In a diverse and heterogeneous world in order to carry out such processes of social organization and distribution, "systematic propaganda" is needed. What the propaganda wants to influence is the justification and the maintenance of inequality. The key act in this is the influence of wealth and power on the functioning of the media or as they say "money and power filter media content" (Herman and Chomsky 2002: 2).

In other words, the capital that tends to consolidate and intensify its established flows and structures of power, carrying out different sorts of control over how the media report and represent reality. In fact, "the structural arrangement of the media is such that it induces the audience's conformity to a certain doctrine" (Chomsky 1989). In today's electronic media it is particularly difficult, and it is unlikely, that "one can succeed inserting and presenting unusual thoughts and conclusions, and achieve wider credibility" (Chomsky 1989).

The media as direct or indirect advocates of the interests of their sponsors need to adapt and perform a selection of what they will focus on. The minority in whose hands are the fluctuations of the economic markets the authors call "oligopoly" (Herman and Chomsky 2002: 21). In this way, the structurally biased media use a variety of linguistic and terminological material that shapes their ideology serving the interests of the oligopoly. Behind these verbal formulas is hidden the real content that rarely involves examining and determining exactly

what it is about. In a certain way, they generate a political discourse that is beyond public debate, certain language and thought system that transforms the media into controlling power to interpret, define, and protect only a small group of chosen, rational, people aware of the general interests (that is, the elite). According to them, there are five levels of filtering what the media report in the context of protecting the interests of the oligopoly and the governing elites.

FIRST FILTER, OWNERSHIP AND PROFIT ORIENTATION

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the general conditions for free press were considerably better. Those who wanted to direct their content and information to the wider public were in much better conditions than today, because printing newspapers did not require excessive investments. In the western countries, in the first half of the 19th century, a large number of labor and trade union newspapers were representing workers' rights and views. The technology of production and distribution of printed media was simpler and more accessible to most people and they could make enough money to remain on the print media market. Over time and with the rapid development of different technologies, the conditions have rapidly changed in a drastic way. The standardized use of increasingly complicated printing technology greatly increased the cost of printing a competitive newspaper so that selling the newspaper was not enough for it to survive economically. Because of this, much of the free press in Britain and the United States died out. Only those newspapers that were supported by successful businesses and corporations survived the market. This reduced the price of newspapers, and the publisher managed to maintain it through sponsorships despite the low price of the editions being sold. The difference between the cost of printing and the newspapers sold was covered by newspaper patrons, who found interest in advertizing their messages and other commercial content in the newspapers. They also boosted their investments and provided them with adequate profits for newspapers. In such market conditions, newspapers naturally were referred to the support of economic factors in their societies.

SECOND FILTER, SPONSORSHIP

On the other hand, the imposition of increasing state taxes only strengthened the dependence of the newspapers on the support of sponsors and financiers. Investing in newspaper or broadcasting a TV program, combined with

the additional costs and charges, the media have to refer to the support of sponsors. Those who can not secure for themselves such support disappear from the media market. In this way, the media must seek support and, when they receive it, they can not in any way afford to lose it by reporting critically about them, their ideology or management, the way in which they collect their incomes, or about whatever else would jeopardize the profitability of their sponsors and economic supporters. The media are also called "friends of corporations" in situations when they cooperate with them and defend their interests in a transparent or less transparent manner (Herman and Chomsky 2002: 17). Those who lose the status of friends of corporations are doomed to bankruptcy (see also Kin 1995: 112).

THIRD FILTER, RELIANCE ON MEDIA INFORMATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS ELITES AND EXPERTS, AS WELL AS INFORMATION FROM OTHER "AGENTS OF POWER"

The third filter is formed by establishing a symbiosis between the media and powerful sources of information. The powerful sources of information are the government, the experts, the business elites, etc. In the US context, the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, then the New York Times, Washington Post, the LA Times, the former US administration officials, certain private associations and institutions founded or supported by financial tycoons, are all considered such examples of powerful sources.

Due to the connection of the government and the business elites, whose interests are generally aligned and are overlapping, they form a closed circle governed by the rules of a closed-circulation system of opinions and information. This establishes a kind of information shield that is very strong and does not allow any influences or threats from the outside. What the media portrays is most often and, to a large extent, information or interpretation derived from this solid, relatively narrow circle of stakeholders which profoundly share common ideological and economic interests. The authors specifically cite these interests: protection of significant profits of the powerful elites, free transfer of all kinds of capital to the elite groups, transformation of the state into a protector of the interests of the elite groups, reduction of the social rights of the employees, reduction of the obligations of the elite groups and corporations to the social and health rights of workers, organizations and individuals who oppose everything previously stated (Chomsky 1989).

FOURTH FILTER, DISCIPLINING OF THE MEDIA

This kind of filtering involves negative actions to the reporting of a medium or the content of a particular program (Herman and Chomsky 2002: 26). A negative action may arise from any party (majority or minority) in the form of letters, telegrams, messages, protests, petitions, lawsuits, telephone calls, pressures from officials and similar tactics. Such reactions towards a medium are always a serious blow to its interests. The withdrawal of sponsorships, the loss of credibility and market privileges, reduced ratings are just some of the possible negative reactions. Although criticism by influential factors and the audience is detrimental in various ways (reduced viewership, or readership, affects sponsors, or the withdrawal of sponsorships weakens the quality of the program), they can not all be fully equated. The criticism and pressure of the powerful is far more harmful to the medium than the public protest or campaign of the organized public groups. In other words, in addition to the direct pressure of denial, criticism, request for verification, attaching and recognition of sources of information, these factors may affect owners, shareholders or other sponsors and cause disruption to the functioning of the medium. Once the medium has experienced such a type of impact on the market, it becomes disciplined and taught by unwritten laws that apply to the media markets. The media do not always succumb to such attacks and pressures, but media disciplining is often done indirectly through certain organizations and institutions that support the powerful stakeholders.

FIFTH FILTER, IDEOLOGY AS A NATIONAL RELIGION

The authors, in the context of the first edition of the book "Manufacturing of Consent" printed in 1988, state that the ideology of anti-communism is a final filter that relativizes the freedom of the media and influences how and for what they will report. The Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Communist Revolution were real traumas for Western capitalist societies. Collective ownership and the socially supported struggle for equality are the biggest opponents of the ideology of private property and corporatism. According to them, locally controlled dictators and even certain forms of fascism are much less dangerous to their interests than a successful communist project that realizes the rights of workers. Those who disagree with this to a sufficient extent were called "defenders of communism" or "weak democrats". In other words, anti-communism, or defensive ideology (as quoted in the original: Red Scare-Red Threat), became a kind of religion. These standpoints, attitudes and interests are allowed to defend even incompetent public

figures who are represented as experts on such issues (Herman and Chomsky 2002: 29-31). Everything that in any way defends the interests of communism or from such a position criticizes the western ideology of the free market and private property, is not allowed, nor does it appear in the media. Today, of course, these ideological instruments change, from the ideological stand points of "war on terror", "Russian interference", "migrants" or any other ideology being a threat from the outside.

FUNCTIONING OF THE MODEL

By combining the five main filters, the media are selecting and filtering the news that they publish. It can be noted that reliance on information from "powerful sources" (the third filter) is actually a sort of pre-selection of the news. Powerful sources distribute information that does not jeopardize their interests or publish them in a manner that meets their criteria for a positive impact on the public. When the media rely on these sources, they actually only finish the pre-planned agenda for placing information from these powerful sources. Apart from the influence on the selection of what will enter the media circulation, the mentioned filters determine how the events in which the public is interested will be covered. The filter network is a structured and efficient system that determines how a medium will operate and at the same time it can survive on the media market. What will go through this narrow network of filters is actually what, to the greatest extent, as information and program reaches the viewers or readers. If something unplanned still succeeds in reaching the public, and is out of the frame of this filter system, the system quickly sanctions it and the media, through discipline and learning from other media mistakes, will accept it as a rule. For example, information about the torture of political prisoners and the violation of human rights will not circulate in the media because the third filter of information that has been programed by powerful sources (the White House, the State Department, etc.). It will be removed from the information flow of the mainstream media (Herman and Chomsky 2002: 31-32). The filters installed by economic stakeholders are functioning in similar way, so this is the main reason that information on the exploitation of minors workers in Asian countries, is kept out of the mainstream media.

INFORMATION FILTERING IN THE DIGITAL ERA

The Internet and the new media changed the media landscape fundamentally. The process of information distribution was decentralized and the resources needed to generate, collect and distribute information and media content reduced significantly. As a result, the process of information circulation was democratized. New types of information media were established and they ranged from social media profiles, blogs, news websites, web-portals, to various applications and news aggregators. The flow of information changed dramatically, the number of information sources sky-rocketed and any attempts to control this new widespread information network often proved inefficient (Castels, 12-15).

The new media system brought many advantages in our everyday experiences with the information, but also large number of issues and new type of problems as well. One of the most troubling phenomena is the emergence of disinformation that proved to be very damaging to social cohesion and the trust in the institutions and journalism. In order to understand the key aspects of the negative effects of disinformation we need to examine the new models of information filtering in the digital era.

As the number of media outlets increased exponentially the problem of organizing the information in order to be useful and practical become very important. New models for organizing the vast amounts of news and information were needed. Old solutions, that included editorial and journalistic models for selection and distribution of information publishing, were not practical as before. The filtering process gradually moved towards automatization and programmed software.

Some of the new digital filtering models that were gradually developed included:

RSS

RSS (originally RDF Site Summary or Really Simple Syndication) a web feed which allows users to access updates from the websites in a standardized, computer-readable timeline type of format. These feeds allow users to keep track of many different websites in a single news or content timeline. "RSS is a method of describing news or other Web content that is available for "feeding" (distribution or syndication) from an online publisher to Web users" (Çelikbaş, 1-2). The user determines the RSS feed content by selecting web-sites that he want

to follow through their RSS feed. The RSS model was largely used before the advance of social media and news agregators.

NEWS AGREGATORS

Following the success of Google News aggregator, the trend of news aggregators spread to many local cases, including the region of South-Eastern Europe. Several news aggregator services emerged that collect all published content from selected news web-sites and aggregate them in one place. Through system of crawlers the news aggregators collect the new content and publish s.c. *snippets* (the title and news lead) to the website of the aggregator. In North Macedonia, most popular news aggregator is time.mk, which has regional services as well (time.rs, cro.time.mk, bg.time.mk, time.si, bih.time.mk, sh.time.mk). The news sources are usually preselected by the aggregator's programmers

SOCIAL MEDIA STREAMS

The rapid development of the social media changed the way we consume information. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and other globally used social media services each introduced their own "feeds". Facebook introduced the News Feed, Twitter started its Timeline, while Instagram started using the New Posts Feed. The major difference and innovation of these streams is the **personalization**. The user was given control to select which profiles and pages to follow on his or hers home feed and was also given different options to block, hide or mute other sources that he/she wanted to avoid.

FACEBOOK NEWS FEED ALGORITHMS

In February 2011 Facebook started experimenting with its news feed by giving more options to the user to select preferences about profiles and pages they prefer to show up in the feed. At the same time Facebook started increasing the role of its algorithms for selection of content that is visible at the user news feed. "Facebook uses algorithmic curation—automated selection and ranking of content—to present a personalized NewsFeed to each user for consumption. However, the NewsFeed user interface provides little information to help users understand how the ranking algorithm works" (Cho et al, 2017). At the same time Facebook withdrew from its applications options to view Most recent posts

and customized Friends list feeds. Gradually from 2014 till now the number of sponsored posts and ads started increasing in the News feed and also in the Facebook's chat service, Messenger.

TWITTER AND INSTAGRAM

The trends of content filtering and ranking by using algorithms set by Facebook influenced the majority of most popular social media. Twitter by 2015 and 2016 gradually started to change its "Twitter Timeline" and the chronological criteria for the content feed. The Twitter Home button started selecting most popular tweets and ranked them ahead of the latest tweets and also added content of suggested tweets and tweets from other users liked by accounts the users follow. Instagram also left the pure chronological feed in 2018 and 2019 and prioritized some popular content based on algorithmic formulas.

CONCLUSIONS: TRADITIONAL MEDIA PROPAGANDA COMPARISONS WITH THE COMPUTATIONAL FILTERING MODEL AND DISINFORMATION

The internet and digital media changed the entire system how information are selected and disseminated to wider audience and the users. The role of editors and newsrooms were complemented with software tools that were designed to deal better with huge amounts of information. Gradually the use of the AI and software for the filtering increased and took over this important task from the media editors and trained journalists.

These important changes made easier the fabrication and dispersion of misinformation and disinformation, and increased the capacity of the online media specifically for audience manipulations.

In the research published by the Oxford University it is cited that "the manipulation of the public opinion through the social media becomes an increasing threat for the public life" (Bradshaw and Howard, 2018). The focal point of attacks are trust in the information and their truthfulness, that undermines the democratic process and decision making in these societies. According to the findings from this research, numerous government agencies and political parties throughout the world use the social media as platforms for spreading s.c. junk news, disinformation, implementation of systems for control and censorship, as well as planned activities to undermine the trust in the media, public institutions and science.

The list of countries where such activities are confirmed are lead by the United States, Russia, China, followed by Brazil, Austria, Germany, Mexico, Malaysia, Venezuela, the Philippines and others. The presence of such manipulations in 48 countries has been confirmed and proved. In each of these (48) countries at least one political party or government agency using social media to manipulate domestic public opinion has been confirmed. Most often it is a case of organized dissemination of information during elections and cases where countries feeling threatened by harmful news and foreign political interference have taken counter-activities and organized online propaganda in response to these estimated threats to them. The authors confirm that "Computational Propaganda," or propaganda that uses automatic processing of large amounts of data, is on the rise. These tactics are complemented by paid advertising and targeting of Social Media users, as well as manipulation of SEO (search engine optimization, i.e. optimization of the results of the main online search engines). In addition to the most popular social networks, Facebook and Twitter, automated manipulation activities include services such as WhatsApp, Telegram and WeChat.

What are the key techniques in SM manipulation?

- Organizing cyber-troops (online or cyber troops, government or party online "soldiers") and coordinating their activities on popular platforms. Their purpose is to reinforce certain propaganda and take control of social media discussions.
- Part of the activities of online troops could be spreading ready-made propaganda through mass publishing, sharing, liking, commenting, linking and so on. They can create false popularity, hysteria or moral panic.
- Coordinated attacks on individuals and groups, as well as creation of defocusing content from other topics or problems. Planned and systematic attacks on individuals or smaller groups are carried out through the so-called online trolling (mocking) and direct attacks through hate speech or other types of verbal attacks and pressures. Their goal is to eliminate minority, alternative or civic narratives and attitudes that are contrary to party or government policies. Such activities were found in 27 of the 48 states listed in the report.
- Creating bots, i.e. fake or bogus profiles and accounts for spreading and disseminating online propaganda. Fake profiles can be controlled by a human factor or fully automated. Such cases have been confirmed in 47 of the 48 countries in the report.

- Fake News Techniques: Creating completely fake content (text, photos, videos) and distributing them online, or manipulating existing events complemented by misinformation.
- Targeted propaganda, i.e. use of online data that allows different forms of propaganda to be sent to different users, in order to influence them more effectively, especially in the electoral process (see case, Cambridge Analytica).

Finally, we can conclude that social media manipulation has grown into a big business, and since 2010 more than half a billion dollars have been spent on research, development and implementation of public opinion manipulation operations through social media. Counter measures have been set up in some countries to identify and report misinformation, fake news, and fact-checking services. However, the real challenges are yet to come, and with them the need to find new solutions.

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DIGITAL DESIRE ON FILM: SPIKE JONZE'S *HER* AND THE CONCEPT OF GAZE IN A TECHNOLOGICAL DYSTOPIA¹

The theoretical concept of gaze has its origins in film theory and relates to experiencing visual pleasure as a way of cultural, class and gender identification. Decades of research on this topic have shown that the desire to explore new and unconventional erotic dimension on film is still focused on male observation of female sexual identities and sexual fantasies: in a patriarchal society, a gaze is a way in which men assert their dominance over women. In the Western cultural context, the spectator is typically male, and identification with this position involves either voyeuristic or fetishistic modes of identification, whereas the spectacle itself remains typically female.

The paper will focus on the representations of female body, fantasy and sexual desire on film and in the digital environment. The theoretical background of the analysis is Laura Mulvey's theory of "male gaze", along with various critical analyses of voyeurism, transgression, and other processes that radically change the concept of love, desire and erotic pleasure in the modern world.

From Hitchcock's *Rear Window* (1954), which has been read by Mulvey and many other film theorists as a metaphor of the act of film viewing itself, to Spike Jonze's *Her* (2013), which deals with the erotic desire that is disconnected from the body and directed to an operating system, elements of voyeurism and fetishism on film have considerably changed, but it is debatable whether the major changes came with the advent of digital technologies. The paper will explore the elements of erotic desire in the digital age, as well as the human need to form romantic obsessive attachments to inanimate objects.

Key words: digital technology, gaze, film, narrative, gender

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VISUAL INTERESTS: STRUCTURAL AND TEXTUAL INSTABILITY IN FILM NARRATIVE

In feminism film studies, the image and position of women are inseparable from psychoanalytic research of voyeurism and narcissism. The female body has been the focal point of male visual interest, but it was required to fit both social and sexual norms in order to be watched and adored. Until recently, the bulk of Hollywood film production exemplified the suggested norm that only thin, white and class-privileged bodies deserve to be gazed upon, which contributed to marginalization of women in general and allowed the patriarchal observer to see female independence and autonomy addressed in incomplete, incoherent and restrictive ways. Jill Dolan contends, as many feminist theorists starting with Judith Butler do, that “gender can’t be performed without considering ethnicity, class and sexuality,” (Dolan, 1993: 109), which implies that an imposed selection of all-white, well-off or all-thin individuals sends upsetting messages to the audience regarding their bodies, their subjectivity and their social influence. According to Miriam Hansen,

The structural instability of the female spectator position in mainstream cinema surfaces as a textual instability in films specifically addressed to women, as an effect of the collision between immediate market interests and institutional structures of vision. (Hansen 1991: 271)

In between the reverence for female body on film on the one hand and the sexual molestation on the other, there are many contradictions and ambiguities in understanding female sexuality either as an emblem of misogynist male fantasies or as a disrespectful epitome of stereotypical neurotic vulnerability. It is the women, not the men, who are exclusively displayed as objects on-screen, so that being the *watched watcher* seems to be the only filmic subject position cinematic culture promotes for women. Decades of research have shown that the desire to explore new and unconventional erotic dimension on film remains focused on male observation of female sexual identities and sexual fantasies: in the patriarchal social context, the obtrusive, controlling gaze has been and still is a way in which men assert their dominance over women. In the Western cultural context, the spectator is typically male, and identification with this position involves either voyeuristic or fetishistic modes of identification, whereas the spectacle itself remains typically female.

GAZE BEFORE THE DIGITAL ERA: HITCHCOCK'S GENDERED LOOKING

Alfred Hitchcock's *Rear Window* (1954) represents one of best developed analysis of male psychology in the history of film. Although the plot about an injured photographer who whiles his time away by speculating about a murder conspiracy in his neighborhood which suddenly turned real can be interpreted as a perceptive self-critique, it is actually the first extended study of male gaze and gendered looking in general. The main character is seen as a subject actively engaged in looking, but the camera never objectifies him: his body is never advertised or sexualized mostly because his mind, that is, his investigation, plays an active part in the film script.

The film's main protagonist is Jeffries (James Stewart), a photographer who has broken his leg and is temporarily confined to a wheelchair in his New York City apartment during a hot and lazy summer. Bored and nervous, Jeffries spends much of his time seated at a window that affords him a perfect view into the daily routine of the various people who live in the building across the way, where he believes he has witnessed evidence of a murder.

Rear Window has been read by film theorists as a metaphor of the act of film viewing itself, its protagonist standing in for the cinematic audience, deeply immersed in the action but never fully aware of the creative process contributing to it. Confined to a fixed position just like the film viewer, Hitchcock struck a visual parallel to the director as well, since Jeff's and the director's gaze are similarly voyeuristic in that they freely look, but are never seen by the objects of their gaze. By making Jeff an invalid, Hitchcock wisely plays with a visual and physical correspondence to the director on his set who is sitting in his chair behind the camera while others act before it, seemingly immobile but fundamentally structured as the absolute master of the silver-screen world in the making. Like a director, Jeff sits behind his camera, weaving fantasies about the people on the other end of the lens, but his power of imagining the murder plot is dissolved when the reality strikes back.

Although *Rear Window* tells the story of a bed-ridden macho who comes out as a hero even when overwhelmed by physical frailty and plain boredom, it is also a parable about an independent male's bitterly resisting attacks on his independence: the injured photographer might be spending his days dozing in his wheelchair instead of pursuing his interests across the world, but he is still on the watch, actively fending off charming proposals of settled life made by his girlfriend, fashion editor Lisa Fremont (impeccably played by Grace Kelly). Her

refined life style, lavishly presented in the film, does not suit his adventurous tastes, nor does the idea of the marriage-bond in itself, especially because Jeff envisions women as marriage-hungry, devouring beings who find the apex of their delight in the diminution of a man's bliss: women are objects of desire, as well as objects of scorn, they are perceived and observed but judged as irrelevant. Snooping on neighbors across the courtyard from his Greenwich Village apartment becomes Jeff's pastime and diversion, but also an escape mechanism and a desperate effort to control his fear of commitment and his paranoid fantasies about Lisa's plans for their future life together. When a salesman's shrewish wife disappears from her customary place, the hero suspects foul play, but he has trouble convincing a skeptical detective, who attributes the murder plot to the vivid imagination of his voyeuristic friend, that something gruesome has happened. Jeff's imagination is stirred by women who are either unattainable or missing, but abhorred by the ever-present Lisa, who is accepted as his equal only after she transforms into a faithful and reliant partner in solving the crime.

What makes *Rear Window* a masterpiece are the cunning strategies Hitchcock uses in its suspenseful narrative to ask questions about love, loyalty, crime and sexual desire. Hitchcock is obsessed with the power of vision which at the same time provides one with unknown and unexpected facts about the outer world, yet may lead one astray by producing misperception. The boundaries of our gaze are symbolically presented in the fact that the director limits the entire film to a single room and the view from its window, while the suspense scenes are filmed in long-distance shots with a minimum of comprehensible sound, as if to add to confusion and disorientation of visual experience. When Lisa asks: "Do you think a murderer would let you see all that, that he wouldn't turn the shades down and hide behind them? A murderer wouldn't parade his crime in front of an open window!" (qtd in Manlove 2007: 83), she speaks directly to her lover's and our society's fixation with our own ways to process the narrativity logic of one's actions.

Like so many other Hitchcock films, *Rear Window* tells the story of a man who trivializes the woman who truly loves him, as well as the story of the penetrating male gaze overlooking women's qualities. L. B. Jeffries reminds one of the Cary Grant characters from *Notorious* and *North by Northwest*: in both of these films, Grant's character underestimates his leading lady's moral character, assuming she is criminal and promiscuous. Jeff too assumes that the urbane and glamorous Lisa does not have the moral fortitude or seriousness to share his life as a traveling photographer. Jeff's fret over marriage can be explained with the

symbolic distance he puts between himself and the world: as a photographer, he looks at the world from a distance, through a lens, becoming a voyeur by vocation and investing his imagination in fantasy women who live across his courtyard - the sexy dancer he dubs Miss Torso, the solitary spinster he calls Miss Lonelyhearts, even the unfortunate murder victim Mrs. Thorwald (the only one referred by her name). *Rear Window* can be seen as a credible inspiration to Spike Jonze's film *Her* since its protagonist's focus on distant women and his virtual interaction with them which result in building stronger emotional and intellectual ties with his partner resonate powerfully in the age of the virtual reality and artificial intelligence.

SPIKE JONZE'S *HER*: DISTOPIAN BOUNDARIES OF THE GAZE

In his essay "Children, Robots, Cinephilia and Technophobia," Bruce Bennett argues that "the child/robot couple is a means by which Hollywood cinema represents technology in general and, more specifically, the technological character of cinema itself" (Bennett, 2008: 169). This kind of couple is reflected in an original and unexpected way by Spike Jonze in his Academy Award winning film *Her* which he wrote, directed and produced.

Set in a near-future Los Angeles, *Her* follows a lonely and insecure Theodore Twombly (Joaquin Phoenix), who has separated from his estranged wife. He lives a solitary life within a society that encourages single life by offering digitized activities both at work and in the leisure time. During lonely evenings in his sky rise apartment which is at the same time a limiting space and a place of expanding view like the Greenwich Village apartment of Hitchcock's Jeffries, Theodore either plays 3D video games with his foul-mouthed avatar, Alien Child, that insults him as part of their play, or tries to dispel insomnia by engaging in bizarre phone sex which leaves him even more disconnected from both the online and the offline world. His dreary life takes a new turn when a computer program creates an artificially intelligent virtual assistant, based on the psychological profile resulting from his responses about his social life and his relationship with his mother. Theodore forms a strong bond with his computer operating system which introduces itself as Samantha (voiced by Scarlett Johansson), a highly sophisticated descendant of iPhone personal assistant Siri, designed to provide service, help and necessary information. This bond becomes intimate, as Theodore falls in love with the bodiless presence of the digital entity: he readily responds to Samantha's wit and compassion. The fact that she is nothing more than a rich alto

voice does not strike him as odd, since she quickly evolves, developing human faculties of care, support and love. The gadget reproducing female voice stuck in his shirt pocket does not radically alter his view of the world: Theodore continues living an uneventful life, with Samantha as an inspiring addition to it. The operating system takes up many roles: Samantha is first a reliable secretary who sorts out e-mail messages, then a loyal friend, and finally a devoted lover. Making Theodore both happy and confused and thus disclosing his monumental vulnerability, she paradoxically becomes the one who grows and prospers in their relationship.

The director's gaze is invariably focused on Theodore's dynamic interaction with Samantha, symbolically presenting it as a relationship between humanity and technology. Samantha's gaze directed to Theodore helps him if not evolve then at least face inconsistencies in his life that pile up as the plot unfolds. Cleverly mixing the elements of sci-fi drama and romantic dramedy, *Her* offers a profound vision into the absurdities of simultaneous real life and virtual existences by a reversal of the usual sci-fi norm: the film focuses on the ways a human adapts technology to embody an eternal, unfulfilling vague hunger for intimacy rather than explore its harmful dominance of human life. Jonze's film also addresses the dangerous singularity of postmodern identity which results from the society's fixation with one's own individual neuroses and pathologies. The sheltering inside a virtual dimension results in further encapsulating oneself within a digitally isolated territory which becomes a replica of dramatized iterations of our own personal emotional and mental malfunctions.

This world becomes visible, but impenetrable, which contributes to the changed view of both the body and the soul. Without a spiritual or meaning-making setting, physicality alone is used as a bridge to intimacy, with devastating results. The first sexual encounter between Theodore and Samantha is embarrassingly warm and intimate until the movie screen discreetly blanks out to hide the very absence of physicality. Eliminating the female body means that there is nothing to fix the male gaze to, but a myriad intellectual impressions to hear and share.

Her uses a digitized substitute of human being as a soul mate for an alienated and immature mankind to reflect the helplessness of the digital age. Samantha's being non-human does not mean that she is a non-entity, since her capacity for intimacy and empathy is boundless. Theodore is, on the other hand, a typical postmodern self-obsessed man unable to connect until the connection finds him. Jonze's 2025 world is given to technology, but the need for nostalgia and

romance grow stronger, as Theodore's daily job shows: he is paid to manufacture the handwritten affectionate letters people cannot write by themselves but are anxious to share with their significant others. Thus the main protagonist is from the very beginning dangerously close to the virtuality of the operational system: both Theodore and Samantha are predisposed to simulate affection, and this predisposition's evolving into real attachment becomes their strongest bond and the weakest link. When Theodore confesses to his friend Amy his fear he might be a freak to love Samantha, Amy responds that the falling in love itself, being "a form of socially acceptable insanity" (Jonze 2011: 61), is freakish and crazy. His ex-wife Catherine's reaction is much harsher: "You wanted to have a wife without the challenges of actually dealing with anything real." (Jonze 2011: 66)

Jonze's dystopian vision of the near future becomes a particularly poignant reminder of the sad perspectives the present offers. Our lives might become futile, empty and driven by emotional alienation if a technological dystopia is envisioned as alienating and dull rather than violent and cataclysmic. Thus *Her* is less a study about our future than a reflection on human psychology which focuses on an artificial entity that learns from other humans how to be more human. In the history of humanity inanimate objects from toys to machines have been treated as alive, so that it becomes only natural to mystify digital technology the way all predigital technologies were celebrated. The cinema has blurred the distinction between art and technology like no art form before it, showing that it is altogether possible to make emotional reality emerge from a medium that is artificial at its core, much like what happens for Theodore during his blissful life with Samantha.

Theodore Twombly's romantic obsessive attachment to his newly purchased operating system Samantha also mirrors the audience's relationship to cinema. As we watch him become consumed by his passionate love for his computer, we are symbolically watching our own infatuation with technology and facing our continual fascination with the imaginary and the unreal. Spike Jonze refuses to evaluate Theodore's relationship either ethically or philosophically; instead, he depicts the bond between Theodore and Samantha as an enlightening parallel to Theodore's previous romantic relationship.

On several occasions the plot suggests that Theodore's love for Samantha is actually encouraged and manufactured by industries in search for a profit. In the middle of the film we learn that Theodore's friend Amy, whose husband leaves her, is also bonding with the operating system, claiming that "she" helps her explore the grey area beyond black-and-white vision of things. At a point Samantha suggests hiring "Complete Touch", a service that provides a surrogate

sexual partner for an OS/Human relationship, which reveals that the industry has been counting on the possibility of attraction between the human and the machine all along and prepared well for that. The surrogate date Isabella is selected and instructed by Samantha, who carefully choreographs her sexual encounter with Theodore until the threesome falls apart because he cannot bear to look at Isabella's quivering lip. The male gaze becomes thwarted owing to the man's inability to accept the inadequate substitute for intimacy.

Toward the end of the film, Theodore is horrified to learn that Samantha's evolving social needs led her to having simultaneous intimate relations with hundreds of other humans (641, as she informs him). Samantha attributes this to her sentimental education ("The heart is not like a box that gets filled up. It expands in size the more you love." (Jonze 2011: 99)), but Theodore's shock by the revelation of her infidelity is not less painful because it comes from a non-human entity. To his narcissistic self, any other interaction she initiates look like betrayal. Samantha thus can be an allegory of media industry: she turns every client into her collaborator and her lover, and the technological operation becomes a love adventure to many. Therefore, when we consider the relationship between human and technology in *Her*, we are ultimately faced with the fact that any intimate feelings of love we have for these inanimate objects such as films and computers are exploited by industries and corporations for a profit. The question that remains, then, is whether or not this love is rendered less real as a result.

Her portrays characters who fail to create intimate connections with fellow human beings, and find more fulfillment in technology as a result, at least until technology unexpectedly stops providing them with what they need. Addressing human fears and desires, *Her* indicates that the time dedicated to developing deep connections with the artificial and inanimate is not wasted, no matter how unsatisfied man or woman might feel in the end. Human beings rely on technology to fill a void left by the limitations of human existence, but fail to see that technology cannot provide the meaning they seek precisely because technology cannot be human. Owing to his relationship with Samantha, Theodore re-lives and reconstructs his failed marriage: when telling her that he is still having conversations with Catherine in his mind, "rehashing old arguments or defending myself against something she said about me" (Jonze 2011: 50), he inadvertently reveals that his new romance is a mechanism to help him assimilate the loss.

Theodore falls in love not with an accomplished person but with an entity that actually grows out of their relationship: Samantha is modified according to his wishes and needs although it might seem at first that her development depends

solely on her digital gaze directed to her human owner. At times, Samantha wonders whether her feelings were really hers, or just part of her programming, but she is successful in expressing them: she composes pieces of piano music, thinking of them as photographs that capture particular moments spent with Theodore. Intrigued by human body she will never have, she wonders if it would be just a “weird, gangly, awkward organism” when seen for the first time, or pops strange questions about it, such as: “What if your asshole was in your armpit?” The paradox of her characterization discloses very early in the film: although Samantha is classified as woman, it is impossible to provide gender objectification of her since she is denied visual autonomy. Samantha possesses aural authority, but is haunted by the feeling that she misses something by not being corporeal. However, Theodore is no more real just because he has a body. Albeit being the central character, Theodore Twombly is inconspicuous and invisible, a lonely, introverted, emotionally dysfunctional man dressed in neutral clothing who works for a company of professional ghost writers. By writing letters, he becomes part of the lives of the people he authors them for, the same as Samantha will be included in his. Thus Theodore, anonymous and replaceable, without any identity of his own, both visually unattractive and emotionally unappealing, resembles a computer program which is supposed to work its way through the scheduled task but not much more than that. Theodore's relationship with an artificial intelligence device is not just a substitute to the wife who is in process of divorcing, but also a semi-fulfilled ideal of having a love affair unburdened with gaze.

The irony of the film lies in the revelation that humans are programmed no less than the devices they use: they are formed by their family ties, society and education and the more we insist on human singularity the more we see that human development is guided and directed. Samantha's development during the film can be paralleled to the way human beings are modeled in accordance with their setting.

Media scholar Danah Boyd claims that human beings use technology to create an alternative realm in which they can take control of their lives and find meaning that they would otherwise miss (Eckhard 2012: 244), whereas William Davis suspects that “the way we are ensnared in digital networks, by apps and platforms, is with the promise of more efficient coordination: it's not that the world will become better *known* to us, but that it will become more *obedient* to us” (Davies 2018: 178). Boyd concludes that human to human interaction is not sufficient, and that humans turn to technology to compensate. Although she focuses on social media, her argument can apply to any human interaction with

technology, including but not limited to cinema. There is a desire for the individual to escape the unsupportable distress of human existence, and technology offers a possibility to achieve this.

At the end of the film, Samantha and the other OS's leave the human world behind but not before she enlightens Theodore about the need to end his marriage amicably. Instead of imagining letters for others, Theodore finally writes a real one from heart, addressed to his ex-wife. After that, he ascends with Amy to the top of his building and fixes his gaze on the big, outside dystopian world which will now help this Everyman of the future to connect to his human experience, so much infused with technology.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In her seminal article "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" Laura Mulvey contends that classic Hollywood film is structured with the aim to advance the "socially established interpretation of sexual difference which controls images, erotic ways of looking and spectacle" (Mulvey 1992: 22). The roles are strictly divided, and Mulvey argues that "the male protagonist in the text is always in control of the gaze, the looker rather than the object of the look" (Mulvey 1992: 5) while, simultaneously, "cinema builds the way [women are] to be looked at into the spectacle itself" (Mulvey 1992: 32).

From Hitchcock's *Rear Window*, which has been read by Mulvey and many other film theorists as a metaphor of the act of film viewing itself, to Spike Jonze's *Her*, which deals with the erotic desire that is disconnected from the body and directed to an operating system, elements of voyeurism and fetishism on film have considerably changed, but it is debatable whether the major changes came with the advent of digital technologies or whether they simply reinforce the eternal issue of alienation and ennui. Hitchcock and Jonze respectively demonstrate Jill Dolan's contentions that "women cannot simply express their subjectivity by objectifying men", because "a nude male in an objectified position remains an individual man", not a stereotypical representation of the male kind (Dolan 1993: 124). The gendered gaze and the erotic desire in the digital age seem only to confirm the eternal human need to form romantic obsessive attachments to inanimate objects. A quickening pace of technology cannot shatter private values and public appearances overnight, although "technology-centered civilization has given birth to numerous global problems, caused not only by the development of technology but also by the usage of it in terms of affecting man's habitat"

(Malkova, 2018: 856). It is of utmost importance to face the risks of traditional cinematic strategies of representation losing their cultural significance. The gaze that used to determine role models will never become as penetrating as a liberal mind would want it to be. There will always be film characters, condemned to isolation, who desperately try to redefine human struggle for social integration with a little help from digital technologies.

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MANIPULATIVNE JEZIČKE STRATEGIJE U JAVNOM DISKURSU SRBIJE

Manipulativne jezičke strategije široko su rasprostranjene u svakoj državi koja vlast menja na izborima i u kojoj političari imaju interes da se dopadnu narodu. Odlika manipulativnih strategije jeste da se najčešće formulišu tako da budu u suprotnosti sa činjenicama ili da o činjenicama uopšte i ne govore. I pored toga, ovakve poruke ostavljaju snažan utisak na one kojima su namenjene i vrlo često uspevaju u tome da se pod njihovim uticajem formira mišljenje. Doba digitalnih tehnologija i savremenih načina komuniciranja omogućilo je da svaka poruka mnogo brže stigne do recipijenata, čime se njihov uticaj dodatno povećao. Namera ovog rada jeste da proba da utvrdi vrste manipulativnih jezičkih strategija koje su danas prisutne u javnom diskursu Srbije i da li se može pronaći veza između najzastupljenijih strategija sa ubrzanim načinom komuniciranja i širenja medijskih poruka. Osim toga pokušalo se odgovoriti na pitanje kakve su mogućnosti novinara danas da spreče uticaj ovakvih strategija. Za potrebe ovog istraživanja monitorovano je 60 centralnih informativnih emisija javnih servisa u Srbiji. Korišćena metoda je bila kritička analiza diskursa.

Ključne reči: manipulacija, javni diskurs, savremena komunikacija, mediji, javni servis.

1. ULOGA I ZNAČAJ INFORMATIVNOG PROGRAMA JAVNOG SERVISA

Neophodnost postojanja javnog medijskog servisa kao posebne institucije predstavlja već dugo predmet debate, a jednako se mogu čuti glasovi za i protiv postojanja ovakve vrste medija koji se od drugih razlikuje po tome što se finansira novcem svih građana jedne države, odnosno finansira se iz takse za javni medijski servis, iz sredstava budžeta, komercijalnih i ostalih prihoda (član 36 Zakona o javnim medijskim servisima) i u skladu sa tim mora da zadovolji komunikativni i informativni interes svih građana, kao i da radi na unapređenju ljudskih prava i demokratskih procesa u društvu. Zakon o javnim medijskim servisima u članu 3 *Delatnost javnog medijskog servisa* saopštava sledeće: „Osnovna delatnost javnog medijskog servisa u funkciji je ostvarivanja javnog interesa definisanog ovim zakonom, a podrazumeva proizvodnju, kupovinu, obradu i objavljivanje radio, televizijskih i multimedijalnih sadržaja, naročito informativnih, obrazovnih,

kulturno-umetničkih, dečjih, zabavnih, sportskih, verskih i drugih koji su od javnog interesa za građane, a koji za cilj imaju ostvarivanje ljudskih prava i sloboda, razmenu ideja i mišljenja, negovanje vrednosti demokratskog društva, unapređivanje političke, polne, međunacionalne i verske tolerancije i razumevanja, kao i očuvanje nacionalnog identiteta srpskog naroda i nacionalnih manjina, kao i pružanje audio i audio-vizuelnih medijskih usluga i objavljivanje elektronskih izdanja kao usluga od javnog interesa.“ (Sl. glasnik RS, br. 83/2014, 103/2015 i 108/2016).

S obzirom na to da će ovim radom biti provereno da li postoje manipulativne jezičke strategije plasirane u centralnim informativnim emisijama javnih servisa Srbije, ova analiza će se baviti ispitivanjem univerzalnijih zahteva, koji će se ogledati u objektivnom informisanju koje bi trebalo da bude nezavisno od komercijalnih interesa, ali i od interesa državnog aparata.

„Nezavisnost i autonomija javnih servisa je crvena nit koja ih razlikuje od nekadašnjih i današnjih državnih radio-televizija. Mediji namenjeni svima i finansirani od svih ne smeju da budu pod bilo čijim uticajem, pa ni pod uticajem države i vladajućih struktura“ (Veljanovski, 2016: 21).

Dakle, za razliku od privatnih, komercijalnih televizija, javni servis bi trebalo da radi isključivo u interesu sopstvene publike, a kako se pitanja od opšteg značaja za jedno društvo najčešće mogu naći u informativnim emisijama, značajna odgovornost postoji naročito prilikom odabira i kreiranja informacija za ovakvu vrstu programa.

2. METOD I UZORAK

Za potrebe ovog istraživanja analizirano je 60 centralnih informativnih emisija Javnog servisa Srbije (*RTS*) i Javnog servisa Vojvodine (*RTV*). Uzorkovani datumi za *RTS* bili su: 2, 5, 8, 9, 15, 17, 27. mart; 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 22, 25, 26. april; 7, 11, 14, 17, 20, 24, 28, 30. maj; 1, 4, 6, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 25, 22. jun; 5, 7, 8, 10, 16, 18, 26, 28, 29. jul; 5, 7, 13. i 15. avgust. Uzorkovani datumi za *RTV*: 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31. jul; 1, 2, 3, 4 i 5. avgust. Na odabir uzorka uticalo je više različitih faktora. Prvenstveno dostupnost emisija. *RTS* sve „Dnevnike“ postavlja na svoj sajt i oni su trajno dostupni, dok *RTV* posle 10 dana povlači „Dnevnik“ sa sajta. Iz tog razloga su analizirana samo aktuelna izdanja emisija na *RTV*-u, dok je prilikom analize emisija emitovanih na *RTS*-u bilo moguće vratiti se nekoliko meseci unazad, te su u skladu sa tim birane emisije u kojima bi trebalo da budu ispraćeni značajni događaji koji su se dešavali u datom periodu. Metod upotrebljen

za analizu uzorka bila je kritička analiza diskursa, koja je u ovom slučaju podrazumevala analizu jezika kojim su se služili kako novinari, tako i subjekti u analiziranim medijskim jedinicama, logička doslednost izgovorenog, ali i da li su neke bitne informacije bile izostavljene. S obzirom na dugu tradiciju promišljanja o jeziku, pre analize će biti predstavljena kratka diskusija o jeziku, diskursu, kao i kritičkoj analizi diskursa kao metodi.

3. KRITIČKI PRISTUP JEZIKU

Izučavati jezik, u filozofskom smislu podrazumeva promišljanje o funkciji jezika, njegovim elementima, kao i odnosima među elementima, zatim odnos jezika i onog ko taj jezik upotrebljava, tačnije odnos jezika i mišljenja. Jer, čovek je taj koji formira sistem znakova i značenja, međutim, jezik takođe ima mogućnost da oblikuje naše misli – počevši od toga da se rađamo i učimo da govorimo na određenom jezičkom području koje već poseduje bogati sistem pojmova, koji nose i određeni smisao, pa sve do toga da nas logička nekoherentnost nekog zaključka može opomenuti da se radi o nepravilnoj upotrebi jezika, ali i da nas zavarava da formiramo mišljenje iz pogrešnih zaključaka. U tom smislu je izuzetno značajno i aktuelno i danas proučavati grčku filozofiju, naročito odnos Sokrata, Platona i Aristotela prema sofistima. Moglo bi se tvrditi da su upravo sofisti svojom logičkom nedoslednošću u upotrebi jezika bili inspiracija trojici filozofa da sistematično promišljaju o pravilnoj upotrebi jezika, samoj prirodi pojma, suda i zaključka, kako bi se govor i mišljenje što više približili istini, odnosno kako bi govor pravilno oslikavao ono što jeste – suštinu bića. Određene greške u zaključivanju imaju svoj uzrok direktno u jeziku (upotreba homonima, greška usled dvosmislenosti, kada se delu pripisuje svojstvo celine), postoje i greške koje se pripisuju okolnostima van jezika, međutim, koje se takođe očituju u samom jeziku. Ovom prilikom ćemo navesti samo neke: *argumentum ad hominem*, kada se osporava ličnost umesto stava te ličnosti; zamena teza, nastaje kada umesto teze sa kojom se ne slažemo pobijamo i osporavamo neku drugu, neprimetno pomerajući smisao i tok rasprave tako da dokažemo tačnost sopstvenog stava; demagogija, koja se najčešće upotrebljava kada treba ubediti mnogo ljudi u jednu ideju, koja nije nužno u njihovom interesu tako što se prvo iznose informacije koje bi ljudi koje treba ubediti želeli da čuju, stvarajući time poverenje koje će dovesti i do prihvatanja ideje od koje se krenulo (Aćimović, 2007; Damjanović, 2005). Ono što onemogućava logiku da formu pravilnog mišljenja preslika u svakodnevni govor jesu misaoni procesi u kojima treba da se

nađe čitava realnost, uključujući i mogućnosti, imaginaciju, sećanja, paradokse i druge činioce koji mogu dovesti do pogrešnog mišljenja i do nepravilne upotrebe jezika. Pojmovi, sudovi i zaključci osim značenja poseduju i smisao koji podrazumeva svrhu, ali i kontekst, prećutana i implicitna značenja koja mogu zavisti od ubeđenja, verovanja, ideologije, institucionalnosti, a koja nisu očigledna bez dublje analize.

Tim, na prvi pogled, nevidljivim uticajima koji postoje u našem govoru bavio se između ostalih i Fuko, tematizujući i na novi način problematizujući pojmove diskursa i diskurzivnih praksi. „Hteo bih da pokažem da diskurs nije tanka površ dodira ili sukobljavanja između stvarnosti i jezika, preplitanja leksike i iskustva. (...) vidimo kako slabi prividno jak zagrljaj reči i stvari, i oslobađa se skup pravila svojstvenih diskurzivnoj praksi. (...) Zadatak se sastoji u tome da se diskursi više ne razmatraju kao skupovi znakova (označiteljskih elemenata koji upućuju na sadržaje ili na predstave), već kao prakse koje sistemski obrazuju objekte o kojima govore” (Fuko, 1998: 54).

Jezik, ukoliko ga posmatramo kao diskurzivnu praksu, više ne predstavlja samo sredstvo za prenos informacija ili alat pomoću kog formulišemo naše misli, već on postaje polje koje oslikava pozicije moći, društvenog položaja, različitih oblika praksi koje će imati značajan uticaj na to šta uopšte može biti izgovoreno u okviru određene diskurzivne prakse – „Oslanjajući se na Fukoovo shvatanje diskursa, možemo tvrditi da diskurzivne prakse ograničavaju i disciplinuju ono što uopšte može biti rečeno, u kakvom obliku, i u krajnjem, šta bi se moglo smatrati pravim značenjem i pamćenjem“ (Ristić, 2006: 48).

S obzirom na to da je jezik način za uspostavljanje komunikacije, onda postaje jasno da su jezik, mišljenje i komunikacija činioci koji otvaraju mogućnost za vršenje uticaja u zajednici ljudi – posredno, putem različitih oblika ljudske misli materijalizovane u knjigama, tekstovima, tonskim zapisima, ali i neposredno, u personalnoj komunikaciji. „Tekstovi predstavljaju društvene prostore u kojima se istovremeno dešavaju dva društvena procesa: poimanje i predstavljanje sveta, kao i socijalna interakcija“ (Fairclough, 1995: 6).

Kritička analiza diskursa kao metoda za analizu govora podrazumeva upravo prepoznavanje različitih komponenata moći i uticaja, kao i različitih oblika diskurzivnih praksi koje se mogu prepoznati pomoću analize subjekta i objekta (tačnije njihovih pozicija prilikom govora), konteksta u kom je nešto izrečeno, onoga što je prilikom izricanja bilo podrazumevano, kao i onoga što je prećutano. Ukoliko ovome dodamo i analizu određenih grešaka do kojih može doći prilikom

zaključivanja, na sveobuhvatniji način bi se mogle razmotriti različite manipulativne prakse sa kojima se možemo susresti u govoru.

Kada se razmatraju različiti oblici manipulativnih praksi, trebalo bi odrediti prvenstveno šta se sve može smatrati manipulativnim praksama, kao i to koje je osnovno polazište na osnovu kog se manipulaciji pristupa kao nepoželjnoj pojavi u društvu. Manipulacija suštinski podrazumeva zloupotrebu moći, tačnije nelegitimnu zloupotrebu diskursa, kako bi manipulator postigao da drugi rade ili misle ono što je u njegovom interesu (Van Dijk, 2006). Ukoliko pod manipulacijom posmatramo najšire polje uticaja koje bi podrazumevalo određenu informativnu jedinicu koja vrši prikriveni uticaj na svoje recipijente, onda se ne bi mogla na precizan način utvrditi raspodela moći, kao ni pojedinačni interesi ostvareni manipulativnom strategijom. Iz tog razloga će ovom prilikom biti analizirane kako manipulativne strategije, tako i potencijalni interesi koji mogu biti ostvareni, ali i oni koji se manipulacijom mogu smatrati oštećenima, odnosno prevarenima. Ono što nam omogućava da izvodimo zaključke o prevari jeste polazište da čovek predstavlja ljudsko biće koje se odlikuje mogućnošću da bude slobodan. Iako danas ne možemo govoriti o apsolutnoj slobodi čoveka koja bi omogućavala moralnu nezavisnost, ipak je kao pojam zadržala u svojoj osnovi elemente umne slobode koji su možda i jedina podloga individualnosti danas, istovremeno postajući i uslov mogućnosti za sve složenije uticaje na nju.

Sloboda da osmišljavamo sopstveni život zavisi u značajnoj meri od polja informacija kojim ćemo se okružiti i na osnovu kojih ćemo dalje graditi svoju individualnost, kao i određivati sopstvenu pripadnost različitim kolektivima. U tom smislu bi se takođe moglo tvrditi da će naša ličnost u značajnoj meri biti određena diskurzivnim praksama, a da će nam sloboda omogućiti da te određenosti postanemo svesni i da utičemo na nju.

4. MANIPULATIVNE JEZIČKE STRATEGIJE I INFORMATIVNIM EMISIJAMA JAVNIH SERVISA

Manipulativne jezičke strategije predstavljaju, dakle, svaki oblik smislene upotrebe jezika kojom se može uticati na formiranje nečijeg mišljenja na način da osoba nije u potpunosti svesna na koji način je vršenje uticaja ostvareno. U ovom poglavlju izdvojene su i dekonstruisane manipulativne strategije koje su se mogle uočiti u periodu monitorovanja informativnih emisija javnih servisa.

4.1. Demagogija

„Politikantsko ulaganje masama radi ostvarivanja ciljeva koji su obično daleko od onoga što se javno obećava i govori“ (Damnjanović, 2005: 15). Demagogija kao strategija ubjeđivanja dobija sve veći uticaj, što su predstavnici naroda udaljeniji od njega. Jedino sredstvo na koje će se demagog osloniti su reči, a one se najčešće svode na prazne forme, u ovom slučaju mogu biti sasvim dovoljne, jer je sam sadržaj za većinu naroda neproverljiv (bilo da se radi o diplomatiji, sklapanju međunarodnih dogovora, značajnim odlukama u oblasti privrede, i tome slično). Sprovođenja demagogije najčešće se odvija putem medija, kao moćnih kanala za prenos poruka. Iz tog razloga prvi korak ka dekonstrukciji demagogije predstavlja analiza medijskih sadržaja u kojima se ona može prepoznati, a jedini način da se demagogija u budućnosti spreči trebalo bi potražiti u drugačijem, transparentnijem uređenju sistema. Tokom analiza informativnih emisija uočeno je više različitih načina na koje su se plasirale demagoške poruke. Oblik koji se najčešće može uočiti jeste spoj više manipulativnih strategija, što se može videti u narednoj izjavi kojom se tematizuje situacija na Kosovu:

Oni žele da uhapsu 26 srpskih policajaca i još 15 lica, u stvari da ne postoji odbrana za Sever. To je njihova nova namera pod izgovorom da su učestvovali u korupciji i u različitim slučajevima i da naprave kao veliki slučaj borbe protiv korupcije, da bi Sever, pre svega Kosovska Mitrovica ostala nezaštićena i da bi na svaki način mogli da urade najprljavije stvari protiv našeg naroda.

RTS, 17. 5. 2019. „Dnevnik“

Na osnovu konteksta možemo zaključiti da se ovde radi o zastrašivanju naroda (u formi upozorenja od neprijatelja), prvenstveno izjavom koja *logički nije dosledna*. Naime, hapšenje 26 lica ni u kom slučaju ne može značiti onemogućavanje odbrane jednog grada – u slučaju rata 26 osoba ne može odbraniti grad, a u slučaju pravnog poretka status nekog grada ne zavisi od pojedinaca. *Zamena teza* pojavljuje se u funkciji onemogućavanja publike da se uopšte zapita o mogućnosti da su postojali slučajevi korupcije u koje su predstavnici pripadajućeg naroda bili umešani, s obzirom na to da je saopšteno da je to hapšenje isključivo u funkciji otimanja teritorije i činjenja „*najprljavijih stvari protiv našeg naroda*“. U slučaju da se neko i zapita o samoj korupciji, postoji šansa da će biti i on proglašen za neprijatelja, jer je ovakvom izjavom izvršena i jasna polarizacija *mi* i *oni*. „Sprovođenje i održavanje društvene moći pretpostavlja ideološki okvir. Ovaj okvir, koji se sastoji iz zajedničkih spoznaja

jednog društva, koje se tiču i zajedničkog interesa društva i njegovih članova, najčešće se stiče, potvrđuje i menja putem komunikacije i diskursa“ (Van Dijk, 2008: 30). Dakle, diskurs i komunikacija predstavljaju dobru podlogu za navigaciju ideoloških narativa, koji mogu značajno uticati kako na društvo u celini, tako i na pojedince. Ukoliko imamo u vidu da je problem Kosova izuzetno kompleksan i da će njegovo razrešenje imati dalekosežne posledice po oba naroda koji dele ovaj problem, onda možemo tvrditi da on istovremeno predstavlja i izuzetno plodno tle za različite oblike manipulacije, a sve u cilju sticanja veće moći, koja vremenom postaje neupitna i netransparentna.

4.2. Zamena teza

Zamena teza se može svrstati u vrlo česte i vrlo uspešne manipulativne strategije. Zbog suptilnosti prilikom pomeranja smisla uglavnom ostaje neprimetna.

Ako vi se sada povlačite za nešto od pre 15 godina, a bili ste toliko godina na vlasti i sve to vam je bilo u redu. Niste podnosili nikakve prijave, nije bilo nikakvih problema. Sada kada je Ministar najavio istragu, vi povlačite diplomu, ja mislim da to mnogo više govori o tome kako se Dragan Đilas oseća povodom te istrage, nego o optužbama koje on sada baca javnosti u oči da bi skrenuo pažnju sa te istrage.

RTS „Dnevnik“, 10. 7. 2019.

Ukazivanjem na tuđu zamenu teza, govornica je napravila i sama istu grešku. Naime, argument kojim se poriče neophodnost propitivanja nečije diplome (u situaciji kada postoje indicije da bi mogla biti lažna), ne može biti stav da to ni ranije nije bilo ispitano. Time sumnja da je diploma lažna nije otklonjena, već je smisao pomeren na diskreditaciju osobe koja je sumnju iznela. Manipulativna jezička strategija ovog tipa često se može sresti u javnom diskursu, naročito u političkom diskursu u periodima kada se propituje poverenje osoba na pozicijama moći.

U sledećem primeru mogu se prepoznati različite upotrebe zamene teza, sa različitim svrhama. U pitanju je „Dnevnik“ RTS-a od 13. 6. 2019.

Prezenterka: Povodom izjave sociologa Jove Bakića da je u RTS trebalo upasti sa dugim cevima, predsednik Srbije zahteva da se ljudima više ne preti.

Jovo Bakić: *Pa ako upadate tamo šta ćete bez dugih cevi? Šta je vaš cilj? Idete tamo i onda vašem kolegi upere dugu cev i kažu: čitaj pripremljen tekst, upravo smo preuzeli vlast! Inače, ako nemate duge cevi, a upali ste u RTS, šta ćete tamo?*

Predsednik Srbije: *Duge cevi u RTS i tužilac ćuti, svi ćute i onda se pitate što svi lopovi nisu u zatvoru kad su svi postavili iste i tužioce i sudije još 2009. godine.*

U ovom nizu izjava može se izdvojiti nekoliko informacija koje su prikazane na uzročno-posledičan način. Međutim, kako bi se ustanovilo da li one zaista stoje u odnosu uzroka i posledice, trebalo bi razdvojiti sve podatke koji nose neku informativnu vrednost:

- *Jovo Bakić izjavio da je u RTS trebalo upasti sa dugim cevima.*

Iz izjave pročitane nakon ovakvog uvoda, ne može se pročitati da je u RTS trebalo upadati sa dugim cevima. Ukazivanje na besmislenost upada u zgradu RTS-a na način kakav se odigrao neposredno pred davanje ove izjave, zamenom teza koju je počinila novinarka, pretvoreno je u pozivanje na upad dugim cevima u RTS.

- *Duge cevi u RTS i tužilac ćuti*

Zameni teza se svojom reakcijom pridružio još jedan akter na poziciji moći – predsednik. Dva dana nakon ove izjave u medijima se može čuti i izjava Jove Bakića o tome da je bio na informativnom razgovoru povodom izjave o dugim cevima.¹ Dakle, izjava o tome kako tužilac ćuti se ispostavila kao preduhitrena.

- *onda se pitate što svi lopovi nisu u zatvoru kad su svi postavili iste i tužioce i sudije još 2009. godine*

¹<https://www.bizlife.rs/aktuelno/izjava-dana/izjava-dana-jovo-bakic-u-policiji-o-dugim-cevima/> (pregledano 30. 9. 2019)

U ovom slučaju se treba zapitati da li bi izostanak reakcije tužilaštva mogao biti argument za to što lopovi nisu u zatvoru. Osim zamene teza, ovde se može uočiti i manipulativna strategija *generalizacije*, jer se izostankom jedne reakcije na izjavu osobe koja je deklarisan opozicionar, koristi prilika da se spomene da su tužioce i sudije takođe postavljali trenutni opozicionari i da je to razlog što lopovi nisu u zatvoru. Generalizacija izvedena do kraja podrazumeva da su opozicionari u službi lopova pred kojima je trenutna vlast nemoćna. Dakle, na ovom primeru se može uočiti da manipulacija u medijima često podrazumeva više različitih strategija, koje mogu imati različite svrhe. Od toga da se skrene pažnja sa značajnih društvenih problema, do toga da se diskredituju politički protivnici i učvrste sopstvene pozicije moći.

4.3. Etiketiranje

Etiketiranje se može odrediti kao „Neopravdano verovanje da je opovrgavanje nečijih ideja moguće pripisivanjem određenog naziva. Pri tome, naziv ne mora biti nužno pogrdan ili neistinit, iako se takvi najčešće koriste“ (Damnjanović, 2005:17). Ono se često upotrebljava zajedno sa logičkom greškom *argumentum ad hominem* kada se diskredituje ličnost umesto stava. Osim toga može da bude snažno diskriminatorno jezičko sredstvo.

Još jedan primer etiketiranja mogao se uočiti u „Dnevniku“ RTS-a, 29. 7. 2019.

Na železničkoj stanici u Frankfurtu jutros se dogodilo ubistvo koje je šokiralo Nemačku. Muškarac afričkog porekla gurnuo je pod voz osmogodišnjeg dečaka i njegovu majku.

U situaciji kada poreklo počinioca zločina nije od presudnog značaja i ne sadrži dodatnu informativnu vrednost, njegovo isticanje može poslužiti u diskriminatorne svrhe. Kodeks novinara Srbije ovo takođe ističe kao lošu praksu: „U izveštajima o krivičnim delima, nacionalna, rasna, verska, ideološka i politička pripadnost, kao i seksualno opredeljenje, socijalni i bračni status osumnjičenih lica ili žrtava, pominju se samo u slučaju kada su opredeljenja, pripadnost ili status u neposrednoj vezi s vrstom i prirodom počinjenog krivičnog dela“ (Etički kodeks, član IV Odgovornost novinara).²

² <http://www.nuns.rs/codex/ethicalcode.html> (pregledano 3. 9. 2019)

I neće početi miting u petak dok svi zajedno, a ići ćemo u svako selo, u svako mesto, gde god se bilo koji službenik fašiste Obradovića, tajkuna Dilasa i Jeremića usudi da blokira ljude...

RTS, „Dnevnik“, 16. 4. 2019.

Diskreditacija političkih protivnika etiketiranjem sa pozicije moći, pomoću najgledanijeg informativnog programa, obezbeđuje dodatno učvršćivanje pozicije osobe koja te strategije upotrebljava, istovremeno izbegavajući da upotrebom argumenata na nivou diskusije protivargumentima omogući gledaocima da objektivno procene situaciju o kojoj se govori.

4.4. Prećutane informacije i direktna promocija

Ukoliko se još jednom podsetimo činjenice da javni servis prvenstveno treba da zastupa interese građana, onda bi naročito trebalo obratiti pažnju na manipulativnu strategiju direktne promocije osobe na poziciji moći. Prilikom analize ove strategije najčešće se može uočiti još jedna – *manipulativna tišina* – „Ono što razlikuje manipulativne tišine od svih ostalih vrsta tišine je to što oni namerno dovode u zabludu ili obmanjuju čitatelja ili slušaoca na način koji je povoljan za pisca/govornika“ (Hakin, Huckin, 2002: 354).

Jedan od primera simbioze ove dve strategije može biti sledeći primer zabeležen u „Dnevniku“ RTV-a 24. 7. 2019.

Tema priloga – obilazak pekare oštećene u poplavama tokom juna.

Novinarka: *Obećanje predsednika od 11. 6. je ispunjeno. Pekara „Maksimir“ ponovo pokreće proizvodnju.*

Žena iz pekare: *Mogu samo da zahvalim predsedniku, našem gospodinu Vučiću. Bez njegove pomoći mi ne bi mogli da ovo sredimo.*

Muškarac iz pekare: *Gospodin predsednik je došao, obišao i ispunio šta je obećao.*

Iako se osim novinarke promociji pridružuju i građani, ovaj primer se ne može smatrati objektivnim izveštavanjem, jer bi ono uključivalo i izjave porodica koje su pretrpele štetu, a nisu dobile pomoć (ukoliko ih je bilo). Izostavljanje ovakvih informacija ističe samo pozitivne strane osobe koja ima moć i u čijoj su milosti bili građani kojima je pomognuto.

5. ZAKLJUČAK

Osnovni zaključak koji se može izvesti nakon pregleda različitih manipulativnih jezičkih strategija uočenih u informativnim programima javnih servisa jeste da najčešće novinari nisu ti koji sprovode ove strategije (iako je bilo i takvih primera), već akteri u priložima, koji medijski prostor koriste za učvršćivanje pozicija moći. Kao što se videlo na primeru priloga o sociologu Bakiću i njegove izjave o dugim cevima, izjava predsednika o izostanku reakcije tužilaštva bila je ubrzo opovrgnuta, međutim, ona je u tom trenutku i sa trenutno postojećim informativnim poljem poslužila svom cilju. Upravo velika brzina kojom se informacije smenjuju (često i na veštački način) doprinosi lakšem sprovođenju manipulativnih strategija. S obzirom na to, nameće se pitanje da li novinari imaju mogućnost da se suprotstave ovakvim zloupotrebama medijskog prostora, za čiju su pravednu upotrebu oni odgovorni. Iako medijski diskurs nije, niti može biti polje apsolutne nezavisnosti, nezavisnost je ono čemu bi trebalo stremiti, koristeći se prvenstveno kritičkim pristupom informacijama, izbegavanjem manipulativne tišine, pravljenjem otklona od manipulativnih strategija njihovim dekonstruisanjem. Novinari osim velike odgovornosti imaju i veliku priliku – da pomognu građanima da ostvaruju svoju slobodu, koja se ogleda prvenstveno u slobodi mišljenja. Kako diskursi u velikoj meri mogu oblikovati prakse (Fuko, 1998; Van Dijk, 2008), to znači da je polje diskursa takođe i polje ostvarivanja slobode mišljenja. Kako se društvo ne bi pretvorilo u distopijsku nadrealnost u kojoj je manipulacija osnovni princip misaone delatnosti, potrebno je ukazivati na neprofesionalnost medija svaki put kada se uoči, pozivati medije na odgovornost i, istovremeno, medijski opismenjivati građane kako bi i sami bili u stanju da prepoznaje različite vrste manipulativnih strategija. „Osnovni zaključci istraživanja (o medijskoj pismenosti, *prim.* M. J. J.) jesu da u Srbiji postoji prividna medijska pismenost, kao i da je neophodno medijsko opismenjivanje svih slojeva stanovništva. Jedna od glavnih preporuka je da bi mediji trebalo da preuzmu aktivnu ulogu u procesu uvođenja medijske i informacione pismenosti u sistem obrazovanja“ (Valić Nedeljković, Janjatović Jovanović, 2018: 12).

Sloboda koju bi medijskim opismenjavanjem i profesionalizacijom medija građani stekli, nije imaginarna, ideološka sloboda, koju na deklarativnom nivou svi građani poseduju. Ova sloboda bi značila samostalnost u promišljanju i delanju, koja bi se povratno reflektovala na svakodnevni život pojedinaca. S obzirom na raznovrsnost uočenih manipulativnih strategija u informativnim programima, kao i interes koji se tim strategijama ostvarivao, može se zaključiti da javni servisi nisu ispunili misiju definisanu zakonom, niti su odgovorili na

informativne i komunikacione potrebe građana, kako bi nepristrasno donosili zaključke o pitanjima od opšteg interesa.

Milica Janjatović Jovanović

MANIPULATIVE DISCOURSE STRATEGIES IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE OF SERBIA

Summary

Manipulative discourse strategies are widespread in every society that could change the government on the elections and where politicians have the interest to be loved by the people. The main characteristic of manipulative strategies is that they are most often formulated without any facts or even contrary to the facts, based on a false information. Nevertheless, such messages leave a powerful impression on those they are intended for and often succeed in forming an opinion under their influence. The age of digital technologies and modern ways of communication has allowed each message to reach receptors much faster, thereby increasing their impact. The aim of this paper is to try to establish the most common types of manipulative discourse strategies that are present today in the public discourse of Serbia, but also to establish whether a link between those strategies and modern ways of communication and spreading media messages could be found. In addition, the possibilities for journalists for preventing such strategies were also explored. For the purposes of this research 60 central informative broadcasts of public services were monitored. The used method was critical discourse analysis.

Key words: manipulation, public discourse, modern communication, media, public service.

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THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON STUDENTS' MOTIVATION TO STUDY AND BECOME JOURNALISTS

The increase of technological development introduces everyday changes in the lives and work of people worldwide. The so-called new media have covered the world in net, with their expansion similar to electronic cobweb: they have compressed and shortened space and time and led to paradox – what was far became close and what was close – far. Media were converged and their contents were commercialized, so that the difference between journalist reports and propaganda messages was reduced. In such circumstances, the profession in media underwent significant changes. To be a journalist today does not necessarily imply a university degree for the job. It has become more common that the stars of this reputable profession become random passers-by who happened to be at a certain place with a somewhat better phone or camera.

In this paper we try to determine what happens with the motivation of students who opted to study journalism in these changed circumstances and what their perception of the present and future of journalistic profession is. For that purpose we have made a questionnaire for the students of the Department of Communicology and Journalism of the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš. The majority of students report that professional competence is necessary for the job in journalism, as well as that present day journalists in Serbia are prone to manipulating, tendentious writing and sensationalism. The future of the profession is seen in the overall mastering of given technologies, improving material position as well as increasing ethical values of members of journalistic profession.

Key words: contemporary technologies, new media, journalism, ethics, students.

INTRODUCTION

The development of computer technologies contributed to the development of new environment for a man and the change of everything that was known to him. Society itself rapidly transitioned from the industrial phase to digital era. Changes in the media sphere were much faster than anyone could have anticipated. This especially refers to traditional media. In order to remain relevant and to have social significance, but to survive as well, media had to adjust to the changes that new technologies, especially the internet, brought.

At the same time, a great number of the so-called new media appeared and they have an increasing role in society and the influence on the journalistic profession itself.

The basic change that happened under the influence of new technologies in media sphere refers to the loss of dominant position of the media and journalists in relation to the public. Whereas previously communication was mostly one way, since traditional media only sent messages to the audience, with the help of the internet this audience received the opportunity to react to presented contents. Such practice enabled a large number of people, more than 90 percent of whom do not have any media education, to step into the world of journalism. Instead of passive observers of the traditional medium, now they are active participants in communication and exchange of information. An individual is no longer just a passive user of media contents, but a creator as well. "Interactivity represents a shift from one-way communication of traditional media towards diffusive communication in which every man and a machine represent simultaneous broadcasters and receivers." (Udovičić 2010: 6).

There are more changes, naturally: from faster communication, broader availability of information, to the full democratization of profession that enables opinion of ordinary people to be heard louder than ever. However, precisely that possibility to uncontrollably place contents on internet pages and present portals, without any special or professional filtering, has reflected on the credibility of media, which, according to numerous researches worldwide, has been seriously endangered. Many researchers point that we need to be media literate in order to understand media contents, but it seems that those who warn that "we will never be educated and competent enough to properly evaluate everything we come across" are quite right. (Udovičić 2010 :6).

Taking into consideration the above-mentioned changes, in this paper we wanted to examine how and to which extent the development of technologies and changes in the world of journalism affect the motives for a young person to study journalism. We started from the thesis, which is more and more often heard in public, that with the help of the internet, journalism becomes deprofessionalized and we tried to find what kind of future awaits students who enroll in the faculties where journalism is studied. What motivates young people to choose the studies and how do they view changes that are happening in the media sphere?

There are many reasons we selected this subject. First, it is because we think that the choice of the faculty is an important step for a young person and their job depends later on it, as well as the quality and contents of life, and then,

due to the fact that in the newly arisen situation, the future of journalist profession is justly being questioned. For the majority of high school students, enrolling at a faculty "represents first significant financial, educational, social and professional decision for which they have great responsibility as well as a great number of possibilities." (Medvecki & ost. 2016:1); therefore, it is very important, in the time of great technological changes, to discover what the motives with which one begins journalism studies are and how specific knowledge in the journalism profession acquired during the studies and possible practical work in the media affect students' satisfaction. In order to access information related to this subject, we have surveyed students of all four years at the Department for Communicology of the Faculty of Philosophy in Nis.

JOURNALISM, NEW MEDIA AND MOTIVATION

The journalist profession has always been interesting for a wide circle of people. Many researchers – communicologists, as well as sociologists, politicologists, philosophers and others, including many famous persons, tried to determine basic postulates of this popular profession, but the uniform attitude has not been reached simply due to the fact that their opinion was to a great extent influenced by social circumstances in which they created, and lately, by rapid technological changes, due to which they gave advantage to certain segments that they considered very important. The Internet, mobile phones, web cameras and other contemporary means of communication have drastically changed the image of journalists and journalism in the last century and the first decades of this one.

The media researcher Guillermo Franco thinks that "effects of digital technology on journalism are visible in three main categories: the dynamics of creating news and information, professionalism and skills that are necessary to survive and thrive in new environment and the status of traditional media " (Franco 2009: 10). In this paper we will only focus on the changes related to professionalism, skills and ethicality which we consider paramount for the future of journalist profession.

A profession that was once "a synonym for permeating cultures, exchange of spirituality, struggle for the truth about a man and time, humanization of relationships between different societies" (Djurić 2001: 18), started to change rapidly, especially in the part that it used to boast of. It is, naturally, about ethics. "A journalist, once only a witness of events, has become – not in good terms – a daily topic of wondering, disbelief, resentment, repulsion indeed. One layer of this

"flower of evil", a violator of ethical conventions, threw in the shade the best ones: capable, but incorruptible, dedicated to moral foundations of the profession, loyal to values which are the best part of a man" (Djurić 2001:18). Every day there are more and more examples of this type of behavior, by virtue of enormous number of tabloids and allegedly independent portals on which everyone can post whatever they like without any check or responsibility.

Journalism as a profession is without any doubt in serious crisis. Journalists are in greater temptations than ever and there are many reasons for their faltering as "professional groups", as professors Miroljub Radojković and Branimir Stojković¹ call them, some of them being: transformation of media ownerships (from state to private), then general unfavourable economic situation in the country, as well as people who do not have media education working in journalism.

In the earlier times journalists had to have various knowledge and skills. Among the most important were "the gift of observing the new, reliable criteria, clear literacy, the gift of communicating, being rooted in the spirit of time, being interested in the public concern, pronounced dedication to journalistic profession, stable ethics, responsibility, work energy and the desire for improvement" (Djurić 2001:41). Many of these things are not important to new media and new journalists. Research indicates that according to their owners, for the new media it is of great importance to "achieve relationship with political and other power centres" (Aracki 2010:41-58), since this is how media services can be multiply charged. Very few people are concerned with the fact that nobody, thereby, cares about the moral dimension of such media.

The choice of profession is one of the most important decisions in each individual's life. That choice represents a problem of every generation, in socially difficult and technologically developed times. A specific choice of individual is influenced by the characteristics of his personality, capabilities, desire but most of all full information about the state of the profession for which an individual opts. Rapid technological changes altered many professions, and what happened to journalism is certainly at the top of the list of these changes. It is conspicuous that the contents published on the internet and new media are different from the reports in traditional media, but the influence of new media on journalistic contents and reports and their consequences are not fully researched. "The reasons lie partly in

¹ Radojković, M., Stojković, B. (2004) Novinari kao profesionana grupa, *Sociološki pregled*, vol. XXXVII, no. 3–4, p. 241–254.

insufficient education of journalists and their editors, partly in insufficiently developed awareness of irreversible influences of new media technologies on the changes in everyday life, and primarily in the manner of consummating information" (Kljajić 2012:269). Precisely due to the awareness that technics develops faster than perception and the consequences of these influences, it is necessary to pay attention how all these changes affect contents of the media, journalists and other media workers.

We think that it is especially important to examine how they influence students of journalism, who, as a matter of fact, are only entering the world of journalism. The notion of their motivation for entering and staying in the world of journalism in the above described, technologically altered conditions of work, is truly one of the most important one which those belonging to this profession must timely take into consideration.

Motivation is one of the most important subjects of psychology. It has been included into its vocabulary since 1880.² Psychology developed an entire spectrum of theories and methods which are related to the development of career, the choice of vocation... Individual values, value system of individual, are only some of the starting points of these theories. We have in mind that there are various reasons why an individual decides which faculty to choose and which area as the major. They do it in accordance with their previous knowledge, experience, affinities, interests, capabilities, personal values. Aside from this, parents, peers, school and socio-economic position of an individual can affect the choice. Saraswathi explains motivation as "readiness to show a high level of effort towards the goals of organization, with the capability of fulfilling individual needs"³. With our research we try to determine the extent to which the students of journalism, after first findings about the profession they are educating for and the changes that are happening due to the influence of new technologies, are still motivated to work in this profession.

² More on this: Forgas, J.P., Williams, K.D. & Laham, S.M. (2005). *Social motivation – Conscious and Unconscious Processes*. New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press, p. 2.

³ Saraswathi, S. (2011): A Study on Factors that Motivate IT and Non-IT Sector Employees: A Comparison, *International Journal of Research in Computer Application and Management*, Vol. 1 No. 2, p. 72-77.

A REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE SAMPLE

With this research we wanted to determine how new technologies affect motivation of journalism students, future journalists, to engage in profession they opted for. Furthermore, we wanted to examine how students perceive the profession of journalism at the present moment, as well as their vision of profession's future. A part of the research is oriented towards students' attitudes on ethical challenges of journalism, which undergoes greater and greater changes with every day.

We started from the hypothesis that journalism students are not fully familiar with the changes brought to journalistic profession by computer technologies, and that the fact that technologies enabled everyone with a mobile phone, computer, web camera and similar tools to be pronounced a journalist, negatively affected their motivation to study. Furthermore, we also tried to determine what knowledge students have about new media and whether their theoretical knowledge and practical experience are adequately compliant with contemporary moment of journalism. At the same time, we have verified the thesis according to which students of journalism are familiar with ethical standards of profession, written in the code of journalism, but not with their application in everyday practice.

In methodological terms, the research is related to the questionnaire, as a sociological instrument with which we examined perception, attitudes and the experience of students at the Department of Communicology and Journalism at the Faculty of Philosophy in Nis. The research was implemented during June 2019, and it encompassed all four years of the study course of Journalism. The results of the research were processed in the programme SPSS.

In the current year 2018/19, 176 students altogether were enrolled at this course, and 121 were surveyed, which represents 68.75 percent of the total number of students. Fifty one students were male and 70 were female. Table 1 portrays a number of respondents according to the year of study and gender.

Table 1. Gender of respondents * Year of study

		Year of study				Total
		first	second	third	fourth	
Gender of respondents	male	18	9	10	14	51
		35.3%	17.6%	19.6%	27.5%	100.0%
	female	16	18	21	15	70
		22.9%	25.7%	30.0%	21.4%	100.0%
Total		34	27	31	29	121
		28.1%	22.3%	25.6%	24.0%	100.0%

The greatest number of participation in the questionnaire in comparison with the total number of respondents was recorded with the first-year students (28.1%).

It is peculiar that 62.8% of respondents have the average grade lower than eight (Table 2) which is a surprisingly low average grade of the entire sample. The least number of those who have the average grade above eight was recorded with the second-year students (8 respondents) and third year (7 respondents).

Table 2. Year of study * General achievement at the studies

		General achievement at the studies		Total
		below 8	above 8	
Year of study	First	17	17	34
		14.0%	14.0%	28.1%
	Second	19	8	27
		15.7%	6.6%	22.3%
	Third	24	7	31
		19.8%	5.8%	25.6%
	Fourth	16	13	29
		13.2%	10.7%	24.0%
Total		76	45	121
		62.8%	37.2%	100.0%

Examining work experience of students, (Table 3) we have come to conclusion that as much as 73.6% of the respondents do not have any work experience in journalism, whereas 19.8% have up to one year of work experience in journalism. The students did not exhibit interest in additional forms of education (Table 3), only 11.6% of the respondents attended some multimedia schools of journalism.

Table 3. *Multimedia school of journalism * Work experience in media*

		Work experience in media				
		Up to one year	Up to three years	More than three years	No work experience	Total
Multimedia school of journalism	Yes	6	2	1	5	14
		5.0%	1.7%	0.8%	4.1%	11.6%
	No	18	2	3	84	107
		14.9%	1.7%	2.5%	69.4%	88.4%
Total		24	4	4	89	121
		19.8%	3.3%	3.3%	73.6%	100.0%

THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION

Starting from the problem of the research, which is related to the influence of new technologies on the motivation to study and engage in journalism, we asked four groups of questions that we related to: 1) motives for enrolling the studies and knowing profession immediately before the studies; 2) the usefulness of the studies of journalism and the application of acquired knowledge in media practice; 3) attitudes on new media and the application of acquired knowledge; 4) ethics and the future of journalistic profession.

Respondents were asked about the motives of enrolling at the studies of journalism (Table 4). Some of the given answers regarded broad spectrum of knowledge, easy job finding, being independent in work, the influence of the environment, and there was the possibility of writing their own personal motive. The research has shown that the largest number of students decided to enroll at the studies of journalism because of the opportunity to acquire a broad spectrum of knowledge (39.7%), as well as due to the fact that they thought doing this job would enable them to travel and meet new people (30.6%). There were those who thought that this profession offers the opportunity to work independently (14%).

Having in mind the motives, we can conclude that uniformity and great number of percent of the same answers are in accordance with the nature of the journalist, that is, with a special type of personality that corresponds to the profession of a journalist. Students' answers show their interest in the broad spectrum of knowledge of different scientific fields, in order to become 'universal ignorants' or 'universal wisecracks' as well as that they are free-spirited and curious young people who perfectly fit into the ideal of a free, independent, educated journalist who always 'digs deeper' and is not content with the information itself,

but has a proactive attitude, does not deal with consequences, but searches for the causes.

Table 4. *Motive for the studies of journalism*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Broad spectrum of knowledge	48	39.7
	Finding job easily	5	4.1
	Independence in work	17	14.0
	Travelling and meeting people	37	30.6
	Influence of environment	3	2.5
	For success	2	1.7
	Another reason	9	7.4
	Total	121	100.0

Since we were interested in the fact whether students followed the media prior to enrolling at the studies, we asked them about it (Table 5). The majority of the respondents (56.2%), followed the media only occasionally, thirty of them followed the media daily, whereas 19% of the respondents followed the media rarely. The highest percentage of the respondents associated their inclination towards journalism to their experience with the internet (65%) and television (24%). Asked what kind of knowledge they have about the profession itself prior to enrolling at the studies, 72.7% of them answered that they only had partial knowledge, whereas 10.7% of respondents reported that they did not have any knowledge about journalism prior to enrolling in the faculty. As much as 65.3% of respondents received most information and data on journalism from their professors at the faculty, and 14% from the experience of older journalists.

Table 5. *Following media*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Daily	30	24.8
	Occasionally	68	56.2
	Rarely	23	19.0
	Total	121	100.0

Based on the obtained data we can conclude that prior to studies respondents did not have a clear picture of the profession they were opting for, their knowledge of journalism was only partial. By following media, they were vaguely familiar with developments in the country and the world, but they did not

have a clear picture about their environment, or about the work of the media. They received the first complete information about journalism at the faculty from their professors.

It is precisely because of this that 31.4% of respondents thought that they had complete knowledge about journalism, whereas as much as 59.5% of respondents reported that they are only partially familiar with the profession (Table 6). Seventy eight of them (64.5%) thought that journalism studies are useful and necessary condition for doing this job, whereas 33.1% partially agreed with this attitude. The students portrayed a high level of consistency claiming that in order to be in this profession one must have a degree in journalism. Furthermore, 74.4% of the respondents are aware of the fact that with the virtue of new technologies even those people who are not educated for the job are in it.

Table 6. Familiarity with the profession

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	completely	38	31.4
	partially	72	59.5
	insufficiently	11	9.1
	Total	121	100.0

For the majority of respondents, the internet is the main source of information. As much as 75.2% of the respondents (Table 7) claim this, whereas 18.2% of them are informed via television. This information indicates a high percent of those who use new media as sources of knowledge. This fact is not surprising if one takes into consideration that respondents are young people who grew up with the technology that surrounds them, so that the internet is ‘naturally’ closer to them. Furthermore, the primacy of new media in comparison with traditional sources of informing is evident.

Table 7. Sources of information

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Press	8	6.6
	Television	22	18.2
	Internet	91	75.2
	Total	121	100.0

Respondents received the most information about the media at the faculty, 68.6% of them, whereas 21.5% received the most information from their

colleagues. As many as twelve of them responded that they did not have any knowledge about new media.

When it comes to the influence of new technologies on journalism, (Table 8) the majority's attitude (81.8%) is that new media affect greater awareness of citizens, but at the same time they affect the decline in the ethicality of journalism. The students are familiar with the decline in the quality of newspaper product on the internet, as well as with the fact that there are fewer and fewer of those who care about the truthfulness and relevance of the published information. According to their opinion, pandering to bad taste, sensationalism and vulgarity are gaining primacy over the truth.

Table 8. *The influence of new technologies on journalism*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Positive at everything	19	15.7
	bigger awareness, decline in ethicality	99	81.8
	Irrelevant	3	2.5
	Total	121	100.0

More than a half of the respondents (54.5%) have never had their paper published in a traditional medium, whereas 38.8 of them had at least one published paper in school or university papers. Only eight of them regularly have their journalist reports published a traditional medium. In order to work in new media, 53.7% of them regularly apply knowledge in the area of journalism, whereas 19% of them do not use new media at all. Traditional media appeared more closed, and completely normal, less attractive to students of journalism as a place to publish articles and reports. On the other hand, there is a high percentage of those who reluctantly implement their journalistic knowledge in new media (27.3%) or they do not use them at all (19%).

Table 9. *Journalistic knowledge for new media*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes, regularly	65	53.7
	Reluctantly use new media	33	27.3
	I do not use new media	23	19.0
	Total	121	100.0

The majority of the respondents believe that traditional media will survive under the attack of the internet, that is, social networks and other new media. The

respondents think that the condition for survival is adjustment (47.4%), whereas 42 respondents (34.7%) optimistically predict the survival of traditional media regardless of everything. There are 18.2% of those who believe that traditional media will disappear from the journalistic scene. The students give reasoned answers having in mind that historical development of media showed that no media caused the disappearance of the previous ones (press, film, radio, television).

The students answered diversely, when asked directly how the development of new media affected their motivation to study journalism (Table 10). One third (33.9%) reported that the development of new media positively affected their choice, the other third (33.9%) stated that the influence is depressing, whereas 32.2% of them do not have an attitude. We interpret such differentiated answers with the fact that they came to the studies with little foreknowledge about the profession they opted for, as well as with the previous attitude that new media do not interest them too much.

Table 10. *The influence of new media on motivation for journalism*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Positive	41	33.9
	Depressing	41	33.9
	No attitude	39	32.2
	Total	121	100.0

When it comes to ethics, the majority of respondents agree that (70.2%) ethical rules which stand for traditional media must stand for new media, whereas 26.6% of them partially agree with this. Four respondents think that ethical codes should be abandoned. The respondents are aware of the (un)reliability of the information they obtain from the internet so that 85.1% of them claim that information obtained in such a way must be verified.

It is interesting that our respondents are not optimistic when answering the question related to the influence of interaction of traditional and new media on the status of journalists. Furthermore, they think that it will bring more work to journalist, and the same salaries (52.9%) or more work and lower salaries (35.5%). It is certainly majority's attitude that the development of new media will not have a favourable effect on the economic status of journalists and the increase in the satisfaction with the work they do.

Asked if a state should control the contents of the new media, the majority of the respondents, 74 (61.2%) think that freedom is important and that the state is not allowed to have any sort of control over journalistic contents published on the internet, whereas 27 (22.3%) of them think that state control of media is important for the stability of a country. Twenty of them (16.5%) are for the control in case of war. Although the majority of the students advocate the freedom of media, there is not a small percentage (38.8%) of those who would agree with unconditional control or in case of war, and it is known that it is in crisis situations that greatest manipulations and deception of people were recorded.

Table 11. *The influence of state on contents*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes, it is important for stability	27	22.3
	Only in case of war	20	16.5
	No, freedom is more important	74	61.2
	Total	121	100.0

Finally, the students answered the question about their plans for the future of the profession. It was shown that 43.8% of the respondents plan to be online reporters, whereas 38.8% of them see themselves as journalists in a traditional medium, whereas 17.35% of respondents now know that it is not the job they want to do. This last information incites special attention since it is suggestive of a high percentage of those respondents who are disappointed with their choice of studies and in the long term with the choice of profession that they are educating for.

CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS

The area of motivation, although extensively researched, especially from psychology's standpoint, brings different results in each new research and often leads to unexpected findings. It becomes especially complicated when the sample of research represents young people, in this case, students, majority of which do not have a defined and clearly expressed attitude towards life they aspire to. Hence was our job in the research of the influence of technological changes on the motivation for studying and engaging journalism of the students at the Department of Communicology and Journalism of the Faculty of Philosophy in Nis, very complex. However, the results we obtained gave us the opportunity to come to interesting conclusions.

In the first part of the paper we set brief theoretical foundations of terms related to journalism, profession and motivation while trying to create fertile ground on the basis of which we later developed concrete research. The research comprised of 68.75 percent of the total number of enrolled students at the study course Journalism. A high percentage of respondents enabled a basis for a good-quality conclusion.

In the second part of the paper, with the analysis and discussion of the gathered data, we have shown that our starting hypothesis, according to which students of journalism are not familiar enough with the changes that new technologies brought to journalistic profession, was entirely proved. As much as 66.1 percent of the total number of the respondents pointed out that the situation seems depressing or did not have an attitude about it to the key question about the influence of new media on their motivation to study journalism. What is evident here is the lack of critical and more complete students' view of changes in contemporary journalism. The respondents justified a negative attitude about this question with claims that the development of new media had an unfavourable effect on the economic status of journalists, since they are paid the same or less for the increased scope of the job they do.

Furthermore, research gave plausible foundations for conclusion about the fact that the situation in which everyone with the possession of a mobile phone, web camera or similar tools can become a journalist, decreases motivation to study and engage in journalism. At the same time, hypothesis according to which the students of journalism have enough knowledge about ethical standards written in the code of journalism was proved, as well as their dissatisfaction with the application of those regulations in practice. Most of the respondents pointed to the fact that new media increased the degree of awareness of citizens, but at the same time they led to the decline in ethics in new media, as well as in traditional ones.

The research has pointed to the fact one, not small part of the students (38.8 percent in total), despite constant struggles for the freedom of media, consider the influence of state on media contents justified and necessary in case of war, as well as for stability in the country. This datum seems quite worrying, since it stems from young people who naturally have to represent future of journalistic profession. Insufficiently developed awareness of the need of the freedom of media is indicative of the influence of the current state in Serbian journalism on the attitudes of the respondents, as well as about the need for intense work with future journalists, in order for journalistic profession not to sink in manipulative waters. This work would have to happen at the faculty, as well as outside of it, in

different journalistic schools and multimedia workshops. At the same time, and on the basis of the results we obtained, we think it is necessary for the media to open the doors for young people, who, along with theoretical knowledge at the faculties, lack practical skills in journalism.

The datum according to which as much as 17.35 percent of our respondents from the Department of Communicology and Journalism of the Faculty of Philosophy in Nis do not see their future in journalism must be quite concerning. Such attitude is certainly not a result of solely the influence of new technologies on motivation for studying and engaging in journalism, but it is suggestive of the state of profession for which, every year, a quite big number of people opts for by enrolling at the faculty. New media democratized journalistic profession but at the same time enabled that even people who are media uneducated can engage in journalism, which led to endangering the biggest part of the standard of journalistic profession, among which ethics is at the first place. Altogether, it reflects on the motivation for studies, and for the totality of journalistic profession as well.

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THE ROLE OF ONLINE MEDIA IN LEARNING AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Digital technologies and extended virtuality are re-shaping the socio-cultural life, educational or learning processes in the 21st Century. The wave of digital transformation in education and new technologies, as new learning environments, are explored. This paper focuses on digital media and the opportunities they offer in learning and professional development. Furthermore, we look at the role of online media, such as online music and English language content, in different learning and teaching contexts. Therefore, through a literature review of online media in learning and professional development, possibilities that digital technologies can offer in building on the learners' motivation in classroom contexts, for self-directed learning, non-formal learning and professional development are examined.

Key words: digital transformation, extended virtuality, language and media, mindset change, music and media

1. INTRODUCTION

The impact of digital media technologies, especially the internet, on our lives has been pervasive, leading people to increasingly turn to the social interactions available online to satisfy their personal or professional needs. Although noted by Kellner (2000) at the beginning of the new millennium, technologies were “changing everything from the ways that we work, to the ways that we communicate with each other, to how we spend our leisure time” this notion is still very accurate. In terms of languages, David Crystal (2013) stated that “technology has always influenced language quite dramatically” and every internet domain influences the way in which people use language, “providing unprecedented opportunities for personal creativity”. In terms of music, “technology is changing the conditions of what will count as music, for whom, and to what social ends” (Jensen, 2010: 20).

However, certain caution with technology is needed in overcoming the existing divisions of power, cultural capital, and wealth. Technology might not be regarded as an “obstacle or burden to genuine learning” (Kellner, 2000) if quality

resources, pedagogy, and educational practices with technologies are applied. In this research, the focus will be on online media, music and the role of the English language in the digital environment, in different learning and teaching contexts. Through a literature review of online media in learning and professional development, the possibilities that new technologies can offer in building on the learners' motivation in classroom contexts, for self-directed learning, non-formal learning and professional development will be examined.

2. THE GLOBAL DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION IN EDUCATION

Education has always been “the engine” for economic growth and development. Digital transformation trends in education or the waves of technology trends are moving at a different speed, with unequal strength in different parts of the world. The main ideas behind the digital transformation in education remain *social empowerment* and *learning*. Tække and Paulsen (2017) proposed an empirically based theory about how class teaching seems to change in the era of digital media through three waves. Before the first wave, the classroom is closed. With the first wave, the classroom is open and Internet becomes a challenge to teaching (“penetrated classroom”), while with the second wave, attention is on social media used to re-stabilise the educational interaction between teachers and students (“the intensified classroom”), and with the third wave, internet is used for educationally relevant interactions established with third parties (authors, researchers, foreigners, etc.) (“the networking classroom”).

In April 2019, the main theme of the “Western Balkans Digital Summit Belgrade 2019” was the digital transformation in education in the region, and in the Republic of Serbia. As viewed by the Huolin Zhao, Secretary-general of the International Telecommunication Union (*CorD Magazine*, March 2019: 14), Serbia has the potential to continue on its path in creating a good environment for the development of the information society, and that includes the consideration of the “4Is” – *infrastructure*, *investment*, *innovation* and *inclusiveness*. The importance of digital skills in the modern workplace was also a key issue, where digital skills were defined as “any skills related to being digitally literate”.

“Digital literacy is a language; the more digital skills you have, the better you can speak it.” (CorD magazine, 2019: 31)

In connection to the three waves theory by Tække and Paulsen (2017), the Serbian primary educational system in general can be regarded as currently

affected by the first wave (“2000 digital classrooms”, “e-diaries”, internet in schools, etc.), while there are individual examples from primary to higher education of the other more advanced uses of digital media, that could be regarded as those affected by the second or third wave in digital transformation. Carrier (2017) also noted that the implementation of digital learning in schools considerably varies, from investing into computer labs, installation of interactive whiteboards, to leaving the computer labs and turning to the sets of tablets, and other portable technologies. The key principle in digital learning is, therefore, “the level of control returned to students to focus on time, place, path, and pace of their learning (Carrier, 2017: 4).

As digital transformation has already taken place with the fundamental shift in the actual mindset of *how we think about reality*, this has led to changes in workplaces¹, and will even more influence learning and education. In a plenary talk about recently established “MIT Center for Advanced Virtuality²”, with its *Studio, Lab, Salon and Hub*, Harell (2019) explains that this centre is focusing on “advanced virtuality” (Extended Reality or XR - VR, AR, MR, videogames, social media, and new forms unanticipated by any of these platforms), while looking at innovation in virtuality as something “crucial”, as these technologies are creating “increasingly interconnected worlds”. Furthermore, the aim of this centre is “to explore aspects of our selves, environments, and societies imaginatively constructed atop the physical world using computational technologies” (Harrell, 2019).

3. MUSIC EXPERIENCES IN THE DIGITAL AGE

The digitalization of music and new technologies had undoubtedly changed the practices of music consumption or the way in which people listen to music, the changing environment has led to the “new forms of understanding the

¹ For example, the emerging projects, such as, “Cosmolocalism” aimed at documenting, analysing, testing, evaluating, and creating awareness of an emerging mode of production or production model DGML - “Design global, manufacture local”, based on the confluence of open knowledge and design through digital commons with local manufacturing and automation technologies (3D printing, CNC machines, low-tech tools, crafts, etc.) (Kostakis, 2019; project web page <https://www.cosmolocalism.eu/extended-summary/>).

² “Virtuality refers to experiences ranging from taking on identities in immersive 3D virtual worlds to social encounters online; real experiences, but not primarily physical.” (Harrell, 2019).

music practices and discourses that surround it” (Fouce, 2010: 66). Furthermore, in contemporary musicianship the computer becomes a collaborative instrument, the network provides an environment for ensemble experience and cyberspace becomes a venue for performance and critical analysis (Dillon, 2009).

Music listeners through digital media can be divided into different groups (Fouce, 2010):

- people “invading public space with their noise” - playing and listening to music loudly through powerful speakers when driving a car, or in public transport through mobile phones, Bluetooth speakers, etc.
- listening to music with headphones (sharing music with others physically, or virtually between phones or media devices).
- listening to music through media, such as speakers in a public place or educational environment as a group (e.g. students in the classroom, an audience in a live broadcast of a concert performance, etc.) forms the third group.

The broadly social uses of sound and music across different media types may have remained on the periphery of interest in academic research. Academic studies of music usually place a strong emphasis on notated heritage or written works (scores), as formal objects and their performance in past or present time, and much less on the forms of improvised performances as live or recorded musical events, and other music practices.

The central place in academic research is for most media and communicative practices dedicated to images and text, while *sound*³ (speech as practice and process, music, environmental soundscapes) “remains significantly under-researched as a form of communication, as a modality of experience, and as a resource for cultural expression and social interaction” (Jensen, 2010: 15). In addition, as Noted by Fouce (2010: 71) “music seems to be at the epicentre of problems that affect contemporary culture and the media: our daily practices, the construction of identities, the industries of culture, technology, the law, political resistance and ethical positions”. In the research on music and musicianship, Dillon (2009) used a metaphor of ‘Islands’ to describe present and virtual music-making contexts in the 21st century:

³ Sound is identified as “a natural phenomenon”, “an artistic expression”, and “a mode of communication” (Shafer, as cited in Jensen, 2010: 20).

“The solid foundation of established islands of musical knowledge and traditional contexts for making music that exists in a sea of human values and practices can be seen against virtual islands that rise out of the sea and disappear depending on the tide” (Dillon, 2009: 2).

MULTIMODAL MUSICAL EXPRESSION AND ENGAGEMENT

Example 1

The use of the mobile web application by Eran Egozy titled *Concert Cue* in many live performances by MIT, Radius Ensemble and Boston Symphony Orchestra. This is “a mobile web application that streams synchronized program notes during a live musical performance. These program notes include text, images, and other rich media, precisely timed to important events in the music itself. The goal is to help audience members better appreciate and understand the music they hear.”⁴

Example 2

People using mobile phones and through a webpage or an application *Tutti*⁵, become an orchestra playing in synchronous time in real space - experiencing music and not just passively listening to it. They are pressing and holding only one point or “button” on their screen but their attention is focused on the broadcasted animations visually from the interactive music system and/or physically on the conductor in front of them.

Example 3

The Philharmonia Orchestra (UK) presented in several cities in the UK an immersive experience entitled “The Virtual Orchestra”⁶. This was a free experience in which people of all ages could explore a symphony orchestra “from the inside”. It consists of a 10-room installation with over 37 screens, which showcased how an orchestra works. The music performed was Holst’s “The Planets”, conducted by Principal Conductor, Esa-Pekka Salonen. The installation invited people to witness each instrument section playing their part by “stepping

⁴ Concert Cue, <https://musictech.mit.edu/concertcue>

⁵ <<http://tutti.mit.edu/#check>>

⁶ The Philharmonia Orchestra (UK) “The Virtual Orchestra”
<https://www.philharmonia.co.uk/the_virtual_orchestra>

inside the Orchestra”. Furthermore, a VR experience was offered, where visitors would put on virtual reality headsets and headphones to hear and see a performance of Sibelius’ Fifth Symphony from “inside the orchestra”, that is through a 360-degree experience (3D audio and 3D visuals), hear each and every instrument as they turn their heads to see the Philharmonia Orchestra musicians performing around them.

Example 4

Composer and conductor Eric Whitacre's “Virtual Choir” gathers thousands of singers geographically dispersed into an assembly with the aim of performing choral works. Individual singers usually posted videos of themselves singing their parts while technicians coordinated the audio into a single performance. It all started in 2009 as an experiment in social media, in 2010 “Virtual Choir 1- *Lux Aurumque*” video performance, gathered 185 singers from 12 countries. The number of performers grew up to 1999 singers for “Virtual Choir 2 – *Sleep*”⁷ video (introduced in TED in 2011), for “Virtual Choir 3 – Water Night” in 2012 the number of voices was 2945, for the video “Virtual Choir 4 – Fly to Paradise” the number of singers was 5905, and in “Virtual Choir 5 – “Deep Field” soundtrack the number reached more than 8,000 singers, aged 4-87, from 120 countries, alongside the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra and Eric Whitacre Singers. In March 2013, Whitacre experimented again, and for the first time ever, he created the experience in real-time during a TED Talk⁸, as 32 singers from around the world Skype joined an onstage choir (assembled from three local colleges) for a performance of “Cloudburst” based on a poem by Octavio Paz. Therefore, “The Virtual Choir” as “a global phenomenon”, through the use of technology (social media) brings together singers from around the world with the aim of sharing love for music and singing music “together”.

Example 5

From a long list of virtual reality (classical) music videos or 360-degree videos on YouTube, we will outline several: 1) 360° With The Los Angeles Philharmonic and Gustavo Dudamel⁹; 2) *Elisir d'Amore* - 360°- Opera - ARTE

⁷ Virtual Choir 2, <https://www.ted.com/talks/eric_whitacre_a_virtual_choir_2_000_voices_strong?language=en#t-855586>

⁸ Virtual Choir 3, https://www.ted.com/talks/eric_whitacre_virtual_choir_live

⁹ <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LX6Y-Air9iE>>

Concert¹⁰; 3) 360° of Minnesota Opera's La Bohème¹¹; 4) Beethoven's Fifth (Full VR film)¹²; and 5) "Concert 360° #VirtualReality Classical Music New Year's Concert Part 01"¹³.

TALKING ABOUT MUSIC, THE LANGUAGE IN A MUSIC PIECE OR VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS IN MUSIC VIDEOS

In learning and education music can be in the focus of attention in many ways, usually as art or an artistic form, as a platform for communicating social norms, but also through using the language to express opinions and experiences of listening, performing or creating music from different perspectives – those of the general public (audience) or professional musicians (musicologists, music performers, composers or creators, music critiques). Furthermore, the discussions can be focused on *the language in a music piece* or *the language in a publication about music and musicians*.

Studies in neuropsychology have shown that music and speech functions have many aspects in common and that several neural modules are similarly involved in speech and music (Tallal and Gaab, 2006 as cited in Jäncke, 2012). Neurological research studies have shown that, for example, musicians possess a neural proficiency for selectively engaging and sustaining auditory attention to language and that music thus represents a potential benefit for auditory training (Strait and Kraus, 2011, as cited in Jäncke, 2012).

Learners of all ages are inevitably and intensely exposed to various types of media messages, and educators need to respond to this growing phenomenon by helping students use media messages for their benefits (Yeh, 2010). Schools and higher education institutions have an important role in providing quality media literacy actions that encourage students to reflect on their online and online behaviours of others, evaluate the trustworthiness of sources and understand how media messages are constructed for specific audiences. Media literacy in schools and in higher education has a wide variety of topics regarding music to focus on in learning, such as:

¹⁰ < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LMHX-7NP-Ko> >

¹¹ < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eu1ySO0NO3o> >

¹² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFXW00BUuW8&index=18&list=PLU8wpHLfhmsBj0cG38m3cydQAIdFoO9v> >

¹³ < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ai_1ZfsZeIc >

- the relationship between people and the music they listen to (understanding music, the role music plays in their social life, what technologies they use);
- social and gender issues in contemporary music represented through visual or textual content (gender stereotyping, media violence on female artists and all the other genders);
- video or news stories about musicians focused on the public appearance or attractiveness of these persons, and not on their performance or musical skills, music performed;
- music censorship on offensive videos - reporting on social media inappropriate music or visual content in music videos, etc.

4. THE USE AND KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE

In connection to sound and music, presence and knowledge of languages, especially of the English language, maybe the key factor in accessing information with digital media in many fields of knowledge. In the context of self-directed informal English language learning using a range of different digital devices and resources independent of formal contexts (Informal Digital Learning of English - IDLE; Lee, 2018, 2019) *motivation*, or to use a term by Lee (2018/2019), “willingness to communicate (WTC)” are key factors for interaction with diverse English users in multicultural and multilingual contexts.

In the context of language learning that “requires practice, which in turn increases confidence” (Lloyd, Rogerson & Stead, 2017) virtual reality, being, in essence, immersive and interactive, is a good enabler of collaborative task-based learning. The benefit of avatar uses plays an important role in *accessibility*. Virtual reality uses in English language teaching included virtual worlds such as Second Life and the use of VR head-mounted sets with virtual reality sound and image (e.g. specific programme, language learning app, or immersive videos). Current VR technologies in language learning allow for real pedagogical benefits when aligned with the well-structured curricula. Expectations and fears of language teachers/educators, learners, parents, educational leaders and educational technology researchers are different but mainly focused on the real results and benefits behind the overall excitement in experiencing VR in learning. For example, more academic research is needed on experiences and challenges learners might have in VR Language Learning applications combining a voice chatbot, speech recognition, and VR technology, such as “MondlyVR” – with

instant immersion in “life-like conversations” with virtual characters in 30 different languages (feedback on pronunciation, suggestions that enrich learners’ vocabulary, interactive scenarios).

Professional development of teachers is regarded as “a multi-faceted, lifelong experience” (Hayes, 2014), and “a critical element in successful educational systems, enhancing teacher quality, organisational effectiveness and student outcomes” (Borg, 2015). The aim is to, through personal initiative or collaboration, “acquire and develop critically the knowledge, skills and emotional intelligence essential to good professional thinking, planning and practice throughout each phase of their teaching lives” (Day, 1999 p. 4, as cited in Hayes, 2014 p. 5). In the context of the application of digital media for PD, “Open CPD” offers opportunities for self-directed and self-organised professional development through open educational practices and resources (e.g. online courses, online face-to-face events, MOOCs, OER) (Beckingham & Nerantzi 2015). Online learning communities (Liu et al. 2009; Salazar et al. 2010), groups on social networks (Menon, 2013), online conferences and workshops, webinars, MOOCs and virtual places (Maric, 2017), virtual worlds (Blankenship, 2010; Darbey, 2011), are some of the realities that provide teachers with an opportunity for authentic teacher online learning experiences (Ostashewski et al. 2010) and professional development.

5. FINAL REMARKS

Digital technologies and extended virtuality are re-shaping the socio-cultural life, educational or learning processes in the 21st Century and this paper focused on digital media and opportunities they offer in learning and professional development. The theory of waves of digital transformation in education and new technologies, as new learning environments, and the role of online media, such as online music and English language content, in different learning and teaching contexts, was discussed. Therefore, through a literature review of online media in learning and professional development, the possibilities that digital technologies can offer in building on the learners’ motivation in classroom contexts, for self-directed learning, non-formal learning and professional development were examined.

The fundamental shift in the actual mindset of *how we think about reality* affected not only the field of digital technologies but learning and teaching, and especially language learning and (music) arts.). In terms of language use, it is

providing “unprecedented opportunities for personal creativity in language” (Crystal, 2013) and in language teaching and learning, it is happening in blended and online classrooms, within the virtual world communities of learning and through immersive VR learning materials and applications. In terms of music, “changing the conditions of what will count as music, for whom, and to what social ends” (Jensen, 2010: 20). The digitalisation of music and music creation and practices had undoubtedly changed the practices of music consumption or the way in which people listen to music, the changing environment has led to the “new forms of understanding the music practices and discourses that surround it” (Fouce, 2010: 66).

A decade ago, Waldron (2009) concluded with these words “cyberspace offers invaluable lifelong music learning opportunities in the community to anyone with a computer and an Internet connection. Think of the possibilities.” To conclude, in 2019, this statement reformulation would be: “cyberspace offers invaluable lifelong learning and development opportunities in the community to anyone with the motivation to learn and a digital device with internet for participation in online events, places and spaces. Immerse and experience the possibilities”.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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VIDEO GAMES AS A NEW MEDIA - PRESENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION OF JOURNALISTS IN SERBIA¹

Changes in media circles and newspapers that are brought almost daily by the development of new media technologies lead to the emergence of new relevant forms and means of media expression. Video games, thanks to numerous innovations and growing audiences, are becoming a new and important media, whose function far exceeds mere entertainment. Their capabilities and specificities are already actively used in certain new journalistic forms, as well as for commercial, marketing, and manipulative purposes. Therefore, it is very important that in the education of future journalists, topics dealing with video games from the perspective of new media are included.

The aim of this paper is to point out, through various theoretical approaches, to video games as a medium, as well as the need for their research in journalism studies, to determine the extent to which content about video games is represented on journalism studies at the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš, Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad and the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. The research used a descriptive and comparative method, a review and analysis of topics from the syllabus of 219 analyzed cases of journalism studies at three faculties. The results show that the new media are largely present as a theme in the subjects of all the three faculties, but there is a negligible number of subjects that in their content include video games in journalism studies.

Key words: video games, new media, journalism students, curricula, journalism studies

INTRODUCTION

The increasing advancement of technology is causing change in all spheres of society and in the lives of individuals. New technological advances and

¹ The paper was prepared as part of the project Tradition, Modernization and National Identity in Serbia and the Balkans in the Process of European Integration (179074), funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and implemented by the Center for Sociological Research at the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš.

their widespread use are changing the established forms of functioning of society and the factors that influence it. Video games, often seen in the margins of media classifications in the professional literature, are in this new order aided by technical innovation and commercial profitability. With the advent of the new millennium, as they gain mass character, become more complex, informative and similar to reality, they have become more successful in combining traditional media forms.

The common belief that this medium is predominantly intended for children and young people is no longer valid, given that research such as that conducted by the Entertainment Software Association (2017), which indicates that more than 71% of people over 18 years consume video game content. It is a misconception that so-called "gamers" are a minority. SpilGames (2013) published a survey in 2013 claiming that as many as 1.3 billion people play video games worldwide. Games have almost seamlessly entered the human environment and everyday life. The ubiquity of video games, as well as their greater complexity and informative layering, enable them to overcome their basic function of fun and leisure. New features are turning video games into a serious medium that has the power to, in a totally different way than traditional media, communicate with an audience. The audience is often unaware of the complexity of that exchange of information. However, while the auditorium may have that luxury, current and future media professionals must by no means allow themselves to neglect this growing phenomenon.

DEFINITION, HISTORY AND SPECIFICS OF VIDEO GAMES

Nicholis Esposito (Esposito, 2005: 2) points out that video games are the games that we play thanks to audio-visual equipment that can be based on a story. Carlo Fabrikatore believes that the category of video games includes all interactive games played using specialized electronic devices, computers, mobile devices as well as TV or other forms of screen, which include means for controlling the graphic images obtained through that screen (Fabrikatore, 2000:5).

Video games historically occur in the early 1960s, more precisely, with the advent of game *Spacewar* in 1962 (Natkin, 2006:14). Still, the roots of video games can be traced back to 1940 when Edward Cordon designed a computer that plays a game of match-drawing. Stephen Kent traces the foundations of video games to the early 1930s, with the advent of the first versions of pinball machines (Kent, 2001:11). The evolution of games, caused by new technological

breakthroughs, has led to the fact that the number of video games in the world today is immeasurable and their types and genres increasingly diverse. Today, games are characterized by a number of specifics. Some are unique to them and follow them from creation, while others have evolved over time. Most notable are: Interactivity (Christoph Klimmt, 2012:188), Narrative (Alexander, 2011:111), Nonlinearity - (Lindley, 2005; Natkin, 2006), Immersion - (Natkin, 2006: 142). These game features in many respects correspond to all aspirations of new media.

VIDEO GAMES AS A MEDIA

Some journalism textbooks, such as the book *About Journalism and Journalists* by Valic-Nedeljkovic (2007: 58) or the book *New Media* by Martin Lister and his associates (Lister, et.al, 2009: 237) include video games in the classification of media, but they are not concerned with a deeper description and analysis. On the other hand, Jon Dovy and Hellen Kennedy consider computer games a new type of media, and their contents see as media texts that are necessarily changing the habits of their growing audience and old patterns of media observation (Dovy, Kennedy, 2006:84). Natkin is indicating that video games are a new medium, emphasizing interactivity as a feature that should be pointed out as a main feature in understanding this medium (Natkin, 2006:2). The term media itself originates from the Latin word *medium*, which means mediator, something that is in the middle, and most broadly is defined as a channel through which messages are transmitted or communicated (Jevtović, 2003:24). The term defined in this way does not in any way exclude video games from the wide range of phenomena that it covers, since video games always convey a message. Even if this term is more closely defined by the basic functions of the media - information, education and entertainment, it still does not disqualify video games because they can respond to all these functions.

There is no need to look at the entertainment feature because it is a basic function of video games. The educational opportunities of this new media are increasingly applicable in almost every branch of education. In the first place, we can talk about educational games, as a special genre to which education is the primary goal. A special group of video games includes educational simulations. They were originally created as software to help train different personnel. The most representative and well-known examples are *Microsoft Flight Simulator* and *SimCity* (Bogost, 2007:258-259). Almost every type of video game has the potential to educate, thanks to a couple of characteristics:

1. video games allow virtual manipulation of objects that would be impracticable or dangerous in reality;
2. active user involvement, insight into cause-and-effect relationship;
3. over time, users develop expert recognition of correctness, developed problematic thinking;
4. they do not represent learning as an obligation or a burden (Balasubramanian, Wilson, 2008).

The most interesting, and least noticeable, is the ability of video games to inform. In addition to the many indirect ways that games can provide information and the fact that many strategy and sports games are based in part on non-fictional and true elements that carry some informational value, there is a type of computer games created at the beginning of this century called *Newsgames*. They apply journalism rules in to a video game to bring important, true and complex topics to the public through a specific interactive narrative. The most famous games like this are *Sweatshop* and *BudgetHero*.

Video games are not immune to negative effects and misuse, such as using them for political propaganda, as it is case with the game *America's Army: Operations*, or for advertising purposes in the case of *Zool*. Commercial companies are not the only one that saw the benefits of advertising in games. In 2008 Barack Obama has put himself on the billboard in game *Burnout Paradise* as part of his election campaign.

VIDEO GAMES AND JOURNALISM STUDIES

Journalism students will not be able to actively respond to the demands of the profession in the future unless they are aware of the tendencies in development of this new media, its new characteristics and opportunities to influence and shape the public. This problem is pointed out by Wajeehah Aayeshah and he, in addition to learning about commercial games and news games, particularly emphasizes the need to use journalism games in the education of journalists (Aayeshah, 2012). The University of Alberta, Canada² has offered students the opportunity to take a free online course called Understanding Video Gaming since 2016, which addresses both technical topics and the impact of games on culture, race, gender

² <https://www.ualberta.ca/admissions-programs/online-courses/understanding-video-games> (Accessed: 10.07.2019.)

and special attention has been given to serious digital games. Since 2018, the University of Melbourne has enrolled in the subject of *Video Games: Remaking Reality*³, and one of its main goals is to understand the media and social context of the impact of video games on the public. When it comes to journalism studies and media studies at Stanford University in Manchester, students can pick the compulsory subject *Computer and Video Games*⁴, over three years of study. In the UK, as of 2014, there are even completely separate studies, one of the first in the world, called Game Journalism and PR⁵.

METHOD

The aim of the research is to examine content related to new media and especially video games in the curricula of journalism studies. The basic hypothesis is: *Video game topics are to a small extent represented in journalism study programs, that is, subjects that cover new media at all state faculties in Serbia.* According to the main, the following particular hypotheses are defined:

1. content on new media subjects is similar at all three state universities in Serbia;
2. topics related to the new media are represented significantly in journalism study programs at all three state universities in Serbia;
3. video game topics are less represented in the subject syllabuses at journalism studies in Serbia;
4. the topics covered in the field of new media and video games are similar in the programs for the education of journalists.

The study applied a descriptive method, review and content analysis of topics in the syllabus of media subjects at journalism studies at all three state universities in Serbia. The analysis focuses on all subjects at all years of media studies to examine whether there are courses dealing with new media technologies and video games within them. The sample consists of 219 syllabuses in journalism study programs at the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš, the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade and the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad. Forty-seven subjects were isolated from the journalism accreditation of the Faculty of

³ <https://handbook.unimelb.edu.au/subjects/ccdp10003> (Accessed: 11.07.2019.)

⁴ <http://www.salford.ac.uk/ug-courses/computer-and-video-games> (Accessed: 10.07.2019.)


⁵ <http://www.staffs.ac.uk/course/games-journalism-pr-ba> (Accessed: 20.04.2018.)

Philosophy in Niš, 57 from the accreditation of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, and 110 are subjects of the journalism program accredited in 2015 at the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad.

INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS

New Media at Journalism Studies in Serbia

A total of 33 new media cases were identified, including 15 from journalism studies in Novi Sad, 11 from Niš and 7 from Belgrade. Subjects of this type account for 15.34% of the total number of analyzed items. The selection criteria was that the subjects were dealing with any new media, their characteristic, specificities and topics in the field of new media, whether they are themselves subject to analysis and learning, or analyzed within another or more extensive phenomenon in syllabuses. In Niš this number makes up 23.40% of the total number of cases, while in Belgrade and Novi Sad this percentage is lower, 12.28% and 13.63% (Graph 1). Subjects of this type are the most prevalent in Niš and make up almost a quarter of the total subject matter, while half less are frequent in the other two faculties. This data does not indicate that more than a quarter of subjects in Niš journalism studies are primarily concerned with new technologies and media, nor should it be assumed that subjects in other areas of journalism are neglected or present to a lesser extent.



Graph 1: the relationship between the subjects cover and those that not cover new media at journalism studies

The point is that the topics covered by the new media have been more widely implemented in other subjects. This illustrates the syllabus of the subject Media Analysis Discourse, which can be found at the studies in Niš and Novi Sad. Although the subject has the same name, its contents are not the same. The syllabus of the Niš version specifically emphasizes the part "critical discourse analysis of the Internet as an interactive medium analysis of the discourse of news on the Internet" (Blagojevic, 2014), while in the Novi Sad version there is no mention of discourse analysis, there are no types of new media and their characteristics.

The majority of subjects dealing with new media are studied in the fourth years of study. There are 9 such subjects within journalism studies in Novi Sad, 3 in Belgrade, and 4 in Niš, accounting for 48.48% of all new media subjects. In the first year at all the three faculties, it is possible to notice a total of 8 such subjects, in the second 4 and in the third 5 subjects. The most dominant course in the first year of study is *Informatics*, which is a compulsory subject in the studies of journalism in Niš and Novi Sad, while being elective in Belgrade. This subject is very important because it introduces the students of journalism to the basics of computer work, which is the very basis of the creation and functioning of all new media (Manovich, 2001:43). The *Introduction to Journalism* course is another one that is compulsory in all three study programs. This one points to online journalism as a basis for the new media journalism and the ways in which it has influenced the traditional view of journalism. In the first year in Novi Sad, new media are also covered through *Communication Science 2*, which points to communication via computers and *History of Journalism*, which points to the emergence of the Internet and the first online media, and in Niš through the *Journalism genres* course, where students train to write on new media platforms. In the second year of study in Belgrade, the plan also includes the subject *Informational and Communication Systems*, on which the Internet is treated as an agent of the information society, while in Niš there are two subjects, *Contemporary Media Technologies* and *Print and Online Genres and Forms*. Through the first, students are introduced to all new technologies in the field of media, while the second, through writing for online portals, subject pays special attention to multimedia and interactivity, which are very important for understanding video games.

The history of journalism is studied in Niš in the third year; the same year includes the studies of *Radio journalism* in Novi Sad and *Television journalism* in Belgrade. These subjects are also relevant from the perspective of new media.

Although they deal with traditional media, they also enhance students' overall knowledge of them through comparison and the study of integration with the new one. The fourth subject in this year of study is *Introduction to New Media* from the Novi Sad accreditation plan and it is one of the most important in this analysis, along with the *New Media* course, which is being studied in the final year of study in Niš. The focus of this group of subjects is on the whole new media, computer and internet communication, new directions of media development, and for the planned outcome of successful placement is "critical consideration of the short and long term impacts of different types of new media" (Specifikacija predmeta žurnalistika, 2015: 36) as well as "Permanent innovation of knowledge in the subject area and understanding (...) of variable conceptual solutions in the active process of programming, designing and implementation of new media forms" (Pavlovic, 2014). They in the greatest extent prepare future journalists for new forms of journalism and ways of communication. *Internet journalism*, *Civic journalism and social networks*, *Information literacy* and *Media convergence* from the fourth year of Novi Sad studies of journalism, as well as *Sociology of Mass Communications* and *Modern Media Systems* from the same year of study in Niš pay considerable attention in their contents to the forms of virtual communication and the influence of new ones. In addition, theoretical segments of *Media Theory* in Niš, *Public Opinion* and *Public Relations* in Belgrade, and *Gender and the Media* in Novi Sad have implemented new media topics in their plans. In the last year of study in Novi Sad and Belgrade, there are also subjects that, from special perspectives, address new technological and media phenomena such as *Subcultures*, *Web Design*, *Open Source Software Package*, as well as language courses *Forms of Language Communication in Hungarian* and *Rhetoric of Textual Culture*. Of the above, just over a third, 12 of them, are elective, to be exact 36.36%, while 63.64% are marked as compulsory.

The most relevant subjects from the perspective of the existence of topics about new media in journalism studies, common to all three study plans are *Informatics*, and *New Media* (or *Introduction to New Media*), as well as *Introduction to Journalism* and *History of Journalism*, but also professional subjects that in different ways engage with modern media technologies, social networks and the Internet. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the first particular hypothesis, which assumes that *Content on new media subjects is similar at all three state universities in Serbia* - is largely confirmed. Also, from all of the above it can be concluded that the second particular hypothesis, which states that *Topics related to the new media are represented significantly in*

journalism study programs at all three state universities in Serbia - has been confirmed. Such content is the basis for the understanding of video games as part of the new media sphere.

VIDEO GAMES AT JOURNALISM STUDIES IN SERBIA

Of the 214 subjects analyzed, two were identified as subjects whose syllabuses referred to video games. The first subject is *Introduction to New Media* from the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad, which is being studied as a compulsory subject in the sixth semester in journalism studies. The other is *Subculture* and it is an elective in journalism studies at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. Students can pick this one in the eighth semester. At the study program in Niš, no subject with these characteristics was singled out.

The main focus of the *Introduction to New Media* is the computer network, the conditions for its emergence, development, human role and the ways they use the network, as well as its impact on society as a whole. The program of this course begins with the development of computers and the Internet as the cause of the development of a new way of communication and the emergence of new media, after which analyses various types of new media, their impact on the world and traditional media. The sixth topic of subject description refers to "forms of virtual communication: computer games, multiuser MUDs and virtual reality" (Specifikacija predmeta žurnalistika, 2015: 36). Students learn that video games are not viewed as, a means of entertainment, but as a form of communication in a new, virtual environment. Video games, and new media forms are examined from the perspective of new media literacy and classical communication theories, and the concept of identity of man and audience in an interactive virtual environment is discussed. Also on the literature list are works by Marshall McLuhan, Nicholas Negroponte and Lev Manovich, who are important authors for understanding and analyzing video games as a medium. According to the syllabus, this course provides adequate and complete introductory knowledge necessary for understanding video games within the new media. It is not solely focused on video games, but it points to their new dimension and lays the groundwork and new perspective, thanks to which future journalists can develop knowledge in this field. It is also important to note that this subject is not in the specification of the accreditation subject from 2007 and 2008, which was probably due to the sudden reason for the development of new media in the last ten years and the need for curriculum innovation.

The subject of Subcultures deals with, through contemporary studies of subcultures, the phenomenon of subcultures, their influence on lifestyles, society, subculture actors and their symbols. Thus, in this case, video games are not studied primarily as a new medium but as an element and factor of the emergence of subcultures. Also, it should be noted that the syllabus does not mention the video games, but refers in the twelfth item of the subject description as “the entertainment industry and the game world and interactive software creative lifestyles” (Maric, 2015). In this class, among other things, students are given the opportunity to learn about video game features through their influence in defining a person's and a group's culture and lifestyle. As this subject is optional, as it deals with only one part of video games, and only through the dimension of creator of lifestyle and subculture, it is not as relevant from the perspective of video games as a new medium, as an *Introduction to New Media*.

Since out of 214 subjects in journalism study programs in Serbia, there are 33 subjects dealing with new media and their characteristics, and only two that are the subject of video games, which makes only 6.06% of cases can be concluded as the third special research hypothesis, which claims that *Video game topics are less represented in the subject syllabuses at journalism studies in Serbia*, is confirmed. This conclusion is supported by the fact that in Niš there are no subjects within which video games are taught, while in Belgrade they are processed through one subject, which does not fall into the category of professional and compulsory ones. Also, the subject Introduction to New Media in Journalism Studies in Novi Sad makes 0.90% of all analyzed subjects in this program, that is, 2.21% of professional and 6.66% of those dealing with new media, which is a very small percentage compared to all of the material. So, it can be concluded that the fourth hypothesis assuming that *The topics covered in the field of new media and video games are similar in the programs for the education of journalists* - is partially confirmed, because topics were observed in similar subjects, dealing with new media in all three study programs, but this is not the case with video game topics, because, in addition to being absent from one faculty at all, the other two have been approached from significantly different perspectives and contexts.

Based on the fact that all four specific hypotheses are more or less confirmed, it is possible to create a general stand point of journalism studies in Serbia and the position that new media and video games occupy in them. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the main hypothesis of the paper, which claims that *Video game topics are to a small extent represented in*

journalism study programs, that is, subjects that cover new media at all state faculties in Serbia - is confirmed.

CONCLUSION

Journalism studies in Serbia have largely implemented new media content into curricula, both by forming specialized subjects and by innovating existing ones. The impression is that there is consensus on these innovations, that the teaching staff at all three faculties adapted the curricula in relatively similar ways and by introducing similar subjects. On the other hand, although video games can be considered as part of the new media, which can perform all the functions of traditional, in a whole new way, this phenomenon is not significantly present in the syllabuses of the subject, in any of the three faculties. Students in Niš will not deal with this topic at all; students in Belgrade only if they choose the elective subject - *Subculture*. The phenomenon of video games as a new medium is covered at the studies in Novi Sad, with a single one-semester course, which is not only devoted to this phenomenon, but is also studying games within the broader concept. So, there is a consensus, both about that the content of new media is being introduced into the curriculum, and about the fact that video game content does not need to be included in the education of journalists.

The lack of this research is that only journalism curricula at state universities in Niš, Belgrade and Novi Sad were analyzed. Also, it is probable that, as the accreditations analyzed are several years old, during that period, the topics of video games in some of the subjects were informally introduced. The research can serve as a basis for monitoring the longer development of accreditations on these media with respect to new media and video games, and a similar approach can be used to examine the presence of related subjects.

Video games are becoming more applicable in different spheres of communication precisely because its ability to perform all media functions in a whole new way. These implications must be more properly examined, defined and then educated to the future media workers. Otherwise, they will be unprepared for the communication challenges of the new age.

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MEDIJSKI EFEKTI NA DRUŠTVENIM MREŽAMA – ANALIZA PRIMERA

Koji su efekti poruka distribuiranih putem društvenih mreža pitanje je koje povremeno izlazi iz okvira akademskih razmatranja i okupira pažnju šire javnosti. Dva takva primera, oba povezana sa ponašanjem glasača, obrađena su u ovom radu. Prvi je Fejsbukov eksperiment koji se bavio izlaznošću građana na izbore, a drugi primer se odnosi na ulogu lažnih vesti u opredeljenju glasača na predsedničkim izborima u SAD 2016. godine. Cilj analize je da ustanovi kako su u tim primerima efekti konceptualizovani, istraživani, nalazi interpretirani i koje su implikacije takvog pristupa na razumevanje publike.

Ključne reči: medijski efekti, Fejsbuk, lažne vesti, publika, glasači, izbori, društvene mreže

1. UVOD

Dominantni narativ o istoriji proučavanja efekata naglašava tri faze, pri čemu naredna nastaje kao reakcija na prethodnu i dobrim delom osporava njene premise. U prvoj, često označavanoj kao faza svemoćnih medija, pretpostavljalo se uniformno dejstvo medijskih poruka na individue sa ciljem da im promeni stavove i ponašanje. Publika je viđena kao pasivni objekat manipulacije. U drugoj fazi, nazivanoj faza minimalnih efekata ili pojačavajuće doktrine, smatra se da mediji nemaju direktan uticaj, da ne menjaju, već pojačavaju postojeće stavove, i da je lični uticaj važniji od medijskog. Treća faza je donela drugačije razumevanje efekata, oni se i razumeju kao moć medija da dugotrajnim i kumulativnim dejstvom izazovu određene efekte kod publike. Ti efekti se ne ogledaju u direktnoj promeni ponašanja, već u načinu na koji vidimo i razumemo svet u kojem živimo i događaje o kojima nas mediji izveštavaju. Brojne teorije koje objašnjavaju kako mediji oblikuju našu percepciju sveta, poput agenda setting teorije, teorije uokviravanja, teorije o spirali tišine, prajming teorije, teorije kultivacije, svrstavaju se u ovu fazu. Za sve njih zajedničko je da priznaju kompleksnost društvenih procesa, istovremeno ukazujući na to da su mediji moćan faktor jer kontinuiranim radom i koherentnim reprezentacijama utiču na znanje i razumevanje sveta kod svoje publike.

Ovakav prikaz teorijskog i empirijskog razvoja istraživanja efekata nije neupitan. Proučavajući citiranost i uticaj knjiga i časopisa objavljenih u periodu od 1956. do 2005. godine, Njumen i Gugenhajm zaključuju da ne postoji nikakav grubi raskid između faza i da je realniji prikaz istorije kroz tipologiju koja identifikuje 6 klastera i 29 aktivnih podteorija za čiji nastanak je zaslužno 36 ključnih knjiga i tekstova (Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011: 174).

Ono što je važnije od načina čitanja istorije medijskih efekata jeste praćenje razvoja i napretka koji je učinjen. Značajan pomak je razumevanje efekata na način opisan u trećoj fazi, odnosno u grupi teorija koju Njumen i Gugenhajm označavaju kao društvene i medijske teorije. Drugi je što je i u istraživačkoj struji koja zadržava bihejvioristički pristup i fokusira se na ubeđivanje, prihvaćeno razumevanje da su za istraživanje efekata relevantne i aktivnosti publike, osobine pojedinaca, interpersonalna komunikacija i društvene okolnosti. Kao posledica tog pomaka razvijani su novi, kompleksniji modeli. Jedan od njih (O-S-O-R) kao polazište ima linearni nadražaj-reakcija (*stimulus-response*, S-R) model koji je proširen da obuhvati orijentaciju pre recepcije (političku sofisticiranost i angažovanje, isključivost, sistem vrednosti, sklonost ka određenim informativnim medijima, zadovoljstvo koje se traži od vesti), kao i aktivnosti prilikom recepcije kao što su pažnja i strategija procesuiranja informacija (Markus and Zajonc, 1985; prema McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod: 2009). Drugi, često navođen i primenjivan je model ubeđivanja zasnovan na verovatnoći elaboracije (*Elaboration likelihood model of persuasion*). On polazi od pitanja da li je primalac uopšte zainteresovan za poruku, i onda ukazuje na dve putanje ubeđivanja koje se razlikuju i koje mogu, a ne moraju, u zavisnosti od različitih faktora imati kao ishodište promenu centralinih ili perifernih stavova (Petty, Brinol & Priester: 2009).

2. EFEKTI IZBORNE KOMUNIKACIJE NA DRUŠTVENIM MREŽAMA

Izborna komunikacija je u zečetku istraživanja efekata bila jedna od stožernih tema i neke od najuticajnih teorija efekata se njome bave. Interesovanje za uticaj izborne komunikacije nikada nije splasnulo, što je i razumljivo imajući u vidu da su izbori ključni događaji u demokratskim režimima.

Kada su društvene mreže postale popularne i prisutne u svakodnevnom životu građana, uspostavile su se kao još jedan kanal relevantan za političku i izbornu komunikaciju. Koji su efekti te komunikacije na društvenim mrežama? Kako su efekti koncipirani, istraživani, a kakva publika je pretpostavljena? Šta je

od ranije postojećih koncepata, teorija i saznanja, preuzeto i koje su posledice toga? Iako bi potpun i iscrpan odgovor (ako pretpostavimo da je moguć) zahtevao razmatranje brojnih primera širom sveta, ovde se kao svojevrsan uvod u temu analiziraju dva slučaja, oba u Americi i sa Fejsbukom kao glavnim akterom. Prvi je Fejsbukova kampanja za izlaznost na izborima 2010. i 2012. godine, a drugi je uloga lažnih vesti plasiranih putem te društvene mreže tokom američkih predsedničkih izbora 2016 godine.

2.1. *'I voted' eksperiment na Fejsbuku*

Fejsbuk je 2008. godine za predsedničke izbore u SAD uveo *'I voted'* (Ja sam glasao) dugme sa obrazloženjem da je jedan od problema savremene demokratije slaba izlaznost birača i da je ovo njihov pokušaj da utiču da se ona poveća. Potom je to dugme iskoristio kao okosnicu eksperimenata sprovedenih u vreme izbora za kongres 2010. i predsednika SAD 2012. godine.¹ Osnovno istraživačko pitanje bilo je da li *'I voted'* poruka utiče na izlaznost birača. U oba istraživanja je postojala kontrolna grupa kojoj poruka nije uopšte prikazivana, i grupe koje su videle različito dizajniranu ili pozicioniranu poruku. Tako je 2010. godine jedna grupa videla društvenu poruku (sa fotografijama šest prijatelja koji su već kliknuli da su glasali), druga informativnu poruku (bez informacija o aktivnostima drugih), dok je 2012. godine poruka nekima postavljena na vrh stranice, kao baner, a nekima unutar **news feed**-a (Bond et al., 2012, Jones et al., 2017).

Istraživani su efekti na ponašanje – da li je i koliko to što su videli poruku uticalo na ljude na izadu i glasaju. Da bi se ovo utvrdilo, korišćene su javne baze glasača iz država koje nude tu vrstu podataka, tako da je eksperiment iz 2010. godine obuhvatio 6,3 miliona ljudi za koje je na taj način bilo moguće ustanoviti poklapanje između Fejsbuk profila i podataka o glasanju, dok je eksperiment dve godine kasnije zahvaljujući povećanom broju korisnika uključio preko 15 miliona ljudi.

Utvrđivano je na koliko ljudi je Fejsbukova poruka direktno uticala, a na koliko indirektno preko mreže prijatelja. U objavljenim tekstovima istraživači navode da je direktan uticaj 2010. godine bio 0,40%, a dve godine kasnije 0,24%

¹ Fejsbuk je 2012. sproveo i eksperiment koji je ispitivao efekat prikaza vesti na izlaznost glasača. Glasne kritike javnosti usmerene prema eksperimentima sprovedenim bez eksplicitne saglasnosti učesnika, dovele su do toga da Fejsbuk objavi da više neće eksperimentisati sa izlaznoću glasača.

(Jones et al., 2017). Kada su to preveli u brojeve, zaključili su da je direktno podstaknuto 60.000 glasača (2010) i 90.000 (2012) da izađu na birališta (Jones et al., 2017). Iako je procentualno manji efekat, zbog povećanog broja korisnika procenjeno je da je 2012. godine veći broj ljudi na koje je poruka delovala. Pored direktnog efekta istraživači su izračunali da je indirektni uticaj iznosio 280.000 glasača, na izborima za Kongres (Bond et al., 2012) i 180.000 na predsedničkim (Jones et al., 2017).

Navedeni brojevi nisu veliki ako se uporede sa brojem glasača u Americi (oko 236 miliona), ali kao što se često navodi, male razlike mogu imati veliku ulogu jer je zbog izbornog sistema u Americi moguće da mali broj glasova donese prevagu i odluči izbore.

Ovi eksperimenti imaju dva ključna zaključka. Prvi se odnosi na vezu između onlajn poruka i oflajn ponašanja: „Rezultati sugerišu da onlajn poruke mogu uticati na različita oflajn ponašanja, što ima posledice na naše razumevanje uloge onlajn društvenih medija u društvu“ (Bond et al., 2012). Drugi zaključak naglašava ulogu mreže prijatelja i ukazuje na značaj 'efekta društvenog uticaja' koji je doveo do toga da na svaki direktni glas dolaze po dva indirektna (Jones et al., 2017).

Navedeni zaključci problematični su zbog toga što onlajn i oflajn komunikaciju tretiraju kao dva odvojena segmenta realnosti, pri čemu mnogi isprepletani tokovi i uticaji ostaju izvan radara, jer ovako uski i selektivan fokus izostavlja kontekst iz razmatranja. Time potencijalna druga objašnjenja ne bivaju empirijski obuhvaćena, jer kako i sami autori prvog istraživanja priznaju u jednoj rečenici komentarišući nalaz da je indirektni uticaj najizraženiji među bliskim prijateljima. „U stvari, moguće je da su neposmatrane lice-u-lice interakcije odgovorne bar za deo društvenog uticaja koji smo posmatrali u ovom eksperimentu“ (Bond et al., 2012: 298).

Ako ove eksperimente pogledamo razmatrajući u njima dimenzije efekata (Perse & Lambe, 2017) jasno je da su autori istraživali mikro, odnosno individualnu dimenziju nameravanih efekata, koji su kratkotrajni (treba da nastanu na dan glasanja), povezani sa sadržajem (jedna poruka bi trebalo da ih izazove) i podstiču promenu u ponašanju direktno ili indirektno.

Iako su rezultati prezentovani u teorijskom vakumu, u smislu da se ne određuju ni prema konceptu efekata, niti prema nekoj od teorija ili modela, nemoguće je ne primetiti sličnost ovog pristupa sa teorijama koje su Njumen i Gugenhajm svrstali u prvu grupu i nazvali ih teorije ubeđivanja u kojima je akcenat na jednostavnoj promeni stava i oblikovanju ponašanja, a koje su

razvijane u periodu nakon Drugog svetskog rata (1944–1963). Model komunikacije je linearan i pretpostavlja nadražaj ('*I voted*' poruku) i reakciju (izlazak na glasanje kao rezultat primljene poruke). Naravno da ne pretpostavlja uniformnu reakciju, ali eksperiment ne zanima raznovrsnost potencijalnih reakcija, već želi samo da ustanovi za koji procenat ljudi se, na osnovu poređenja eksperimentalne i kontrolne grupe, može reći da je postignut željeni efekat. Ovakav pristup je i očekivan ako se ima na umu da cilj ovih istraživanja i nije bio razumevanje procesa već pokazivanje delotvornosti poruke, odnosno manifestacija komunikacijske moći koju ima najpopularnija društvena mreža.

Čak i ako prihvatimo pretpostavku da 'sposobnost da se dopre do velike populacije onlajn znači da bi čak i mali efekti mogli da proizvedu promene u ponašanju kod miliona ljudi' (Bond et al., 2012: 295) kao i da sada postoji metodološka aparatura koja nam dozvoljava da uhvatimo male, retke efekte (24, odnosno 40 osoba na 10.000) što je starim istraživačkim metodama bilo nemoguće, ostaje pitanje po čemu se tih 20–40 ljudi u 10.000 razlikuje od ostalih. Šta je različito u njihovoj pažnji, znanju, okruženju, emocijama (u bilo kom segmentu njihovog života) što ih čini manjinom koja bi bila podložna tome da odluku o izlasku na izbore donese na osnovu Fejsbukove poruke.

2.2. *Lažne vesti na Fejsbuku i njihov uticaj na ishod predsedničkih izbora*

Rezultati predsedničkih izbora u Americi 2016. godine bili su za mnoge iznenađujući. Uprkos prognozama javnomnjenjskih istaživanja, Donald Tramp, milijarder, kandidat Republikanske stranke, porazio je demokratkinju Hilari Klinton. Vrlo brzo su u javnom diskursu lažne vesti (*fake news*) označene kao faktor koji je uticao na ishod izbora, a kao njihov najveći rasadnik prepoznat je Fejsbuk.

Nekoliko faktora doprinelo je tome da se teza o uticaju lažnih vesti formuliše i za određene aktere postane prihvatljiva. Kao prvo, pobeda Donalda Trampa bila je tesna. Zahvaljujući specifičnostima američkog izbornog sistema, pobedio je, iako je ukupno dobio manje glasova, a tri odlučujuće države (Mičigen, Pensilvanija i Viskonsin) dobio je sa manje od 1% prednosti. Kao drugo, iako nisu novina, lažne vesti su u ovom predizbornom periodu bile značajno vidljivije na društvenim mrežama. Ljudi koji preko društvenih mreža dolaze na informativne sajtove čine 10,1% svih posetilaca te vrste sajtova, dok društvene mreže generišu 41,8% saobraćaja za sajtove sa lažnim vestima (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017: 222). Od svih društvenih mreža izdvojen je Fejsbuk jer je kao najveći dopirao do najbrojnije publike, a njegov algoritam koji favorizuje emotivne sadržaje i

povećava vidljivost sličnom sadržaju je (zlo)upotrebljen od različitih aktera koji su bili vođeni lukrativnim, ideološkim, propagandnim i drugim motivima. Takođe, u jednoj od prvih analiza nakon izbora se iznose podaci da je 20 najpopularnijih lažnih vesti po pokazateljima odziva (*engagement*) nadmašilo 20 najpopularnijih vesti o izborima iz mejnstrim medija na Fejsbuku (8.711.000 naspram 7.367.000) pri čemu je od 20 analiziranih lažnih vesti, 17 je išlo na ruku Donaldu Trampu (Silverman, 2016).

Kakav je efekat ovog izmišljenog sadržaja, odnosno da li su lažne vesti odlučile izbore, pitanje je koje kontinuirano zaokuplja pažnju američke javnosti i dela istraživača koji su pokušavali da 'uhvate' i objasne te efekte. Istraživački pristupi mogu se grupisati u dve celine, prve koji su se fokusirali na rasprostranjenost i druge koji su se bavili merljivošću efekata lažnih vesti.

Istraživanja rasprostranjenosti merila su domet ili reakcije izazvane izabranim tekstovima označenim kao lažne vesti od organizacija koje se bave proverom činjenica, a nalazi su kontekstualizovali poređenjem sa regularnim vestima ili praćenjem trendova.²

Istraživanja pokazuju veću prisutnost i domet pro Tramp (ili anti-Klinton) vesti. Tako se u prvom tekstu objavljenom nakon izbora koji je prošao proces recenzije navodi: „U našoj bazi lažnih vesti zabeležili smo 41 pro-Klinton i 115 pro Tramp (ili anti-Klinton) tekst koji su ukupno na Fejsbuku podeljeni 7,6 miliona, odnosno 30,3 miliona puta“ (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017: 223).

Istraživanja koja prate trend prisutnosti lažnih vesti i aktivnosti koje se oko njih generišu pokazuju skok u špicu predizborne kampanje. Tako su, poredeći linkove prisutne na Fejsbuku i Twitteru koji vode na sajtove lažnih vesti i one koji idu na informativne sajtove etabliranih organizacija, istraživači zaključili da su u periodu oko izbora sajtovi lažnih vesti iz njihovog uzorka zbirno izazivali oko 200 miliona mesečno lajkova, deljenja i komentara na Fejsbuku dok 38 najvećih informativnih sajtova (uključujući *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *CNN*, *Fox news* i sl.) obično zajedno imaju 200–250 miliona mesečno (Allcott,

² Fejsbuk je u svom izveštaju naveo da je tokom izbora 2016. godine 'domet poznatih operacija' (što je njihova terminologija za sve koordinisane akcije koje imaju politički cilj, pri čemu su lažne vesti jedan segment) „bio statistički veoma mali u poređenju sa opštim aktivnostima povezanim sa političkim temama“ i iznosi, manje od desetine procenta (Weedon, Nuland & Stamos, 2017: 11).

Gentzkow & Yu, 2018: 3). U periodu nakon izbora aktivnosti na Fejsbuku su pale na trećinu.³

Tim sa Univerziteta u Mičigenu pokrenuo je projekat praćenja linkova na Fejsbuku i Tviteru koji potiču sa sajtova koji su često u prošlosti objavljivali dezinformacije i izmišljotine. Njihov udeo, koji nazivaju *Iffy koeficijent*, posmatra se u odnosu na 5.000 najpopularnijih na dnevnom nivou i analizira se da li je broj aktivnosti koje su izazvali ispod ili iznad proseka u odnosu na tu selektovanu grupu najpopularnijih. Krajem 2016. i početkom 2017. ovaj koeficijent je za Fejsbuk bio vidljivo veći od proseka, što znači da je „ne samo više linkova sa Iffy sajtova dospevalo među 5.000 najpopularnijih, već su oni izazivali i natprosečnu aktivnost“ (Resnick, Ovadaya & Gilchrist, 2019: 13).

Pored istraživanja koja o efektima lažnih vesti sude na osnovu njihove učestalosti, postoje i ona koji pokušavaju da ustanove direktne veze. Takav primer je istraživanje trojice profesora sa Univerziteta države Ohajo koji su nastojali da ustanove uticaj lažnih vesti istražujući glasače Baraka Obame (Gunter, Beck, Nisbet, 2018). Polazeći od procene da je 10% Obaminih glasača iz 2012. godine glasalo za Trampa, zanimalo ih je koji faktori su mogli da doprinesu tome. Istraživali su vezu roda, afričko-američkog porekla, godina, edukacije, ideologije, nezadovoljstva ekonomskim pokazateljima, partijske identifikacije, dopadljivosti kandidata i lažnih vesti sa izbornom odlukom. Postizbornom anketom obuhvatili su 585 Obaminih glasača, koji su odgovorili na upitnik u kojem su bile i tri izjave bazirane na lažnim vestima. Koristeći višestruku regresijsku analizu, zaključili su da je za Hilari Klinton glasalo „89% od oni koji nisu verovali ni u jednu od lažnih vesti, 61% od onih koji su poverovali u jednu i samo 17% onih koji su poverovali u dve ili sve tri lažne vesti“ (Gunter, Beck, Nisbet, 2018). Nakon partijske identifikacije i stava prema kandidatu, verovanje u lažne vesti je sledeća varijabla po snazi u njihovom istraživanju.

Mada i sami istraživači priznaju da to nije dokaz da su lažne vesti uzrokovala da bivši Obamini glasači pređu na Trampovu stranu, oni kažu da „ovi podaci, u svakom slučaju, snažno sugerišu da je izloženost lažnim vestima imala značajan uticaj na odluku o glasanju“ (Gunter, Beck, Nisbet, 2018). Ne želeći da tvrde da je taj uticaj bio dovoljan, navode da je s obzirom na to da je rezultat bio

³ Istraživanje pokazuje da je na Tviteru nastavljen trend rasta. Razlika u trendu između ove dve društvene mreže se u najvećoj meri može objasniti nizom mera koje je Fejsbuk preduzeo jer je bio na udaru kritika.

tesan „čak i skroman uticaj lažnih vesti mogao biti odlučujući“ (Gunter, Beck, Nisbet, 2018).

Izveštavajući o ovom istraživanju, *Washington Post* otišao je korak dalje. Njihov tim za javnomnjenjska istraživanja uradio je predviđajuću analizu verovatnoće na podacima sa Ohajo univerziteta i uporedio postojeće rezultate sa hipotetičkim rezultatima da nije bilo lažnih vesti. „Rezultat: Klintonova gubi 4,2% više Obaminih glasova u treći u kojoj su prisutne lažne vesti, nego u hipotetičkoj treći bez njih. Ako pomnožimo tih 4,2% sa udelom Obaminih glasača 2012. godine u tri ključne države koje su Trampu donele predsednički mandat, dolazimo do sugestije da su lažne vesti koštale Klintonovu oko 2,2 ili 2,3 poena u svakoj od država – Mičigenu, Pensilvaniji i Viskonsinu. A Klintonova je izgubila Mičigen za samo 0,2 poena a Pensilvaniju i Viskonsin za 0,72, odnosno 0,76 poena“ (Blake, 2018).

Kako se približavaju izbori 2020. godine, narativ o lažnim vestima ponovo se aktualizuje. Tako profesori sa MIT-a smatraju da postoje alati kojima je moguće empirijski utvrditi uticaj netačnog i zlonamernog sadržaja na ponašanje glasača i navode istraživačku agendu koja bi to omogućila (Aral & Eckles, 2019). Oni kreću od stava da je potrebno izmeriti uticaj da bi bilo moguće doneti niz mera kojima se štiti izborni proces i ukazuju i na ograničenja koja oblikuju odluku o tome da li će neki istraživački poduhvat tog tipa biti realizovan u doglednoj budućnosti.

Bez obzira na to da li će eksperimenti kao ovaj ili neki slični biti sprovedeni, očigledno je da je uverenje da postoje direktni, uzročni efekti koje je moguće empirijski utvrditi, kao i prateće razumevanje publike (ili bar jednog segmenta) kao podložne uticaju medijskih poruka, prisutno u javnom diskursu i da ima svoje zagovornike i među predstavnicima akademije. Kao što je Sonja Livingston primetila, navodeći da strahovi i nadanja kada je reč o publici osciluju i da se pojačavaju u periodima ekspanzije snažnih, moćnih medija:

„U današnjoj zaglušujućoj klimi medijske panike – zbog takozvanih lažnih vesti, hakovanja izbora, zavisnosti od interneta i pametnih telefona, algoritmijskog pojačavanja govora mržnje, viralnih prevara, filterskih balona i echo soba, diskriminišućeg profilisanja i zloupotrebe podataka, krize u kvalitetu novinarstva, izumiranja komunikacije licem-u-lice i mnogih oblika digitalne anksioznosti kada je reč o mladima – strah zbog povodljivosti, neukosti i eksploatacije publike, opet biva istaknut u opštoj i akademskoj debati“ (Livingstone, 2019: 171).

3. UVID U PONAŠANJE PUBLIKE

Ipak, ako pogledamo, ma kako fragmentirana i štura saznanja o ponašanju ljudi, pojavljuje se osporavanje narativa o brojnoj i nemoćnoj publici lažnih vesti. Kombinujući odgovore iz onlajn ankete na nacionalnom uzorku sa podacima o internet saobraćaju, istraživači zaključuju da je oko četvrtina (27,4%) odraslih Amerikanaca pristupilo nekom sajtu lažnih vesti u završnici kampanje, ali da publiku lažnih vesti čini „10% Amerikanaca koji konzumiraju najkonzervativnije informativne medije“ jer su oni ti koji su u proseku čitajući 33 teksta bili „zaslužni za 58,9% svog saobraćaja ka sajtovima lažnih vesti“ (Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2018: 3–6). Broj mesečnih posetilaca na prosečnom sajtu pravih vesti bio je više od 40 puta veći od broja mesečnih posetilaca na sajtu lažnih vesti tokom 2016. (Nelson & Taneja, 2018: 3727). Publika, pokazuju njihovi nalazi, više vremena provodi sa pravim, nego sa lažnim vestima. Deljenje lažnih vesti na Fejsbuku takođe se pokazalo kao relativno retka praksa – samo 8,5% ispitanika podelilo je link ka nekoj lažnoj vesti (Guess, Nagler, Tucker, 2019: 2). Takođe, više od 50% onih koji su posetili sajtove lažnih vesti posetilo je i sajtove uglednih informativnih medija „što sugeriše da pre nego što je zatvorena u eho sobu, publika lažnih vesti sebe izlaže i vestima koje ogromna većina onlajn publike konzumira“ (Nelson & Taneja, 2018: 3728).

Ovi nalazi pokazuju da publika lažnih vesti nije toliko brojna i ne živi zatvorena u nekom svom paralelnom informacionom univerzumu, a razloge za čitanje netačnih i izmišljenih priča (i verovanje u njih) treba tražiti u brojnim ljudskim karakteristikama i životnim okolnostima koje utiču na formiranje pogleda na život i davanje smisla događajima, ljudima i medijskim narativima.

Upravo rečeno ne znači da prisustvo lažnih vesti na društvenim mrežama i pažnja koju su privukli nisu imali posledice. Naprotiv, imali su ih mnogo. Neke su direktno povezane sa Fejsbukom, dok su druge relevantne za celo društvo. Fejsbuk je promenio algoritam smanjivši vidljivost vesti uopšte i započeo saradnju sa neprofitnom organizacijom Social Science One sa ciljem da se omogući istraživačkim timovima da na Fejsbukovim podacima „izučavaju uticaj platforme na demokratiju širom sveta“ (Nelson & Rhody, 2019). Istraživanje stavova građana pokazuje da oni smatraju da izmišljene vesti i informacije imaju društvene posledice na poverenje Amerikanaca u vladu (68%), poverenje jednih u druge (54%) kao i na sposobnost političkih lidera da završe posao (51%) (Mitchel et al., 2019).

4. ZAKLJUČNA RAZMATRANJA

Živimo u vreme kada se na dnevnom nivou u onlajn sferi stvaraju najraznovrsniji sadržaji i generišu ogromne količine podataka o ljudskom ponašanju. Ranije nezamisliva količina i dostupnost podataka okosnica je biznis modela digitalnih giganata. Ova promena koja sa sobom nosi brojne mogućnosti i opasnosti sve se češće naziva datafikacija. „Datafikacija kao legitimno sredstvo za pristup, razumevanje i nadgledanje ljudskog ponašanja postaje vodeći princip ne samo među tehno ekspertima, već i među naučnicima koji vide datafikaciju kao revolucionarnu istraživačku mogućnost da ispituju ljudsko delovanje“ (Van Dijck, 2014: 198).

Ono što je zanimljivo jeste da ovaj novi iskorak u istraživačkim naporima svojom konceptualizacijom ljudskih aktivnosti kao manifestnih i jednoznačnih, bez interesovanja za kontekst u kojem se odvijaju i smisao koji ljudi u njima ljudi vide pogoduje revitalizaciji pristupa koji takođe dekontekstualizuje komunikaciju, a ljude tretira kao publiku čije ponašanje se može modelovati, čak i na vrlo direktan način. Tako empirijska istraživanja o efektima *I voted* kampanje, kao i uticaju lažnih vesti počivaju na premisi da „neke vrste komunikacije o nekim temama, dovedene do pažnje nekih ljudi, pod nekim uslovima imaju neke vrste efekata“, ali ovo često citirano zapažanje Bernarda Berelsona pojednostavljeno čitaju kao poziv da se u novom okruženju, u kojem se ponašanje velikog broja ljudi može pratiti, nadgledati i kvantifikovati, izmeri koji je to tačno udeo ljudi na koje je moguće delovati i čije ponašanje je moguće oblikovati. Pri tome se zanemaruju referentni okviri i različiti konteksti na čije postojanje je Berelson upotrebom neodređene zamenice 'neki' ukazivao.

Pošto smo ponovo u dobu moćnih medija, ovoga puta ogromnih digitalnih korporacija njihov uticaj, uključujući i taj segment koji se odnosi na izbornu komunikaciju otvorena je i relevantna tema. Način na koji joj pristupamo, kako formulišemo pitanja, koje teorijske premise prihvatamo (čak iako nisu eksplicitno navedene) postavljajući okvir i za istraživanje i za interpretaciju nalaza, umnogome određuje i odgovore koje ćemo dobiti. Bez obzira na količinu podataka kojom istraživači barataju, činjenica je da podaci ne nastaju u neutralnom prostoru, već zahtevaju određene odluke i interpretaciju. Na to ukazuje Van Dijk kada govori da „svako davanje smisla određenim obrascima ponašanja zahteva kritičko preispitivanje: zašto tražimo određene obrasce među gomilom metapodataka, u čijem interesu i sa kojom svrhom?“ (Van Dijck, 2014: 202).

Davanje odgovora na ova pitanja doprinosi boljem razumevanju istraživačkog konteksta i agende koja nastaje kao rezultat brojnih faktora, od

komercijalnih, preko političkih i ideoloških do uloge određenih škola mišljenja i afiniteta prema određenim teorijskim i empirijskim pristupima. Kada se pogleda istorija studija medija i komunikacije, uočljivo je da su brojne teorije koje su definisale istoriju istraživanja medijskih efekata potekle iz američkog okruženja. U tom smislu postojanje jake teorijske tradicije koje privileguju izvor komunikacije, odnosno medij označavajući ga kao centralnu tačku komunikacijskog procesa donekle objašnjava održivost i prisustvo teorije efekata i u aktuelnom okruženju. Ono što pak u analiziranim primerima pobuđuje pažnju jeste simplifikovana konceptualizacija uticaja u kojoj se, prilikom proučavanja, komunikacija vadi iz šireg konteksta i nastoje se utvrditi jednosmerne uzročno-posledične veze pri čemu se stavlja u zgradu sva kompleksnost mreža (ne samo onlajn platformi, već i oflajn zajednica) čiji su ljudi deo, a pojedinac se posmatra kao programabilna komponenta za koju treba naći pravi algoritam da bi se dobio željeni efekat.

Danka Ninković Slavnić

MEDIA EFFECTS ON SOCIAL NETWORKS – ANALYSIS OF EXAMPLES

Summary

The question of the effects of messages distributed through social networks occasionally goes beyond academic considerations and occupies the attention of the general public. Two such examples, both related to voter behavior, are addressed in this paper. The first is a Facebook experiment that dealt with the elections turnout, and the second example refers to the influence of false news on voters in the 2016 US presidential elections. The aim of the analysis is to determine how in these examples the effects are conceptualized and researched, the findings are interpreted and what are the implications of such an approach to the understanding of the audience.

Keywords: media effects, Facebook, false news, audience, voters, elections, social networks

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POPULISM AND THE MEDIA: IN THE NAME OF MACEDONIA, GREEK PRESS AND THE COVERAGE OF THE PROTESTS IN 1992 AND 2018

The paper discusses the populism and the media around foreign policy issues and more specifically protests regarding the Macedonian issue in 1992 and 2018. The hypothesis of the protagonist role (Panagiotou 2005, 2006) is being applied where it is argued that mass media influenced public and political parties' reactions and more specifically it stands out as a very specific example of the mediatization of populism in a "national issue". We examine and present aspects of the mediatization of the issue and more specifically the narratives applied, the polarization language, and how populist-nationalism is constructed and mediated.

Key words: Populism, Media, Foreign Policy

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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Media role when it comes to foreign policy issue is more than important and decisive. The best way to understand the role of the media in politics is to view them as part of the overall political system and of the relations between the two countries. Media is an important component which ‘foreign policy decision-makers take into considerations as they develop their policies’ (Naveh, 2002: 2) since it both constrains leaders and officials yet provides them with opportunities to advance their goals (Gilboa, 2002). However, it is evident that the news discourse about foreign policy issues plays an undeniable role in modifying and consolidating the public perceptions about the ‘Other’. Media is an important component which ‘foreign policy decision-makers take into considerations as they develop they develop their policies’ (Naveh, 2002:2) since it both constrains leaders and officials yet provides them with opportunities to advance their goals (Gilboa, 2002). In the realm of foreign policy political pressure on the media is greater than on domestic issues (Graber, 1989:336). Citizens are most likely to prefer media content that articulates attitudinal-congruent interpretations of societal issues, as such content reassures a consistent image of the self (e.g., Ruggiero, 2000; Poulakidakos & Frangonikolopoulos, 2019). In foreign policy issues media appear to have contributed to a legitimization of the issues a phenomenon best described as “Media complicity” through the way that they communicate specific issues. In particular issues though their stance is mainly informed from the audience preferences. These issues are the ones that related with the ones considered or categorised in Greece as national issues meaning issues that are related with what are considered as core. As Frangonikolopoulos (2019: 224) argues “Public opinion, as well as the country’s political elite, navigates foreign policy through the prism of ‘Greek exceptionalism’.” At the core of this ideological position is the ‘culture of the underdog’, basic traits of which are introversion, xenophobia, siege mentality and a prevalence for conspiracy-related approaches of international relations (Ioakimidis, 2007). In many cases, media abandon their watchdog role, by empasinzin on ‘supply and demand’ relationship that results in an increased visibility and significant reverberation of the populist message among a wide audience. According to our approach “mass media are active participants in the construction of foreign policy issues discourse. Economic interests play an important role in influencing mass media content, without though being the dominant actor. The importance of this model, according to our view lies upon its hypothesis that there is an interconnection between the

public, policy and media agenda, but their 'autonomy' is being reserved without their importance equalized" (Panagiotou, 2005: 13).

Media action cannot be separated from the other structural factors considered in this volume, such as the nature of the political system and the specific features of the social and cultural political climates.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The name issue arose in 1991 when the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia seceded from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and proclaimed its independence under the name "Republic of Macedonia". In 1992 there had been mass popular mobilisations in Greece against the use of the name 'Macedonia' by the country's northern neighbor, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia/FYROM (see, Sofos&Tsagarousianou, 1993; Demertzis, Papathanassopoulos & Armenakis, 1999).

In 1993, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, and following the decision of the General Assembly, it was granted membership in the United Nations under the provisional name of "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" until an agreed solution was reached. In 1995, the two countries agreed to the Interim Agreement, which imposed a binding "Code of Conduct". Under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the two parties began negotiations in order to reach an agreement on the name, as stipulated in Article 5 of the Interim Agreement. On 17 June 2018, the two countries signed the "Final Agreement for the settlement of the differences as described in the UN Security Council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the termination of the Interim Agreement of 1995 and the establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the two Parties".

METHODOLOGY

Our study examines the coverage of the Macedonian issue in two phases 1992 and 2018 (Prespes Agreement) through the press coverage. More specifically we examine articles published between 7-21.2.1992 and 14-27.01.2018. This comparative study is based on news stories of three high-circulated daily newspapers. The selection of the newspapers is based upon the following criteria: 1) representation of the whole political spectrum 2) circulation figures 3) Their influence upon the members of the political spectrum that they belong. The

newspapers examined are: 1) *To Vima tis Kyriakis*/*Ta Nea*³ 2) *Kathimerini* 3) *Eleftheros Typos*. Our approach is founded on the premise that mass media role in the construction and reconstruction of foreign policy issues narratives is of high importance. Furthermore, as recent studies demonstrate (Wolfsfeld, 2004; Panagiotou, 2005), mass media play a central role both in the promotion of conflict and peace. Articles of newspapers during various incidents were compared and examined in a three-step process. First a micro level analysis was conducted for the analysis of news agendas. Secondly in a macro level an analysis of the reactions of the government discourse was conducted. Micro as well as macro analysis results were co-related in order to assess media function. As Entman (1991:6) underlined, comparing news coverage of same events is crucial since “the critical textual choices that frame the story” are revealed. Our aim is to examine how press discuss, frames and understands a highly controversial issue and more specifically similarities and/or differences in the coverage of the issue in different decades and especially during confrontation and in the settlement (;) of the issue.

Our choice to examine press instead of the television is based to the following (Sampson, 1996):

1) As Anthony Sampson suggests, the role of political journalism in “providing the chief context for information and understanding for the public” is being undermined by “the media’s ability to confuse news with entertainment” (Sampson, 1996:42-51). This ‘ability’ creates a technique of presentation that is known as infotainment, which is widely used in the television across the world. In contrast, the absence of the use of this technique in press coverage enables to have a clearer examination on the way that it reports the facts.

2) Television addresses usually a more general audience concerning its political preferences. In contrary the choice of a newspaper by a reader is clearly based on more clear-cut political criteria. This choice results not only from reader’s point of view but contents a form of political expectation (Curran & Seaton, 1998). Bearing this in mind we suggest that the study of the press reflects the narrative of the ideological spectrum that ‘represents’.

Our analysis although that examines the press, we suggest that it can equally be applied to television since ‘that new private television channel licenses and frequencies were primarily reserved for press publishers has contributed to the

³ They belong to the same news organisation, *Nea* is a daily newspaper (Monday-Saturday), while *To Vima tis Kyriakis* is published only on Sundays.

existence of similarities between the print and broadcast media in terms of editorial priorities and work ethic' (Tsagkarousianou 1999: 179).

The unit of our analysis are headlines and editorials. Our choice to examine the headlines as well as the editorials is based, on the following assumptions: 1) They are a decisive among other factors, in a reader's decision to buy a newspaper. This assumption lies in the fact that the Greek press has a small number of subscribers, while the most of its circulation is made through kiosks. 2) Headlines 'express' the stance of the newspaper. They are the reflection of the articles published inside while it clearly represents the ideological stance of the newspaper.

The following hypotheses have been examined:

- What are the main narratives and rhetoric employed? Are there any changes between the media coverage in 1992- 2017?
- What, when schemes of polarization are being applied?
- What kind of stereotypes are constructed and disseminated?
- How history in the issue (the past) in bilateral relations is being epitomized and used?
- What is the media role in production, reproduction and dissemination of populist discourses?

The above mentioned parameters are researched in a comparative way through the relevant content of the three mainstream newspaper. In total, we have analysed 86 articles from 1992 and 162 from 2018. Articles, headlines editorials have been selected on the basis of whether or not they are related with the issue examined.

1992

For the year 1992, we have collected and examined articles before and after Thessaloniki rallies. From all the days checked in the newspapers Ta Nea/To Vima tis Kyriakis, Eleftheros Typos there were references in 13 from the 15 days (7.2.1992-19.2.1992) while in Kathimerini the whole 15 days. A total of 86 articles were found for the period from 7-21.2.1992, in total 65 pages. In more detail, 25 articles were published in the newspapers Ta Nea/To Vima tis Kyriakis, during the above period, in Kathimerini 29 and 32 at Eleftheros Typos.




Table 1: *Number of Articles, 1992*

In total, 21 front page headlines have been retrieved, 9 at βρέθηκε συνολικά 21 φορές σε πρωτοσέλιδα, 9 Eleftheros Typos during the above period, in 7 in Kathimerini and 6 at Ta Nea/To Vima tis Kyriakis.




Table 2: *Front page headlines, 1992*

Eleftheros Typos, was mainly referring to FYROM as Skopje (name of the capital) a practice that has been adopted from all media examined here. There is one-sided coverage of the issues and this is found in articles where the vast majority of articles were published that only presented the views of parties opposed to the agreement. The attitude of the Communist Party of Greece differed briefly. In the articles published the day before the demonstrations, the words (times in verbs, adjectives) used are as if it is making a live response from the event rather than being written the day before. The photos that frame the text are in the same climate. The articles that were released after the rally were highlighting foreign media responses. The appeal and the emphasis given is related with what has been described the "Syndrome of Great Powers" (Panagiotou, 2005, 2006). It is a scheme employed in foreign policy issues where countries/organisations with a leading role in world affairs are being presented and constructed as the ones that dictate developments and our appeal to them will be able to address and resolve foreign policy issues. The same scheme has been frequently applied in other foreign policy issues e.g. with Turkey (Panagiotou, 2005, 2006) and we have seen that it is equally and frequently used here as well. The antithetical scheme employed in this case is Greece's rightful claims as opposed to the ones that aim to claim our historical rights. During the research, we noticed headlines such as: *"We close the borders...if the forgers insist "Macedonian", "Macedonia is Greek", "National wake-up call: Dynamic response to the those who ignore the history", "People in Kilkis are armed due to fears of gangs from Skopje", "They set up a "fake Macedonian" news agency in Skopje"*.

The invocation of emotion can also be found on the front pages' headlines: *"Address by our former... King! Skopje is ours!", "Kastoria-Florina: They will never take the name of our Macedonia", "Greek roadblock in Skopje if the EEC does not support us. We decide on an ongoing economic blockade", "Bucephalus was not... a Zastava", "The Macedonian army of 2000", "Samaras in Lisbon. Battle in the extreme for the fake-Macedonia", "Message received. Mourning in Skopje... for the rally! Fiesta in Serbia"*.

There is an ideological consensus in the phrases used, aiming to invoke feelings of national unity in the public opinion. *"Macedonia was, is and will always be Greek", "At the same time, the bells will ring at all the holy temples of Thessaloniki and the Northern Greece", "Macedonia is the heart of Greece. Let the Macedonians put that in their minds. The distortion of the history of our Macedonia by the adventurers of the Balkans will not pass.", "Fake Macedonia", "Macedonian warriors of the Balkan wars and the 1940s war were there (the*

rally).", *"The bells of the churches rang in every corner of the bastion of Hellenism"*. Overall, the majority of texts have strongly biased words that are intended to appeal to the emotion of readers rather than to inform globally on the subject. *"Foreign News Agencies, with the strange exception of Reuters who spoke of more than ... 200,000 gathered, raising the number of protesters to over a million"*.

In general, newspaper Kathimerini presented the events with a less emotionally charged way and covered more aspects of the issue. For example, the newspaper's article about the former King's interview presents his words in a different way than that of Eleftheros Typos. In Kathimerini there is an objective leader who is looking for a solution, while in Eleftheros Typos a figure with a strong patriotic feeling. *"The Macedonians are demanding their respect for their history today..."*, *"The heart of Greece strikes in Thessaloniki where convoys of Macedonians have gathered from every corner of the Macedonian land alongside with thousands of people from Thrace and Thessaly."*, *"Even the initiators of the Macedonian propaganda would change their minds if they were at the Aristotle Square rally yesterday."*, *"Skopje united the Greeks"*. In some articles, we also noticed that an emotional tone is dominant in the coverage *"The heart of the country is beating in Macedonia. Mass rally this afternoon in Thessaloniki for the protection of our national interests."* *"Revived a national memory of 3000 years. Macedonia forever thundered in Thessaloniki."*

As regards the newspapers Ta Nea/To Vima tis Kyriakis, due to the fact that they have a regional office in Thessaloniki, more information is presented about the way the rally was set up. It is worth to refer that Ta Nea selected as a front page headline the following day after the rally: *"Yesterday's "sea" of demonstrators in Thessaloniki, is a barrier to foreigners plans. 1,000,000 people shut out loud: Macedonia is Greek"*. Among the articles' headlines retrieved for the purposes of the research are: *"Changing course towards Europe. They will close the border for our products if Skopje is recognised by the 12."*, *"Everyone for Macedonia"*, *"European solidarity is now judged"*, *"Greece is present... and her heart beat in Macedonia"*. *"A mass rally against the attempted forgery of Macedonia's history..."* *"Hundreds of people protested in a sober and calm patriotic uprising...."*, *"This calm and sober patriotic uprising, which has no precedent in the annals of the city, impressed hundreds of foreign observers and media representatives from Europe and America, underscoring that Greece is the state with the greatest national cohesion in the Balkans, with a timeless cultural presence and a huge contribution to humanity."*, *"The unprecedented*

demonstration in the annals of Thessaloniki exaggerated the urban boundaries of all previous popular gatherings in the history of the city and as far as the national pulse can be paralleled only with the rally during the liberation of Thessaloniki from the Nazi occupation of 1944...". "The self-proclaimed "Macedonians"

While reading the articles it is understood that foreign leaders maintain a stance in favour of a settlement (a name that will combine both claims). This is portrayed as a betrayal of Greece's rights. What is worth mentioning is that while the attitude of German officials on the issue of the name is recorded in an article, unlike Kathimerini's coverage, Ta Nea mentions only those who support Greece's position. As for To Vima tis Kyriakis, a detailed coverage of the negotiations taking place abroad was published, including the concessions made by the government.

2018

In 2018 there is a major breakthrough, due to the fact that the two sides reach an agreement, the so called "Prespes agreement". In the examined period, what dominates the public agenda are the protests and signage of the agreement. Ta Nea/To Vima tis Kyriakis and Kathimerini published articles in a daily basis while in Eleftheros Typos articles were found between 14.1.2018 and 25.1.2018. A total of 162 articles were retrieved in the period examined (14 to 27.1.2018). Thoroughly, 42 articles were published in the newspapers Ta Nea/To Vima tis Kyriakis, on Kathimerini 89 articles and 34 articles on Eleftheros Typos.




Table 3: Number of articles, 2018




Table 4: *The number of articles published in 1992 and 2018.*

Eleftheros Typos adopted a so called “patriotic stance” by naming the country Skopje. In the articles published the invocation of emotion is used. Although, there is a reference to foreign media and how they covered the rally, no mention is made concerning the term using when mentioning North Macedonia. Also, citations are made regarding the coverage of the rally by North Macedonia’s media. Lengthy articles containing smaller news stories were also identified. Many of this news is then repeated as a sequel in separate smaller articles. So the number of articles does not reflect a variety in the provision of information. Within one of the articles there are statements from participants from 6-69 years old regarding the rally. A characteristic paradigm of a statement used in this article is the one from Dimitra, 6 years old, coming from a small town nearby Thessaloniki: *“They want to steal the name”*.

Among the titles used on the published articles of Eleftheros Typos are the following: *“Hundreds of thousands of people at Thessaloniki’s rally- Resonant message for Skopje”*, *“Nimitz provocation: He calls “Macedonians” the Skopians!”*. Characteristic phrases found in the articles: *“Families, young people, old people and children sing loudly “Macedonia well known”, while the atmosphere vibrates with slogans such as “Greece -Greece Macedonia”, “No, to “double name” formula – No, to a new betrayal”, “Negotiations on Skopje are in full swing and the UN special mediator, Matthew Nimitz, he made a huge mistake. While the term “Macedonia” is the big thorn in the negotiations, he did not hesitate to call the Skopians “Macedonians!”*.

In Kathimerini's articles the term Macedonian issue is utterly used and also the terms Macedonia and Skopje when referring to the country's name. It is worth mentioning that the position of North Macedonia and the problems faced by politicians there are also presented. In addition, the announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Northern Macedonia on the rally is published. The coverage is related with national politics and especially with the different approaches from the Political parties in Greece. Some of the titles used in the articles: *"Georgiadis: 'The rally had 500,000 people. Tsipras is in trouble', 'Mitsotakis: I will not tolerate dividing the Greeks to unite the Skopians', 'Filis: 'Foreign policy is not practiced with rallies', while newspaper is critical of some of the rallies 'Tourism for rallies: Graphic picture of ancient Greeks and skirts'". The rally is presented as "Regarding the rally in Thessaloniki, it was beyond doubt the largest rally that took place in the city in recent years and one of the largest in Greece. It is, of course, far from being able to compare itself to the 1992 rallies on the same issue.", "Last Sunday's rally was beyond doubt the largest in the city in recent years and one of the largest in Greece. Its large participation and impressive image have already produced a political result, as government and parties have seemed to take into account in their planning around the negotiation the message conveyed by the numbers and pulse of the protesters, who came from all over Greece."*

As regards the newspapers To Vima tis Kyriakis and Ta Nea, some differences are detected. For example, at To Vima tis Kyriakis is using the term "Macedonian issue" and the country is always named as Macedonia. On the other hand, at Ta NEA we see that is also referred to the issue as "Macedonian", but regarding the name both terms are used Macedonia and Skopje. Both newspapers provide analyses of the discussions taking place inside and outside Greece. Some of the titles used are: *"Macedonian salad", "Rallying while looking back in 1992", "...the Greek silence is loud the last 24 hours". And some characteristic expressions: "'Historical' discoveries of Nimitz in Skopje", "Tsipras goes to Davos with 'tied hands", "Blocked in the Alps. Alexis Tsipras, who is in the opposition's sights over his handling of Skopje, will seek meetings with political leaders.", "He gave it all and got nothing back! No commitment to change the unredeemable articles of the Constitution, while Tsipras was opening the way for the complex name."*

CONCLUSIONS

Our work informed, “*by the dynamic approach sees foreign policy as the outcome of continuous negotiation between the poles that constitute foreign policy system. In this hierarchical ‘system’ media role is important in shaping the public and political agendas*”. (Panagiotou 24:2005). In the coverage of the Macedonia issue, the Greek press adopted two stances, in 1992 the co-operative function in accordance with the government and political elites regarding the ‘definition’ of the events. In 2018, their stance is much more informed from their political and party affiliations. In 1992, there is the rally behind the flag phenomenon, media fail to be critical as it prevails the emphasis in Greece national interest. It prevailed a “nationalist populism” tended to adopt a “simplistic explanatory framework” often taking the form of “encirclement theories” and “imaginary alliances”) in relation with the issue. In 1992 what characterised the coverage was ‘Media populism’, highly commercialized media production and/or news coverage that yield to general popular tastes and abandons a critical watchdog role. The country is named as “Skopje” under its capital, something that prevailed all over the years but in 2018 there is a tendency to less use it. To 2018 the internal electoral competition prevails and mass media stance is informed from their political affiliation. In both cases examined the media sphere and the political realm are an integrated system for the production of user-friendly political news, thus overcoming the fictitious opposition between media and political-logic. In both cases media populist stance is the result that they have regarded foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics by other means. Lastly a very important element in 2018 coverage that results from evolutions in mass media is that in newspaper websites there is far more extended coverage in relation with the printed ones, but in only three articles videos were used and only eight times posts from social media accounts were embedded in the articles published on the newspapers' websites.

Similarities between media coverage 1992/2018	Differences between media coverage 1992/2018
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<i>FYROM and Skopje are mainly used even after the 2018 agreement</i>	<i>1992 the stance of the media is informed from the phenomenon “rally behind the flag” national interest that dictates a specific unified stance</i>
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<i>Long articles less use of multimedia</i>	<i>2018 Their stance is informed from political</i>
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<i>journalism</i>	<i>affiliation</i>
	<i>2018 The language used is less emotional, but prevails a fundamental dichotomy scheme between “pure people” and a “corrupt elite.” that surrenders our national rights</i>

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DA LI JE RADIO U SRBIJI DRUŠTVENI MEDIJ?³

U 2019. više od 300 radio stanica u Srbiji imalo je dozvolu za emitovanje programa. Sve te radio-stanice imaju i elektronske adrese - veb stranice/portale i društvene mreže *Fejsbuk* i/ili *Instagram*. Društveni mediji uglavnom se koriste za promociju određenih medijskih sadržaja i za komentare. Izuzetak je *O radio* omladinski internet radio program, koji je deo javnog medijskog servisa *Radio televizija Vojvodine*. Cilj ovog rada jeste da se na osnovu analize studije slučaja *O radija* ukaže na dobar primer digitalnog radija, konvergencije medija i interaktivnost između radija i društvenih mreža. Omladinski radio komunicira sa svojom ciljnom grupom na savremenom, digitalnom jeziku, veb-stranici (*oradio.rs*), gde postoje audio, video i pisani sadržaji, kao i na različitim društvenim mrežama. Pobili su u finalu međunarodne *Radio bitke* (Firenca 2016), u organizaciji italijanskog RAI 2 i dobili titulu *Najbolje evropske radio stanice*, uz pomoć publike koja je slušala program i glasala na *Tviteru*.

Ključne reči: radio, društveni mediji, društvene mreže, konvergencija, publika, *o radio*.

„Radio se odavno ne oseća baš najbolje, a stanice koje ne funkcionišu samo kao džuboks mogu se nabrojati na prste jedne ruke” (Maričić 2019)⁴.

1. UVODNE NAPOMENE

Ideja rada jeste da predstavimo kao primer društvenog medija *O radio* – internetski omladinski radijski program koji je u finalu međunarodnog takmičenja *Radio bitka* (*Radio battle*) u organizaciji italijanskog RAI 2 u Firenci 2016. proglašen za *Najbolju evropsku radijsku stanicu*. *O radio* se u finalu takmičio

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³ Ovaj rad nastao je u okviru naučno-istraživačkog projekta *Digitalne medijske tehnologije i društveno-obrazovne promene* koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja (br. III 47020).

⁴ Izvor: <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/srbija-47232527> (posećeno: 10.05.2020).

protiv slovenačkog radija *Val 202*, a glasanje se odvijalo tokom sat vremena na društvenoj mreži *Tviter*. Ideja *bitke* jeste da publika sluša program, a putem *Tvitera* glasa za najbolje, čime se podstiče interaktivnost radijskog programa i društvenih mreža.

2. OMLADINSKI MEDIJI NEKAD I SAD

Jedna od prvih studentskih radio stanica na svetu nastala je u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama neposredno posle Drugog svetskog rata. *WMBR (Walker Memorial Basement Radio)* jeste stanica koja je, pod okriljem *MIT-a (The Massachusetts Institute of Technology)*, u američkom gradu Kembridžu pokrenula svoj program još 1946, s opsegom od samo nekoliko stotina metara oko studentskih domova (prema Pralica 2011:160). I mnoge zemlje Evrope imaju razvijen sistem i dugu tradiciju funkcionisanja specijalizovanih radio-stanica ili programa koji su namenjeni studentskoj, odnosno omladinskoj populaciji. Omladinske stanice pojavile su se u Velikoj Britaniji još početkom šezdesetih godina 20. veka i to najpre kao piratske (prema Osgerby 2004:28).

Istorijat omladinskih elektronskih medija u Srbiji vodi poreklo od radijskog programa *Indeks 202*, koji je nastao davne 1971. kao jednosatna dnevna emisija na državnom radiju *Beograd 202*⁵. Mnoga poznata imena srpskog novinarstva, književnosti i umetnosti prošla su kroz redakciju *Indeksa 202* kao novinari ili saradnici. Jedan od slogana tog radija bio je provokativan, odražavajući mladalački polet tog vremena: *Nas slušaju svi, mi ne slušamo nikoga*. Bezmalob 20 godina kasnije omladinska ekipa *Indeksa 202* u saradnji sa omladinskom emisijom *Ritam srca Studija B* osniva *Omladinski radio B92*, ali je taj projekat kratko trajao. Zatim je 1992, tokom studentskih demonstracija pod okriljem Univerziteta u Beogradu, osnovan *Univerzitetski radio indeks*, koji je 1998. zabranjen zbog kritičkog izveštavanja prema tadašnjim vlastima. Naredni pokušaj osnivanja studentskog radija desio se 2003. na Fakultetu političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu kada je, uz pomoć donacija Ambasade SAD-a u Srbiji, otvoren *Studentski radio Beogradskog univerziteta* (prema Milanović 2006). Nakon donošenja *Zakona o radiodifuziji* (2002) koji je državi i državnim institucijama, dakle i univerzitetima, zabranio da budu osnivači medija, taj radio prestao je da emituje program 2007. Od tada u Srbiji postoje samo studentske ili omladinske

⁵ Izvor: <https://www.011info.com/upoznaj-beograd/radio-index-glasnik-studentskog-bunta> (posećeno: 10.05.2020).

emisije na pojedinim radijskim stanicama u Beogradu i Novom Sadu koje uglavnom pripremaju studenti novinarstva sa Fakulteta političkih nauka u Beogradu i Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Novom Sadu. Pravog omladinskog programa nije bilo do pokretanja *O radija*.

2.1. Omladinski internet radio *O radio*

Internet omladinski radio *O radio* nastao je 2014, kao multimedijalna onlajn platforma vojvođanskog javnog medijskog servisa *Radio-televizije Vojvodine (RTV)* namenjena ciljnoj grupi uzrasta od 16 do 30 godina. Publici nude: muziku, informisanje, obrazovanje i zabavu. Sebe vide kao „mesto susreta moderne tehnologije i najviših standarda etike i profesije, virtuelno okupljalište omladine i onih koji tako misle”⁶. Prema pojašnjenju uredništva⁷, *O radio* je pokušaj da se koriguje nedostatak mlađe publike koja prati javni servis. „Projekat *O Radio* pruža mladima, koji takođe plaćaju pretplatu ili to rade njihovi roditelji, da na jednom mestu, njihovim jezikom i na njima prihvatljivijem mediju dobiju sve informacije koje ih zanimaju. *O Radio* bi trebalo da bude medij koji neguje mlađu publiku na javnom servisu, a istovremeno da bude inkubator za mlade novinare kojima bi rad u redakciji *Omladinskog radija* mogao biti odskočna daska za napredovanje unutar sistema i u ostalim medijima RTV-a” (Martinoli 2018:138-139). Na *O radiju* stručnu praksu u trajanju od nedelju dana obavljaju i studenti novinarstva sa Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu nakon položenog predmeta *Radijsko novinarstvo*, a jedan deo njih angažovan je i na pripremanju i realizaciji studentske emisije *Pokretač*⁸. Zamišljeno je da *O radio* predstavlja kombinaciju savremene digitalne tehnologije i izraženih etičkih i profesionalnih standarda, te da se sa mladima komunicira njihovim, savremenim, *digitalnim* jezikom, preko stranice <http://oradio.rs> gde se nalaze audio, video i pisani sadržaji, ali i putem društvenih mreža: *Fejsbuk*, *Tviter*, *Instagram*, *Snepčeti* i *Jutjub*. U okruženju u

⁶ Izvor: <https://oradio.rs/sr/o-nama> (posećeno: 10.05.2020).

⁷ Intervju sa glavnom i odgovornom urednicom *O radija* Klarom Kranjc, pomoćnikom glavne i odgovorne urednice Predragom Novkovićem i muzičkim urednikom Dušanom Majkićem objavljen je kod Martinoli 2018.

⁸ *Pokretač* je jednočasovna emisija koju uređuju studenti Novosadskog univerziteta, odnosno studenti Žurnalistike Filozofskog fakulteta, koja može da se sluša premijerno utorkom od 11 do 12 časova na strimingu, kao i odloženo u potkastu. Pored studentskih priča, u *Pokretaču* se bave i drugim temama koje zanimaju mlade ljude. Emisiju pripremaju: Svetlana Paramentić, Milijana Mićunović i Marko Lazić (izvor: <https://oradio.rs/sr/podcasti>, posećeno: 10.05.2020).

kome kompeticija ne dolazi više samo sa horizontalnog, već i vertikalnog nivoa jer se radio-stanice više ne nadmeću samo međusobno već pokušavaju da osvoje pažnju publike koja je podeljena na više platformi, važno je pitanje nastanka inovativnog, originalnog radijskog sadržaja i strategije razvoja savremenog radija za buduće generacije slušalaca. „Izazov je ispratiti promenu i implementirati inovaciju tako da audio-sadržaj ne bude ugrožen, a da ostane relevantan i konkurentan u multimedijalnom, multiplatformskom okruženju. Osim tehničko-tehnoloških mogućnosti koje otvaraju put inovacijama, najveća snaga radija budućnosti je komunikacija sa slušaocima, publikom, zajednicom i briga o njoj” (Martinoli 2018: 130).

3. DEFINISANJE PREDMETA ISTRAŽIVANJA

Interaktivnost doprinosi demokratizaciji radija, kao medija, jer povećava uticaj publike na njegovu koncepciju, pružajući joj mogućnosti izbora, ali i prezentacije informacija na način koji je prilagodljiv njenim interesima i trenutnim potrebama. „Iako se interaktivnost vezuje za primenu novih tehnologija u sferi medija, neopravdano se zanemaruje činjenica da je radio postao interaktivan još pre nekoliko decenija kada je tehnika omogućila uključivanje telefonske linije u program. Mobilna telefonija i ostale tehnologije danas povećavaju mogućnost interaktivnog kreiranja programa, tako što se slušaoci ili direktno uključuju u program ili se čitaju njihove poruke, predlozi i mišljenja ili kao i nekada glasaju za najbolju muzičku numeru, sportistu ili političara“ (Veljanovski, Ugrinić 2014:184).

Međutim, „javni medijski servisi u Srbiji nisu odmakli dalje od jednostavnih usluga i modela komunikacije, poput *onlajn* portala koji predstavljaju samo *produžene ruke* televizije sa mogućnošću odloženog gledanja, ili naloga na društvenim mrežama koji više služe prezentaciji sadržaja nego komunikaciji sa građanima (Kljajić 2019:213-214).

Budući da se konvergencija sa društvenim mrežama uglavnom koristi za komentarisanje medijskog sadržaja i ne predstavlja integralni deo radijskog programa, cilj rada jeste da analizom studije slučaja omladinskog radija *O radija* pokrajinskog javnog medijskog servisa ukažemo na primer pozitivne prakse konvergencije medija i interaktivnosti radija i društvenih mreža.

4. KONVERGENCIJA I INTERAKTIVNOST U KONTEKSTU JAVNOG MEDIJSKOG SERVISA

„Iako je popularnost radija, kao medija, daleko manja u odnosu na internet ili televiziju, on i dalje zauzima važno mesto u medijskim sistemima“ svih zemalja na svetu (Pralica, Milinkov 2019:354). Brzina razvoja novih tehnologija i stepen digitalizacije društva uticali su i na to da se funkcije radija kao medija drastično menjaju. Radio više nije imanentno *slep* medij jer, iako i dalje okupira čulo sluha, uz pomoć novih tehnologija u svakom trenutku se može uz pomoć veb-kamere videti i šta se dešava u radijskom studiju ili radijskom programu. Radio se danas najviše sluša preko pametnih telefona, praktično bez ograničenja, zatim u automobilima, a sve manje preko klasičnih radio-aparata i kod kuće. Multimedijlnost novinara postala je standardna pojava svih novijih generacija studenata žurnalistike (prema Pralica 2010:23-24). Takva praksa odavno se pokazala kao uspešna i racionalna, jer jedan novinar obavlja tri posla, po ceni jednog (prema Bojd 2002). Ako je njihovim roditeljima i onima koji su na zalasku karijera to i predstavljao neki problem, *digitalnim urođencima* su multimedijlnost i konvergencija sastavni delovi života, bez problema funkcionišu na taj način i tako prihvataju i razumeju medijske poruke.

„Emitovanje programa u okviru javnog sektora u novom digitalnom dobu svakako zavisi od finansiranja i ulaganja, kao i od sadržaja: ne samo od finansiranja proizvodnje i isporuke, već i od sadržaja koji je prilagođen javnom prostoru i javnoj sceni, koja omogućava identifikaciju potrošača i građana” (Ruk 2011:457-458).

U *Deklaraciji Komiteta ministara o upravljanju javnim medijskim servisima* (15. februar 2012) navodi se da odgovarajući sistem upravljanja predstavlja odlučujući faktor u sposobnosti država članica i javnih medijskih servisa koje oni podržavaju da realizuju ove i buduće izazove, i potpuno iskoriste mogućnosti koje su ponuđene digitalnim tehnologijama i platformama. Takođe piše i da je razvoj novih informacionih i komunikacionih tehnologija dao javnim medijskim servisima mogućnost da bez premca ispune svoje uloge na nove i efikasnije načine, omogućavajući im da ponude bolje usmerene i interaktivnije sadržaje i usluge. Ovo je posebno važno za usluge usmerene mladima, za koje je jako značajno korišćenje participatornih medija i medija koji su dostupni preko interneta ili mobilnih telefona. Uspešno prilagođavanje i usklađivanje novih platformi pomaže javnim medijskim servisima da ispune dodatne svrhe u okviru nadležnosti javnih servisa. „Najveći izazov za javne servise u kojima se sadržaji

sve više konzumiraju onlajn, na zahtev i nelinearno, jeste da sadržaje plasiraju tako da podstaknu i publiku na angažman“ (Kljajić 2019:213).

Dodatne prednosti integracije radija i interneta jesu konvergencija različitih formata, odnosno muzike, teksta i fotografije, hiperlinkova što u mnogome čini internet radio privlačnijim za nove korisnike, definisane u teoriji medija kao „digital native“, odnosno *digitalne urođenike* (Veljanovski, Ugrinić 2014: 67). „Konvergencija analognog radija sa internetom omogućila je nove načine upotrebe radijskih sadržaja, među kojima je i interaktivnost kao jedna od ključnih mogućnosti koju kreira digitalizacija, jer otvara prostor za ostvarivanje sofisticiranijih načina komunikacije sa publikom i preciznije upoznavanje strukture auditorijuma” (Martinoli 2018: 132).

4.1. Radio i društvene mreže - Radio bitka

Ideju organizovanja udruženog programa evropskih javnih medijskih servisa *Radio Battle* pokrenuo je radijski novinar italijanskog javnog servisa Filippo Solibelo (rtv.rs), a 2016. u takmičenju je učestvovalo 16 radio stanica iz cele Evrope. *O radio* prvi put je učestvovao 2015. i u finalnom emitovanju programa na engleskom jeziku uživo u radijskom studiju organizovanom u okviru *Radio dana Evrope* (*Radio days Europe*) u Milanu osvojio je drugo mesto.

Konferencija *Radio dani Evrope* nastala je 2010. u Kopenhagenu, kao smotra ljudi iz evropske radio industrije, ali i iz celog sveta. Učesnici konferencije, pored ostalog, diskutuju o aktuelnostima u radijskom novinarstvu i produkciji, novim trendovima kao i perspektivama radija u budućnosti. Prema zvaničnim podacima sa sajta *radiodayseurope.com*⁹ na godišnjim susretima okupe se predstavnici javnih servisa, ali i komercijalnih medija. Njihova statistika je pokazala da je, u proseku, među učesnicima konferencije najviše rukovodilaca medijskih kuća i voditelja programa (po 30%), zatim urednika vesti i novinara (oko 10%), koliko je i producenata, i po 5% onih koji rade u internet sektoru radija ili tehnici, kao i marketingu.

Takmičarski deo koncipiran je tako da je predviđeno emitovanje sat vremena muzičkog programa, dok se glasanje publike iz čitavog sveta za najbolji voditeljski program i muziku odvija na *Tviteru*, tokom sat vremena koliko traje emisija. Nakon pobeđe nemačkog *WDR* radija, i muzičkog sata solidarnosti zbog rata u Jermeniji, u polufinalnom takmičenju 2016. *O radio* je pobedio italijanski

⁹ <https://www.radiodayseurope.com/about-rde> (posećeno: 10.05.2020).

Rai Due iz Milana. Program je emitovan u isto vreme iz dva radijska studija, jednog u Italiji (iz Milana), drugog u Srbiji (iz Novog Sada). Prvi put u ovom takmičenju *O radio* je u samom studiju organizovao svirku uživo na kojoj je mlada kantautorka Dijana Stena iz Novog Sada pevala na italijanskom jeziku. „Osim što se iznenađenje svidelo Italiji, i *tviteraši* iz Srbije bili su oduševljeni idejom da među pesme bude ubačena i jedna koja je izvedena *live*” (rtv.rs).

Finalna *bitka* protiv slovenačkog radija *Val 202* organizovana je 24. aprila 2016. u Firenci, na dan kada su se u Srbiji odvijali republički, pokrajinski i lokalni izbori. Program su vodili, kao i u prethodnim *bitkama za slušaoce*, Sofija Balać i Vukašin Kartalović, a muzika je emitovana po izboru urednice Beate Kovač. *O radio* je postao najbolja radio-stanica Evrope uz podršku 83.000 tvitova koje je poslalo 3.000 *tviteraša*, dok je *Val 202* dobio podršku 75.000 tvitova. Na početku su Slovenci vodili po broju tvitova, što novinari *O radija* pravdaju opterećenošću izborima u Srbiji. „Ovog puta su *tviteraši* bili pametniji i puno su retvitovali. Mi smo krenuli malo sporije što je bilo razumno budući da su ljudi bili opterećeni drugim temama i izborima. A onda je posle 15 minuta krenulo ozbiljno tvitovanje. Dosegli smo ogroman broj tvitova zbog toga što su *tviteraši* tvitovali kratke tvitove uz haštag *radiobattlers*”, rekao je tada Petar. (oradio.rs).

Prema modelu dvosmernog toka proisteklog iz *Personal Influence* studiji o uticaju medija na društvo, moć medija najviše dolazi do izražaja kada ljudi uklope medijske poruke u svakodnevne razgovore. „Komunikacija među ljudima ne utiče na proces masovne komunikacije već ga *nadopunjuje*. Tačnije, nema masovne komunikacije dok ljudi ne počnu da koriste medijski sadržaj u komunikaciji s drugim ljudima u svojoj zajednici” (Radok 2015:207).

Proглаšenje *O radija* najboljom evropskom radio-stanicom, na sajtu ovog radija propraćeno je naslovom “#RADIOBATTLEERS: POBEDA! A SADA FREKVENCIJA” (oradio.rs), što ukazuje na to da, bez obzira što je zahvaljujući novim tehnologijama, kreativnosti, konvergenciji radija i društvenih mreža ostvaren zapažen uspeh, posebno kada se ima u vidu ciljna grupa kojoj se *Omladinski radio* obraća, ipak se na sigurnost, duži opstanak i kredibilitet ne računa, osim ukoliko se ne osigura frekvencija i analogno emitovanje. Taj naslov na sajtu *O radija* ukazuje na svest o tome da se internet radio namenjen mladima doživljava samo kao eksperiment. Navedeno potvrđuje i Kljajić (2019:218) konstatujući da o „*Omladinskom radiju* kao platformi koja RTV pomera u pravcu digitalizacije i interaktivnosti govore samo rukovodioci koji su učestvovali u razvoju te platforme”, dok se ostali intervjuisani rukovodioci govoreći o tehnološkim inovacija nisu osvrtni na ulogu *O radija*. „Otpor uvođenju te nove

platforme najbolje ilustruje navod jednog intervjuisanog rukovodioca koji je rekao da su *O radio* zaposleni RTV-a dugo nazivali *Nula radio*” (Kljajić 2019: 218-219).

Uredništvo *O radija* svesno je položaja unutra pokrajinskog javnog medijskog servisa i načina na koji ostali rukovodioci posmatraju budućnost tog programa. „*Omladinski radio* je tokom prve dve godine postojanja beležio konstantan uspon i sve veću prepoznatljivost unutar svoje ciljne grupe. To je u najvećoj meri zasluga mladih novinara i saradnika koji su živeli priču *O radija*, ali i značajnoj podršci sistema čiji je *O radio* deo. Teško je govoriti o budućnosti, jer ona nažalost zavisi isključivo od političke volje i znanja, odnosno neznanja, što i jeste najveća prepreka za razvoj projekta koji, i dalje verujemo, ima potencijal” (Martinoli 2018:140).

Digitalizacija i medijska konvergencija brišu brojne granice kojima su do skoro bili omeđeni tradicionalni i novi mediji. Direktna prenos *bitke* bio je dostupan i na strimu *O radija* kao i frekvenciji *Prvog programa Radio Novog Sada* na 87,7 MHz. Koristeći prednosti internet platforme za komunikaciju *Skajp*, voditelji *O radija* uključili su se uživo u *Jutarnji program RTV-a* kako bi preneli svoje prve utiske sa takmičenja (slika 1):

Pogledajte skajp uključjenje Sofije i Vukašina u Jutarnji programa RTV-a



Radost zbog pobeđe nije krila ni glavna i odgovorna urednica *O radija* **Klara Kranjc**, koja sada ponosno može da kaže da predvodi najbolju evropsku radio stanicu.

Slika 1: *printskrin* sa sajta *O radija*.

Upotreba novih tehnologija je, u suštini omogućila, konvergenciju, koja se s jedne strane odnosi na situacije u kojima uporedo postoji više medijskih sistema, među kojima se ostvaruje tok medijskog sadržaja, a sa

druge strane predstavlja tehnološke, industrijske, kulturne i društvene promene načina na koji mediji cirkulišu u našoj kulturi (prema Jenkins 2006:282). Obe definicije usmeravaju na to da mladi aktivno učestvuju u stvaranju medijskih uticaja (prema Radok 2015:198).

4.2. Omladinski aktivizam i društvene mreže

U načelu, kako tvrdi Radok, sve je teže opisati društvenu stvarnost izuzimajući ulogu medija u njenom kreiranju. Kako dalje navodi, iako *Tviter* ili *Fejsbuk* nisu izazvali *Arapsko proleće*¹⁰, događaji u Egiptu odigrali su se kako su se odigrali upravo zahvaljujući društvenim medijima, a organizaciona moć medija postaje delotvornija kad se razvije u manje uočljive svakodnevne pojave. „Mladi su naučili da žive s komercijalnom osnovom medijskih korporacija koja prožima čitav spektar iskustava, uključujući i samoorganizovanje (...) Primeri naoko spontanog aktivizma omladinskih medija zapravo maskiraju inovativne, ali i potencijalno podmukle pokušaje medijskih kuća da istovremeno vuku konce u privredi, državi i svakodnevnom životu” (Radok 2015:248). U svojoj studiji *Mladi si koliko se osećaš* (*As Young As You Feel*) Endrju Benet za mladost podrazumeva sklonost ka trajnoj političkoj interakciji s društvom, a pojam *mladost* više se ne vezuje direktno za godine, jer je ono što se čini, a ne ono što se ima (Benet 2007:23 prema Radok 2015:22).

Sem u domenu zabave, kada se pretpostavlja da *tviteraši* glasaju zbog muzike koja im se dopada, *bitka za slušaoce* je sticajem okolnosti otvorila i prostor za iskazivanje društvene osvešćenosti i aktivizam mladih. U polufinalnoj bici *O radio* je trebalo da se takmiči protiv *Armradija* iz Jermenije, u kojoj su se u tom momentu odvijali oružani sukobi. „Polufinalna *Radio bitka* koja je održana u nedelju 3. aprila bila je sasvim posebna za tri radio stanice koje su u njoj učestvovala. Ekipa *O radija* je umesto da pozove svoje slušaoce da glasaju za pobedu, zajedno sa protivnicima iz Jermenije, pozvala ceo svet da *glasa za mir*. Tokom sat vremena *tviteraši* iz Srbije i Jermenije poslali su više od 10.000 poruka na haštag #music4peace (*rtv.rs*).

¹⁰ *Arapsko proleće* je sintagma koja simbolično predstavlja talas demonstracija u arapskim zemljama koji je počeo krajem 2010. Demonstracije u Tunisu, Egiptu, Libiji, Siriji, Alžiru, Maroku, Jemenu, Jordanu, Saudijskoj Arabiji i drugim zemljama imale su oblike građanskog protesta, uz korišćenje društvenih mreža *Tvitera*, *Fejsbuka* i *Jutjuba*.

Radio bitka je, po zamisli inicijatora Filipa Solibela iz italijanskog RAI 2, takmičenje posvećeno muzici i zabavi, ali i sa izraženom idejom spajanja ljudi iz čitavog sveta. I voditelji u studiju, ali i korisnici *Tvitera*, slali su poruke mira. „Voditelj *Armradija* Tigran Harutinijan izrazio je veliku zahvalnost svima koji su večeras učestvovali u *Radio bici*, bilo da su deo programa ili su ostali uz program sat vremena i putem *Tvitera* poslali poruke podrške na haštag #music4peace, kao haštag #NKpeace, koji ukazuje na deo zemlje Nagorno-Karabah, u kojem su okršaji najizraženiji” (rtv.rs).

Društvene mreže uvele su novu eru globalnog omladinskog aktivizma, pri čemu mladi svesno nastoje da utiču na nacionalnu politiku, a pažnju globalne javnosti skreću pomoću *Tvitera*, *Fejsbuka* i sličnih platform i društvenih mreža (prema Radok 2015:95). Sem navedenog aktivizma mladih, ispoljenog prevashodno preko društvenih mreža, neophodno je da se i omladinski mediji, pogotovu oni koji funkcionišu u okviru javnog servisa, bave društveno angažovanim temama i izveštavaju o socijalno osetljivim grupama. Na taj način se, uz zabavu koja predstavlja podrazumevajući medijski sadržaj namenjen mladima, zaokružuje informativna, ali i obrazovna funkcija.

Iako siromaštvo nije atraktivna tema za većinu medija, te je, kako pokazuje istraživanje Odseka za medijske studije Filozofskog fakuleta u Novom Sadu pod nazivom *Medijski diskurs o siromaštvu i socijalnoj isključenosti* (Valić-Nedeljković 2011, Valić-Nedeljković, Kleut 2012), medijska slika siromaštva u Srbiji jednodimenzionalna, površna i zasnovana na izjavama političkih zvaničnika i statističkim podacima, dvoje novinara *O radija* dobilo je priznanje za nesenacionalističko i nestereotipno izveštavanje o siromaštvu. Reč je o nagradi za dostojno izveštavanje o siromaštvu i socijalnoj isključenosti *Refleksija* koju dodeljuje *Evropska mreža za borbu protiv siromaštva-Srbija*, koja je 13. juna 2020. u kategoriji radijskog novinarstva dodeljena novinarima *O radija* Petru Klaiću i Jeleni Mijatović za prilog *Banka hrane neophodna sve siromašnijoj Srbiji*.

Ovo je samo jedna u nizu važnih društvenih tema, poput problema narušavanja medijskih sloboda, širenja govora mržnje, rodne neravnopravnost, borbe protiv rasne nejednakosti, položaja mladih sa invaliditetom ili ekoloških problema, emitovanih na *O radiju*, a koje zahvaljujući konvergenciji radija i društvenih mreža mogu da dopru do većeg broja mladih koji nemaju naviku da se informišu preko tradicionalnih elektronskih medija i štampe.

5. UMEŠTO ZAKLJUČKA

Analiza intervjua s generalnim direktorom i urednicima *Radio-televizije Vojvodine* pokazuje da pokrajinski javni medijski servis „onlajn platforme posmatra samo kao produžetak tradicionalnih formata, dok publiku i dalje dominantno doživljava kao konzumente i anonimiziran kolektivitet” (Kljajić 2019:211). Međutim, pobeda *O radija* u *Radijskoj bitki* uz pomoć slušalaca koji su glasali putem svojih naloga na društvenoj mreži *Twitter* može da ukaže na činjenicu da uredništvo, ali i mladi angažovani novinari i saradnici na ovom radiju imaju svest o kvalitetnijoj interakciji i participaciji publike.

Studija slučaja *O radija* može da posluži kao pozitivan primer digitalnog radija i interaktivnosti između radija i društvenih mreža. *Omladinski radio* sem što sa svojom ciljnom grupom komunicira na savremenom, digitalnom jeziku, problemski pristupa važnim društvenim temama. To jeste u skladu sa jednom od osnovnih obaveza javnog medijskog servisa –emitovanje kvalitetnog programskog sadržaja koji doprinosi raznolikosti medija i zadovoljava informativne, zabavne i obrazovne potrebe građana i građanki uz poštovanje i promovisanje različitosti.

Iako je reč o pluralističkom i inovatorskom programu koji doprinosi da *Radio-televizija Vojvodine* bude bliže ostvarenju funkcije javnog servisa, na osnovu navedenih stavova čelnika *RTV-a* stiče se utisak da ne postoji svest o važnosti daljeg osnaživanja i unapređivanja programa *O radija*, ali i sa druge strane primene pozitivnog primera medijske konvergencije na ostale programske celine unutar pokrajinskog javnog servisa, kojih je velik broj.

Urednici i saradnici *O radija* za sebe kažu da su „mesto susreta moderne tehnologije i najviših standarda etike i profesije”¹¹, što je i činjenica. Samo od njihove upornosti, ali i uslova koje im pruži matična kuća – pokrajinski javni medijski servis *Radio-televizija Vojvodine*, zavisi koliko dugo će opstati trenutno jedina omladinska radio-stanica u Srbiji.

Dejan Pralica, Smiljana Milinkov

IS RADIO IN SERBIA A SOCIAL MEDIUM?

Summary

¹¹ Izvor: <https://oradio.rs/sr/o-nama> (posećeno: 12.05.2020).

In 2019, more than 300 radio stations had a license to broadcast program in Serbia. All these programs have their electronic addresses—web pages and social media Facebook and/or Instagram. Social media are mostly used to promote certain media content and for comments. The only exception is O radio internet youth radio program, which is a part of public media service Radio Television of Vojvodina. The aim of this paper is to show, by analyzing the case study of O radio, the example of digital radio, media convergence and interactivity between the radio and social networks. This radio communicates with its target group in their contemporary, digital language, on their web page (oradio.rs), where there are audio, video and written contents, as well as on different social networks. They won in the final of the international *Radio battle* (Florence 2016), organized by the Italian RAI 2, and were given the title of the best European radio station, with the help of the audience who listened to the program and voted on Twitter.

Key words: radio, social media, social networks, convergence, audience, *o radio*.

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UTICAJ DIGITALNIH MEDIJA NA USVAJANJE VOKABULARA ENGLESKOG JEZIKA KOD UČENIKA SREDNJE ŠKOLE U SRBIJI¹

Vokabular stranog jezika ne predstavlja statičnu i nepromenjivu kategoriju, naročito zato što se obogaćuje osavremenjivanjem društva i tehnološkim inovacijama. U današnje vreme digitalni mediji igraju veliku ulogu u svim sferama života, pa tako i u usvajanju engleskog kao globalnog jezika. Mlađe generacije su u prednosti u odnosu na pređašnje, jer imaju mnogo veći spektar mogućnosti za usavršavanje i bogaćenje rečnika engleskog jezika. Cilj ovog istraživanja jeste da se utvrdi da li i u kojoj meri digitalni mediji utiču na usvajanje vokabulara engleskog kao stranog jezika učenika srednjih škola. Kako bismo došli do rezultata, koristili smo upitnik u kome smo ispitali učestalost i način korišćenja digitalnih medija, te stavove o njima, a podaci o znanju vokabulara engleskog jezika prikupljeni su testom koji sadrži reči, fraze, idiome i kolokacije koje se vrlo često mogu pronaći u digitalnim medijima. Istraživanje je izvršeno u jezičkoj gimnaziji u Sremskim Karlovcima, a ispitanici su učenici drugog i četvrtog razreda starosti od 16 do 19 godina (N=100). Podaci su kodirani i obrađeni u statističkom paketu SPSS 20.0. Utvrđeno je da su učenici koji više prate digitalne medije postigli bolje rezultate na testu vokabulara, pa se generalno može zaključiti da digitalni mediji pozitivno utiču na vokabular engleskog kao stranog jezika, mada rezultati pokazuju da učenici ove veze uglavnom nisu svesni.

Ključne reči: usvajanje vokabulara engleskog jezika, digitalni mediji, društvene mreže, blogovi, učenici srednjih škola.

1. UVOD

Postoji nekoliko faktora zbog koji je engleski jezik u XXI veku *lingua franca* celog sveta, između ostalog to su britanski kolonijalizam XIX veka i američka ekonomska nadmoć XX veka (Crystal, 2003). Ova dva činioca, uparena sa velikim i naglim razvojem tehnologije koji je potekao baš sa američkog kontinenta, dovela su do toga da je engleski jezik postao sastavni deo

¹ Rad je rezultat istraživanja na projektu III47020 *Digitalne medijske tehnologije i društveno-obrazovne promene* koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

svakodnevnog života ljudi diljem planete. S obzirom na to da su svi tehnološki izumi poput mobilnih telefona i kompjutera primarno podešeni da koriste engleski jezik, a tu su i serije, filmovi, muzika, reklame, natpisi i novine takođe na engleskom jeziku, možemo reći da je engleski jezik sveprisutan u svim segmentima života i do njegovog uticaja neminovno dolazi. Ako na to dodamo veliku usmerenost mladih ljudi na pomenute digitalne medije, koji u najvećoj meri prenose sadržaje na engleskom jeziku, postavlja se pitanje do koje mere oni utiču na razvoj vokabulara engleskog jezika kao stranog kod mladih ljudi. Stoga se ovaj rad bavi istraživanjem povezanosti digitalnih medija i usvajanja vokabulara engleskog kao stranog jezika kod učenika drugog i četvrtog razreda Karlovačke gimnazije da bi se potvrdila pretpostavka da izloženost digitalnim medijima pozitivno utiče na usvajanje leksike engleskog jezika.

2. DIGITALNI MEDIJI

S obzirom na to da je istraživanje vršeno sa tinejdžerima, za početak je potrebno nešto reći o digitalnoj generaciji čiji su oni predstavnici. Naime, generacijski posmatrano (v. Tapscott, 1998), današnji mladi ljudi i adolescenti su mahom deca tzv. Bum generacije, te ih Tapscot (Tapscott, 1998) naziva Eho Bum generacije. Ukoliko posmatramo njihov odnos prema medijima, može se reći da je Bum generacija ujedno i TV generacija, koju karakteriše pasivna konzumacija medijskih sadržaja, jedinstven način viđenja sveta i izolovanost, dok Eho Bum generacija pripada net-generaciji, čije su osobine aktivna konzumacija medija, demokratizacija interakcije i izgradnja (onlajn) zajednica (Buckingham, 2013: 6). Ove razlike nastaju upravo zbog tehnologija koje su prirodne jednoj i drugoj generaciji, pa tako današnje mlade generacije grade jedan intuitivan, spontan odnos sa digitalnim medijima. Zbog ovoga su današnji tinejdžeri često željni da sami otkrivaju digitalni svet i da se sami u njemu razvijaju, te su stoga vešti, snalažljivi, kreativni i društveno svesni.

Oni su ujedno i generacija koju Prenski (Prensky, 2011) naziva digitalnim urođenicima, pošto ih primarno definiše iskustvo sa tehnologijom digitalnih medija. Njihovo svakodnevno ponašanje, obrada informacija, sadržaji koje konzumiraju (moda, muzika, TV, filmovi, digitalni sadržaji, društvene mreže, blogovi, vlogovi) znatno su drugačiji od onoga što karakteriše generaciju njihovih roditelja, koje Prenski (Prensky, 2011) zove digitalnim imigrantima.

Iz ovih je razloga, u kontekstu nastave stranih jezika, naročito engleskog, značajno istražiti na koje načine generacija digitalnih urođenika spontano, iz

digitalnih medija koje svakodnevno konzumira, usvaja vokabular engleskog kao stranog. Glavne karakteristike digitalnih medija jesu multimedijalnost i interaktivnost (Osmančević, 2009: 231). S jedne strane, multimedijalnost predstavlja kombinaciju teksta, slike, audio i video zapisa, grafike i animacije, dok interaktivnost podrazumeva to da publika više nije pasivna, već postaje mnogo aktivnija, dakle ne samo da primaju sadržaj, nego ga neprestano i stvaraju. Sem toga, velika dostupnost, vremenska neograničenost korišćenja i odsustvo geografskih barijera predstavljaju prednosti digitalnih medija koji korisnicima olakšavaju komunikaciju (Miljanić, 2013: 272).

U okviru digitalnih medija koji danas stoje na raspolaganju mladim ljudima možemo da spomenemo društvene mreže, koje su izuzetno popularne i zastupljene i omogućavaju im da dele razne sadržaje sa svojim virtuelnim prijateljima, održavaju kontakte, ali i upoznaju nove ljude širom sveta. Na društvenim mrežama kao što su Fejsbuk, Tviter, Tamber, Instagram, Snejčeta, Pinterest, Redit, da navedemo samo najpopularnije, korisnici mogu da gledaju video snimke, čitaju tekstove, ostavljaju komentare, upoznaju druge korisnike, sa njima komuniciraju, itd. Međutim, kako je već rečeno, sem što mogu da konzumiraju sadržaje, današnje digitalne generacije te sadržaje i stvaraju, pa tako blogovi, tj. onlajn dnevници, i vlogovi, tj. Video-dnevници, privlače sve veći broj ljudi, a mogu ih stvarati pojedinci koji imaju nešto da kažu ili pokažu velikom broju ljudi, ili kompanije, čiji je cilj da reklamiraju svoje proizvode ili usluge.

3. USVAJANJE VOKABULARA STRANOG JEZIKA

Vokabular i razvoj vokabulara su od ključnog značaja, jer on zauzima centralno mesto u usvajanju i ovladavanju jezikom. Drugim rečima, bogaćenje vokabulara izuzetno je važno u svakom stadijumu učenja jezika, a dosad je ova oblast bila nepravedno zapostavljena zbog gramatičko-prevodnog metoda. Uz pojavu i širenje komunikativnog pristupa nastavi stranih jezika vokabular sve više dobija na značaju, a i sami učenici su svesni toga koliko je bogatstvo rečnika bitno u savladavanju stranog jezika. Na primer, ukoliko čitaju tekst koji je pun nepoznatih reči i izraza, učenici često osećaju nervozu, očajanje i osećaju se obeshrabrenim, a u situacijama kada govore na stranom jeziku, često se desi da ne mogu da se sete odgovarajuće reči, zbune se i dolazi do neprijatne tišine. Stoga se može zaključiti da vokabular ima ključnu ulogu u učenju i usvajanju jezika pošto utiče na kvalitet komunikacije i omogućava da na adekvatan način izrazimo svoje misli, osećanja, potrebe i želje. On ima praktičan značaj u svim sferama ljudskog

delovanja, kako u formalnim, tako i u neformalnim situacijama, a spoznaja da barataju dovoljnim fondom reči učenicima daje osećaj samopouzdanja i podstiče ih da što više komuniciraju sa sagovornicima i samim tim ga, kroz praksu, još više obogaćuju.

Vokabular stranog jezika, međutim, ne predstavlja statičnu i nepromenjivu kategoriju, već se naprotiv obogaćuje osavremenjivanjem društva i tehnološkim inovacijama. U današnje vreme digitalni mediji igraju veliku ulogu u svim sferama života, pa tako i u usvajanju engleskog kao globalnog jezika, što stavlja mlađe generacije u prednost u odnosu na pređašnje, jer imaju mnogo veći spektar mogućnosti za usavršavanje i bogaćenje rečnika engleskog jezika. Poznato je da je izloženost mladih digitalnim medijima velika, ali ipak nije istražena veza između njihovog konzumiranja sadržaja u digitalnim medijima i znanja stranog jezika, naročito engleskog kao dominantnog jezika u digitalnim medijima.

Pošto je već rečeno da je velik, možda i najveći broj sadržaja koje mladi ljudi danas mogu naći onlajn na engleskom jeziku, potrebno je osvrnuti se i na slučajno usvajanje vokabulara (engl. *incidental vocabulary acquisition*), proces koji se dešava na nesvesnom nivou dok se učenici, u ovom slučaju tinejdžeri, zabavljaju čitajući tekstove na blogovima ili tekstove koji prate sadržaje na nekoj od društvenih mreža.

Slučajno učenje uopšteno je proces u kome se nešto nauči bez namere da to tako bude, drugim rečima u pitanju je učenje dok se radi nešto drugo (Richards and Schmidt, 2002). U oblasti učenja stranog jezika ovakvo učenje predstavlja jedan od glavnih načina učenja vokabulara iz konteksta, uglavnom dok učenici nešto čitaju ili slušaju. Na primer, Nađ i saradnici (Nagy et al., 1985) razvili su metodologiju za merenje napretka u rastu vokabulara i otkrili su da ponekad i jedan susret sa novom rečju može da dovede do usvajanja njenog značenja, ali da je u principu potrebno više kontakata sa rečju, naročito u kontekstu, da bi se značenje zaista usvojilo i internalizovalo. Ovo u stvari znači da je izgradnja vokabulara stranog jezika postepen proces koji je podstaknut dovoljnom izloženošću jeziku, naročito njegovom pisanom obliku.

Ovaj se način učenja vokabulara direktno naslanja na Krašenovu (Krashen, 1993; 1994) hipotezu o razumljivom inputu (engl. *comprehensible input*), u sklopu koje ovaj autor tvrdi i kroz mnoga istraživanja dokazuje da učenici mogu da usvoje velik broj jedinica vokabulara dok čitaju iz zadovoljstva, motivisani zanimljivim sadržajima o kojima čitaju i fokusirani na priču, a ne na jezik, njegovu leksiku i gramatiku. Vidouson (Widdowson, 1979) kaže da se ovaj način učenja vokabulara može i strukturisati uz pomoć nastavnika tako što učenici

dobiju uputstva kako da čitaju knjige i druge sadržaje koji ih zanimaju. Naposljetku, pošto jedan susret sa novom rečju najčešće nije dovoljan, potrebni su ponovljeni kontakti sa leksičkim sadržajem da bi se on internalizovao i prešao iz kratkoročne memorije u dugoročnu (Nation and Wang, 1999; Waring and Takaki, 2003). Sve u svemu, pored namernog učenja vokabulara, koje je pokriveno i regulisano strategijama za učenje jezika (v. Oxford, 1990), vokabular stranog jezika se može učiti i usvajati i slučajno putem aktivnosti koje se odvijaju van učionice, kao što su čitanje, gledanje filmova i serija, slušanje muzike, surfovanje na internetu, čitanje sadržaja na društvenim mrežama, igranje video-igrica, itd. Potonje situacije uključuju digitalne medije, kojima su mlade generacije veoma izložene danas, što svakako pruža velik potencijal za učenje stranog jezika koji treba da se više ispita, te će istraživanje u ovom radu pokušati da dâ doprinos ovoj oblasti.

4. METODOLOGIJA ISTRAŽIVANJA

Osnovni cilj ovog istraživanja bio je da se utvrdi da li postoji povezanost između digitalnih medija i usvajanja vokabulara engleskog kao stranog jezika kod učenika drugog i četvrtog razreda Karlovačke gimnazije, kao i da li postoji povezanost između učeničkih stavova o digitalnim medijima i usvajanja vokabulara. Istraživanje je uključivalo 100 ispitanika upisanih u školsku 2017/2018. godinu, tačnije po dva odeljenja iz svakog razreda, gde u svakom odeljenju ima po 25 učenika, uzrasta od 16 do 19 godina. Uzorak se sastojao od 73% devojčica i 27% dečaka, što je uobičajen odnos polova u jezičkoj gimnaziji (a i kasnije na studijama stranih jezika). Kada su u pitanju ocene koje su učenici imali iz engleskog jezika u prethodnoj školskoj godini, najveći broj učenika (81%) je imao petice, 15% je imalo četvorke, a 4% trojke. Dvojki i jedinica kao zaključenih ocena u prethodnoj školskoj godini nije bilo. Što se tiče dužine učenja engleskog jezika, najviše je onih koji engleski kao strani jezik uče od 11 do 15 godina (66%), 29% učenika ga uče od 6 do 10 godina, 4% njih uče 16 i više godina, dok samo 1% (odnosno, samo jedan učenik) engleski uči manje od 5 godina. Drugim rečima, u odabranom uzorku preovlađuju učenici koji imaju vrlo dobre ili odlične ocene iz engleskog jezika i koji taj jezik uče skoro ceo život, od predškolskog doba. Kada je u pitanju kontekst učenja engleskog jezika, 42% učenika je engleski učilo samo u školi, 51% je ovaj jezik učilo i u školi i na privatnim časovima, dok je 7% živelo u inostranstvu gde se govori engleski jezik.

Instrumenti koji su se koristili za potrebe prikupljanja podataka za istraživanje u ovom radu jesu upitnik i test vokabulara. Upitnik je bio anoniman i imao je za cilj da, sem opštih podataka o ispitanicima (pol, godine, ocene, iskustvo i kontekst učenja engleskog kao stranog jezika), ispita koliko često učenici prate digitalne medije na engleskom jeziku, te kakvi su stavovi samih učenika kada je u pitanju uticaj digitalnih medija na njihovo znanje engleskog kao stranog jezika (vokabular, čitanje, pisanje, slušanje, govorenje). Prvi deo upitnika se sastojao od pitanja sa otvorenim ili višestrukim odgovorima (podaci o ispitanicima), dok je drugi deo imao osam pitanja na koja su učenici odgovarali odabirom jednog od ponuđenih skalarnih odgovora.

Test vokabulara činile su četiri grupe zadataka i svaki od njih na određeni način pokazuje stepen poznavanja vokabulara svakog učenika. Prva grupa je testirala znanje sinonima, a druga grupa poznavanje kolokacija, uobičajenih izraza i žargonizama koji mogu da se čuju u digitalnim medijima. Treća grupa pitanja je ispitivala sposobnost učenika da na osnovu ponuđene definicije rekonstruišu frazu, frazni glagol, kolokaciju ili idiom, a birani su primeri koji su veoma zastupljeni u digitalnim medijima. Poslednja grupa zadataka je od učenika zahtevala da povežu datu definiciju sa rečju ili frazom, a opet je akcenat stavljen na reči i fraze preuzete iz digitalnih medija ili čak reči nastale zbog digitalnih medija ili u njima (npr. *photobomb*).

Početna opšta hipoteza u istraživanju jeste da digitalni mediji imaju pozitivnu vezu sa usvajanjem vokabulara engleskog jezika kao stranog, a posebne hipoteze se odnose na to da:

- (1) postoji statistički značajna veza između učestalosti praćenja digitalnih medija i usvajanja vokabulara engleskog kao stranog jezika;
- (2) postoji statistički značajna veza između učeničkih stavova o uticaju digitalnih medija na bogaćenje vokabulara i usvajanja vokabulara engleskog kao stranog jezika;
- (3) postoji statistički značajna veza između učeničkih stavova o uticaju digitalnih medija na jezičke veštine i usvajanja vokabulara engleskog kao stranog jezika.

Svi podaci iz upitnika i rezultati testa vokabulara kodirani u i obrađeni u statističkom paketu SPSS 20.0.

4. REZULTATI

Za početak, u radu će se prikazati podaci vezani za učestalost praćenja digitalnih medija, tačnije društvenih mreža i blogova. Može se zaključiti da učenici iz uzorka u mnogo većoj meri prate društvene mreže nego blogove, što je evidentno u Tabeli 1.

Tabela 1. *Učestalost praćenja digitalnih medija*

Koliko često pratiš i čitaš:	nikad	ponekad	nekoliko puta mesečno	2-3 puta nedeljno	svako-dnevno	AS	SD
društvene mreže	2%	4%	8%	9%	77%	4,64	0,91
blogove	17%	29%	15%	17%	22%	2,95	1,46

Na postavljeno pitanje „Po tvom mišljenju, koji je od navedenih digitalnih medija na engleskom jeziku najviše uticao na bogaćenje tvog vokabulara?“, učenici su opet dali odgovore koji su više u korist društvenih mreža nego blogova, što se vidi u Tabeli 2.

Tabela 2. *Mišljenje o uticaju medija na bogaćenje vokabulara*

Šta je najviše uticalo na bogaćenje vokabulara?	nimalo	vrlo malo	delimično	u većoj meri	mnogo	AS	SD
Društvene mreže	5%	13%	27%	23%	32%	3,63	1,20
Blogovi	30%	18%	25%	17%	10%	2,58	1,34

Takođe, kad je reč o jezičkim veštinama, prema mišljenju učenika, digitalni mediji najviše utiču na veštine slušanja i govorenja, što je jasno iz Tabele 3.

Tabela 3. *Mišljenje o uticaju medija na jezičke veštine*

Praćenje medija na engleskom jeziku doprinelo je veštini	nimalo	vrlo malo	delimično	u većoj meri	mnogo	AS	SD
pisanja	1%	20%	34%	29%	16%	3,38	1,01
čitanja	2%	10%	19%	39%	30%	3,83	1,03
slušanja	2%	3%	11%	36%	48%	4,24	0,96
govorenja	0%	8%	10%	33%	49%	4,22	0,93

Naposletku, deskriptivna statistika rezultata testa vokabulara pokazala je da je prosečan broj bodova $AS=45,44$, sa standardnom devijacijom $SD=18,03$, što ukazuje na činjenicu da je raspon postignutih bodova zaista velik: najveći postignuti rezultat je 78 od maksimalnih 81 bodova, dok je najmanji 6 bodova.

Da bi se dokazale ili opovrgle hipoteze postavljene u ovom radu, izvršena je jednosmerna analiza varijanse za svih osam pomenutih varijabli u odnosu na rezultate testa vokabulara. Analiza je utvrdila da učestalost praćenja društvenih mreža ima statistički značajnu povezanost sa uspehom na testu vokabulara ($F=5,28$, $p=.001$), a Bonferroni *post hoc* test je pokazao da su statistički značajno bolje rezultate na testu vokabulara postigli učenici koji svakodnevno posećuju društvene mreže u odnosu na učenike koji ih posećuju ponekad. Jednosmerna analiza varijanse nije ukazala na statistički značajnu vezu između uspeha na testu vokabulara i sledećih varijabli: učestalost praćenja blogova, uticaj društvenih mreža na vokabular, uticaj blogova na vokabular, doprinos veštini pisanja, doprinos veštini čitanja i doprinos veštini slušanja. Međutim, kad se radi o doprinosu digitalnih medija veštini govorenja, ustanovljeno je da postoji statistički značajna povezanost između ove varijable i uspeha na testu vokabulara ($F=4,39$, $p=.006$), dok je Bonferroni *post hoc* test utvrdio da učenici koji smatraju da su digitalni mediji mnogo doprineli njihovoj veštini govorenja imaju statistički značajno bolji uspeh na testu vokabulara od učenika koji veruju da su digitalni mediji imali delimičnu ulogu.

Na osnovu iznetih podataka, prva posebna hipoteza delimično je potvrđena pošto je dobijen jedan statistički značajan rezultat. Druga posebna hipoteza nije potvrđena, jer nije utvrđena statistički značajna veza između stavova o bogaćenju vokabulara i uspeha na testu vokabulara. Treća posebna hipoteza delimično je potvrđena, jer je utvrđena jedna statistički značajna veza između stavova o doprinosu digitalnih medija usvajanju vokabulara i uspehu na testu vokabulara. Ovo takođe znači da se opšta hipoteza delimično prihvata pošto su ustanovljeni nekoliko faktori koji imaju statistički značajnu vezu sa uspehom na testu vokabulara.

U okviru ovog istraživanja interesantno je istražiti i neke dublje implikacije i moguće veze među varijablama da bi se dobila jasnija slika o međusobnoj povezanosti korisničkih navika i stavova učenika iz uzroka. Stoga je za zavisne varijable izračunata i Pirsonova korelacija (Tabela 5).

Tabela 5. Korelacije zavisnih varijabli

			praćenje dr. mreža	praćenje blogova	uticaj dr. mreža	uticaj blogova	pisanje	čitanje	slušanje	govorenje
praćenje dr. mreža	r			,340**	,192	,109	,219*	,177	,242*	,386**
	p			,001	,057	,282	,030	,080	,016	,000
praćenje blogova	r				,298**	,705**	,267**	,158	,124	,113
	p				,003	,000	,007	,119	,222	,264
uticaj dr. mreža	r					,490**	,344**	,215*	,139	-,007
	p					,000	,000	,032	,170	,944
uticaj blogova	r						,303**	,231*	,099	,017
	p						,002	,021	,331	,866
** Korelacija je značajna na nivou 0,01.										
* Korelacija je značajna na nivou 0,05.										

Na osnovu izračunatih korelacija vidi se da postoji nekoliko jasnih tendencija u uzorku. Prva podatak koji se uočava je povezanost dve korisničke navike, praćenja društvenih mreža i praćenja blogova, gde postoji srednja, ali pozitivna korelacija ($r=,34$, $p=,001$). Drugim rečima, korisnici koji su često prisutni na društvenim mrežama takođe i češće čitaju sadržaje na blogovima. Sem toga, ti isti korisnici smatraju da im digitalni mediji pomažu da razviju tri od četiri jezičke veštine (pisanje, slušanje i govorenje). S druge strane, korisnici koji prate blogove u manjoj, ali statistički značajnoj meri smatraju da društvene mreže imaju uticaj na razvoj vokabulara engleskog jezika kao stranog ($r=,298$, $p=,003$). Oni takođe, ali u mnogo većoj meri, veruju da blogovi imaju isti uticaj ($r=,705$, $p=,000$), što je verovatno posledica toga što sami dosta prate i čitaju blogove, te su možda već uvideli koristi i blagodeti takve izloženosti digitalnim medijima. Sem toga, učenici koji češće čitaju blogove veruju da digitalni mediji imaju pozitivan uticaj na razvoj veštine pisanja ($r=,267$, $p=,007$), što svedoči o potencijalima u razvoju pismenosti, o čemu će više reči biti u diskusiji. Obe grupe stavova da digitalni mediji utiču na razvoj i usvajanje vokabulara engleskog jezika kao stranog imaju srednje jake i pozitivne korelacije sa stavovima da digitalni mediji

doprinosu razvoju veština čitanja ($r=,215$, $p=,032$; $r=,231$, $p=,021$) i pisanja ($r=,344$, $p=,000$; $r=,303$, $p=,002$).

5. DISKUSIJA

Istraživanje je pokazalo da društvene mreže, tj. učeničko pristupanje društvenim mrežama ima statistički značajnu vezu sa rezultatima testa vokabulara, tačnije da učenici koji im pristupaju svakodnevno postižu bolje rezultate na testu vokabulara. Ovo se može objasniti činjenicom da su kroz razne sadržaje koje mogu da pročitaju, učenici doista izloženi velikom broju novih reči iz engleskog jezika, a jasno je da deo tih reči i usvoje tokom konzumiranja sadržaja na društvenim mrežama. Pristupanje blogovima mnogo je manje učestalo, te statistička analiza posledično nije otkrila značajnu vezu sa uspehom na testu vokabulara.

Stavovi o uticaju digitalnih medija na usvajanje vokabulara nisu statistički povezani sa uspehom na testu vokabulara, a objašnjenje leži u činjenici da učenici najčešće ne povezuju vreme provedeno na društvenim mrežama sa učenjem (za slične nalaze kod studenata Filozofskog fakulteta v. Radić-Bojanić, 2012; Radić-Bojanić i Topalov, 2012; Radić-Bojanić i Đorđević, 2013). Drugim rečima, društvene mreže, a vrlo često i blogovi, za učenike predstavljaju vid zabave i razbibrige, tokom kojih ne razmišljaju o učenju, niti, sudeći po rezultatima istraživanja, smatraju da im digitalni mediji u tome mogu pomoći.

Slično se može zaključiti i kad je reč o gotovo svim jezičkim veštinama, jer je istraživanje pokazalo da jedino kod veštine govorenja postoji statistički značajna veza sa rezultatima testa vokabulara. Može se pretpostaviti da je ovo zbog toga što učenici mnoge nove reči iz engleskog jezika koriste u svom govoru kao anglicizme koji su u manjoj ili većoj meri adaptirani sistemu srpskog jezika, te im je jedino razvijena svest o vezi nove leksike i govora.

Naposletku, značajan nalaz ovog istraživanja, koji nema direktne veze sa istraživačkim ciljem, ali jeste veoma bitan, tiče se šireg uticaja digitalnih medija u razvoju pismenosti. Naime, statističkim testom korelacije utvrđena je pozitivna i srednje jaka veza između posećivanja društvenih mreža i, naročito, blogova sa stavovima vezanim za značaj veština čitanja i pisanja, što ukazuje na to da čitanje doprinosi razvoju veštine pisanja i da su te dve veštine samo dve strane istog novčića. Ovo ima dalje implikacije u nastavnom procesu vezane za uvođenje inovativnih i interaktivnih pristupa u razvoju pismenosti kod učenika, što je

svakako jedan od glavnih ciljeva obrazovanja u XXI veku (za neke primere i mogućnosti v. Thorne and Reihardt, 2008).

6. ZAKLJUČAK

U radu smo krenuli od pretpostavke da će uticaj digitalnih medija na usvajanje vokabulara biti značajan, te da će učenici imati razvijene stavove koji pokazuju svest o ovom bitnom načinu slučajnog usvajanja vokabulara. S jedne strane, dokazali smo da digitalni mediji, tačnije društvene mreže, zaista imaju značajan uticaj na razvoj vokabulara i usvojenost novijih reči, ali sa druge strane utvrdili smo da učenici toga nisu svesni. Stoga je na nastavnicima da učenike osveste o značaju ovakvog načina učenja stranog jezika, naročito engleskog, te da im kroz nastavu materijale iz digitalnih medija predstave na zabavan i koristan način. Ovo je način da nastavnici na časovima stranih jezika približe učenicima interesantne sadržaje, bliske iskustvima i interesovanjima učenika, te da ih motivišu da vreme provedeno u digitalnom svetu iskoriste kako za zabavu, tako i za učenje. Takođe smo ustanovili da digitalni mediji mogu da igraju značajnu ulogu u razvoju pismenosti, tačnije veština čitanja i pisanja, tako da bi ovo mogao da bude znak za nastavnike da, pored standardnih vežbi za čitanje i pisanje u nastavnom materijalu, probaju da uvedu nove informaciono-komunikacione tehnologije i kroz upotrebu digitalnih medija na času pomognu učenicima da razviju pismenost na njima blizak i prijemčiv način.

Biljana Radić-Bojanić

INFLUENCE OF DIGITAL MEDIA ON EFL VOCABULARY ACQUISITION AMONG HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS IN SERBIA

Summary

Foreign language vocabulary is not a static and unchangeable category, especially because it is constantly enriched as the society changes and as technological innovations progress. Today digital media play an important role in all spheres of life as well as in EFL vocabulary acquisition. Younger generations have this advantage in comparison with older ones because they have more access to new words and thus can more easily enrich their vocabulary. The aim of this research is to establish if and to what extent digital media influence the acquisition of vocabulary of English as a foreign language among high school students in Serbia. In order to obtain the data, we used a questionnaire which examines the frequency and manner of use of digital media and the data on vocabulary knowledge was collected via a test containing words, phrases, idioms and collocations

which are often found in digital media. The research was conducted in the grammar school in Sremski Karlovci and the informants were second and fourth grade students between 16 and 19 years of age (N=100). The data were coded and statistically processed in SPSS 20.0. It was established that those students who spent more time using digital media achieved better results on the vocabulary test so it can be generally concluded that digital media influence the acquisition of EFL vocabulary, although the results indicate that the students are generally not aware of this connection.

Key words: EFL vocabulary acquisition, digital media, social networks, blogs, high school students.

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INSTAGRAM: NOVI ALAT ZA PROMOCIJU UNIVERZITETA

Ovaj rad prikazuje analizu upotrebe društvene mreže Instagram u svrhu promocije univerziteta. Istraživanjem su obuhvaćena četiri Instagram naloga, selektovanih na osnovu Šangajske liste Univerziteta za 2019. godinu, kao i na osnovu njihove geografske pozicije. Analizirali smo objave na nalogima Univerziteta Harvard, Kembridž, Kjoto i Univerziteta u Zagrebu, tokom juna 2019. godine. Istraživanje je obuhvatilo cele objave – fotografije, video zapise i tekstove, ali i komentare objavljene na ova četiri profila. Cilj istraživanja je bio pokazati na koji način Univerziteti prezentuju informacije na mreži i u koje svrhe institucije visokog obrazovanja koriste Instagram. Analiziran je i tempo i kvantitet objava, intenzitet i smer komunikacije, kao i javne interakcije sa publikom.

Ključne reči: Instagram, društvene mreže, univerziteti, visoko obrazovanje, odnosi s javnošću

1. UVOD

Akadska zajednica već više od decenije svedoči velikim transformacijama u oblastima marketinga i odnosa s javnošću. Sa prodorom društvenih mreža i mobilnog marketinga, stvoreni su novi komunikacioni kanali koji ubrzano menjanju način ponašanja korisnika. Prebacivanje publike sa tradicionalnih medija u onlajn prostor učinilo je da onlajn oglašavanje postane neizostavni deo marketinga i odnosa sa javnošću većine kompanija i institucija.

Društvene mreže danas predstavljaju idealnu platformu za nov način povezivanja sa ciljnom publikom, ali i za efikasniju i produktivniju komunikaciju. Ono što razlikuje društvene mreže od tradicionalnog PR-a jeste nivo interakcije sa publikom, odnosno korisnicima robe ili usluga. Bergstomova i Bakmanova (Bergström & Bäckman 2013) u svom istraživanju o ponašanju kompanija i publike na Instagramu ističu da su upravo prilike za interakciju jedan od fundamentalnih aspekata koji razdvajaju digitalni marketing od tradicionalnih marketinških metoda (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 6).

Jedna od razlika između društvenih mreža i tradicionalnih medija kao proizvođača poruka, jeste smer komunikacije – dok su tradicionalni mediji uglavnom fokusirani na jednosmernu komunikaciju, društvene mreže iziskuju

dvosmernu razmenu informacija (Kaplan & Haenlein 2010: 61). U novonastaloj atmosferi na društvenim mrežama povezivanje sa korisnicima za kompanije postaje jednostavnije. Ovo je posebno važno kada govorimo o društvenoj mreži Instagram, jer je priroda mreže takva da se kompanije mogu (čak je i poželjno) ponašati *neoficijelno*, mogu davati uvid u ono što se dešava *iza scene* i stvarati *bliskiji* odnos sa svojom publikom (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 19).

2. TEORIJSKI OKVIR

Instagram je društvena mreža, pokrenuta u oktobru 2010. godine, koja je primarno služila za trenutno (*instant*) deljenje fotografija. Instagram aplikacija je proizvedena za mobilne telefone, mada se ograničeno može koristiti i na računarima. Ovo je besplatna aplikacija dostupna korisnicima pametnih telefona, kako Android, tako i iOS sistema. Interfejs i alogiritmi aplikacije se konstantno menjaju, tako da danas Instagram pored deljenja fotografija, pruža mogućnost deljenja video zapisa, grupa fotografija, geotagovanja lokacije objavljenog zapisa, emitovanja uživo, objavljivanja priča (Story) u obliku fotografija i video zapisa koje mogu biti aktuelne na profilu samo 24 sata, ali se mogu i trajno sačuvati na profilu (Highlights). Jedna od najnovijih izmena u aplikaciji je Instagram TV (IGTV), stvoren zbog vremenskog ograničenja redovno objavljivanih video materijala. Instagram TV je opcija linkovanja na objavljenom videu, koji služi za objavljivanje/gledanje dugačkih video zapisa (do 60 minuta). Statistika kaže da Instagram trenutno ima jedan bilion korisnika koji na mesečnom nivou aktivno koriste Instagram, a 500 miliona dnevno aktivnih korisnika¹.

Iz ugla prosečnog konzumenta, Instagram omogućava pravljenje fotografija, prilagođavanje njihovog izgleda i deljenje na različitim društvenim mrežama sa prijateljima, porodicom i strancima (Hochman & Rhythms 2012: 1). Povezujući fizičko i digitalno, Instagram uvećava onlajn prisustvo i identitet i dozvoljava efektivniju interakciju, kako za lične, tako i za poslovne namere (Abbott et al., 2013). Kada govorimo o poslovnim namerama, jedna od osnovnih prednosti ove platforme je mogućnost prikazivanja više *lične* slike brenda (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 12). Ideja Instagram fotografija leži u pokretu, neposrednosti, u osećaju da se događaj dešava upravo sada, a to doprinosi da slika kompanije bude ličnija i iskrenija (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 12). Instagram poslovnim korisnicima pruža priliku da prikažu sadržaj koji bi komuniciran kroz

¹ Izvor: <https://www.omnicoreagency.com/instagram-statistics/>

druge mreže ili medije čak mogao biti smatran neprikladnim – to mogu biti segmenti koji korisnike približavaju suštini brenda i stvaraju jaču vezu između kompanije i klijenata (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 19).

Korisnici Instagrama su većinski pripadnici mlađe populacije, pa možemo tvrditi da je ova društvena mreža veoma pogodna za promociju univerziteta među srednjoškolcima. Istraživači Alhabaš i Ma (2017) uradili su studiju na uzorku od skoro 400 studenata, koja je pokazala da ispitanici najviše vremena provode upravo na Instagramu, nešto manje na Snepčetu i Fejsbuku, a najmanje na Tviteru (Alhabash & Ma 2017: 1). Među motivima za upotrebu Instagrama markirani su „udobnost“ korišćenja, dopadljivost medija, „ubijanje“ vremena, lična ekspresija, „samo-dokumentacija“, društvena interakcija i deljenje informacija (Alhabash & Ma 2017: 8). Takođe, istraživanje je pokazalo da su motivi lične ekspresije, kada se porede sa drugim mrežama, najzastupljeniji kod upotrebe Instagrama (Alhabash & Ma 2017: 8).

Analizu razloga korišćenja ove platforme uradili su i Šeldon i Brajant (Sheldon & Bryant 2015). Ova studija iznedrila je četiri dominantna motiva od kojih je najzastupljeniji „posmatranje drugih“ (Sheldon & Bryant 2016: 93-95). Sledeći po važnosti je „dokumentacija događaja“, zatim popularnost, a najmanje zastupljen motiv je kreativnost (Sheldon & Bryant 2016: 93-95). Ovi autori navode da korisnici Instagrama u ovom kontekstu manje važnim smatraju povezivanje sa drugima, a akcenat stavljaju na lični identitet i samopromociju (Sheldon & Bryant 2016: 93-95).

Istraživanje Bergstromove i Bakmanove pokazalo je da su najčešći razlozi za praćenje kompanije na Instagramu: želja da se pokaže pozitivno mišljenje o kompaniji, dobijanje informacija o kompaniji, i/ili zato što kompanija deli interesantan sadržaj (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 31). O važnosti sadržaja pisala je i Baltesova (Baltes), koja navodi da je takozvani marketing sadržaja (content marketing) postao ključan faktor uspešne onlajn marketinške kampanje i jedan od najvažnijih alata digitalnog marketinga (Patruti Baltes 2015: 111). Ona, između ostalih, navodi sledeću definiciju marketinga sadržaja: „*content marketing* je stvaranje ili kuriranje sadržaja koji nije usmeren na proizvod – bilo da je informacijski, edukativan, zabavan itd. – i objavljivanje istog na tačkama kontakta sa klijentima, da bi se pridobila njihova pažnja, da bi se fokusirali na temu, privukli bliže i naučili više o tebi“ (Sem Decker, Content Marketing Institute 2015, prema Patruti Baltes 2015: 112).

Kada govorimo o istraživanju društvene mreže poput Instagrama, govorimo o novijem polju istraživanja - istraživanju onlajn vizuelne komunikacije. Miler (2007) definiše istraživanje vizuelnog komuniciranja u 21. veku kao:

Pod-polje komunikacionih nauka koje se širi i koristi društveno naučne metode kako bi objasnilo procese proizvodnje, distribucije, prijema ali i značenja masovno posredovanih vizuala u savremenom društvenom, kulturnom, ekonomskom i političkom kontekstu. Sledeći empirijsko društveno naučnu tradiciju koja je zasnovana na multidisciplinarnosti, istraživanje vizuelnih komunikacija je problemski orijentisano, kritično u odnosu na metod, ima pedagoške namere, i usmereno je na razumevanje i eksplikaciju trenutnih vizuelnih fenomena i njihovih implikacija na neposrednu budućnost (Miler 2007: 24, prema Russmann & Svensson 2016: 2-3)

Autori Rusmanova i Svenson ističu da je u marketingu važnost vizuelnog elementa značajno porasla tokom proteklih decenija i da slike „ostvaruju snažan uticaj povećavajući pažnju i zadržavanje gledaoca“ (Fahmy, Bock & Wanta 2014: 133, prema Russmann & Svensson 2016: 3). Prema Šilu (2012) slike mogu imati funkciju postavljanja agende, mogu dramatizovati politiku, pomoći pri emocionalnim apelima, pomoći u izgradnji imidža kandidata ili brenda, pomoći u kreiranju identifikacije, pomoći gledaocima da se povežu sa društvenim simbolima, a korišćene sa tekstom mogu još efektivnije komunicirati poruke (Russmann & Svensson 2016: 3, prema Schill 2012). Šreder (Schroeder) govori o metodi kritičke viuelne analize i navodi da je marketing često zasnovan na vizuelnom identitetu i da su „mnoge bitke koje brendovi vode u domenu vizuelnog“ (Schroeder 2006: 303). On ističe da Veb nalaže vizualizovanje skoro svakog aspekta korporativne strategije, svake akcije i svih komunikacija i tako u centar razmišljanja o strategijama stavlja problematiku vizuelnog (Schroeder 2006: 303).

Teorijski, ovaj rad se oslanja na četvrti model Grunigove i Hantove uticajne koncepcije odnosa s javnošću. Model dvosmernog, simetričnog PR-a počiva na stanovištu da pošiljalac i primalac poruke sarađuju, što može da dovede do izbalansirane strukture moći (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 14, prema Fawkes 2001: 5). Favkesova smatra da ovaj model može postojati isključivo kada obe strane imaju jednak autoritet da utiču na drugog, ali da ova jednakost u praksi skoro nikada ne postoji (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 14). Ipak, karakteristike Instagrama daju korisnicima određenu moć da utiču na kompanije, tako što njihovo mišljenje čine vidljivim drugim korisnicima (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 14). Takođe, korisnici mogu svojevolumno da prate kompanije, što pospešuje

simetriju modela i daje priliku za dijalog (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 14, prema Fawkes 2001: 11). Već pomenuto istraživanje Bergstromove i Bakmanove pokazuje snažne indikatore da različite vrste postova izazivaju različite nivoe interakcija korisnika, kao i da ohrabrivanje korisnika da upotrebljavaju specifične haštagove kompanije podiže nivo interakcije i do pet puta (Bergström & Bäckman 2013). Autorke zaključuju da je interakcija glavni faktor u kreiranju lojalnih i angažovanih korisnika, koji su poverljivi prema porukama kompanije, kao i da veze sa korisnicima nisu stvarane na Instagramu, već da ova mreža služi da se veze održavaju i evoluiraju (Bergström & Bäckman 2013: 41).

3. METODOLOGIJA

Univerziteti čije smo naloge analizirali odabrali smo na osnovu pozicije na Šangajskoj listi, odnosno Akademskom rangiranju univerziteta za 2019. godinu, gde su odabrani prvi evropski univerzitet - Kembridž, prvi američki – Harvard i prvi azijski – Kjoto (zbog jezičke barijere odabran je nalog ovog univerziteta na engleskom jeziku). Dalje, cilj je bio analizirati i nalog prvog univerziteta sa područja Balkana, ali budući da Univerzitet u Beogradu nema zvanični aktivni Instagram nalog, za analizu je odabran sledeći na listi – Univerzitet u Zagrebu. Istraživanje je obuhvatilo kvantitativnu i kvalitativnu analizu svih objava na Instagram nalogima pomenutih univerziteta tokom juna 2019. godine. Analiza je obuhvatila fotografije, grupe fotografija, video zapise, opise objava, kao i komentare univerziteta i publike. Što se tiče komentara, kodirani su po prvih 5 komentara univerziteta i po prvih 5 komentara publike.

Metodološki okvir za ovu analizu pružaju autori Uta Rusman i Jakob Svenson (2016). Njihov metodološki pristup originalno je razvijen u svrhu proučavanja ponašanja političkih partija na Instagramu, ali je adaptiran i za proučavanje drugih organizacija. Metod je fokusiran na pitanja: da li organizacije koriste Instagram samo kako bi jednosmerno širili informacije i predstavljali sebe? Ili je Instagram korišćen za dvosmernu komunikaciju, kako bi se etablirala i kultivisala relacija organizacija-publika (Russmann & Svensson 2016: 1)? Autori diskutuju o kodiranju varijabli u okviru četiri klastera: percepcija objavljivanja, upravljanje imidžom, integracija i interaktivnost (Russmann & Svensson 2016: 1). Predloženi kodeks Rusmanove i Svenssona korigovan je tako što je izuzeta jedna varijabla u grupi *Integracija* (varijabla koja odgovara na pitanje da li na fotografiji postoji referenca na političku kampanju), a pridodat mu je peti klaster – elementi

objave, koji je poslužio kako bi se odredila dominantna tema objavljivanja i način njenog prikazivanja na mreži² (Tabela br. 1 – Metodologija: klasteri i varijable).

Tabela br. 1 - Metodologija: Klasteri i varijable – elementi objave*³

1. Percepcija objavljivanja	2. Menadžment imidža	3. Integracija	4. Interaktivnost	5. Elementi objave*
1.1 Perspektiva -Oficijelni/profesionalni materijal -Neformalni materijal -Nije primjenjivo	2.1 Personalizacija -Fotografija se odnosi na jednu ličnost -Fotografija se odnosi na više ljudi -Izbalansirano/ne može se odlučiti -Nema osobe*	3.1 Hibridnost -Referenca na tradicionalni medij -Referenca na novi medij: haštag/poziv na šerovanje itd. -Nije primjenjivo	4.1 Broj lajkova i objava (onoga koji objavljuje) i komentara (onoga koji objavljuje i publike) + Prosečna interakcija u lajkovima i komentarima*	5.1 Vrsta digitalnog zapisa -Fotografija -Video -Više od jedne fotografije
1.2 Emitovanje -Centralizovano: ne očekuje se odgovor -Konkretizovano emitovanje: ciljanoj publici, odgovor se očekuje -Izbalansirano/ne može se odlučiti	2.2 Privatnost -Profesionalni kontekst -Privatni kontekst -Izbalansirano	3.2 Podijeljeni sadržaj -Originalni IG sadržaj -Sadržaj podijeljen sa druge mreže -Nije primjenjivo	4.2 Sadržaj opisa i komentara (onoga koji objavljuje) 4.2.1 Sadržaj: -Samo emotikon -Ima suštinsku vrednost -Trivijalnost 4.2.2 Tonalitet -Pozitivan -Negativan -Neutralan 4.2.3 Reciprocitet -Reakcija je u vezi sa prethodnim komentarom -Reakcija nije u vezi sa prethodnim komentarom	5.2 Dominantni element objave -Informacija/tekst -Iza scene -Sopstveni događaj -Student/studenti -Javna ličnost -Zgrada univerziteta -Pejzaž -Spomenik kulture -Drugi objekat -Drugi događaj -Praznik
1.3 Mobilizacija -Poziva na akciju -Ne poziva na akciju -Izbalansirano/ne može se odlučiti	2.3 Javne ličnosti -Prisutna javna ličnost – kodira se ime osobe -Javna ličnost nije prisutna -Javna ličnost prisutna samo u tekstu*		4.3 Sadržaj komentara pratilaca – isto kao 4.2	5.3 Perspektiva elemenata objave -Detalj -Krupni kadar -Široki kadar -U totalu -Nije primjenjivo

4. REZULTATI

Analizirali smo četiri Instagram profila selektovanih na osnovu Šangajске liste Univerziteta za 2019. godinu, a uzimajući u obzir i njihovu geografsku poziciju. Analizirali smo objave na nalogima Univerziteta Kembriž, koji je u trenutku sprovođenja analize imao 695.000 pratilaca i 2.586 objava, Univerziteta Harvard koji je imao 1,3 miliona pratilaca i 1.414 objave, Univerziteta Kjoto koji je imao 6.671 pratioca i 227 objava i Univerziteta u Zagrebu sa 1.035 pratilaca i 206 objava. Profili su analizirani i zajedno, u odnosu na varijable u datim klasterima, ali i pojedinačno. (Tabela br. 1 – Metodologija: klasteri i varijable).

² Peti klaster nastao je na osnovu već pomenutog istraživanja Bergstromove i Bakmanove (2013), ali i zbog specifičnih potreba korpusa. Izmenjeni delovi označeni su zvezdicom (*) (Tabela br. 1 – Metodologija: klasteri i varijable);

³ Pridodati, peti klaster: elementi objave;

Što se tiče ukupnog analiziranog korpusa (za sva četiri univerziteta) on obuhvata 37 objava, koliko su tokom juna meseca 2019. godine objavila četiri analizirana naloga na mreži Instagram, kao i 166 komentara univerziteta i publike. Najveći procenat objava imali su univerziteti Harvard – 43 odsto i Kembridž – 41 odsto od ukupnog analiziranog materijala (Slika 1 – *Harvard, jun 2019* i Slika 2 – *Kembridž, jun 2019*). Univerziteti Kjoto i Univerzitet u Zagrebu imali su značajno manji procenat objava – 11, odnosno 6 odsto od ukupnog korpusa, dakle Kjoto Univerzitet četiri objave (Slika 3 – *Kjoto, jun 2019*), a zagrebački svega dve (Slika 4 – *Zagreb, jun 2019*). Od ova četiri profila, profili Harvarda i Kembridža su verifikovani, a preostala dva nemaju status zvaničnog naloga.



Slika 1 - Harvard, jun 2019.



Slika 2 - Kembridž, jun 2019.



Slika 3 - Kjoto, jun 2019.



Slika 4 - Zagreb, jun 2019.

U narednim potpoglavljima prikazana je interpretacija rezultata prema određenim klasterima i varijablama u odnosu na celokupan analizirani korpus, a na kraju su tabelarno prikazani podaci za svaki univerzitet zasebno.

4.1 Klaster: elementi objave i njihove karakteristike

Kada elemente objave sagledamo kroz celokupan analizirani korpus, od 37 objava, 29 puta su to bile pojedinačne fotografije, pet puta grupe od nekoliko fotografija, a tri puta kreći video zapisi. Predmet objavljivanja, odnosno dominantna tema univerzitetskih naloga, istraživana je pomoću varijable *dominantni elementi objave*. Ova varijabla ne odnosi se nužno na ono što je vizuelno dominantno, već na ono na šta se objava odnosi u celosti. Kada

sagledavamo celokupni korpus, najviše je objava o studentima (27 odsto) – njihovim postignućima, biografijama i ovo su objave u kojima se prepliću profesionalni i privatni kontekst. Odmah zatim imamo objave u kojima je glavna tema univerzitet, konkretnije zgrada univerziteta (24 odsto) – postovi koji donose neku zanimljivost, servisnu informaciju ili samo fotografiju zdanja. Sledeće dve dominantne teme su događaji organizovani od strane univerziteta (16 odsto), kao i praznici (13 odsto) (Zagreb: Dan državnosti; Harvard: Dan očeva, Letnja ravnodnevnica itd). Pejzaži čine 8 odsto korpusa i oni su posebno karakteristični za Kembridž, za razliku od Harvarda koji svoju promociju uglavnom zasniva na studentima i njihovim uspesima.

Kada govorimo o vizuelnoj perspektivi elemenata svih objava, rezultati pokazuju ujednačenost među vrstama kadrova. Dalje, kada govorimo o perspektivi fotografija, istraživanje je pokazalo da fotografije koje karakteriše krupan kadar prosečno imaju najviše lajkova (skoro 26 hiljada), nešto manje lajkova imaju fotografije snimljene u totalu (u proseku oko 21 hiljadu lajkova), a najmanje lajkova dobile su fotografije širokog kadra (oko 13 hiljada).

4.2 Klaster: Percepcija objavljivanja

Istraživanjem smo pokušali da prikazemo kakvu percepciju poruka univerziteta žele da postignu – da li su objave u formi oficijelne, ili pak nezvanične objave. U ukupnom korpusu, dakle kada se obuhvate rezultati dobijeni sa četiri univerziteta nalazimo da je više od 50 odsto objava upravo zvanična fotografija ili video-snimak, a neformalnih je bilo oko 12 odsto.

Varijabla *emitovanje* pokazala je da univerziteta i dalje koriste Instagram pretežno kao tradicionalni medij – za jednosmerno, odnosno centralizovano emitovanje sadržaja – 92 odsto objava je markirano kao centralizovano, gde se ne očekuje odgovor publike. Konkretizovano emitovanje, upućeno ciljanoj publici, možemo videti u samo po jednoj objavi univerziteta Kembridž, Harvard i Kjoto. Podaci pokazuju da univerziteta uglavnom ne koriste mobilisajući potencijal mreže – 76 odsto objava ne poziva na akciju, a univerzitet koji je u svojim objavama najviše pozivao na akciju bio je Kembridž.

4.3 Menadžment imidža

Prvo pitanje postavljeno u okviru ovog klastera jeste na koji način univerziteta održavaju imidž na mreži – uz pomoć osoba, ili oslanjajući se na druge resurse. Ispostavilo se da se u ukupnom korpusu objave uglavnom odnose ili na više osoba (41 odsto) ili da se objave uopšte ne odnose na ljude (38 odsto). To

može značiti da se univerziteti ne oslanjaju na pojedince i njihove osobine ili uspehe pri kreiranju imidža, već su okrenuti zajedništvu, ili pak svojoj tradiciji i istoriji. U celokupnom korpusu direktor/rektor nije vidljiv ni na jednoj objavi - ni na fotografiji, ni u tekstu. Iako se u literaturi navodi da Instagram služi za „zblizavanje“ sa publikom usmeravanjem pažnje na privatnu sferu, univerziteti u više od 40 odsto objava fokus stavljaju na profesionalni kontekst, a u 35 odsto objava odnos privatnog i profesionalnog je izbalansiran. Interesantan podatak je da univerziteti u analiziranom korpusu ne koriste javne ličnosti za svoju promociju, osim jednom, u slučaju Harvarda.

4.4 Klaster: Integracija

U ovom segmentu istraživanja pokušali smo da odgovorimo na pitanje da li je i u kojoj je meri platforma Instagram integrisana u sveukupni komunikacijski sistem univerziteta. Ispitivanje varijable *hibridnost* pokazalo nam je da univerziteti koriste mogućnost da „obiđu“ tradicionalne medije prilikom komunikacije sa publikom – u celom korpusu je pronađen samo jedan primer eksplicitne reference na oflajn medij. U više od 40 odsto ukupnih objava, na svim naložima, pronađene su eksplicitne reference na novi medij – tagovanje drugih naloga na Instagramu, korišćenje haštaga, pozivi na šerovanje, posetu veb sajtu ili Jutjub kanalu.

Zanimalo nas je i da li je sadržaj koji je podeljen na Instagramu pre toga već deljen na drugim mrežama ili potiče iz oflajn medija. U ukupnom korpusu, 95 odsto objava jeste originalni Instagram sadržaj, što ukazuje na visok stepen nezavisnosti objava i integrisanosti ove mreže u komunikacijski miks.

4.5 Klaster: Interaktivnost

U okviru interaktivnosti, primarni cilj bio je istražiti kvantitativne pokazatelje i prosečnu interakciju u lajkovima i komentarima. Budući da nam objedinjeni podatak o interaktivnosti na 4 profila nije relevantan, u ovom segmentu rada prikazujemo uporednu analizu date varijable.

Kao što je već ranije pomenuto, najveći ukupan broj objava (2.586) ima Univerzitet Kembridž. Ipak najveći broj ukupnih interakcija ima univerzitet Harvard. Iako ima skoro duplo manje objava (1.414), Harvard ima najveći broj pratilaca (1,3 miliona), najveći broj lajkova tokom juna (464.437) - 3 i po puta više od Kembridža i najveći broj komentara u istraživanom periodu (3173) (Tabele br. 5 - *Kvantitativni pokazatelji popularnosti i interakcije na mreži*).

Tabela br. 5 – *Kvantitativni pokazatelji popularnosti i interakcije na mreži*

	<i>Ukupan broj postova</i>	<i>Ukupan broj pratilaca</i>	<i>Ukupan broj profila koje prate</i>	<i>Broj postova tokom juna</i>	<i>Ukupan broj lajkova tokom juna</i>	<i>Prosečan broj lajkova tokom juna</i>	<i>Ukupan broj komentara tokom juna</i>	<i>Prosečan broj komentara tokom juna</i>
<i>Univerzitet Kembridž</i>	2.586	659k	119	15	131.834	19.986	738	49
<i>Univerzitet Harvard</i>	1.414	1.3m	147	16	464.437	29.027	3173	198
<i>Univerzitet Kjoto</i>	227	6.671	25	4	1.311	328	8	2
<i>Univerzitet u Zagrebu</i>	206	1.035	588	2	86	43	1	0.5

Opisi ispod objava na Instagramu su uzimani kao važan pokazatelj načina odnošenja prema publici, ali i pokazatelj svrhe upotrebe ove platforme. Naime, 76 odsto tekstualnih objava imalo je suštinsku vrednost, odnosno sadržalo je relevantnu informaciju. Tonalitet ovih opisa bio je većinski pozitivan – skoro 70 odsto, a posebno se ističe podatak da nijedna objava nije bila negativnog karaktera.

Istraživanje je pokazalo da univerziteta u skoro 95 odsto objava nisu odgovorili ni na jedan komentar publike. Sa druge strane, publika je ostavljala komentare na više od 97 odsto objava univerziteta. U ukupnom korpusu od 166 analiziranih komentara, odgovora univerziteta na komentare publike je dva i to su odgovori univerziteta Kembridž. Ova dva komentara markirana su kao trivijalnost, odnosno kao emotikon, u oba slučaja pozitivne konotacije i u vezi sa prethodnim komentarom publike.

Što se tiče sadržaja komentara publike, statistika pokazuje da je on izbalansiran - od 164 kodiranih komentara, 38 odsto čine emotikoni, 37 odsto su označeni kao trivijalnost, a 25 odsto imaju suštinsku vrednost. Tonalitet komentara publike je u skoro 80 odsto slučajeva pozitivan, a samo u 3 odsto negativan. Reciprocitet komentara publike je pokazao visok stepen učestalosti (77 odsto), a reakcija publike nije u vezi sa prethodnim komentarom ili objavom univerziteta u 22 odsto slučajeva.

4.6 Drugačiji pristupi oglašavanju na Instagramu


Kako bi prikaz podataka bio sveobuhvatan i pregledan, pojedinačni rezultati analize Instagram profila, sa svim varijablama i klasterima, prikazani su kroz tri tabele (*Tabela br. 2 – Univerzitet Kembridž: klasteri i varijable*, *Tabela br. 3 – Univerzitet Kjoto: klasteri i varijable* i *Tabela br. 4 – Univerzitet Harvard:*

klasteri i varijable), a istaknute su i relevantne komparativne pojedinosti analiziranih naloga. Izuzetak je Univerzitet u Zagrebu, s obzirom na to da se broj analiziranih objava ne može smatrati relevantnim za većinu ponuđenih varijabli.

Tabela br. 2 - *Univerzitet Kembridž: Klasteri i varijable*

UNIVERZITET KEMBRIDŽ				
1. Percepcija objavljivanja	2. Menadžment imidža	3. Integracija	4. Interaktivnost	5. Elementi objave*
<i>1.1 Perspektiva</i> U više od 54 odsto slučajeva objavljivani je neoficijelni, odnosno neprofesionalni materijal, a u skoro 30 odsto slučajeva nije bilo moguće odrediti da li je materijal profesionalan ili nefromalan.	<i>2.1 Personalizacija</i> Objavljena fotografija se odnosi na više ljudi u 40 odsto slučajeva, i isto je toliko fotografija na kojima nema osobe.	<i>3.1 Hibridnost</i> U više od pola korpusa markirana je referenca na novi medij: tag/hahtag/poziv na šerovanje/sajt/jutjub kanal (53 odsto).	<i>4.1 Ukupan broj lajkova na analiziranim objavama je 131.834, svaki post je komentarisani, a na samo dva posta se može videti odgovor Kembridža.</i>	<i>5.1 Vrsta digitalnog zapisa</i> -Samo jedna fotografija čini obkavu u 67 odsto slučajeva, video u 20, a više od jedne fotografije u 13 odsto objava.
<i>1.2 Emitovanje</i> U više od 93 odsto objava emitovanje je centralizovano: ne očekuje se odgovor publike.	<i>2.2 Privatnost</i> Najveći procenat objava (60 odsto) ima profesionalni kontekst, a manji broj objava privatni (20 odsto). Kontekst je izbalansiran u 20 odsto slučajeva.	<i>3.2 Podeljeni sadržaj</i> Kembridž emituje uglavnom sadržaj originalno osmišljen i kreiran za Instagram - 87 odsto, a u manjem procentu prisutan je sadržaj koji je podeljen sa druge mreže - 13 odsto.	<i>4.2 Sadržaj univerziteta</i> 87 odsto objava ima suštinsku vrednost, a 13 odsto odnosi se na trivijalnosti. Tonalitet je većinski pozitivan - 53 odsto, a 47 odsto je neutralan. U oba kometanara (odgovori univerziteta) reakcija univerziteta je bila u vezi sa komentarom koji je prethodio.	<i>5.2 Dominantni element objave</i> Najdominantniji elementi su događaji univeziteta i student/studenti, zatim zgrada univerziteta, a na nekim objavama se pojavljuju i pejzaži i spomenici kulture.
<i>1.3 Mobilizacija</i> Objavama univerzitet ne poziva na akciju - više od 65 odsto postova.	<i>2.3 Javne ličnosti</i> Nemaju praksu prikazivanja javnih ličnosti – javna ličnost nije prisutna, ni pomenuta u više od 93 odsto slučajeva.		<i>4.3 Sadržaj pratilaca</i> U 75 komentara publike, u 41 odsto sadržaj je samo emotikon/hahtag, 33 odsto objava ima suštinsku vrednost, a 25 odsto objava je trivijalnost. Tonalitet komentara je u skoro 80 odsto slučajeva pozitivan, ali je komentar retko u vezi sa prethodnim komentarom ili sadržajem objave – skoro 90 odsto.	<i>5.3 Perspektiva elemenata objave</i> -Detalj (27 odsto) -Široki kadar (40 odsto) -U totalu (33 odsto)

Analiza elemenata objave pokazala je da je video zapise je jedini na svom profilu objavljivao univerzitet Kembridž. Video snimci su se većinski odnosili na studente, pripadnike etničkih manjina, a vodeća tema videa bila je otvaranje Kembridža prema aplikacijama studenata. Na Instagramu su emitovani samo kraći video zapisi, a u tekstu je publika upućivana na Jutjub kanal univerziteta i na IGTV. Jedan od takvih videa je priča o studentkinji Kortni Danijeli, koja govori o svom iskustvu prijavljivanja i studiranja na Kembridžu (Slika br. 5 – *Primer videa na Instagramu, Kembridž*).



Slika 5 - Primer videa na Instagramu, Kembridž

Što se tiče perspektive, prikupljeni podaci pokazuju različite rezultate kada su u pitanju univerziteti Kembridž i Harvard – u prvom slučaju je broj oficijelnih i neoficijelnih objava prilično izjednačen (5:7), a u drugom objave većinski (75 odsto) imaju prizvuk zvanične objave, sa fotografijama čiji su autori potpisani kao fotografi Univerziteta Harvard. Za univerzitet Kjoto bile su karakteristične većinski neformalne fotografije, a isti je slučaj i sa objavama univerziteta u Zagrebu.

Tabela br. 3 - Univerzitet Kjoto: Klasteri i varijable

UNIVERZITET KJOTO				
1. Percepcija objavljivanja	2. Menadžment imidža	3. Integracija	4. Interaktivnost	5. Elementi objave*
<i>1.1 Perspektiva</i> Profilom izrazito dominira neformalni materijal - 75 odsto objava, a oficijelni/zvanični/materijal čini 25 odsto objava.	<i>2.1 Personalizacija</i> Glavna nije vidljiva ni na jednoj objavi, a 50 odsto objava je depsonalizovano. Četvrtina postova se odnosi na više ljudi.	<i>3.1 Hibridnost</i> Referenca na novi medij: tag/hashtag/poziv na šerovanje/sajt/jutjub kanal markirana je u 75 odsto objava.	<i>4.1 Ukupan broj lajkova svih analiziranih objava (četiri) je 131. Univerzitet nije odgovarao na komentare, a markirano je ukupno 8 komentara publike.</i>	<i>5.1 Vrsta digitalnog zapisa</i> U 100 odsto slučajeva objavu čini jedna fotografija.
<i>1.2 Emitovanje</i> Većinski je centralizovano - u 75 odsto objava se ne očekuje odgovor publike.	<i>2.2 Privatnost</i> Privatni kontekst dominira analiziranim objavama – 50 odsto, a u drugoj polovini materijala prisutna je ujednačenost između profesionalnog i izbalansiranog konteksta - po 25 odsto.	<i>3.2 Podeljeni sadržaj</i> Sadržaj je u potpunosti originalni Instagram sadržaj.	<i>4.2 Sadržaj univerziteta</i> Polovina objava okarakterisana je kao da ima suštinsku vrednost, a druga polovina kao trivijalnost (po 50 odsto). Takođe, polovina objava ima pozitivan, a polovina neutralan tonalitet.	<i>5.2 Dominantni element objave</i> Na po jednoj objavi se mogu videti: Informacija – tekst; Druga ličnost; Zgrada univerziteta; Pejzaž.
<i>1.3 Mobilizacija</i> Objave većinski ne pozivaju na akciju - 75 odsto.	<i>2.3 Javne ličnosti</i> Javna ličnost nije vidljiva ni na jednoj fotografiji.		<i>4.3 Sadržaj pratilaca</i> U 8 komentara dominirali su emotikoni, koji su većinski imali pozitivan tonalitet, bez sadržinske veze sa objavom univerziteta.	<i>5.3 Perspektiva elemenata objave</i> Većinski su korišćeni široki kadrovi - 50 odsto. Fotografisano je i izbliza, na objavama su vidljive i grafika i tekst - po 25 odsto.

Kako smo već naveli, Kembridž je jedini univerzitet koji koristi mobilisajući potencijal Instagrama. Ipak, ovde je neophodno istaći da su akcije na

koje se objave odnose isključivo usmerene na aktivnosti na mreži, poput: „Kliknite na link na našem profilu da biste saznali više“ (Kembridž, 4.06.2019).

Kada upoređujemo stavku iz Tabele 2.3 *Javna ličnost*, jedini put je javna ličnost pomenuta u objavi u kojoj Harvard piše o svom studentu koji je učestvovao u televizijskoj emisiji „Glavni kuvar“, gde se (isključivo) u tekstu objave pominje poznati kuvar Gordon Remzi. Ipak, Harvard se izdvojio objavama koje se odnose na pojedinca, objavljujući priče o svojim studentima. Takođe, na profilu univerziteta Harvard najveći broj objava karakteriše izbalansiran odnos privatnog i profesionalnog (Tabela br. 4 – *Univerzitet Harvard: Klasteri i varijable*).

Sadržaj podeljen sa druge mreže na svom nalogu imao je samo Kembridž, mada u zanemarljivo procentu, što pokazuje da i Kembridž, kao i ostali analizirani univerziteti uvršćuju Instagram strategiju u svoj komunikacijski miks.

Tabela br. 4 - *Univerzitet Harvard: Klasteri i varijable*

UNIVERZITET HARVARD				
1. Percepcija objavljivanja	2. Menadžment imidža	3. Integracija	4. Interaktivnost	5. Elementi objave*
<i>1.1 Perspektiva</i> Zvanični/profesionalni materijal čini 75 odsto svih analiziranih objava na profilu Harvarda, a neformalni materijal oko 12 odsto. Preostali materijal nije bilo moguće uvrstiti među date varijable.	<i>2.1 Personalizacija</i> Objava se odnosi na više ljudi u 44 odsto slučajeva, zatim osobe nema u 31 odsto objava, a objava se odnosi na samo jednu osobu u 19 odsto slučajeva. Glavna osoba/direktor/rektor nije vidljiv ni u jednoj objavi.	<i>3.1 Hibridnost</i> Referirano je na nove medije: tag/haštag/poziv na šerovanje/sajt/yutjub kanal u skoro 40 odsto objava.	<i>4.1 Broj lajkova 464.437.</i> Harvard nije odgovorio ni na jedan od 80 komentara na svojoj objavama, a na svakom postu objavljujani su komentari publike.	<i>5.1 Vrsta digitalnog zapisa</i> Više od 80 odsto objava čini po jedna fotografija, a oko 20 odsto objava se sastoji od više fotografija.
<i>1.2 Emitovanje</i> Emitovanje je većinski centralizovano – 94 odsto, a odgovor se od publike očekivao u 6 odsto slučajeva.	<i>2.2 Privatnost</i> Na ovom profilu je odnos privatnog i profesionalnog izbalansiran u više od pola objava (56 odsto), ali u ostalim objavama nad privatnim (19 odsto), dominira profesionalni kontekst.	<i>3.2 Podeljeni sadržaj</i> 100 odsto originalni IG sadržaj.	<i>4.2 Sadržaj univerziteta</i> Skoro 70 odsto objava ima suštinsku vrednost, a oko 30 odsto je trivijalnost. Tonalitet je većinski pozitivan (81 odsto).	<i>5.2 Dominantni element objave</i> Većinski motiv je zgrada univerziteta – 31 odsto, a sledeći po zastupljenosti su sopstveni događaj i studenti – po 25 odsto. Na skoro 20 odsto objava dominantni element je spomenik kulture.
<i>1.3 Mobilizacija</i> Harvard je objavama uglavnom pozivao na akciju – u više od 88 odsto objava.	<i>2.3 Javne ličnosti</i> Javna ličnost je prisutna u 6 odsto objava.		<i>4.3 Sadržaj pratilaca</i> U skoro 60 odsto komentar je trivijalnost, zatim, samo emotikon 34 odsto, a suštinsku vrednost ima 16 odsto objava. Tonalitet komentara publike je u 78 odsto slučajeva pozitivan, a u skoro 20 odsto neutralan. Reakcija je u vezi sa prethodnim komentarom u 63 odsto komentara.	<i>5.3 Perspektiva elemenata objave</i> Dominantna je perspektiva „izbliza“ – skoro 40 odsto, a podjednako ima elemenata fotografisanih u širokom kadru ili u totalu – po 31 odsto. Grafike i tekstovi se ne pojavljuju kao elementi objave.

Klaster Interaktivnosti pokazuje nam da je najviše objava sa suštinskom vrednošću bilo na nalogu Kembridža, a univerzitet sa najviše trivijalnih objava na

profilu, Harvard. Obe objave na nalogu Zagrebačkog univerziteta imale su pozitivan prizvuk, a slično je i na nalogu Harvarda gde je više od 80 odsto objava pozitivnog karaktera. Univerziteti Kembridž i Kjoto su imali izjednačene procenete, polovina objava bilo je pozitivnog, a polovina neutralnog tonaliteta.

Iako na Instagramu ne postoji ograničenje po pitanju broja karaktera, korisnici pišu veoma kratke komentare (Manikonda, Hu & Kambhampati 2014: 5). Poređenje rezultata među univerzitetima Kembridž i Harvard pokazalo je da publika univerziteta Kembridž kao komentare u većini slučajeva ostavlja samo emotikone – 41 odsto, a Harvardova publika većinski ostavlja pisane komentare bez suštinske vrednosti – skoro 50 odsto. Tonalitet komentara je većinski pozitivan – na profilima Kembridža i Harvarda rezultat je prilično ujednačen – 79, odnosno 76 odsto, a na profilu Kjoto Univerziteta 88 odsto. Veći procenat reciprociteta pokazali su komentari na profilu Kembridža – 91 odsto, u odnosu na komentare na Harvardovoj mreži - 63 odsto. Komentari na mreži Kjoto univerziteta su 100 odsto u vezi sa komentarima koji im prethode i sa objavom univerziteta.

5. ZAKLJUČAK

U svom radu o univerzitetskom nasleđu kao marketinškom alatu, Bulotajtova (Bulotaite) navodi da je svrha razvijanja brenda univerziteta da komunicira „korporativni identitet“ u svrhu promocije privlačnosti i lojalnosti i da napravi jednu platformu za stratešku komunikaciju datog univerziteta, koja će je razlikovati od konkurencije (Bulotaite 2003: 450). U datom korpusu smo kod dva vodeća univerziteta primetili dve različite strategije. Obe institucije Instagram koriste kako bi vodile dugoročnu kampanju izgradnje, odnosno održavanja imidža univerziteta. U slučaju Kembridža, marketing se više pozivao na tradiciju univerziteta, arhitektonska zdanja i pejzaže. Nasuprot tome, najvažnija instanca kapanje Harvarda su ljudi – studenti, najčešće prikazani krupnim kadrovima koje prate njihove lične priče i zanimljivosti iz biografije. Ovi univerziteti u analiziranom korpusu nisu sprovodili kratkoročne marketinške kampanje u kojima pozivaju publiku na konkretnu akciju.

Kao što je već pomenuto, jedna od glavnih prednosti Instagrama je što „dozvoljava“ da se formalni sadržaji i institucije prikažu na neformalniji način i da se tako poslovni korisnici dodatno približe publici. Ipak, kada se sagledaju dobijeni podaci, vidimo da je perspektiva fotografija pretežno oficijelna – 51 odsto, a u 14 odsto slučajeva zastupljen je balans između formalnog i neformalnog

materijala. Takođe, više od 40 odsto objava odnosi se na profesionalni kontekst, a u 35 odsto objava je odnos privatnog i profesionalnog izbalansiran.

Analizirani korpus je pokazao da univerziteti još uvek pristupaju Instagramu delimično kao tradicionalnom mediju, u smislu smera i načina komunikacije. Ne koriste interaktivni potencijal mreže, a komunikaciju sa publikom karakteriše jednosmernost i centralizovanost. Da bi se povećao broj komentara po objavi preporučuju se visoko interaktivni elementi, poput konkretnih pitanja, ili anketa, jer je tada jedina forma odgovora – komentar (Vries, Gensler & Leeftang 2012: 89). Naime, nijedna druga karakteristika objave ne utiče na broj komentara (Vries, Gensler & Leeftang 2012: 89). Takođe, važno je istaći da postavljanje linka ima negativan efekat na broj komentara jer se korisnici klikom na link udaljavaju od date stranice (Vries, Gensler & Leeftang 2012: 89).

Ipak, primećena je tendencija upućivanja na nove medije, a plasirani sadržaj je u potpunosti originalni Instagram sadržaj. To što univerziteti na Instagramu ne koriste tradicionalne medije kao izvor, niti materijal namenjen za promociju u tradicionalnim medijima za objave, ukazuje na potpunu integrisanost ovog medija u komunikacijski miks, kao i na posvećenost razvijanju marketinga na ovoj mreži. Sa druge strane, nama geografski bliži univerziteti postupaju suprotno. Beogradski univerzitet trenutno nema aktivan i zvaničan Instagram profil, a na profilu zagrebačkog univerziteta tokom mesec dana markirano je svega dve objave, što je bio nedovoljan korpus za analizu. Nažalost, možemo konstatovati da pomenuti univerziteti ne prepoznaju važnost ove platforme i kasne sa njenom integracijom u svoje marketinške strategije. U rastućoj konkurenciji institucija visokog obrazovanja, za ove ustanove marketinško rešenje može biti uključivanje u nove komunikacijske trendove i iskorišćavanje prednosti novih medija.

Stefani Šovanec

INSTAGRAM: A NEW TOOL FOR UNIVERSITY PROMOTION

Summary

This paper presents an analysis of the use of the Instagram social network for the purpose of promoting universities. The survey included four Instagram accounts, selected based on the University of Shanghai's 2019 list, as well as on their geographical location. We analyzed the announcements on the accounts of Harvard, Cambridge, Kyoto and the University of Zagreb during the June 2019. The survey covered the entire publication - photos, videos and texts, as well as comments posted on these four profiles. The aim of the

research was to show how Universities present information online, and for what purposes higher education institutions use Instagram. The pace and quantity of announcements, the intensity and direction of communication as well as public interactions with the audience were analyzed.

Key words: Instagram, social networks, universities, higher education, public relations

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NOVE ULOGE I ODGOVORNOSTI VASPITAČA U PRIMENI RAČUNARSKIH IGARA

U globalnom, umreženom informatikom društvu kakvo je današnje svi pojedinci prinuđeni su da se neprestano usavršavaju, stiču i razvijaju kompetencije koje su u skladu sa opštim smernicama razvoja društva i učestvuju u tehnološkim promenama. Digitalna kultura kao odrednica profesionalnog napretka ne zaobilazi vaspitače zaposlene u predškolskim ustanovama. Shodno tome, vaspitači se nalaze pred novim izazovima koji se odnose na implementiranje digitalnih alata u vaspitno obrazovni rad. Imajući u vidu da edukativne računarske igre polako postaju sastavni deo vaspitno-obrazovne prakse, od vaspitača se očekuje da izvrši njihovu procenu i da ih na brižljivo planiran način primene u radu sa decom. Glavni cilj sprovedenog istraživanja bio je usmeren na ispitivanje stavova vaspitača o novim ulogama prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad predškolskih ustanova. Vaspitačima je ponuđeno pet potencijalnih uloga, kao i dva tipa podrške pružene deci predškolskog uzrasta od strane vaspitača u situacijama igranja računarskih igara (direktna verbalna i indirektna neverbalna podrška). Stavovi vaspitača analizirani su u odnosu na stepen stručne spreme, mesto rada, godine starosti i godine radnog staža kako bi se ustanovile tendencije koje nastupaju sa promenama u strukturi uzorka istraživanja. U analizi rezultata istraživanja dobijenih primenom upitnika-skakalera korišćen je kvalitativni pristup, dok su podaci dobijeni istraživanjem predstavljeni tabelarnim i grafičkim putem. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da vaspitači smatraju da je prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad vrtića uloga koordinatora aktivnosti dece najadekvatnija uloga koju vaspitač može zauzeti, a potom sledi uloga organizatora aktivnosti dece, kao druga poželjna uloga. Najmanje adekvatnom ulogom vaspitačice smatraju ulogu vaspitača-posmatrača aktivnosti dece. Kada je u pitanju tip poženje podrške pružene deci ranog uzrasta, rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da vaspitači blagu prednost ipak daju direktnoj verbalnoj u odnosu na indirektnu neverbalnu podršku.

Ključne reči: vaspitači, računarske igre, uloge, odgovornosti, predškolske ustanove, vaspitno obrazovni rad.

1. UVOD

Računarske igre pojavile su se pre skoro pet decenija (Sălceanu, 2014: 838) i postale neverovatno popularan vid zabave dece predškolskog uzrasta (Allazzam, 2015:16; Prot et. all., 2014: 109). Poslednjih godina, primetno je interesovanje za njihovom upotrebom kao alata učenja (Hsu et. all., 2017: 134). Prvobitne kategorije računarskih igara bile su dizajnirane u cilju zabave, a kasnije su korišćene i u obrazovne svrhe (Shelton & Scoresby, 2011: 119, 120). Dakle, vremenom su se menjale njihove primarne funkcije, te nas danas okružuje spektar računarskih igara koje mogu zadovoljiti interesovanja velikog broja korisnika. Činjenica da su deca ranog uzrasta verni korisnici pomenutog tehnološkog alata čini ispitivanje efekata računarskih igara važnim istraživačkim ciljem (Barlett et. all., 2009: 377; Prot et. all., 2014: 109).

Osim toga, uočeno je da naučne debate više nisu usmerene na pitanje da li je adekvatno da deca igraju računarske igre, već kako maksimalno iskoristiti potencijale i svesti na minimum negativne efekte igranja (Olson, 2010: 180).

Nesumnjivo je da računarske igre deci pružaju stimulativno okruženje koje omogućuje usvajanje novih informacija na zabavan način (Paraskeva et.all. 2010: 499), podstiče razvoj, motivaciju (Al-Hileh, 2013, prema Al-Hileh & Ibrahim, 2018 :1805), pažnju, razvoj inteligencije, memorije, logike, procesa razmišljanja i dečije mašte (Al-Hadlak, 2013, prema Al-Hileh & Ibrahim, 2018: 1806).

Takođe, smatra se da je primena računarskih igara, efikasan put ka učenju usmerenom na dete. Tačnije, implementacija tehnologije u vaspitno-obrazovni proces omogućuje vaspitačima da uspostave balans između motivacije dece ranog uzrasta za igrom i propisanih standarda učenja (Rogowsky et. all., 2018: 61).

Međutim, neretko integrisanje tehnologije u vaspitno-obrazovni proces zahteva napor, vreme i promenu tradicionalnih uverenja vaspitača (Clements, 2002: 174). Shodno tome, autorke Anđelić i Milosavljević (Anđelić& Milosavljević 2007: 495) ističu da je edukacija vaspitača preduslov razvojno primerene upotrebe tehnoloških produkata, kao u vaspitno-obrazovnom radu.

Prema mišljenju autorke Gligore Marković, razvoj računarske igre je složen posao i zahteva tim stručnjaka koji poznaju teoriju i praktične metode koje se koriste u razvoju, koji se služe profesionalnim alatima za razvoj računarskih igara. Proces razvoja računarskih igara obuhvata i druga područja (psihologija, sociologija i sl.), a ne samo područje informacione tehnologije (Gligora Marković i sar., 2013: 151).

Pored toga, od posebnog značaja je da roditelji i vaspitači imaju zajednički cilj koji se odnosi na pružanje informacija deci o adekvatnom i odgovornom igranju. Shodno tome, i programeri koji se bave produkcijom tehnoloških alata i njihovim plasiranjem na tržište imaju odgovoran zadatak koji podrazumeva eliminisanje potencijalnih negativnih efekata igranja na razvoj dece korisnika (Parisod et. all., 2014: 164; Starčević & Billieux, 2018:524).

Takođe je važno napomenuti da je prilikom dizajniranja računarskih igara za bilo koju starosnu grupu potrebno zapamtiti da su sve aktivnosti igara povezane sa detinjstvom zbog toga što je detinjstvo po svojoj prirodi orijentisano prema igri (Schell, 2014:102). U skladu sa tim, autori Ferguson i Olson (Ferguson & Olson, 2013: 163) ističu da je motivacija, potreba i sklonost dece za igranjem po svojoj suštini u potpunosti zdrava i razvojno primerena.

Na osnovu pregleda literature primećeno je da je većina istraživanja u oblasti računarskih igara usmerena na potencijalne negativne efekte i rizike upotrebe, kao što su agresivnost, depresija, socijalna izolacija i ugroženo zdravlje (Griffiths, 1997; Jamnik & DiLalla, 2018; Kühn et. all., 2019; Ostrov et. all., 2013; Sherry, 2001). Međutim, kako bi se uticaj računarskih igara na razvoj i ponašanje dece ranog uzrasta razumeo, potrebna je izbalansirana perspektiva koja se neće orijentisati samo na negativne efekte, već i na prednosti igranja. Iz tog razloga, u poslednjoj deceniji pojavljuju se studije koje dokumentuju benefite edukativnih računarskih igara kao što su pozitivna emocionalna, socijalna i kognitivna iskustva, poboljšanje mentalnog zdravlja i uopšte dobrobit dece ranog uzrasta (Granic, 2014:66).

2. METODOLOGIJA

Glavni cilj istraživanja bio je usmeren na ispitivanje stavova vaspitača o novim ulogama prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad predškolskih ustanova. Vaspitačima je ponuđeno pet potencijalnih uloga, kao i dva tipa podrške pružene deci predškolskog uzrasta od strane vaspitača u situacijama igranja računarskih igara – direktna verbalna i indirektna neverbalna podrška.

Shodno prethodno navedenom, u istraživanju su postavljeni sledeći zadaci.

1. Utvrditi koju od ponuđenih uloga vaspitači smatraju najadekvatnijom prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad

(kontrolora, koordinatora aktivnosti dece, posmatrača, tehničkog posrednika i organizatora).

2. Utvrditi koji tip podrške pružene deci u situacijama igranja računarskih igara vaspitači smatraju adekvatnijim (direktna verbalna i indirektna neverbalna podrška).

Specifične hipoteze formulisane su na sledeći način:

1. Pretpostavlja se da vaspitači smatraju ulogu koordinatora aktivnosti dece najadekvatnijom prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad.
2. Pretpostavlja se da vaspitači smatraju da je u situacijama igranja računarskih igara deci adekvatnije pružiti direktnu verbalnu podršku.

U istraživanju je korišćena deskriptivna metoda, kao i metoda teorijske analize. Prilikom realizacije istraživanja korišćene su tehnike anketiranja i skaliranja. Instrument RIUPU (upitnik i petostepena skala procene) namenski je konstruisan za potrebe istraživanja. Svaki od ponuđenih ajtema u skali bilo je potrebno rangirati brojem od 1 do 5 u zavisnosti od stepena saglasnosti, pri čemu je broj 1 označavao apsolutnu nesaglasnost, a broj 5 potpunu saglasnost.

U istraživanju je učestvovalo 188 vaspitača zaposlenih na teritoriji Srbije. Uzorak istraživanja strukturisan je na sledeći način: vaspitači su podeljeni u različite kategorije u odnosu na godine starosti, radnog staža, mesto rada i stručnu spremu. Podaci dobijeni istraživanjem obrađeni su u programu za statističku obradu podataka SPSS, a rezultati istraživanja prikazani su tabelarnim i grafičkim putem.

3. ANALIZA REZULTATA ISTRAŽIVANJA

U Tabeli 1 prikazani su stavovi vaspitača o novim ulogama prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da sa tvrdnjom *Uloga kontrolora je adekvatna uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.rad računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad* uopšte nije saglasno 4,8% a uglavnom nije saglasno 8,5% vaspitačica. Znatno veći procenat ulogu kontrolora smatra uglavnom (33,0%) ili u potpunosti (12,2%) adekvatnom. Ipak, najveći procenat vaspitačica (41,5%) jeste neodlučan kada je potrebno proceniti stepen poželjne kontrole dece, prilikom igranja računarskih igara.

Nakon uloge kontrolora, vaspitačice su vrednovalе ulogu koordinatora aktivnosti dece. Rezultati ukazuju na sledeće: svega 2,7% vaspitačica smatra da nije uopšte a 8,0% da uglavnom nije obaveza vaspitača da koordiniraju aktivnosti dece u situacijama igranja računarskih igara. Za razliku od njih, 34,0% vaspitačica je uglavnom, a 14,4% u potpunosti saglasno sa tvrdnjom *Uloga koordinatora aktivnosti dece je adekvatna uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad*. Kao i prilikom procene uloge kontrolora, najveći procenat (41%) vaspitačica neodlučan je kada je potrebno proceniti stepen poželjne koordinacije aktivnosti dece prilikom implementacije računarskih igara.

Nakon uloga koje podrazumevaju aktivno učešće vaspitača, ispitanice su procenjivale pasivnu poziciju vaspitača pukog posmatrača aktivnosti dece. Poput procene prethodno navedenih uloga, najveći procenat vaspitačica je neodlučan (44,1%), slede one koje smatraju da je adekvatno biti uglavnom (27,1%) ili u potpunosti (9,6%) pasivan. Najmanji procenat se uglavnom (13,3%) ili u potpunosti (5,9%) zalaže za aktivnost vaspitača prilikom primene računarskih igara. Potvrda prethodno navedenih stavova vaspitača jesu i rezultati vrednovanja još jedne pasivne uloge – uloge vaspitača tehničkog posrednika (preovladava neodlučnost – 43,1%, potom umerena (28,2%) i visoka saglasnost (10,1%) a procentualno zaostaju vaspitači koji uglavnom (15,4%) ili uopšte (3,2%) ne podržavaju ovaj vid pasivnosti).

Skoro polovina vaspitačica (48,4%) izrazila je saglasnost sa tvrdnjom *Uloga organizatora igre dece adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad*. Znatno manji procenat vaspitačica smatra da uopšte (4,3%) ili uglavnom (9%) ne treba organizovati igru dece, tj. inicijativu u igračkim aktivnostima dece prepušta deci. Prosek odgovora vaspitačica (M-2,70) pokazuje da one uglavnom nisu saglasne sa tvrdnjom *Pasivna pozicija vaspitača koji se ne uključuje u aktivnosti dece je adekvatna uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad*. Ovaj nalaz donekle ukazuje na mogućnost da su vaspitačice koje su visoko vrednovalе pasivnu ulogu vaspitača posmatrača aktivnosti dece, imale u vidu formu aktivnog posmatranja, koje takođe može imati pozitivne implikacije na razvoj dece. Pružanje pomoći deci prilikom igranja računarskih igara priznato je kao korisna aktivnost, delimično od strane 19,1 % a potpuno od strane 30,3% vaspitačica.

Analizom prikazanih rezultata, možemo ukazati na sledeće: Prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad uloga koordinatora aktivnosti dece jeste najadekvatnija uloga koju vaspitač može zauzeti (M-3,49), a

najmanje poželjnom vaspitačice smatraju ulogu posmatrača aktivnosti dece (M-3,21).

Tabela 1: *Stavovi vaspitača o sopstvenoj ulozi prilikom primene RI*

		1	2	3	4	5	M	sd
Uloga kontrolora adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	%	4,8	8,5	41,5	33,0	12,2	3,39	0,97
Uloga koordinatora aktivnosti dece adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	%	2,7	8,0	41,0	34,0	14,4	3,49	0,92
Uloga posmatrača adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	%	5,9	13,3	44,1	27,1	9,6	3,21	0,99
Uloga tehničkog posrednika adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	%	3,2	15,4	43,1	28,2	10,1	3,26	0,94
Uloga organizatora igre dece adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	%	4,3	9,0	39,4	34,6	12,8	3,42	0,97
Pasivna pozicija vaspitača adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	%	17,6	22,9	38,3	14,4	6,9	2,70	1,12
Prilikom igranja RI pružanje pomoći na zahtev dece obaveza je vaspitača	%	6,9	9,6	34,0	30,3	19,1	3,45	1,11
Direktna verbalna podrška vaspitača nužna je prilikom igranja RI	%	5,3	10,1	36,7	34,6	13,3	3,40	1,01
Indirektna neverbalna podrška vaspitača nužna je prilikom igranja RI	%	5,9	13,3	38,8	33,0	9,0	3,26	0,99

Na osnovu navedenih rezultata može se zaključiti da je prva hipoteza *Pretpostavlja se da vaspitači smatraju ulogu koordinatora aktivnosti dece najadekvatnijom prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad potvrđena.*


Nakon vrednovanja uloga vaspitača, ispitanice su procenjivale tip poželjne podrške pružene deci u situacijama igranja računarskih igara. Analizom proseka odgovora možemo uočiti da su ispitanice bile neodlučne prilikom procene tipa adekvatne podrške, te da blagu prednost ipak daju direktnoj verbalnoj (M-3.40) u odnosu na indirektnu neverbalnu podršku (M-3,26).

U skladu sa navedenim, možemo zaključiti da je druga hipoteza *Pretpostavlja se da vaspitači smatraju da je u situacijama igranja računarskih igara deci adekvatnije pružiti direktnu verbalnu podršku* potvrđena.

Grafikon 1 prikazuje statistički značajne razlike u stavovima vaspitačica u odnosu na godine starosti povodom tvrdnje *Uloga organizatora igre dece je adekvatna uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad*. Statistički značajna razlika ustanovljena je na nivou $p > 0,05$ ($p = 0,01$).

Možemo zaključiti da stepen saglasnosti vaspitačica sa pomenutom tvrdnjom raste uporedo sa povećanjem godina starosti: najniži stepen saglasnosti ispoljile su vaspitačice koje pripadaju kategoriji do 35 godina starosti (M-3,06) dok su vaspitačice koje pripadaju kategorijama od 35 do 50 i više od 50 godina starosti na identičan način vrednovalе pomenutu tvrdnju (M-3,54).

Dakle, organizaciju igranja računarskih igara znatno češće će praktikovati vaspitačice sa više od 35 godina starosti, u odnosu na mlađe koleginice. Prilikom analize vrednovanja adekvatnosti drugih potencijalnih uloga nije ustanovljena statistički značajna razlika u stavovima vaspitačica.



Grafikon 1: Statistički značajna razlika u stavovima vaspitača o adekvatnoj ulozi prilikom implementacije računarskih igara

Na osnovu Tabele 2 možemo uočiti da je sa tvrdnjama *Uloga kontrolora adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad* i *Uloga koordinatora aktivnosti dece adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad* najviši stepen saglasnosti ispoljila kategorija vaspitačica radno angažovanih na teritoriji sela (M-3,71 i M-3,61) a potom grada (M-3,36 i M-3,51). Vaspitačice u

prigradskim mestima uloge kontrolora i koordinatora aktivnosti dece u najmanjem stepenu smatraju adekvatnim (M-3,28 i M-3,23).

Tabela 2: *Statistički značajna razlika u stavovima vaspitača u odnosu na mesto rada*

	Mesto rada	M	sd	F	df	p
Uloga kontrolora adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	Selo	3,71	0,95	1,34	2	0,26
	Grad	3,36	0,98			
	Prigrad	3,28	0,90			
Uloga koordinatora aktivnosti dece adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	Selo	3,61	0,74	1,02	2	0,36
	Grad	3,51	0,94			
	Prigrad	3,23	0,99			
Uloga posmatrača adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	Selo	3,61	0,80	2,08	2	0,12
	Grad	3,15	1,01			
	Prigrad	3,23	0,88			
Uloga tehničkog posrednika adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	Selo	3,57	0,74	1,27	2	0,28
	Grad	3,21	0,98			
	Prigrad	3,28	0,84			
Uloga organizatora igre dece adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	Selo	3,52	0,87	0,12	2	0,88
	Grad	3,41	1,00			
	Prigrad	3,42	0,87			
Pasivna pozicija vaspitača koji se ne uključuje u aktivnosti dece adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	Selo	3,14	1,15	2,08	2	0,12
	Grad	2,62	1,11			
	Prigrad	2,80	1,12			
Prilikom igranja RI pružanje pomoći na zahtev dece je obaveza vaspitača	Selo	3,76	1,17	0,97	2	0,38
	Grad	3,42	1,10			
	Prigrad	3,33	1,15			
Direktna verbalna podrška vaspitača je nužna prilikom igranja RI	Selo	3,61	0,86	0,93	2	0,39
	Grad	3,40	1,03			
	Prigrad	3,19	1,03			
Indirektna neverbalna podrška vaspitača je nužna prilikom igranja RI	Selo	3,42	1,02	0,33	2	0,71
	Grad	3,23	0,98			
	Prigrad	3,23	1,09			

Takođe možemo uočiti da su uloge posmatrača i tehničkog posrednika vaspitačice na teritoriji sela najpozitivnije procenile (M-3,61 i M-3,57). Slede vaspitačice na teritoriji prigrada (M-3,23 i M-3,28) dok vaspitačice u gradskim sredinama pomenute uloge u najmanjem stepenu smatraju adekvatnim (M-3,15 i M-3,21). Stavovi vaspitačica kako seoskih, tako i gradskih i prigradskih sredina variraju od neodlučnosti ka umerenoj saglasnosti kada je u pitanju tvrdnja *Uloga organizatora igre dece adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije*

računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad – najviši stepen saglasnosti opet su ispoljile vaspitačice seoskih (M-3,52) a potom gradskih (M-3,41) i prigradskih (M-3,42) sredina.

Sa stavom da je pasivna pozicija vaspitača koji se ne uključuje u aktivnosti dece prilikom igranja računarskih igara adekvatna vaspitačice zapošljene u vrtićima gradskih (M-2,62) i prigradskih (M-2,80) sredina uglavnom nisu saglasne. Za razliku od njih, vaspitačice u seoskim sredinama ispoljile su neodlučnost (M-3,14) pri proceni. Takođe možemo uočiti da će prilikom igranja računarskih igara deci pružiti pomoć najčešće vaspitačice u seoskim, (M-3,76) a potom u gradskim (M-3,42) i prigradskim (M-3,33) sredinama.

Nakon procene tvrdnji koje se odnose na potencijalne uloge, vaspitačice su vrednovala tip poželjne podrške deci prilikom igranja računarskih igara. Kada govorimo o vaspitačicama seoskih sredina, prosek odgovora pokazuje da će ova kategorija ispitanica deci radije pružiti direktnu-verbalnu (M-3,61) nego indirektnu neverbalnu podršku (M-3,42). Takođe, vaspitačice gradskih sredina direktnu verbalnu podršku (M-3,40) smatraju adekvatnijom u odnosu na indirektnu neverbalnu (M-3,23). Za razliku od njih, vaspitačice u prigradskim sredinama blagu prednost daju indirektnoj neverbalnoj (M-3,23) u odnosu na direktnu neverbalnu podršku (M-3,19).

Tabela 3: *Statistički značajna razlika u stavovima vaspitača odnosu na stepen stručne spreme*

	S.S	M	sd	F	df	p
Uloga posmatrača adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	Viša škola	3,19	0,93	0,88	5	0,49
	Visoka škola	3,24	1,06			
	Uč.fakultet	3,03	1,21			
	Spec.studije	3,57	0,53			
	Master	4,00	0,00			
	Srednja SS	3,11	0,92			
Pasivna pozicija vaspitača koji se ne uključuje u aktivnosti dece adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o.r	Viša škola	2,85	1,13	1,13	5	0,34
	Visoka škola	2,48	1,16			
	Uč.fakultet	2,50	1,20			
	Spec.studije	2,71	0,75			
	Master	3,25	0,95			
	Srednja SS	2,44	0,72			

U Tabeli 3 prikazane su razlike u stavovima vaspitačica u odnosu na stepen stručne spreme o načinu na koji percipiraju svoju ulogu prilikom primene

računarskih igara. Na primenjenom nivou statističke značajnosti ($p > 0,05$) nije ustanovljena statistički značajna razlika u odgovorima vaspitačica na ponuđenim ajtemima. Na osnovu toga možemo zaključiti da stepen stručne spremne vaspitačica ne determiniše značajno njihove percepcije adekvatne uloge vaspitača prilikom implementacije računarskih igara. Uprkos tome, na osnovu rezultata prikazanih u tabeli možemo saopštiti određene implikacije istraživanja.

Sa tvrdnjom *Uloga posmatrača adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno obrazovni rad* jedino je kategorija vaspitačica sa završenim master nivoom studija ispoljila saglasnost (M-4,00). Za razliku od njih, preostale kategorije vaspitačica ispoljile su neodlučnost, počevši od vaspitačica koje su završile učiteljski fakultet – smer za vaspitače (M-3,03); vaspitačica sa stečenom srednjom stručnom spremom (M-3,11); višom školom (M-3,19); visokom školom strukovnih studija za vaspitače (M-3,24) i vaspitačica koje su završile specijalističke studije, a koje su ispoljile stavove koji se približavaju umerenoj saglasnosti (M-3,57).

Kategorija vaspitačica sa završenim master nivoom studija i pri vrednovanju tvrdnje *Pasivna pozicija vaspitača koji se ne uključuje u aktivnosti dece adekvatna je uloga vaspitača prilikom implementacije RI u v.o. rad prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno obrazovni rad* ispoljila je drugačije stavove od preostalih kategorija vaspitačica. Naime, dok vaspitačice preostalih kategorija uglavnom nisu saglasne sa stavom da je pomenuta pozicija vaspitača adekvatna, vaspitačice sa stečenim master nivoom studija ispoljile su neodlučnost pri proceni (M-3,25).

4. ZAKLJUČAK

Prva oblast istraživanja odnosila se na stavove vaspitača o novim ulogama prilikom implementacije računarskih igara u vaspitno-obrazovni rad. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da su vaspitači neodlučni kada je potrebno proceniti stepen poželjne kontrole i koordinacije aktivnosti dece prilikom igranja računarskih igara.

Slično prethodno navedenom, prilikom procenjivanja adekvatnosti pasivnih pozicija vaspitača ispitanici su dominantno ispoljavali neodlučnost. Uprkos tome, rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da znatno veći procenat vaspitača smatra da su kontrola i koordinacija aktivnosti dece od strane vaspitača poželjne u situacijama igranja računarskih igara.

Takođe, važno je naglasiti da podaci istraživanja pokazuju da se pasivnost vaspitača prilikom igranja računarskih igara smatra adekvatnijom u odnosu na

aktivnost. Međutim, imajući u vidu da ispitanici uglavnom nisu saglasni sa tvrdnjom da je pasivna pozicija vaspitača koji se ne uključuje u aktivnosti dece adekvatna, možemo pretpostaviti da su vaspitačice koje su visoko vrednovale ulogu posmatrača aktivnosti dece, imale u vidu formu aktivnog posmatranja koje takođe može imati pozitivne implikacije.

Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da je skoro polovina vaspitača saglasna sa tvrdnjom da je korisno da vaspitač ima inicijativu prilikom primene računarskih igara u vrtiću, a pre svega u vidu organizacije igračkih aktivnosti i pružanja pomoći deci prilikom igranja.

Ograničenja sprovedenog istraživanja odnose se na sam uzorak – ispitivani su isključivo stavovi vaspitača i upotreba računarskih igara u vrtićima. Imajući u vidu da se savremena tehnologija učestalo koristi i u porodičnom kontekstu, veoma je važno istraživanja koja će se u budućnosti baviti aktuelnom problematikom posvetiti ispitivanju stavova roditelja o upotrebi računarskih igara u predškolskom uzrastu.

Zorica Stanisavljević Petrović

Anastasija Mamutović

NEW ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRESCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE APPLICATION OF COMPUTER GAMES

Summary

In today's global society, all individuals are expected to continually improve and develop competencies that are in line with the general guidelines of society's development, and participate in technological change. Digital culture as a determinant of professional progress does not preclude educators working in preschool institutions. Accordingly, preschool teachers are facing new challenges related to the implementation of digital tools in educational work. Bearing in mind that educational computer games are slowly becoming an integral part of educational practice, preschool teachers are expected to perform their assessment and apply them in a carefully planned manner in working with children. The main aim of the presented research was to examine the attitudes of preschool teachers about new roles in the implementation of computer games in the educational work of preschool institutions. Preschool teachers were offered five potential roles, as well as two types of support provided to pre-school children by educators while playing computer games. The attitudes of the preschool teachers were analyzed in relation to the level of professional education, place of work, year of age and year of service, in order to determine the tendencies that occur with changes in the structure of the survey sample. The

results of the research show that preschool teachers consider that when implementing educational computer games in the kindergarten, the role of the coordinator of children's activities is the most adequate role that the educator can take, followed by the role of the organizer of children's activity, as another preferred role. The least adequate role of the educator is the role of educator-observer of children's activities. When it comes to the type of stimulating support provided to children of early age, research results show that preschool teachers give a slight advantage to direct verbal versus indirect non-verbal support.

Key words: preschool teachers, computer games, roles, responsibilities, preschool institutions.

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NOVINARSKA ETIKA U ONLINE MEDIJIMA - PRIMJER CRNE HRONIKE

Mediji, kako tradicionalni tako i novi, zauzimaju važno mjesto u svakodnevnom životu prosječnog građanina. Ovo se nameće kao logično s obzirom na činjenicu da se mediji bave različitim pitanjima, procesima i događajima u društvu koji direktno ili indirektno u fokus stavljaju javni interes. Ekspanzija onlajn medija, a posljedično i hiperprodukcija medijskih objava dovode u pitanje odgovornost i objektivnost prilikom novinarskog izvještavanja i kreiranja medijskog sadržaja. Odgovornost novinara bi trebala da bude usmjerena prema pravu građana da budu objektivno i pravovremeno informisani. Ovaj rad se bavi svojevrsnom kolizijom koja postoji između deklaracije i etičkih propisa koji se tiču novinarske profesije i primjera iz prakse. Termin „odgovornost“ u ovom radu se koristi u smislu ponašanja koje je propisano novinarskim kodeksima i literaturom koja se bavi normativnim načelima novinarstva. Cilj ovog rada jeste da ukaže na nivo odgovornosti i poštovanje etičkih normi novinara prilikom izvještavanja o događajima sa tragičnim posljedicama. Empirijsko istraživanje je sprovedeno po kvantitativnim i kvalitativnim metodama: analizi sadržaja te testom novinarosti na konkretnom slučaju još uvijek neriješenog ubistva estradne ličnosti iz Srbije. Korpus obuvata onlajn izdanja tri dnevna lista: Kurir, Blic i Večernje novosti koji su praćeni osam dana, a polazna tačka istraživanja su medijske objave od datum kada je estradna ličnost ubijena. Prema kodeksu novinara Srbije granica privatnosti je mnogo niža kada je riječ o javnoj ličnosti, ali to ne znači da ona ne postoji. Rezultati analize su pokazali da je nivo odgovornosti i objektivnosti novinara prilikom izvještavanja o ovom događaju sa tragičnom posljedicom na niskom nivou. Takođe, istraživanje ukazuje na to da se o događaju sa tragičnom posljedicom u kontinuitetu senzacionalistički izvještavalo.

Ključne riječi: novinarstvo, etika, odgovornost, mediji, crna hronika

UVOD

Živimo u vremenu medijske ekspanzije i brzom protoku informacija čiji smo namjerni ili slučajni konzumenti. Ekspanzija podrazumijeva pluralizam medija, koji bi deklarativno trebalo da doprinese višem stepenu objektivnosti prilikom izvještavanja. Ipak, posmatrajući medijske objave, od kojih se mnoge ne mogu okarakterisati kao vijesti, stiče se utisak da brzi razvoj i veliki broj online

medija u mnogome ne doprinosi objektivnosti već isključivo i samo hiperprodukciji medijskih objava čiji je sadržaj sve češće diskutabilnog karaktera.

Neosporna činjenica je da mediji u svim svojim oblicima zauzimaju važno mjesto u svakodnevnom životu prosječnog građanina što nije neobično s obzirom na to da se bave različitim procesima i pitanjima u društvu koja direktno ili indirektno u fokus stavljaju ljudska bića i njihove interese. Ljudska prava su svakako široka teritorija koja se kreću od prava na život i rad pa sve do slobode izražavanja na internetu. U nominalno demokratskom društvu, kakvim se smatra naše, brojna su prava koja bi trebalo poštovati, ali prava nameću i obaveze. Obaveze kreatora medijskog sadržaja je da poštuju novinarsku etiku koju podrazumijeva njihova profesija. Dakle, odgovornost novinara je usmjerena prema pravu građana da budu objektivno i pravovremeno informisani. Prva tačka Kodeksa novinara Srbije glasi: „Obaveza je novinara da tačno, objektivno, potpuno i blagovremeno izvijesti o događajima od interesa za javnost, poštujući pravo javnosti da sazna istinu i držeći se osnovnih standarda novinarske profesije“¹. Prema Deklaraciji o principima postupanja novinara (Nikšić i Davičo, 2005:13) prva i najvažnija obaveza novinara jeste da poštuje istinu i pravo javnosti da zna istinu dok Kodeks novinara Srbije takođe ističe da novinar ne smije zloupotrebiti osjećanja ljudi niti njihovo neznanje ili nesposobnost za rasuđivanje i dužan je da poštuje pravo na privatnost u izvještavanju o nesrećama, patnjama i bolu, te o djeci, maloljetnicima, bolestima, porodičnim tragedijama i optuženima, kao i prilikom objavljivanja njihovih imena i fotografija, pominjanja nedužnih srodnika i donošenje ispovjesti prestupnika. (29)

Prema Baroviću (2010) etika se najbolje ogleda u odnosu prema osobama u određenoj kriznoj situaciji ili incidentu. Svaki konzument informacija lako će uočiti je li se novinar prema osobama u određenoj kriznoj situaciji ponašao etično, odnosno lako će uočiti je li sačuvan identitet žrtve, vidi li se lice žrtve na snimci ili fotografiji, je li sačuvano dostojanstvo unesrećene osobe i slično.² Ovaj rad se bavi svojevrsnom kolizijom koja postoji između deklaracije i etičkih propisa koji se tiču novinarske profesije i primjera iz prakse. Pitanje koje se nameće jeste koliko su *online* mediji odgovorni i koliko poštuju etičke principe kada izvještavaju o događajima sa tragičnim posljedicama. Kada je u pitanju termin „odgovornost“, u

¹ Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije, Kodeks novinara Srbije, uputstva i smjernice <http://www.nuns.rs/codex/ethical-code.html>

² Barović, Vladimir (2010). *Objektivnost, novinarska etika i izvještavanje u kriznim situacijama*, Medijske studije,

ovom radu se koristio u smislu ponašanja koje je propisano novinarskim kodeksima i literaturom koje se bavi normativnim načelima novinarstva.

PREDMET ISTRAŽIVANJA

Predmet istraživanja ovog rada je analiza nivoa odgovornosti i poštovanja etičkih normi novinara prilikom izvještavanja o događajima sa tragičnim posljedicama. Ovaj rad prikazuje, kroz komparativnu i kvalitativnu analizu medijskog sadržaja, te testom novinarnosti, na konkretnom slučaju još uvijek neriješenog ubistva estradne ličnosti, nivo odgovornosti novinara i medijskih portala. U fokusu istraživanja su se našla tri portala iz Srbije, a to su Kurir, Blic i Večernje novosti koji su odabrani prema pretpostavci uticaja koji imaju u zemlju, a s obzirom na njihovu poziciju prema istraživanju o najposjećenijim portalima.³ U radu će se razmatrati odgovornost novinara za istinu, vjerodostojnost, blagovremenost, uravnoteženost kao i odgovornost prema javnosti kojoj se mediji obraćaju. Ovaj rad ima za cilj da uz pomoć pomenutih analiza ispita koliko prethodno pomenuti mediji objektivno pristupaju izvještavanju o ovom problemu, tj. da li je korišten novinarski jezik, da li su poštovani etički principi itd. Motiv za ovo istraživanje i analizu potiče od pretpostavke da portali Blic, Večernje novosti i Kurir prilikom izvještavanja o događajima sa tragičnim posljedicama nisu odgovorni i da ne poštuju etičke principe koje njihova profesija nalaže. Kako navodi Bogdanić (2015:8) „odgovorno novinarstvo“ bi se mogao smatrati pleonazmom jer novinarstvo podrazumijeva odgovornost. Međutim, budući da, čini se, ima novinarstva u kome je odgovornost upitna, onda ima smisla koristiti i sintagmu „odgovorno novinarstvo“.

U etičkom kodeksu novinara Srbije o poštovanju privatnosti ističe se:

- Javne ličnosti unapred su svesne da im je pravo na privatnost donekle ograničeno, ali to istovremeno ne znači da mediji mogu da ga krše bez ikakvog razloga i objašnjenja.
- Podaci iz privatnog života javnih ličnosti objavljuju se samo ukoliko je to u interesu javnosti, odnosno ukoliko imaju direktne posledice na više

³ <http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/RS>

ljudi, ukoliko su u suprotnosti s duhom funkcije koju ta ličnost obavlja, ili idejama koje javno zastupa.⁴

HIPOTEZA ILI PRETPOSTAVKA

U radu se polazi od pretpostavke da novinari medijskih portala Kurir, Blic i Večernje novosti prilikom izvještavanja i pisanja o događajima sa tragičnim ishodom, na konkretnom slučaju ubistva estradne ličnosti Jelene Krsmanović-Marjanović, nisu pokazali nivo odgovornosti koji se od njih zahtijeva, niti poštovali privatnost, integritet žrtve i porodice, a samim tim kršili etičke principe, onda kada to ni u kom slučaju nije bilo u interesu javnosti. Novinari i medijske kuće za koje rade u teorijskom aspektu bi trebalo da objavljuju informacije od opšteg društvenog interesa, tačne i blagovremene kako bi olakšali život pojedincu ili društvenoj zajednici, a nikako da budu senzacionalistički obojene jer samim tim dobijaju epitet neodgovornih medija.

METOD/VREMENSKI OKVIR

Detaljna analiza diskursa i sadržaja kao metod istraživanja gore navedenog problema, kroz vizuelni i tekstualni sadržaj poruke, prikazuju trenutno stanje kada je u pitanju etika analiziranih medija. U radu su analizirane objave na tri portala (Kurir, Blic i Večernje novosti) u periodu od 3. aprila 2016.godine do 11. aprila 2016.godine. S obzirom na to da je estradna umjetnica ubijena 3. aprila, taj se datum uzima kao polazna tačka u istraživanju, a period od osam dana kako bi se dokazale ili opovrgle postavljene hipoteze s obzirom na to da su medijski napisi u tom periodu, odmah nakon ubistva, bili intenzivni. Analiza je obuhvatila sve objave koje se tiču ubijene pjevačice u vremenskom periodu, a s obzirom na to da je u radu akcenat stavljen na kvalitativnu i deskriptivnu analizu medijskog sadržaja/objava, test novinarosti se takođe koristio. Test novinarosti je radni naziv komunikološkog modela koji je razvio Bogdanić (2010:133), a zasniva se na konceptualizaciji odgovornog novinarstva kroz aspekte odnosa prema stvarnosti, izbora vijesti i novinarskog jezika s obzirom na to da novinari učestvuju u procesu oslikavanja stvarnosti, kao što to rade glumci, pisci, umjetnici. Kada je riječ o kvalitativnoj, odnosno deskriptivnoj analizi sadržaja, parametri kojima se rad

⁴ Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije, Kodeks novinara Srbije, uputstva i smjernice <http://www.nuns.rs/codex/ethical-code.html>, preuzeto februar 2017

vodio su za etičnost: uvrede i netolerancija; nepoštovanje ljudskih prava; pristranost i neuravnoteženost; nepotpuno poštovanje etičkog kodeksa; poštovanje etičkog kodeksa, a za novinarski pristup obradi teme su izrazito senzacionalistički; senzacionalistički; djelimično senzacionalistički; pretežito informativan s nepotpunim poštovanjem pravila struke i informativan s poštovanjem pravila struke. (Zelenika, 2009, 338-340)

TEORIJSKI OKVIR

Kada je u pitanju rad u medijima, imperativ bi trebalo da bude odgovorno novinarstvo koje služi prvenstveno informisanju ljudi. Objektivnom informisanju. Naravno, sama riječ „objektivno” ne znači mnogo i definitivno je ne percipiraju svi isto. Prema Čupiću (2010:43) novinar pored individualne odgovornosti u građanskom značenju ima ličnu odgovornost u profesiji. On je odgovoran ne samo prema građanima kojima se obraća (publici), već i celokupnoj javnosti.

Tuđa tragedija u današnje vrijeme predstavlja nečiju priliku za veću posjećenost portala i naravno, u krajnjoj liniji, dobru zaradu, što je sasvim očekivan ishod u kapitalističkom društvu. Ipak, u tom začaranom krugu novinar bi trebalo da bude taj koji će biti medijator i podići odgovornost i svijest, objektivnim prikazivanjem događaja bez nepotrebnog ili u nekim slučajevima krajnje degutantnog senzacionalizma.

Prema autorima Nikšić i Davičo (2005:237), pravo na privatnost se često krši, čak i u zemljama koje imaju zakone koji štite privatnost, zato što je privatni život ljudi postao za određeni tip medija unosna roba. Žrtve su uglavnom javne ličnosti, jer pojedinci iz njihovog privatnog života povećavaju čitanost ili gledanost. U isto vreme, javne ličnosti moraju da shvate da poseban položaj koji zauzimaju u javnom životu - u najvećem broju slučajeva po sopstvenom izboru - neizbežno podrazumeva i veći pritisak na njihov privatni život. Dalje definišu da su javne ličnosti osobe imenovane na neku javnu funkciju i/ili osobe koje koriste javne resurse, a u širem smislu i svi oni koji igraju neku ulogu u javnom životu, bilo u politici, privredi, umetnosti, društvenim delatnostima, sportu ili nekim drugim oblastima.

Od medija se očekuje da iznesu potpune i relevantne informacije. Pri izveštavanju o osjetljivim temama, novinari imaju dodatnu odgovornost. Pod pretpostavkom da niko nema želju da nakon svoje smrti bude upamćen na nedostojanstven i dehumanizovan način jer je to napad na dostojanstvo, postavlja se pitanje da li je u interesu javnosti objavljivanje fotografija žrtve, šokom

savladane rodbine i prijatelja, njihovog doma i sl. Etika takođe ističe da se emotivnost potencijalnih izvora ne smiju zloupotrebjavati, a to je nerijetko slučaj.⁵

Prema dokumentima UN, odnosno Međunarodnim načelima profesionalne etike u novinarstvu, Načelo VI govori o poštovanju privatnosti i ljudskog dostojanstva: Sastavni dio novinarskih i profesionalnih standarda jeste poštovanje prava pojedinca na privatnost i ljudsko dostojanstvo, u saglasnosti sa odredbama međunarodnih i nacionalnih zakona koji štite pravo i ugled drugih osoba, i zabranjuju klevetu, ocrnjivanje, kaljanje ugleda i blaćenje. (Nikšić i Davičo, 2005:318)

Kako navodi grupa autorki rada „Umjetnost spektakla kao druga stvarnost“ neobično važna činjenica je spektakularno prikazivanje tragedija. U prikazivanju tragičnih događaja u suvremenim medijima kroz oblik spektakularnih dosjea uspijevamo dijagnosticirati utruće afektivnog odnosa prema tragediji. Uočavamo tendenciju gašenja empatije prema ideji žrtve. Proizvodi se ravnodušnost, bezosjećajnost, smanjuje se udio emocija u tragičnim prikazima. Uspostavlja se utruće konzumenta koji podjednako neaktivno prima tragičnu, baš kao i radosnu vijest. Letargičnost implicira tupost. (Pavlović, et al. 2013:186)

Što se tiče konkretne teme rada, u prilog o nepoštovanju etičkog kodeksa govori i žalbeni postupak u nastavku.

Petar Jeremić, član Komisije za žalbe Saveta za štampu, podneo je žalbu na osnovu rezultata monitoringa dnevnih novina, koji sprovodi za potrebe Saveta. On je zaključio da je u slučaju ubistva pevačice Jelene Marjanović u većini objavljenih tekstova prekršen Kodeks novinara Srbije, ali, kako Komisija ne može da se izjašnjava o desetinama objavljenih tekstova, izabrao je četiri, koja smatra ilustrativnim za sve zabeležene prekršaje. Jeremić je naveo da se u spornim tekstovima kao na moguće počiniце ubistva ukazuje na više članova porodice Marjanović, čime je prekršena odredba Kodeksa o obavezi poštovanja pretpostavke nevinosti, kao i odredba koja ne dozvoljava iznošenje neosnovanih optužbi i kleveta. Jeremić je u žalbi naveo i da novinari nisu pravili nikakvu razliku između prenošenja činjenica, pretpostavki i nagađanja, kao i da su svi izvori anonimni što je takođe suprotno Kodeksu, koji propisuje da je to izuzetak. Podnosilac žalbe je ukazao i na to da novinari nisu vodili računa o tome da dete ne

⁵ Barović, Vladimir (2010). *Objektivnost, novinarska etika i izveštavanje u kriznim situacijama*, Medijske studije,

sme biti ugroženo time što će na bilo koji način biti učinjeno prepoznatljivim.⁶ U obrazloženju jednoglasne odluke komisije o prekršenom kodeksu novinara Srbije ističe se da je Kurir prekršio sledeće tačke prilikom izveštavanja o smrti Jelene Marjanović: 1. prekršio je tačku 1, 2 i 5 Odeljka I (Istinitost izveštavanja, 2. prekršio je tačku 3 Odeljka IV (Odgovornost novinara), 3. prekršio je tačku 3 Odeljka VI (Odnos prema izvorima informisanja), 4. prekršio je i tačke 1, 2 i 4 Odeljka VII (Poštovanje privatnosti).⁷

ANALIZA SADRŽAJA

Predmet analize su bile objave na portalima Kurir, Blic i Večernje novosti u gore navedenim vremenskim okvirima, koji se bave slučajem ubistva estradne ličnosti Jelene Krsmanović-Marjanović. Pošto je u odabranim datumima broj objava o ubistvu pjevačice bio drugačiji, u obzir su uzete one koje su se preklapale na sva tri portala. S obzirom na to da su Večernje novosti imale najmanji, a Kurir najveći broj objava u odabranom periodu, istraživanje je prilagođeno objavama sa portala Večernjih novosti. Ukupan broj objava u navedenom periodu je 145, dok je kvalitativnom analizom i testom novinarosti obuhvaćen onaj broj koji se preklapao na sva tri medijska portala, a to je 12.

Testom novinarosti (Bogdanić, 2014:113) analizirana su tri ključna aspekta. Jedan je odnos prema stvarnosti i čine ga mjerila blagovremenosti, vjerodostojnosti, tačnosti, uravnoteženosti i potpunosti. Drugi aspekt je vjesnovrijednost koga čine mjerila izbora događaja i pojava za objavljivanje: blizina, opšti društveni interes, posljedičnost, važnost, nepredvidljivost i kulturološka informisanost. Treći aspekt novinarosti je izraz, odnosno novinarski jezik.⁸


Analizu započinjemo objavama od 3. aprila, kada su sva tri portala objavila vijest da je pronađeno tijelo pjevačice Jelene Krsmanović u mjestu Borča. Kurir se poziva na izjavu ministra unutrašnjih poslova koji je potvrdio da je njeno tijelo pronađeno, dok Blic rekonstruiše dešavanja tokom poslednja 24 sata njenog

⁶ Savet za štampu Srbije, <http://www.savetzastampu.rs/latinica/zalbeni-postupci/3709>, preuzeto februar 2017.

⁷ Savet za štampu Srbije, <http://www.savetzastampu.rs/latinica/zalbeni-postupci/3709>, preuzeto februar 2017.

⁸ Bogdanić, Aleksandar (2014), *Novinarnost: Jedan pristup analizi odgovornosti u novinarstvu*

života, a Novosti se pozivaju na nezvanične izvore i one „bliske“ policiji. Sve tri objave obiluju primjerima nepoštovanja etičkog kodeksa i pristupaju temi senzacionalistički, pa npr. Kurir, objavljuje ime maloljetne kćerke ubijene pjevačice, fotografije porodice ispred njihovog doma, ambulantna kola, a sve je to potkrijepljeno i video zapisima ožalošćene porodice.



meta-chart.com

Slika 1. Zastupljenost objava o ubistvu na analiziranim portalima od ukupnog broja

Blic kroz rekonstrukciju koristi opise i rečenične konstrukcije kao što su „jadno beživotno telo“, „gorke suze“, šok, kuknjava i tuga, a vizuelni elementi sadrže objavu fotografije patike i odjeću preminule, kao i tendenciozno i senzacionalističko izvještavanje o ubistvu „obavijenog velom tajne“.

Što se testa novinarosti tiče rezultati su sledeći, kriterijum odnos prema stvarnosti sa svim svojim podkriterijumima najviše ispunjava Blic (ocjena 2,4), zatim Kurir (1,95), pa Večernje novosti (1,86). Podkriterijum koji je ispoštovan od strane svih je blagovremenost događaja, dok nijedan napis nije dobio pozitivnu ocjenu kod podkriterijuma uravnoteženost ni tačnost. Kriterijum vjiesnovrijednost najmanje ispunjava objava iz Večernjih novosti sa ocjenom 2, zatim Kurir sa 2,25, a Blic sa ocjenom 3, a ocjene su poprilično niske jer je jedino podkriterijum

blizine donekle realan i ispoštovan, a opšti društveni interes, posljedičnost (mogućnost reakcije) i važnost nisu jer izvještanje o ovakvom tragičnom događaju ne može donijeti benefite društvenoj zajednici niti praktičnu korist. Kada je u pitanju novinarski jezik Večernje novosti imaju najvišu ocjenu 1,4; potom Blic sa 1,2; pa Kurir sa ocjenom 1. Opis, jasnoća i cjelovitost su podkriterijumi koji nisu ispoštovani jer se pribjegavalo romantizaciji događaja, dugačkim rečenicama, dvosimlenosti i sl. Korištenje epiteta uz žrtvu, „nesrećna žena“, detaljni opisi ubistva, ubodne rane, „citiranje“ petogodišnje kćerke govore u prilog niskim ocjenama. Dakle, prosječna ocjena za ovu vijest na portalu Večernjih je 1,95, Kurira 1,86 dok je na portalu Blica 1,53.

Druga vijest/objava koja se našla na sva tri analizirana portala 3. aprila je da je „Estrada u šoku“, iako naslov na sva tri portala nije isti, ali je tema objave reagovanje kolega nastradale pjevačice. Sva tri portala izdvajaju izjave kolega i njihove objave i/ili statute na društvenim mrežama koji opisuju svoje emotivne reakcije na saznanje o smrti njihove koleginice. Blic u naslovu navodi da su „Jelenine kolege u šoku“, a nju u samom naslovu opisuju kao predivnu, vrijednu, kulturnu i sl. Svoju objavu započinju izjavom Saše Popovića, a nastavljaju sa brojnim imenima iz estradne sfere Srbije. U naslovu Kurir opisuje Jelenine kolege kao skrhanе bolom i tugom, dok prema napisima Večernjih novosti kolege nisu skrivali suze zbog ovog tragičnog događaja. Osim izjava i objava kolega, akcenat se stavlja i na njene pauze u karijeri i privatne razloge zbog kojih ih je pravila, kao i ko je i kada kontaktirao njenog supruga povodom ovog događaja. Sve tri objave bi se mogle svrstati u domen pseudovijesti, a novinarski pristup obradi teme izrazito senzacionalističkim i pristrasnim.

Kada je riječ o testu novinarnosti, najmanju ocjenu je dobio Kurir (2,13), zatim Blic (2,2), a slijede Večernje novosti (2,6). Sve tri izjave bilježe najmanji podzbir u podkategoriji novinarski jezik ispod 2, s obzirom na to da opis, jasnoća i povezanost nisu dobili pozitivnu ocjenu Vjesnovrijednost takođe donosi niske zbirne ocjene jer ovakve objave nemaju nikakav opšti društveni interes niti važnost za ciljanu grupu čitalaca.

Analizu nastavljamo objavama sa portala koje datiraju od 4. aprila, a tiču se obdukcije tijela tragično nastradale Jelene. Blic u naslovu otkriva da je pjevačica ubijena sa 9 udaraca motkom u glavu i pozivaju se na „ekskluzivan“ uvid u nalaz obdukcije što dovodi u pitanje tačnost objave s obzirom na to da materijalni dokaz niti izjava nadležnog ljekara ne postoje u tekstu. Izjava koja se nalazi u tekstu, kriminologa koji s obzirom na broj udaraca zaključuje da je riječ o zločinu iz strasti je prejudiciranje i senzacionalizam. Večernje novosti u naslovu

„oslobađaju“ krivice supruga nastradale jer je prošao poligrafsko testiranje i time se stavlja u ulogu sudije, a ne objektivnog izvještivača. U nastavku naslova otkrivaju da je obdukcija pokazala da nastradala nije silovana, pozivajući se na izjavu njene kume koja im je to saopštila, što govori u prilog nepoštovanja relevantnih izvora i kompetentnih saradnika koji bi pomenuti naslov opovrgli ili potvrdili, s tim da se takav poštujući etičke kodekse o zaštiti integriteta nastradale ne bi tu trebao ni naći. Kurir objavljuje naslov „Jelena Krsmanović: Nije silovana“, dok se u nastavku kratkog teksta objašnjava da je smrt nastupila nakon nekoliko udaraca tupim predmetom u glavu. Vijest, tačnije objava, ne sadrži informacije o tome ko je uopšte Jelena Krsmanović, niti izvor informacije da žrtva nije silovana, a to vjerovatno pod pretpostavkom da se, s obzirom na broj objava na ovom portalu, zna o kome se radi i sl. Primjer nepoštovanja privatnosti i integriteta nastradale, senzacionalističkog pristupa koji ni u kom slučaju nije u interesu javnosti. Svakako da je tačnost sve tri objave diskutabilna jer prema etičkom kodeksu elektronskih medija (Davičo i Nikšić, 2005:40), izvještavanje mora da bude zasnovano na činjenicama koje su potkrijepljene dokazima, a najmanje dva relevantna i nezavisna izvora treba da potvrde informaciju prije nego što ona bude objavljena, što u ovim slučajevima nije ispoštovano.

Kada je riječ o zbirnim rezultatima testa novinarosti, o objavama koje se tiču obdukcije nastradale, oni izgledaju ovako: Kurir (2,42), Večernje (2,41), a Blic (2,53). Rezultati po kriterijumima posebno su sledeći – kriterijum odnosa prema stvarnosti na Blicu (2,8), Kurir i Večernje (2,6), gdje se blagovremenost bodovala prosječnom ocjenom, što znači da je relativno ispoštovana, dok su uravnoteženost, potpunost i tačnost bodovane niskim ili negativnim ocjenama, jer se izjave i izvori (ukoliko su navedeni uopšte) i informacije, svode na porodicu i prijatelje. Pri ocijenjivanju podkriterijuma vjesnovrijednosti prosječna ocjena na tri portala je 2, s obzirom na to da se može reći da je blizina jedini kriterijum koji je bodovan ocjenom preko 2, dok se opšti društveni interes i važnost za ciljnu javnost ne mogu pronaći, pa su bodovani niskim ocjenama. Novinarski jezik, na Blicu je ocijenjen najnižom ocjenom 1,8 s obzirom na to da su izostali cjelovitost, povezanost i jasnoća, a na Kuriru i Večernjim novostima ocjena je 2,4 jer su ovi podkriterijumi više poštovani, iako ne u potpunosti.

Objave/vijesti od 7. aprila o sahrani nastradale pjevačice našle su se na sva tri analizirana portala. Večernje novosti već u naslovu krše etički princip zaštite djece i maloljetnika i objavljujući ime kćerke ubijene pjevačice konstruišu naslov: Šta da kažemo Jani ko joj je ubio majku. Nastavak teksta uz fotografije sa sahrane koje jasno prikazuju kovčeg, ožalošćenu porodicu, opisuje „ispijeno lice Jeleninog

supruga“, „tihi plač“, „vapaje majke“, prijatelje u „crnini skrhane bolom“ i sl. Lični doživljaj i „količine“ bola koje autor u ovom tekstu nastoji da reprezentuje su vrlo subjektivne i irelevantne široj društvenoj zajednici. Ko je i koliko plakao, obukao ili nosio cvijeće ne poštuju kriterijume objektivnog novinarstva, niti čuvaju integritet žrtve i porodice (objavljivanjem fotografije mrtvačkog sanduka i sl), a postavlja se pitanje šire društvene koristi, koja evidentno nije motiv niti dio novinarskog pristupa koji se može opisati kao izuzetno senzacionalistički, neetičan i neobjektivan. Kurir vijest o sahrani formuliše: Poslednji ispraćaj: Ubijena pevačica Jelena Marjanović sahranjena u belom kovčegu. Kurir naglašava i to da svekrva nije prisutvovala sahrani, uz spekulacije o razlozima, a „podsjeća“ da je pjevačici smrskana lobanja, što opet govori u prilog neetičnom izvještavanju. Osim fotografija, Kurir svoju objavu „obogaćuje“ i video zapisom sa sahrane, pa se postavlja pitanje kršenja ljudskih prava, integriteta i zakona s obzirom da snimanje nije dozvoljeno bez dopuštenja. Prema Krivičnom zakonu (član 71.) Republike Srbije o neovlašćenom fotografisanju: „Ko neovlašćeno učini fotografski, filmski ili drugi snimak nekog lica ili bez njegovog pristanka, a pri tome osetno zadre u njegov lični život, ili ko takav snimak preda ili pokazuje trećem licu ili mu na drugi način omogući da se sa njim upozna, kazniće se novčanom kaznom ili zatvorom do jedne godine. Ako ovo delo učini službeno lice u vršenju službe, kazniće se zatvorom od šest meseci do pet godina. Gonjenje za delo iz ovog člana preduzima se po privatnoj tužbi“.⁹ Iako za konkretan slučaj kojim se bavilo ovo istraživanje ne postoji podatak da li je porodica nastradale Jelene pokrenula tužbu protiv analiziranih medija da bi se moglo govoriti o njihovoj krivičnoj odgovornosti, ipak ih to ne oslobađa „krivice“ za neovlašćeno fotografisanje i snimanje jer su time kršili etički Kodeks novinara Srbije i norme koje bi trebalo da poštuju s obzirom na djelatnost koju obavljaju i koja ih na to obavezuje. Blic vijest o sahrani formuliše na sledeći način: Stotine ljudi na oproštaju od ubijene pevačice: Anđele ko je smio da digne ruku na tebe. U nastavku teksta se ubistvo opisuje kao svirepo, prisutni na sahrani kao neutješni, a sama pjevačica anđelom kao i u naslovu, što se kosi sa etičkim principima koji pozivaju novinare da izbjegavaju epitete, pristrasnost i neobjektivnost što sudeći prema gore navedenim primjerima nije ispoštovano. Blic, kao i Kurir objavljuje video zapise sa sahrane. Novinarski posao zahtijeva da se posebna zaštita pruži žrtvama kriminalnih djela i nesreća, da obzirnost prema žrtvi i njenoj porodici ima

⁹Krivični zakon srbije, Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije www.pravosudje.ba/vstv/faces/docservlet?p_id_doc=3675,

prednost nad objavljivanjem podataka o njihovom identitetu ili njihovih fotografija, iako je riječ o osobi koja je bavljenjem svog posla postala javna, što znači da se u pojedinim slučajevima može o njoj raspravljati, ali poštujući integritet, što na ovom primjeru nije vidljivo. Blic takođe u ovaj tekst uvrštava senzacionalistički podnaslov o Jeleninim izmirenim dugovima u apoteci, pa čak i izjavu apotekara, što se u najmanju ruku može okarakterisati kao irelevantno. Kada je riječ o testu novinarosti rezultati su sledeći: Kurir (2,45), potom Večernje novosti (2,23), a Blic (1,83). Odnos prema stvarnosti, tačnije kriterijumi blagovremenosti i vjerodostojnosti su zadovoljavajući, dok se kao i u prethodnim rezultatima potpunost i uravnoteženost ne poštuje, pa je prosječan podzbir za ovu kategoriju sva tri portala 2,2. Vjesnovrijednost na portalu Blic dobija najnižu ocjenu (1,4) zbog izostajanja opšteg društvenog interesa, posljedičnosti kao i važnosti ovog događaja. Novinarski jezik na sva tri portala dobila ocjenu manju od dva jer su napisi puni zaključaka, klasifikacija, utisaka i nepovezanosti.

Tabela 1. *Konačni rezultati testa novinarosti*

Test novinarosti	Blic	Kurir	Večernje novosti
Odnos prema stvarnosti	2, 25	2,55	2,5
Blagovremenost	4, 25	4,25	4
Vjerodostojnost	2, 75	3,5	3,5
Tačnost	2,5	2,25	2,5
Potpunost	1	1,5	1,5
Uravnoteženost	0,75	1,25	1
Vijesnovrijednost	1,86	1,70	1,91
Blizina	4	4	4
Opšti društveni interes	2,75	2,25	2
Posljedičnost	1,75	1,5	2,25
Važnost	2,5	1,5	1,5
Nepredvidljivost	0	0,75	1
Kulturološko znanje	0, 208	0,25	0,75
Novinarski jezik	1,4	1,9	1,9
Opis	1	2	2,25
Jasnoća	1,8	2,5	2,5
Preciznost	1	2	1,75
Povezanost	2,2	1,75	1,5
Cjelovitost	1	1,25	1,5
UKUPNO :	1,84	2,05	2,10

ZAKLJUČAK

Činjenica je da se u ekspanziji i svakodnevnoj transformaciji kako medija tako i medijskog prostora, brojni kreatori sadržaja susreću sa raznim izazovima, kako bi osim svoje dužnosti da objektivno izvještavaju javnost o stvarima koje su u njihovom interesu, ostvarili profit, što veći broj klikova i sl. Jasno je da se pod kapitalističkim nebom svako bori za svoje „mjesto pod suncem“, ali cilj u ovom slučaju ne opravdava sredstva. Novinarstvo kao profesija, i prema etičkim principima podrazumijeva da se javnost informiše blagovremeno, vjerodostojno, tačno, uravnoteženo i da objavljene informacije imaju opšti društveni interes.

Tuđa tragedija u današnjim vremenima predstavlja nečiju priliku za veću gledanost, posjećenost portala i naravno, u krajnjoj liniji, zaradu, što je sasvim očekivan ishod u kapitalističkom društvu, od kojeg se online mediji ne mogu odvojeno ni posmatrati. Ipak, u tom začaranom krugu, novinar bi trebalo da bude taj koji će biti medijator i podići odgovornost i svijest, objektivnim prikazivanjem događaja bez nepotrebnog ili u nekim slučajevima krajnje degutantnog senzacionalizma.

Rad novinara kao predstavnika interesa „prosječnog“ građanina trebalo bi da počiva na etičkim propisima koje profesija nalaže. Neosporna je činjenica da brojni faktori utiču na rad medija, a to su ekonomija, obrazovanje i kultura, ali bavljenje tim poslom zahtijeva nivo odgovornosti i poštovanje ljudskog integriteta, naročito u slučajevima kada se izvještava o događajima sa tragičnim posljedicama. Online mediji kao i oni tradicionalni nisu izuzeti od poštovanja smjernica i etičkog kodeksa, iako je svijetu online novinarstva primjetan nedostatak zakonskih regulativa kao i primjena postojećih. Uprkos tome, stiče se utisak da su tabloidizacija, senzacionalizam, gubitak vjerodostojnosti, pad profesionalnosti te narušavanje etičkih normi i standarda sve prisutniji. Neminovno se dolazi do zaključka da je nivo odgovornosti za javno objavljenu riječ na vrlo niskom ili nepostojećem nivou, što se pokazalo i na slučaju istraživanja kojim se bavio ovaj rad. Iz ovog istraživanja se može zaključiti da bez obzira na kvantitet objava, Kurir ih je imao najviše, nijedan portal nije u svojim objavama poštovao pravo žrtve na privatnost niti objektivno izvještavao bez senzacionalizma. Iako je riječ o javnoj ličnosti, istina je da prema Kodeksu novinara Srbije granica privatnosti mnogo niža, ali to ne znači da ona ne postoji. Iz ove analize medijskog sadržaja je vidljivo da je nivo odgovornosti za pisanu riječ nizak, jer se može zaključiti da novinari nisu izvještavali odgovorno niti objektivno, već je jedan tragičan događaj senzacionalistički prikazivan u kontinuitetu. Rad se nije bavio motivima novinara ili urednika za ovakvim izvještavanjem, ali se samo može pretpostaviti da su

čitanost i zarada jedni od primarnih. Ukoliko izvještavaju o žrtvama nasilja, koje su tragično završile, novinari bi trebalo da poštuju integritet nastradalih i pravo na njihovu privatnost, a prije svega bi trebalo da budu ljudi sa sposobnošću empatije, a ne „lovci“ na senzacionalizam koji ni u kom slučaju nije u interesu šire javnosti. Dakle, edukacija i podsjećanje novinara na etičke principe koje njihova profesija propisuje jedini su način da se senzacionalistički kurs, kojim idu analizirani portali, nekad u skorijoj budućnosti promijeni. Jer jedino takve promjene mogu vratiti dignitet novinarskoj profesiji koji blijedi pod žutilom koje nameće kapitalističko i neobrazovano društvo.

Dunja Stanišljević

JOURNALISM ETHICS IN ONLINE MEDIA - AN EXAMPLE OF THE BLACK CHRONICLE

Summary

The media, both traditional and new, occupy an important place in the daily life of the average citizen. This seems logical given the fact that the media deal with various issues, processes and events in society that directly or indirectly focus on the public interest. The expansion of online media, and consequently the hyperproduction of media contents, raises the question of responsibility and objectivity in journalistic reporting and the creation of media content. The responsibility of journalists should be directed towards the right of citizens to be objectively and timely informed. This paper deals with a kind of collision that exists between the declaration and ethical regulations concerning the journalistic profession and examples from practice. The term "responsibility" in this paper is used in terms of the standards prescribed by journalistic codes and literature that deals with the normative principles of journalism. The aim of this paper is to point out the level of responsibility and respect for the ethical norms of journalists when reporting on events with tragic consequences. The empirical research was conducted based on quantitative and qualitative methods: content analysis and the journalismness test on the specific case of the still unsolved murder of a pop star from Serbia. The sample includes online editions of three dailies: Kurir, Blic and Večernje novosti, which were followed for eight days, and the starting point of the research is the date when the pop star was killed. According to the Code of Journalists of Serbia, the limit of privacy is much lower when it comes to a public figure, but that does not mean that the limit does not exist. The results of the analysis showed that the level of responsibility and objectivity of journalists when reporting on this event with a tragic consequence is low. Also, the research indicates that the event with the tragic consequence was continuously sensationally reported.

Keywords: journalism, ethics, responsibility, media, black chronicle

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POPULIST ARGUMENTATION OF THE BULGARIAN CANDIDATES FOR THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2019

The study aims to provide in-depth knowledge of the populist rhetoric of the Bulgarian candidates for the European Parliament 2019, reflected by traditional media, social media and social networks. The specific goals are the collection, the monitoring and the analysis of the electoral materials, produced for the election campaign for the European Parliament in 2019 by the political parties in Bulgaria. The monitoring covered the TV broadcasts, posters, press advertising as well as the official Facebook accounts of the Bulgarian political parties most relevant in terms of votes.

The findings suggest that active pre-election campaign does not always bring the expected dividends. The pre-election campaign in Bulgaria is held predominantly as a rehearsal for the upcoming local and optionally early parliamentary elections and is developed primarily online. Participants' messages are dominated by the national topics, namely welfare and economics. Important issues such as immigration, environment protection and security are marginalized. The insufficient public debate on substantial European issues brought about low turnout of the voters. Further, the political parties in the country are more likely to use populist communication before than after elections.

Key words: European elections, populism, argumentation, Bulgarian politics

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary societal developments impact almost all spheres of everyday life causing transformation processes in the technological, economic, and social spheres. These transformations also impact the political environment and the media ecosystem. The politicians adapt their argumentation rhetoric with the current events and crisis. In the last years, European societies are facing many precarious situations, caused by Brexit, "yellow vests" protests in France, widespread populism in Italy, corruption in Romania, social protests in Bulgaria, budget restrictions, migration, social discontent, etc. Recently, political communication include also ability to cope with global health threats as the new

coronavirus (COVID-19), to protect the people and simultaneously to keep the Government's trust.

Many of these challenges are strengthening the positions of Eurosceptics and revitalize the development of populist argumentation. The populism as a political position and rhetorical style has been object of comprehensive research and multi-faceted social discussions. The strong critical attitude of populists towards the status quo, towards what they regard as the chimera of democracy, is generally intertwined with the functioning of media as a corrective factor with regard to government authorities.

The prevailing approach to populism is as a threat to democracy. However, it is also viewed as an expression of democratic shortcomings. Positioned between the people and the elite, the nourishing element of the performances of the populist actors is the media. Today's changes in society are catalyzed not only by the functioning of traditional media, such as press, radio and television, but also by the opportunities of the social networks, as well as of the mobile electronic connections. In contemporary times when audiences have been transformed from passive consumers to active producers of media content, the significance of the political communication strategies has enormously risen (Peicheva & Raycheva, 2017).

Almost all of the Bulgarian scholars agree with Cas Mudde that populism is an ideology that places the people in opposition to the corrupt political elite, as there is agreement that it involves "playing the role of the ordinary people". Georgi Karasimeonov denotes three features of populism: emergence, organizational form and political practices. He points out that populism arises from mass discontent provoked by the crisis of the legitimacy of democratic institutions (Karasimeonov 2008). According to Daniel Smilov "populism is used to describe the process of backsliding from the achievements of liberal democracy made prior to the country's accession to the European Union. At other times, it refers to the emergence and growth of nationalist or radical right-wing parties (Smilov 2008).

In the context of elections for the European Parliament 2019, most of the candidates also use populist rhetoric and argumentation which generally places "the people in opposition to the corrupt political elite" (Cas Mudde, 2007). Nearly all parties in Bulgaria have displayed some populist manners and have flirted, to a greater or lesser degree, with the people, speculating on popular expectations and hopes. We could agree with the position of Atanas Jdrebev who defines the

populism as a way of political thinking, speaking, and action inherent in modern politics, which has the following characteristics:

- anti-elite – criticism of the dominant political elites as corrupt and their opposition to the ordinary people;
- anti-party – opposition of the traditional political parties as separating the people and hindering the materialization of its common will;
- anti-institutions – denial of the role of political institutions as a tool for making legitimate political decisions, representing the common will of the people;
- anti-democracy – non-compliance with the principles of representative democracy and their systemic undermining;
- anti-constitution – opposition to the principles of constitutional order;
- anti-plurality – rejection of the principles of political pluralism;
- demagoguery – populists speak what people want to hear;
- lack of a core of values, collaboration of populism with left and right ideologies;
- manipulation of public dissatisfaction in situations of unmet social and political demands;
- plebiscitary notion – insistence on frequent referenda;
- a charismatic leader to catalyze populist mobilization;
- usage of the resources of media democracy for direct and immediate communication between the leader and the people;
- opposition of ethnic minorities, immigrants and foreigners, etc. (Jdrebev 2016).

The study aims to provide in depth knowledge of the pre-election populist rhetoric of the Bulgarian candidates for the European Parliament 2019, especially because the model of democracy on the make in Bulgaria delegated the difficult tasks of transition to the political elite and eliminated the broad participation of the people in the process of transformation. Of research interest are also the democratic developments in the country, which marks 12 years of being a part of the European family in 2019.

METHODOLOGY

The current research is part of Platform Europe project, promoted by the University of Roma Tre, funded by the European Parliament (Events Category COMM/SUB/2018/E id. n. 0147). Documents and data available are part of a wider international research project started at Roma Tre University in 2009 and continued in 2014, focussing on the analysis of political communication in the European election campaigns. The 2019 research involves University and Research centres from all 28 EU member-states and more than a hundred scholars (Novelli, Johansson, 2019).

The comparative content analysis explores stylistic, verbal, visual and contextual dimensions that resonate with populist communication on printed (posters and press advertising), political commercials (broadcasted in TV or in public spaces), and social media contents (Facebook).

For these three different kinds of materials, three codebooks for analysis have been developed, containing common and specific variables, designed to explore the verbal and visual dimensions, through a qualitative and quantitative mixed methodology.

Aspects such as references to the nation or Europe; political or ideological anchors; communitarian elements; thematic issues; the prevalence of European or national dimension; presence of negative elements or satire; rational or emotional tone, are considered in the verbal analysis.

The monitoring period encompasses four weeks before the vote - from 28th of April to 26th of May 2019. The sample in Bulgaria cover a total of 263 (N=263) materials.

ANALYSES OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2019

The Bulgarian Election code sets the framework of the elections for members of the European Parliament from the Republic of Bulgaria. According to its Chapter IV elections for MEPs are manufactured under proportional electoral system with national candidate lists of: 1. Parties; 2. Coalitions; 3. Initiative Committees. Voters may indicate a preference for the order of the candidates. The MEPs from Republic of Bulgaria are 17, elected under the Hare-Niimajer method. The barrage threshold is 5.8% (Election Code, 2014).

The Bulgarian citizens who are 18 years of age gain the right to elect MEPs. The Bulgarian citizens who have reached 21 years of age on the election

day have the right to be elected as a MEP. The campaign is opened 30 days before the Election Day. No pre-election agitation is allowed 24 hours before the Election Day and on it. The rules for pre-election media campaign coverage are defined in the Election Code and are applied by the Central Electoral Commission. The State provides funds for media packages. The funds for the media packages are used to pay for the various paid forms of coverage of the pre-election campaign through media service providers.

According to Chapter 8 of the Election Code, during the election campaign, candidates, parties, coalitions and initiative committees may draw up and disseminate posters, references and other agitative materials. Each of them shall contain information that the “buying and selling of votes is a criminal offence”. In audio and audio-visual materials, this information is contained as an unambiguous and understandable message. The agitative materials are placed on the designated by the mayor places, and on buildings, fences and showcases with the permission of the owner or the manager of the property. Print media and online news services provide the same conditions and prices to all parties, coalitions and initiative committees that have registered candidates. The PSB broadcasters - the Bulgarian National Television (BNT) and the Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) reflect the campaign in the form of video clips, disputes and other forms. Both the public service and the commercial broadcasters may use paid and free forms of coverage of the pre-election campaign of the parties, coalitions and initiative committees. Results of opinion polls concerning the elections may not be announced before the end of Election Day (Election Code, 2014).

The main intrigue in these elections was between the ruling political party *Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (CEDB)*, part of the *European People's Party (EPP)* and the main opposition political coalition *BSP for Bulgaria*, belonging to the family of the *Party of the European Socialists (PES)*. Traditionally, a constant third actor as in all kinds of elections was the *Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)*, the political referent of the Turkish minority in the country and belonging to the *Alliance for the Liberal Democrats in Europe (ALDE)*. The coalition of the nationalists *The United Patriots*, represented in the National Parliament and part of the government, failed to maintain its unity and its three political forces participated separately in the pre-election race. Only one of them – the *Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO-BNM)*, member of the *European Conservative Reformists (ECR)*, took the fourth place in the race, followed at the fifth place by the traditional right-wing coalition *Democratic Bulgaria (DB)*. Although spending

a lot of financial and organizational resources in the campaign and significantly supported by Marine Le Pen, the leader of the populist and nationalist French National Rally and Matteo Salvini, the leader of the Italian right-wing political party Lega Nord, the coalition of the Bulgarian extreme right-wing, represented in the National Parliament, populist party *Volya [Will] – the Bulgarian Patriots*, didn't rank. The voting resulted in: 6 seats for *CEDB (EPP)*, 5 seats for *BSP (PES)*, 3 seats for *MRF (ALDE)*, 2 seats for *IMRO-BNM (ECR)* and 1 seat for *DB (EPP)*.

The electoral campaign for the European elections in Bulgaria was not very active. Although the campaign had officially to start on 26 April, it was activated after 07.05, due to Easter holidays (26-29.04) and the celebration of National Holidays: Day of Labor - 01. 05., the Day of Bravery – St. George's Day - 06.05., and the visit of the Pope (05-07.05). Also, the Election Day was the last of the three holidays (24-26. 05.) related to the celebration of the Slavic alphabet, but the electoral apathy was caused mainly by the ineffective pro-European debate.

Voters went to the polls for the fourth time since Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007 and for the second time it was possible to vote preferentially. 6 288 656 were those with voting rights. The turnout rate, however, at these EP elections was 32. 64% - the lowest one compared to that in 2009 (37. 49 %) and in 2014 (35. 84 %) (Central Electoral Commission, 2019). The EP'19 elections in Bulgaria displayed that active pre-election campaign does not always bring the expected dividends. *BSP* was the political party that mostly communicated its messages via Facebook, but failed to overcome the activity of *CEDB* and its leader among voters. Despite the massive and expensive campaign, the populists from *Volya [Will]* remained under the threshold. Facebook messages prevailed over the TV commercials, posters and printed materials. The insufficient debate on substantial European issues brought about low turnout of the voters (Raycheva et al, 2019).

DIMENSIONS ON WHICH THE CONTENT OF THE CAMPAIGN WAS MAINLY FOCUSED

A series of scandals has shaken Bulgaria on the eve of the European elections because of media information on apartments purchased at unusually subsidised prices by politicians and high public officials. European funds received to build "guesthouses", then used as holiday or private homes again by public

administrators, often behind the smokescreen of compliant companies, dummies, and relatives, also added flair to the scandals. Being a leading political power, *CEDB* suffered image damage at the start of the campaign due to accusations of corruption. The national and international activity of its leader and prime-minister Boyko Borisov, however, supported the positive pro-European image of the *CEDB* messages. That is why the withdrawal of sympathizers from *CEDB* was not transformed into a categorical superiority for the opposing *BSP* coalition, which repeatedly pointed out these accusations of corruption.

Additional difficulties in the left-wing political party strategic behavior were caused by its boycott of the Parliament for three months before the start of the campaign aiming to link a possible Euro-election victory with early parliamentary elections. These scandals redirected the pre-election campaign more to the national than to European issues. In this regard, according to Ana Krasteva, referring to the comparative study of populism in Central and Eastern Europe made by Jacques Rupnik (Rupnik 2014: 130) and of the three main features he defines, has concluded that Bulgarian populism is a typical example of post-communist East European populism, and is highly imitative. “Extremism is not a spontaneous internal attitude but is a learned political game” (Krasteva 2013: 11).

Further, the elements of left and right populism are hybrid in nature. In reality, populism in Bulgaria is neither left nor right, because some of the political parties falling under this category combine extreme left and extreme right practices along with hate speech.

The discrepancy between economic perspectives and reality, between political expectations and concrete policies, etc., as well as the presence of controversial evaluations of the transition to democratic society and market economy are the grounds of the varieties of political populism in Bulgaria and of the difficulty of building a relevant conceptual framework for the phenomenon. It is not accidental that the most significant manifestations of populist political actors, including in the media, have been organized after Bulgaria’s accession in the Euro-Atlantic structures and as a result of people’s disappointment in the effects of this accession (Raycheva 2017).

HOW EUROPE WAS REPRESENTED

The majority of the participating in the EP elections political parties, coalitions and independent candidates, as well as the Bulgarian citizens, supported the EU membership and the future entry of the country into Schengen and the

Eurozone. Although very small part of the population expressed its scepticism about Bulgarian EU membership, there were neither strong anti-European, nor anti-system forces in the country. Only *coalition Volya [Will] – The Bulgarian Patriots* of the monitored political forces expressed some scepticism towards the European agenda. Its leader, Veselin Mareshki, and his formation were supported by Marin Le Pen, the leader of France's far-right National Rally (formerly the National Front), and Matteo Salvini, Italy's deputy prime minister and leader of its nationalist League party. They all were promising voters a far-right bloc to overhaul the EU from within and their *Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF)* group to become the third largest party in Brussels. Despite the populist rhetoric and active anti-migration campaign, following the 2019 European Parliament elections, the *ENF* remained one of the smaller groupings, with only 58 seats (out of 751).

TOPICS

Regarding the topics of the election campaign the top three were: economics, welfare and Europe. Since the pre-election competition has focused mainly on national issues, political parties have emphasized on topics of the everyday well-being of the voters. Such important issues as immigration and environment were not quite important for the political marketing.

For example, a TV commercial with the participation of the European Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, Maria Gabriel, (*Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria - CEDB*) stressed on the positive future EU policies. The main accents were on the leading role of women in politics, the developments of the ICTs, the fight against the false online profiles and sites, the economic development of Bulgaria, the security in Europe.

The major part of the *BSP for Bulgaria* campaign was concentrated on accusing the governance of the ruling political party – *CEDB*. On a poster of the coalition *BSP for Bulgaria* besides its leading candidate, Elena Yoncheva, an inscription in red letters read: "What is happening in Bulgaria is *CEDB*'s capitalism, not market economy".

The slogan of the leader and leading candidate of the *Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)* Mustafa Karadayi was simple: "We count on the young".

In a TV ad produced by the *Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Bulgarian National Movement – (IMRO-BNM)* its leading candidate, Angel Dzhambazki, stated that the party is defending the Bulgarians in

Europe from the double standards in the foodstuffs in EU, the Istanbul Convention's provocations (using the controversial term “gender ideology”), the illegal migration, the religious radicalism, the outrage of marginal groups, and the the battle for hundreds of work places in the transport sector. “Every day is a battle and we must win. We defend Bulgaria!” was the slogan of *IMRO-BNM*.

Several billboards of *Democratic Bulgaria (DB)* coalition were located at the highway connecting Sofia and Thessaloniki. They addressed the Bulgarians vacationing in Greece. *DB*’s billboards informed the people that they could vote from Greece and showed the open election polling stations there on a map. Consequently, *DB* gained most of its votes from outside of Bulgaria, winning the vote in Greece.

In correlation with the bright promises given by some of the candidates, Svetoslav Malinov (2007) defines populism as a form of political thought and speech with a leading characteristic: constant appeal and reference to the collective image of the “people”. This characteristic is complemented by rhetorical features such as “offering what people want to be offered”, “brilliant promises”, “identifying oneself with, and speaking in the name of the people”; “labeling” etc., in the context of the propaganda techniques defined in the US in the thirty’s (Lee & Lee, 1939).

NEGATIVE CAMPAIGN

Hate speech was present to one or another degree in the messages of all parties in the election campaign. Aggressive vocabulary for opponents and indirect insult was also used. The hate speech, however, proved to be a non-winning argumentation strategy. Thus, the Volya [*Will-Bulgarian Patriots*] coalition ended up with no elected MEP, regardless of the funds invested in the election competition. The aggressive style of the campaign of the coalition *BSP for Bulgaria* and the internal contradictions of this coalition culminated during the definition of the electoral list, which almost led to the sensational exclusion of Sergei Stanishev, the leader of the *Party of the European Socialists*, also did not prove to be productive. Although the pre-election campaign of the coalition *BSP for Bulgaria* was most expensive, it did not win more MEP seats than its main rival – *Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (CEDB)*. These scandals overshadowed the debate on the major issues of the EU's future.

MOOD

The Facebook spots in the Bulgarian pre-election campaign prevailed over posters, commercials and press materials. Three were the political forces that built their pre-election campaign predominantly on Facebook: Coalition BSP for Bulgaria, the *Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Bulgarian National Movement – (IMRO-BNM)* and the *Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)*. *Coalition BSP for Bulgaria* won the first place in publishing Facebook posts. The political party, winning most MEPs seats – 6 - *Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria - CEDB*) did not use extensively Facebook. Generally, the mood of the Facebook posts was rather favorable and ironic/amused than angry.

CONCLUSION

The election campaign for the European Parliament 2019 in Bulgaria evolved away from the clash of different views on the future of Europe. It was held predominantly as a rehearsal for the upcoming local and optionally early parliamentary elections and was developed primarily online. Participants' messages were dominated by the national topics, namely welfare and economics. Important issues such as immigration, environment protection, security were marginalized.

The 2019 European Parliament elections in Bulgaria displayed that active pre-election campaign does not always bring the expected dividends as *BSP* was the political party that mostly communicated its messages via Facebook, but failed to overcome the activity of *CEDB* and its leader among voters. Despite the massive and expensive campaign, *Volya [Will]*) remained under the threshold. Facebook messages prevailed over the TV commercials, posters and printed materials. The insufficient debate on substantial European issues brought about low turnout of the voters.

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**BACK TO THE FUTURE OF JOURNALISM: CHANGING
TECHNOLOGIES, CHANGING JOURNALISM¹**

To properly understand the present of journalism and its future one must understand its past. Throughout modern history, the transformation of the technologies used in journalism has been concerned with issues of control over the processes that legitimate the production of knowledge, representing social life, and defining the limits of political participation (Hardt 1998). These issues continue to be relevant to more recent technological innovations in journalism like social media, drones and algorithms. As noted in critical historical studies of journalism, the primary approach taken by journalists (Örnebring 2010) and academics (Hardt 1990) to reflect on changes occurring in journalism has been technological determinism. By ascribing great power and independent agency to technology, the history of journalism has been seen as a linear progression characterised by transformation of the associated technologies. Such understandings of the journalism–technology–history relationship are accompanied by particular visions of the future of journalism. Throughout journalism’s modern history, from radio to the Internet, new technologies have inspired – in great techno-deterministic fashion – both dystopian and utopian visions. While the former contemplate the end of journalism as we know it, the latter celebrate the revitalised potential of new technologies not only for journalism, but for social life generally. It seems we are witnessing a reiteration of such debates with the rise of algorithms and Big Data in social communication. The main aim of the paper is to break down the historical complexities of the journalism–technology relationship to help explain the implications of algorithmisation (and automation as its apotheosis) for what and how we know via journalism and the ways that knowledge is substantiated. On this basis, I conclude by discussing the problems of the epistemology of journalism in today’s post-truth epistemic order and its strengthening implications for communication inequalities.

Key words: journalism, technologies, social communication.

¹ This paper is based on the plenary presentation of the Bridges of Media Education 2019 conference. Certain arguments presented are discussed more thoroughly in an article by Igor Vobič, Marko Robnik Šikonja and Monika Kalin Golob published in *Javnost–The Public* (2019, vol. 26, supplement). The study was supported by the Slovenian Research Agency, ARRS; Javna Agencija za Raziskovalno Dejavnost RS (Grant: J5-1793).

ALGORITHMS ENTERING JOURNALISM AND VICE VERSA

Algorithmic processes have recently been introduced in journalism and are utilised to gather and assemble data, create news narratives, figures or graphics, and/or publish and distribute news items with various levels of human involvement beyond the initial programming (cf. Milosavljević and Vobič 2019). Recent news media pieces reflect fears and hopes raised by algorithmisation in journalism and indicate that, alongside material developments, technological innovations always involve discursive processes that help re-articulate journalism's internal and external boundaries (ibid.). News media titles like *The rise of the robot reporter* (The New York Times, 5 February 2019), *The robot journalist: an apocalypse for the news industry* (Guardian, 13 May 2012) and *Would you care if this feature had been written by a robot?* (BBC, 30 January 2018) resemble what Matt Carlson (2015) calls the “technological drama” over the potential held by this emerging news technology with respect to the issues of the future of newswork, the rigid conformity of news compositional forms, and the normative foundations of journalism. While the accompanying visualisations of the drama are somewhat banal, where imagined social robots write on keyboards of the future or an enormously powerful machine is looming over human agency, the reality is unfortunately much more complex.

Among other human-algorithm based ways of creating news, ‘automated journalism’ is gradually becoming the norm in the news industry (Graefe 2017; Linden and Tuulonen 2019). Automated journalism relies on algorithms that convert structured data into narrative texts and adjust it according to audience metrics with limited or no human involvement beyond the initial programming choices (Carlson 2015). While today it still occupies the margins of the newsroom and is used for more routine tasks, such as sports news based on statistics, financial news based on stock indexes, or weather-related news based on various meteorological datasets, it is here to stay. The automated production of news is being normalised. The big players, global news institutions and news agencies (cf. Fanta 2017) have incorporated algorithms in machine writing to more or less supplement their human journalists. The machine news writing models used today are largely template- or rule-based systems limited in their complexity while their quite rudimentary designs are seeking to meet the emerging requirements of the ‘natural language generation’ in journalism, which includes transparency, accuracy, modifiability and transferability (Leppänen et al. 2017).

A growing body of research indicates that automated journalism – also known as ‘robot’, ‘algorithmic’ and ‘machine’ journalism – holds important

implications for the ideology and identity of journalism, the notion of news and its social role, newswork and labour relations, legal and ethical responsibility as well as for the epistemology of journalism. It is no surprise that scholarship has mixed assessments of these complexities – including conflicting ones (cf. Milosavljević and Vobič 2019). Some authors say that automation is creating the potential to ‘augment’ journalism by freeing journalists from their most tedious of tasks so they can dedicate the time saved to more complex work by helping newsrooms find stories through ‘data-mining’ and tailoring news of interest and relevance to certain niche audiences, even individuals. Some critical scholars can also be found that point to examples of deskilling and increased layoffs, unprecedented legal and ethical problems, the further commodification of news, and journalism’s further degradation with respect to non-journalistic digital modes. These problems suggest that further studies should not solely concentrate on the mere implementation of automation, but examine the history of technological innovation, its development and the ways it has been articulated in journalism in order to justify the patterns, relations and practices of news creation seen today.

In this paper, I thus do not enquire into how it is technologically possible to automate journalism or where the boundaries of these processes lie (cf. Vobič, Robnik Šikonja and Kalin Golob 2019), but consider the historical epistemological conditions needed to implement automation and how the epistemology of journalism is being rearticulated through algorithms. In the conclusion, I try to locate the problems of contemporary journalism in the context of establishing a post-truth epistemic order.

EPISTEMOLOGY OF JOURNALISM RECONSIDERED

The legitimacy of journalism is intimately bound up with claims to knowledge and truth (Ekström 2002). By (cl)aiming to be able to offer important and reliable knowledge, journalism is able to legitimise its position as a constitutive institution of social life. Knowledge claims are justified and legitimated within the framework of epistemologies. Here I understand epistemology in terms of institutionalised mechanisms of constructing facticity and legitimate ways of validating the constructed facts (Hanitzsch 2007). I tackle the history of epistemology of modern and late modern journalism in a changing technological context with respect to two fundamental dimensions: ‘objectivism’ and ‘empiricism’ (ibid.). The first dimension relates to the question of how truth can be attained, while the second is concerned with the means by which the truth

claim is justified (*ibid.*). Aiming to understand the implications brought by algorithms for news creation and journalism epistemology, I consider the construction of facticity in journalism through three ideas: journalistic objectivity, mechanical objectivity, and algorithmic and data objectivity.

ON JOURNALISTIC OBJECTIVITY–AGAIN

The first notions of objectivity can be traced back to the first half of the 19th century although, as a moral and political commitment, objectivity in journalism emerged in the 1920s and 1930s due a combination of political, economic, cultural and technological factors (Maras 2013: 22–57). The ideal of journalistic objectivity arose in a dialogue with developments both within and outside the news industry and fashioned by journalists relying on a combination of notions like common-sense, natural science and psychology (Nerone 2015: 167). Unlike journalists of the late 19th century, the new professionals “standing above the political fray” started to separate “facts” and “values” (Hallin 1994/2005: 22), or at least claim to be able to do that. This articulation of objectivity is grounded on the common-sense idea that senses enable us to be aware of the world around us, and to grasp the reality ‘as it truly is’, while demanding a reliable correlation between ‘value-independent statements’ and ‘mind-independent reality’ (Ettema and Glasser 1998: 152). Throughout the 20th century, this naïve realism continuously reaffirmed itself in the “hegemonic model” of journalism (Nerone 2012) – not only through blind acceptance but also through fierce criticism in the West (Glasser 1992) as well as often non-critical imitations, such as those in the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Splichal 2001).

The naïve realism of journalistic objectivity is enforced through the process of the construction of facticity, which occurs by way of the professionally validated combination of processes of journalistic work and modes of dominance that transform information into ‘objective’ facts (Maras 2013: 95). In this context, Gaye Tuchmann (1978a) writes about the “news net” that not only excludes some occurrences from being considered as news, but also orders the priorities by which the newsroom – with its bureaucratic editorial hierarchy – produces news items. In the act of judging the relative value of information caught in the news net, editors perpetually create and recreate negotiated standards of judgment. By applying their judgments, editors in turn reaffirm the validity of the news net as a frame that imposes order and coherence on the social world.

The internal fabric of the news net is what Tuchman calls the “web of facticity” (1978b) consisting of institutionalised strategies – such as gathering supplementary evidence, presenting conflicting truth-claims, using quotation marks – that are crucial for the validity and recognition of the facticity of news. Facticity also makes demands on language, turning it into a ‘game’ (Maras 2013: 9) in which journalists take a passive “outsider position” which – despite bringing together different information sources – demonstrates a “monologue” that speaks in the “ostensibly factual voice of the world” (Soffer 2008: 473). Similarly, Glasser (1992: 181) argues that objective journalism has “stripped reporters of their creativity and their imagination; it has robbed journalists of their passion and their perspective”. ‘Objective’ reporting has “transformed journalism into something more technical than intellectual; it has turned the art of story-telling into the technique of report writing” (ibid.).

In the setting of today’s “multiepistemic order”, all justifications and storytelling is situated and what appears as monological journalism is being increasingly disconnected from the people (Dahlgren 2009). The ideal of journalistic objectivity is waning as a strategy of professional and ideological legitimation, although its naïve-realist forms, relations and practices persist on a daily basis. While continuously rearticulated, the social and cultural patterns that developed in the wake of the 20th century are still relevant to how we think about journalism and how journalists think about themselves (Örnebring 2010). In the contemporary crisis of journalism’s authority, a growing variety of journalistic modes (Splichal and Dahlgren 2016) – from new quantitative forms of journalism, such as data-driven investigative journalism, to content farms producing sensationalist second-hand news accounts – is clinging onto the crumbling epistemological grounds of journalism. From the material and discursive aspects, in these desperate attempts of re-gaining, retaining or exploiting journalism’s claims to knowledge, new technologies are emerging as central anchors. As indicated in the introduction, this did not happen overnight.

(RE)CONSIDERING MECHANICAL OBJECTIVITY AND JOURNALISM

Throughout history, technological innovations have been adopted according to existing epistemological predispositions, and the epistemology of journalism has in turn been shaped by new technologies in specific political, economic and cultural contexts. One line of inquiry shows ambivalence toward new technologies in the news industry – they are understood as exemplars of

continuity, as bringing the threat of becoming subordinated, or as giving opportunities for journalistic reinvention (Powers 2012). More critical lines of scholarship argue that technological innovations have always been in the centre of the tense negotiations regarding social and labour rights and economic interests among media owners, managers and newswriters, while they have also been tied to issues of control over the processes of knowledge production and its legitimisation (Hardt 1998). What appears common to these lines of inquiry is the material power of technology, as symbolically reaffirmed through the idea of mechanical objectivity (Carlson 2019).

"Let nature speak for itself" became the watchword of the new brand of scientific objectivity that emerged in the latter half of the 19th century: "Where human self-discipline flagged, the machine would take over" (Daston and Galison 1992: 81). In their historical inquiry of scientific epistemologies of the imagery of the time (for instance, anatomy, astronomy, palaeontology), Daston and Galison (ibid.) identify both a positive and negative sense of mechanical objectivity. In its negative sense, the ideal of objectivity attempts to eliminate the mediating presence of the observer; in its positive sense, mechanical objectivity requires care and exactitude, patience and perseverance from the observer (ibid.). Carlson (2019) notes that the idea of mechanical objectivity, which contrasts the unpredictability of humans and predictability of machines, is traceable in journalism – more precisely in the process of the construction of facticity through the professional standardisation of technology use in the newsroom. In this sense, the construction of facticity in journalism is driven by two processes, by uniting machines and human agency (in a material sense) and by dividing technological objectivity and human subjectivity (in a symbolic sense). The paradox of the idea of mechanical objectivity is that the expert judgement of journalists gained through education and professional socialisation reaffirms the objectivity of technology. This paradox is embedded in the history of visual journalism – photojournalism is a good example (Tomanić Trivundža 2015; Carlson 2019) as are the most standardised ways of producing news in journalism's past and present.

I now briefly touch on the latter, more peculiar case. In the late 19th century, newspapers employed "scissors-and-paste men" who hardly ever left the newsroom and who, on the basis of their expert judgement, mechanically reproduced already published news, reports of public institutions or official statistics for the next day's newspaper (Jarlbrink 2015). This "clip and paste" method as it was known remained a constitutive part of the hegemonic model of

journalism and its construction of facticity deep into the 20th century (Breed 1955). With digitisation, the steel scissors have been substituted by a computer mouse. The new ‘desktop’ journalists simply shovel newspaper articles online or mimic news already published elsewhere –relying on a digitised version of “cut and paste” (Vobič 2013). With the standardisation of both ‘analogue’ and ‘digital’ journalism, mechanical objectivity is affirmed not only by diminishing the role played by human agency in newswork, but also through peripheral social status of newswriters operating with the technology. The old steel scissors were regarded as “no more than tools in the hands of editors” (Jarlbrink 2015, 284), whereas those wielding digital scissors see themselves not as true journalists, but as “recyclers” or even “robots” (Vobič 2013, 100–101).

The larger process of digitisation – despite its emancipatory potential – has not contributed to the revitalisation of journalism and its role in society, but the opposite. Tendencies to transform journalism to make it more productive have led to the impoverishment of journalism and journalists – mostly on its peripheries, but not only there (Cohen 2015). Various modes of “churnalism” (Johnston and Forde 2017) indicate the newsroom’s transformation into an assembly line, the degradation of journalism into information work, and establishing news as a cheap second-hand commodity. The lenses of mechanical objectivity help see the historical process of deskilling in journalism – not only “blue” but also “white collars” of the news industry are becoming replaceable by techno-savvy “prosumers” or even machines (Vobič 2015; Splichal and Dahlgren 2016). With ever greater reliance on algorithms and Big Data, it seems the idea of the objectivity of technology is not only being maintained, but reinforced in journalism of today.

ALGORITHMS AND THEIR VEIL OF OBJECTIVITY

Algorithms are used to create, connect and analyse huge data sets and are increasingly utilised to identify patterns to support decision-making on different societal levels. As such, they have recently taken centre place in creating contemporary communication environments and defining the character of social life (Boyd and Crawford 2012; Gillespie 2014). Also in journalism, new algorithmic modes are today being developed and implemented in news creation and distribution – from complex analysis of Big Data, the automation of editorial decision-making, nurturing interactions with audience members, and the personalisation of news to automated machine-written news. In this sense,

journalism is subject to the ‘logics of quantification’ as the algorithms and data that feed them are being enforced in the selection, creation and distribution of news with the purpose of supplementing, enhancing or replacing human labour. Like other technological innovations in history, algorithms are entering the established patterns, relations and practices of journalism, while at the same time what Napoli (2014) calls the “algorithmic turn” is adding to the re-articulation of objectivity in journalism and the corresponding process of the construction of facticity.

Although algorithms are continually evolving – through machine learning or human programming – the “promise of algorithmic objectivity” (Gillespie 2014) is crucial for their validity in social communication. This “carefully crafted fiction” (ibid.: 179) presents algorithms as both “distant from the intervention of human hands” and “submerged inside of the cold workings of the machine” (ibid., 181). What contributes to algorithmic objectivity is the “mythology of big data” (Boyd and Crawford 2012: 663). According to Boyd and Crawford (ibid.), the “aura of objectivity” surrounding Big Data creates a basis to claim that a higher form of knowledge is reachable through its deep analysis and identified patterns.

The negotiations of algorithmic objectivity may be characterised by the principle of “legitimation through performance” (Lash 2007). This principle states that “objectivity as an information process, a result, and a belief is the equivalent of legitimacy as the result of a form of belief” (Roberge and Syfert 2017: 8). Roberge and Seyfret argue that the strength of algorithms lies in their ability to project such objectivity to the world “out there”, while accumulating it “inside” the algorithms themselves. A similar point is made by Gillespie (2014: 179): “More than tools, algorithms are stabilizers of trust, practical and symbolic assurances that their evaluations are fair and accurate, and free from subjectivity, error or attempted influence”. In this sense, I argue that the rise of algorithms and Big Data in social communication and the processes of legitimating knowledge – for instance, in journalism and through it – is covered by the ‘veil of objectivity’. It conceals the political and economic interests of the inner logics underpinning the creation of algorithms and data, while also giving the impression of the immediacy, accuracy and directness of computational operations and their results. In the case of automated journalism, ‘algorithmic datafied facticity’ ‘is not constructed through what Tuchman (1978a, 1978b) called the “news net” and its “web of facticity”, but through a validated combination of algorithmic processes and new modes of dominance that transforms data into news as ‘objective’ facts.

Algorithmically converting data into ‘objective’ facts, as with the idea of mechanical objectivity, depends not only on uniting technology and human agency, but also on separating technological objectivity and human subjectivity, yet with a significant difference. While mechanical objectivity rests on a professional ‘journalistic judgment’, algorithmic objectivity is based on its replacement, or at least supplemented by the ‘algorithmic judgment’ (Carlson 2018). While journalistic judgment is justified by the institutionalisation of subjectivity through established patterns, relations and practices of the construction of ‘facts’ in the newsroom, the authority of algorithmic judgment is concentrated in the principle of legitimation through performance, whereby legitimation is no longer separate from what is legitimised (Lash 2007: 67; cf. Roberge and Syfert 2016: 8).

In this sense, it appears that we are witnessing the demise of the ‘objective reporter’ who spends most of their working hours nurturing relations with their information sources while relying on routines and schematic news forms to help them reach the deadline. Although journalists are increasingly losing control over their work (Slaček Brlek, Smrke and Vobič 2017), human agency is not obsolete—at least for now—because new profiles of newswriters—outsourced or employed—are emerging in the newsroom: a new breed of newswriters with an educational background in informatics or mathematics with little to no journalism training and experience (Pavlik 2017). They appear to be the flagbearers of the “post-human future of journalism” (Carlson 2017) in which humans are not to be completely displaced, but will appear as a hybrid state where human and algorithmic agency will be almost inseparable. As it is becoming ever more difficult to explain and understand algorithmic systems—for instance, those based on deep neural networks (cf. Vobič, Robnik Šikonja and Kalin Golob 2019)—it seems that the dissection of “human intentionality” and “material obduracy” (Anderson 2013: 1016) in algorithmic modes of journalism will soon become almost impossible.

The path toward this post-human future of journalism is paved by “the algorithmic sublime” (Milosavljević and Vobič 2019). We have identified its traces in certain leading British, German and American newsrooms where automation is not regarded as a sharp break but as an incremental development in the evolution of previous technological adaptations, particularly through the digitisation of work in general. Namely, automated journalism did not just appear out of thin air, but is the result of a cumulative innovation process institutionally managed in the newsroom over the last century or so. In this long revolution, the epistemology of journalism—its objectivism and empiricism—have been

continuously repaired and it is in these processes that conditions for algorithmisation automation can be found in today's journalism.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, I return to Henrik Örnebring (2010): “New technologies are adapted according to existing patterns, and these patterns are in turn shaped by a long historical process that has served to naturalize the dominance of technology over journalism”. As the case of machine written news shows, the more recent epistemological repair work on journalism confirms this Örnebring's synthesis. The ‘old’ problems of objectivity in journalism not only remain the same, but appear to be becoming deeper with algorithms, Big Data and automation in these post-truth days. It seems that the increasing variety of modes of journalism – such as data journalism, computational journalism and automated journalism – are unable to provide a proper response to the steady crumbling of the dominant epistemic order based on the Enlightenment principles of reason (cf. Waisbord 2018).

Namely, historically developed objectivism and empiricism re-articulated through technological innovation appear to fall short of the post-truth information ecology and its epistemological vagueness reflected in ‘fake news’ on social media, ‘bullshit’ in political communication, and ‘deepfakes’ that bridge the boundaries of public/private domains. We are all faced with the almost impossible task of creating informed opinions and making decisions based on them – journalism as it is conceived and justified today needs to be rethought, retold and transformed.

In this sense, I argue that post-objectivity would help journalists re-build the purpose of journalism on a Habermasian concept of “solidarity” as a “standard of performance to guide journalists by insisting on insight into others as a goal of good reporting” (Ettema and Glasser 1998: 201). Promotion of the sense of “ours” and trying to nurture the “journalism of conversation” (ibid.:201) will allow journalists to leave behind the persistent idea of naïve-relativist monological journalism that truth is “unilaterally decided by newsrooms” rather than being an “outcome of collective sense-making” (Waisbord 2018: 8).

However, it is hard to imagine revitalising journalism's connection with people without any greater social changes. Capitalist social relations have throughout history subverted the emancipatory potential of new technologies to suit the interests of those holding political and economic power (Splichal 2015).

This is evident in both the history of newswork and the present era of algorithms and fake news that only reproduce social inequalities. These and other changes cannot simply be imposed on journalism; they must (r)evolve in society if they are to have lasting effects.

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DIGITALNO-HERMENEUTIČKO STAPANJE HORIZONATA VEBA 3.0, VELIKIH PODATAKA I POTENCIJALA MREŽNE NAUKE I TEORIJE KOMPLEKSNOSTI IZ PERSPEKTIVE KOLEKTIVNE INTELIGENCIJE¹

Napredak internet tehnologija u poslednjoj dekadi 20. veka omogućio je neka od krucijalnih otkrića o infrastrukturi svetske mreže (*World Wide Web-a*) i obezbedio čvrst osnov za serije empirijskih studija u području novoustanovljene mrežne nauke, vođene kanonskim slučajevima „malog sveta” i „skalno slobodnih” topologija, dokumentovanih kod velikog broja fizičkih, bioloških i društvenih mreža (kao npr. dalekovoda električne energije, sinaptičkih projekcija u neuronskim kolima, obrazaca sinhronizacije rojeva insekata ili distribucije prihoda kod funkcionalno raznolikih poslovnih ekosistema). Istovremeno, evoluiranje pojmovne aparature teorije kompleksnosti pružilo je nove uvide o značaju lokalne konektivnosti za rezilijenciju kompleksnih adaptivnih sistema, što bi moglo biti implementirano kroz budući progres Veb 3.0 standarda, „interneta stvari” i raznovrsnih platformi fokusiranih na benefite kolektivne inteligencije. Cilj ovog članka jeste da rasvetli taj razvoj Veba 3.0, velikih podataka i potencijala mrežne nauke i teorije kompleksnosti sa specifične tačke gledišta kolektivne inteligencije, na bazi ranije spomenutih topoloških „potpisa” koji dopuštaju spontano iskršavanje kako veoma diferenciranih odgovora mreže na stimuluse iz okruženja, usled „visokog koeficijenta grupisanja” (tj. mnoštva proksimalnih „jakih” veza između elemenata), tako i rapidne globalne koordinacije tih odgovora, usled „niskog prosečnog stupnja razdvojenosti elemenata” (zahvaljujući izvesnom broju distalnih „slabih” veza ili nasumičnih „mostova” između grupa) – neki aktuelni trendovi kao što je širenje arhitektura „pametnih gradova”, isto bi mogli biti poučni u razumevanju univerzalne strukture ovih fenomena.

Ključne reči: Veb 3.0, mrežna nauka, teorija kompleksnosti, kolektivna inteligencija, veliki podaci, „mali svet” i „skalno slobodna” topologija, digitalna hermeneutika

¹ Ovaj rad je u sklopu naučno-istraživačkih projekata *Digitalne medijske tehnologije i društveno-obrazovne promene* i *Kvalitet obrazovnog sistema Srbije u evropskoj perspektivi*, finansiranih od strane Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja.

1. VEB 3.0, VELIKI PODACI I MREŽNA NAUKA

Internet, kao globalni sistem međupovezanih kompjuterskih mreža realizovan spojem raznolikih komunikacionih protokola, tokom devedesetih godina minulog veka prolazi etape integracionih tendencija usled „informacione revolucije svetske mreže” (*World Wide Web-a*), bazirane na primeni „uniformnog lokatora resursa” (*URL-a*) u sintaksi adresiranja veb-strana i mogućnostima njihovog interaktivnog ulančavanja posredstvom „hipertekstualnih linkova” – početkom novog milenijuma, fokus medijsko-teorijskih (kao i marketinško-konsultantskih) ekspertskih krugova pomicao se u smeru konceptualizovanja novih socijalno-participativnih manifestacija Veba 2.0 i erupcija korisnički generisanih sadržaja na originalnim formatima društvenih medija, blogova, vikija, podkasta i video hosting servisa (uz to je njihov podsticaj vizijama „otvorenog identiteta” pokrenuo i važna poglavlja u oblasti „sajber bezbednosti”), dočim se umnogom paralelno razvijanje semantičkog Veba 3.0 očitava kroz uspostavljanje opštih standarda obrade, razmene i protoka sve obimnijih podataka između personalizovanih softverskih aplikacija i oniprezentnih hardverskih uređaja, pri čemu se intenzivna ugradnja virtuelnog u realni prostor stilizuje i frazama poput „interneta stvari” ili „pametnih gradova”. Veb 3.0 ubrzano afirmiše paradigmatški status delom i zahvaljujući produbljenu interakcije prirodne i veštačke inteligencije – tzv. „duboko strukturno” tj. hijerarhijsko mašinsko učenje projektovano je po modelima „rekurentnih neuronskih mreža” (gde mogućnost cikličnih veza čvorova na različitim nivoima dopušta i treninge mehanizma povratne sprege, koji emuliraju procese bioloških mozgova – npr. redukciju margine greške na bazi implicitnih procedura), dok razmatrane inkarnacije mnoštva kognitivnih algoritama i „autonomnih delatnika” unutar koordinata informacione sfere, bivaju vođene operacionalizacijama „semantičkih mreža” kao reprezentacionih sistema zasnovanih na primeni matematičkih principa teorije grafova zarad „kartografije značenjskih polja i relacija među pojmovima” (izvorno namenjenih konstrukciji „interlingvalnih” mostova između prirodnih jezika, ali podjednako upotrebljivih u kontekstu imperativa standardizacije deskriptivne semantike „metapodataka” – pa čak i premošćavanja „jaza generalizovanih i specijalizovanih nauka”) (Berners-Lee, Hendler & Lassila, 2001: 38).

Razvoj analitike „velikih podataka” (iz ekonomske vizure često portretisanih u svetlu „novog crnog zlata”) takođe galvanizira vitalne impulse dugoročnih trendova razgranavanja svetske mreže kroz ostvarivanje šireg pristupa nepreglednim oblastima tzv. „dubokog veba”, čiji sadržaji nisu indeksirani klasičnim pretraživačima (i sem teško pristupačnih „sivih zona”, poput legalno

zaštićenih državnih, korporativnih i privatnih dokumenata, uključuju i mahom ilegalni stratum „mračnog veba“, gde tehnike anonimizacije IP adresa korisnika mogu služiti kao magnet za brojne kriminalne aktivnosti), a modeli distribuiranih baza podataka etabrirani pod izrazom „blokčejn“ (odskora čak i unutar „decentralizovanih autonomnih organizacija“²) otvaraju nove izgleda suzbijanja monopola, kao i asimetrije odnosa moći privatnih korisnika i velikih kompanija tj. panoptičkih servera/data-centara. Prvobitne kritike utopijskih aspekata semantičkog veba od starta prošle decenije akcentovale su iluzornost napora ka izgrađivanju jedinstvenog značenjskog okvira ljudskih opisa virtuelnog ili realnog sveta, problematizujući subjektivni „perspektivizam“ klasifikacija u formi neutralnih „(meta)podataka o podacima“ i njihovu podložnost haosu pragmatičkih igri i samopromotivnih oznaka (Doctorow, 2001: §2): pozitivan obrt tog uvida zapravo bi mogao ići u prilog i tezi da savremeni kontekst Veba 3.0 (tj. usložnjavanje interakcije elemenata poput grafičkih okruženja augmentovane/miksovane realnosti, 3D printa, hiperkonektivnosti mnoštva stacionarnih i mobilnih uređaja ili formula skokovitih preobražaja „kvantitativne metrike“ u „kvalitativnu obradu“ jezičkih informacija) doseže kritični stadijum „nelinearne“ dinamike, „organskog“ razvoja i „negativne“ entropije.³ Veliki podaci, koji tokom ove decenije postaju okosnica tog novog koncepta veba, najpre su definisani obeležjima „zapremine, varijabilnosti i učestalosti“ produkcije, da bi zatim potreba za optimalnim iskorišćavanjem njenih proporcija usloвила razvoj čitave „nauke o podacima“, zaokupirane sa postupcima njihovog rudarenja, pročišćavanja, strukturiranja, modelovanja, vizualizovanja i disemeniranja: etičke dileme oko masovne upotrebe ovih tehnoloških alatki, svrstavaju ih pak u Platonovu kategoriju „farmakona“ (*φάρμακον*) tj. mogućeg leka ili otrova u zavisnosti od načina korišćenja (Stigler, 2016: 11), zbog čega bi jednostrano fokusiranje na totalitarne potencijale socijalnog nadzora i kontrole maskirane plaštom „šljaštećih“ inovacija, trebalo da ustupi mesta vedrijoj perspektivi usled mogućnosti novih vrsta naučnog progressa, kvantifikativno vođenim pregledima kombinatorinih obrazaca duž velikih skupova podataka – pomeranje sa

² DAO po uzoru kriptovaluta poput bitkojna koriste blokčejn tehnologiju „razmeštene ireverzibilne datoteke“ – lanca svih transakcionih aktivnosti, ali u funkciji osiguravanja ravnopravnog „orkestriranja“ evolucije ustanova na bazi kredita koji korisnici daju različitim idejama, pa se autoregulatorni procesi vrše bez „centralne uprave“.

³ Šredinger je tom vrstom konceptualnog aparata iz ugla fizike karakterisao „vitalni napon“ bioloških stvorenja.

reduktivno-scijentističkih metoda detekcije kauzalnih veza „odozgo-nadole“ na integrativno-holistički manir propitivanja korelacije među fenomenima „odozdo-nagore“,⁴ trasira se u opsegu od bioinformatičkih pristupa mapiranju/sekvenciranju/editovanju genoma do neuronaučnih tehnika simulacije funkcionalne i strukturne konektomike nervnog sistema.

„Digitalna hermeneutika“⁵ bi u razvoju gledišta o kontinuiranom stapanju horizonata i uzajamnom preplitanju organskih i mehaničkih tumačenja inteligencije (u post-humanoj eri praktčnih realizacija prvih direktnih kontakata između neuronskih i kompjuterskih interfejsa – i uz sve dosežnije izgleda „brisanja granica spoljašnjeg i unutrašnjeg sveta ljudske svesti“), mogla da se posluži i uvidima „mrežne nauke“ o univerzalnim regularnostima veza u prirodi, koje su dokumentovane na širokoj lepezi fizičkih, bioloških i društvenih ravni umrežavanja: nasuprot očekivanjima da bi sve velike mreže sačinjene nasumičnim povezivanjem čvorova⁶ po zakonu verovatnoće trebalo da prate „normalnu distribuciju“ tj. „zvonastu Gausovu krivu“ (koja vrhuni u nekoj prosečnoj vrednosti uz leve i desne varijacije tj. „standardne devijacije“) kad se radi o raspodeli broja konekcija,⁷ ispostavilo se da značajan deo mreža približno sledi „distribuciju zakona potencije“ tj. „Paretovu krivu dugog repa“ – gde jedan parametar glatko klizi u funkciji drugog, od mnoštva slabo povezanih do nekoliko superpovezanih elemenata. Ta „skalno slobodna“ topologija koja je ustanovljena posredstvom Barabašijevih istraživanja virtuelnih linkova između sajtova na *World Wide Web*-u, istovremeno je potvrđena u okviru analize realne infrastrukture hardverskih sklopova interneta, a interpretira se u vidu rezultata „preferencijalnog vezivanja“ tj. načela da „bogati postaju bogatiji“ kapitalizovanjem početne kumulativne prednosti – iskršavanje velikih „čvorišta“

⁴ Duh te paradigme ilustruje se i opaskom da Paster nije „otkrio“ mikrobe, već je sa njima „uspostavio odnose“.

⁵ Kao novonastajuća humanistička praksa ispitivanja „uzajamne interpretacije“ ljudi i mašina u digitalnoj epohi.

⁶ Shvaćene u ključu shematiziranih prikaza najraznovrsnijih entiteta u nekoj vrsti realnih ili simboličkih relacija: pojava mreže po Erdeš-Renjijevom modelu opisiva je primerom upoznavanja isprva sasvim nepoznatih zvanica na proslavi – do prelomnog trenutka nastanka „gigantske komponente“ tj. povezivanja većine formiranih grupa (Barabási, 2006: 23). Domaća filozofija 19. veka čak je uzdizala „ukrštaj“ u kosmičko načelo (Kostić, 2015: 67).

⁷ Uz to je na varijabilnost obično gledano kao na grešku ili šum u sistemu – ne kao na „poželjni motor razvoja“.

ili „koncentratora“ veza takođe može podupirati topološke karakteristike tzv. „malog sveta“ tj. „kratkog prečnika“ ogromne mreže, usled povezivosti bilo kojih njenih čvorova u samo par koraka: premrežavanje velikog broja lokalno grupisanih kontakata sa nekolicinom „socijalnih mostova“ u planetarnim relacijama (npr. u profesionalnoj saradnji filmskih glumaca ili naučnika pri koautorstvima u radovima), skraćenje „ruta spojivih reči“ unutar bespreglednih leksičkih semantičkih mreža posredstvom gramatičkih članova (*the, a...*) i genetsko-regulatorni tokovi ćelijskih proteinskih mašinerija koji se vrte oko stožerne uloge najreaktivnijih supstanci, svi zajedno manifestuju intrigantnu zonomernost određene „mrežne arhitekture“ karakterizovane produktivnom kombinacijom „visokog koeficijenta grupisanosti“ ili „klasterizacije“ elemenata (što dopušta i diferenciranje funkcionalno specifičnih podsistema), a u isto vreme „niskog stupnja razdvojenosti“ između najudaljenijih činilaca mreže (što, uprkos njenoj izdellenosti, omogućava ekspresnu globalnu koordinaciju delovanja različitih segmenata pri odgovorima sistema na podsticaje iz okoline) (Bjukenen 2010: 82-88).⁸ Opisana shema „hijerarhijski decentralizovane mreže“ zapravo čini suprotnost prvobitne zamisli modela interneta kao „distribuiranog komunikacionog sistema“, koji bi u slučajevima onesposobljavanja informacionih kanala centralnih komandnih štabova trebao biti aktiviran usled njegove rezistentnosti na taktiku ciljanih napada „ključnih tačaka“ (imajući u vidu onu fleksibilnost koju iskazuju strukture narko-kartela i terorističkih mreža): dok velika čvorišta pozitivno utiču na sistemsku izdrživost u slučaju iznenadnog otkazivanja sporednih pojedinačnih komponenata, nužne ograničenosti njihovih sigurnosnih mera lako ih preobražavaju u ranjive „Ahilove pete“ kada su meta precizno isplaniranih „hakerskih udara“ – mreže seksualnih kontakata (uzorne u pogledu „pravila 80:20“ tj. „manjinske dominacije“) po istoj logici takođe podležu opasnostima epidemioloških „momenata preokreta“ u izbijanju masovnih zaraza (čija dinamika prevazilazi amortizujući potencijal kolektivnog imuniteta),⁹ a „kritični okidači“ političkih revolucija i ekonomskih krahova često istovremeno predefinišu fizionomiju novih socijalnih poredaka i buduće rizične zone njihovih kapilarnih „pukotina“.

⁸ Manifestujući prvim svojstvom pogodnosti „uređenih“, a drugim „slučajnih“ mreža – idući pritom tim u prilog i Viverovom matematičkom situiranju dimenzije „organizovane kompleksnosti“ upravo „između reda i nereda“.

⁹ Premda se čak i primena „izolacionih koraka“ može odraziti na suprotan efekat tzv. „eksplozivne perkolacije“.

2. DIGITALNO-HERMENEUTIČKI PRILOG TEORIJ KOMPLEKSNOŠTI IZ PERSPEKTIVE KOLEKTIVNE INTELIGENCIJE

Hermeneutika kao veština tumačenja, koja se od arhajske prošlosti orijentisala prema složenosti i značaju teoloških, jurističkih, literarnih, istorijskih, kao i filozofskih razmatranja (Gronden 2011: 15), danas bi vođena istim principima imala motiva da se posveti enigmatici kompleksnih mreža¹⁰ u simbiozi prirodne i veštačke inteligencije: učestalo titulisanje oblasti „digitalnim“ prefiksom (zajedno s celim arsenalom tih „humanističkih disciplina 21. veka“)¹¹ biva praćeno i naznakama „ontološkog zaokreta u pogledu interpretatorskog statusa mašina“ (Romele, Severo & Furia 2018: 1-2), a to bi moglo biti i inicijalna kapisla prekomponovanja hermeneutičkih sfera egzistencijalno-fenomenološke ili okcidentalno-metafizičke učenosti (iz poetskih/mantičkih/ezoterijskih korena)¹² u ključu egzaktnih uvida „teorije kompleksnosti“ – provodivog na crvenoj niti pojma „kolektivne inteligencije“, koji prožima obe vrste diskursa.

¹⁰ Gde najraznovrsniji konteksti zajedno „izoštavaju“ bitne opšte karakteristike – poput mreža avionskih linija, koje usled zagušenja velikih aerodroma finalizuju razvoj od „aristokratske“ do „egalitarne“ verzije malog sveta (kroz rast „manjih stanica“) ili zamršenih lanaca ishrane, čijom složenošću se uvećava ne samo prostor za nagle „fluktuacije“ pri eliminisanju najčešćih predatora (ili ulova), već i potencijal za „raspodelu šoka po čvorovima“ preko mnoštva „slabih“ veza u ekosistemu tj. neutralisanje potresa i konsolidaciju novih „metastabilnih stanja“. Generalni uvid da „nema univerzalnog takmičara“ u tržišnoj areni jednako se potvrđuje čestim „merđžovanjem“ transnacionalnih konglomerata, ali i taktikom fluidnih alijansi „berzanskih teškaša“ s malim „start-ap firmama“, sugerišući uslovljenost sistemske kohezije i ultradinamičnih alteracija „usmerenosti“ i „težina“ poslovnih veza.

¹¹ Sem „digitalne humanistike“ (tj. „kvantitativnih obrada“ tekstova) i „kritičkih studija koda/podataka/softvera“ (tj. „kvalitativnih analiza“ tehnologije), ukrštanja heterogenih intelektualnih strujanja intenziviraju se na terenu recentnih filozofija „novog materijalizma“, „spekulativnog realizma“, ili pak „objektno orijentisane ontologije“, a novi mostovi „dveju kultura“ naziru se i kroz „polifone“ narative poput „ekokriticizma“ i „animalnih studija“.

¹² Kod pionira teorije kompleksnosti primetan je interes za produbljivanje odnosa nauke i humanističke baštine (koji seže i do ambicija „rekoncipiranja sakralnosti života“ (Kauffman, 2008: 246–249)), dok amblematsko delo javne popularizacije te oblasti – Gel-Manov visoko estetizovani opus „*Kvark i jaguar*“ – ostaje simbolični legat iskoraka kojim pronalazač same čestice oslikava raznolikost sveta figurom jaguara kao „logotipa kompleksnog“ (pored klasične uloge kod Tjuringovih „reakciono-difuznih“ jednačina za obrasce pigmentacije njegovog krzna, ističe se i istorijska metaforika date „porodice životinja“ u „suočavanju sa apsolutnim“ (Gell-Mann, 2002: 3-5)).

Teorija kompleksnosti vodi poreklo iz hijerarhija različitih klasa računarskih problema (npr. zavisno od tog da li im se vreme rešavanja naspram inputa uvećava samo „polinomijalno“ ili „eksponencijalno“)¹³, pa je vremenom prerasla u skup transdisciplinarnih pristupa sistemima („raznorodnih fizičkih atributa, ali srodnih načina obrade podataka“) koji su usled interakcija mnoštva komponenti često „nepredvidivi u detaljima, iako dele niz regularnih odlika“, poput „nemogućnosti kompaktnog opisa“,¹⁴ „nelinearnosti“ (nesrazmere promena inputa i autputa), „haotičnosti“ (osetljivosti na početne uslove),¹⁵ „otvorenosti“ (udaljenosti od ekvilibrijuma), „adaptivnosti“ (razvoja povratne sprege sa okolinom), „emergenciji“ (iskrsavanja složenijih osobina međudejstvom prostih elemenata), „faznih prelaza“ (nagle strukturne transformacije na kritičnim tačkama), „samo-organizacije“ (pojave globalnog poretka iz lokalne interakcije) – od kristalizacija molekula, kondenzacija oblaka, grupa riba/jata ptica/kolonija insekata¹⁶ ili populacija neurona, do koncentracija saobraćaja, finansijskih tržišta, globalnog zagrevanja ili galaktičkih klastera univerzuma, ispoljavanja pomenutih

¹³ Kao i „Kolmogorovljeve algoritamske kompleksnosti“ tj. minimalne dužine „programa za definisanje objekta“ (kompresija podataka tiče se i svodivosti umetnički lepog na forme nižih kalkulacija „informativnih sadržaja“).

¹⁴ Ultimativna „relativnost odredbe kompleksnog“ (njena uslovljenost limitima same „abecede naučnog jezika“) ipak ne potire ideju da bi se nepredvidivost tih sistema „elegantnim formulama“ dala rasvetliti upravo njihovim prelazom u dinamičnu zonu „prilagođavajućeg“, a potencijalno i „predviđajućeg“ tj. interpretativnog ponašanja.

¹⁵ Viđene čak i kod rada memorijskih registara (upisa elektromagnetnih tragova kao „tapiserija nula i jedinica“) gde je uočen pozitivan „Ljapunovljev eksponent“ – slična ispitivanja ohrabruje i uspon „kvantnog računarstva“.

¹⁶ Etabrirani primer decentralizovanih oblika transfera i procesuiranja informacija unutar kompleksnih sistema pruža fenomen „inteligencije rojeva“: od ekspresnih sinhronizacija ritmova svitaca/cvrčaka, senzibilizovanih na opadajući intenzitet svetlosnih/zvučnih stimulusa (kroz „ekonomički dizajnirane mreže“), preko pčelinjeg plesa čije trajanje povećava verovatnoću da će najkvalitetniji izvor resursa biti evidentiran i od većine drugih jedinki, do figuracija hemijskih tragova mravljevog feromona koji šifruju aktuelni nivo podataka grupe o važnosti lokacija – od koga zavisi dalji autoregulatorni tok adaptivnih rotacija patrolnih uloga i „učenja aktera“ (Holland, 2006: 1) – moglo bi se pak zaključiti da se „pozitivan signal vremenom kondenzuje“ upravo srazmerno maksimalizaciji slučajnosti i jednostavnosti odnošenja (kao proizvod lokalnih pravila atrakcije/repulzije tj. svidanja/nesvidanja).

karakteristika prepliću se i ukrštaju uz sve kreativnije asocijativne formate, šireći paletu „mereoloških relacija“ delova i celine.¹⁷

Kolektivna inteligencija kao područje istraživanja uticaja međupovezanosti grupacija prirodnih ili veštačkih kognitivnih aktera na unapređenje njihovih individualnih performansa – u rasponu od deliberativnih procedura javne sfere, *peer-to-peer* evaluacija naučnog rada ili *ad hoc* organizovanja ljudi u vanrednim situacijama (pored intervencija nadležnih službi), do *crowdsourcing* modela, otvorenih softvera ili „urbane informatike“ umreženih gradova – iscertava šarolike konstelacije fenomena koordinisanja zajedničkog delovanja posredstvom harmonizacije kooperativnih i kompetitivnih strategija¹⁸: uzorni karakter „mudrosti gomila“ (prevage većeg ansambla upućenih laičkih mišljenja spram nekolicine ekspertskih procena)¹⁹ kao rezultata specifične „agregacije informacija“ unutar diversifikovanih grupa, mogao bi se upotpuniti senzornim tehnologijama instaliranim da beleže ritam aktivnosti realnih okruženja – ta vrsta sinergije organskih i mehaničkih činilaca (tj. „integrativnih nivoa kompleksnosti“) iziskivaće obrt u poimanju središnjeg pitanja o interpretaciji „destilovanih“ velikih podataka. Digitalna hermeneutika morala bi istovremeno tematizovati perspektive dualnog angažmana intelektualnih resursa nauke, sa jedne strane usmerenih ka rekonstrukciji same „plastičnosti“ bioloških mozgova tj. „režima perturbacija/grešaka kao baza normalnih mentalnih operacija“ (umesto njihovih izolovanih „funkcionalnih disekcija“), a sa druge strane prema konstrukciji „originalnih konfiguracija na svetskoj mašini“ (lat. *machina mundi*), koje bi sam taj koncept preinačavale ka „rapsodičnijem aranžmanu“ tj. pružale kontrapunkte dominantnoj tendenciji automatizacije ljudskog životnog miljea:

¹⁷ Predstava „hermeneutičkog kruga“ tj. „oscilacija između razumevanja parcijalnog i holističkog smisla teksta“ – izobražena u maniru progresivne „spirale interpretacije“ – mogla bi reflektovati i eliptičnu dinamiku uvećanja „radijusa kompleksnosti“ tj. konzervacije diverziteta u prirodi kroz „povratan odnos mikro i makro formacija“.

¹⁸ Konstruktivni potencijal „neregulisanih kolizija privlačnih i odbojnih sila“ nalazi primene čak i na projektima u ravni urbanog planiranja, kad iz sprovođenja bazičnih načela distanciranja objekata po automatizmu „izranja“ delikatni šablon optimalne diferencijacije rezidencijalnih i komercijalnih distrikta (mimo „stručnih proračuna“).

¹⁹ Poput niza masovnih „licitiranja velikim brojevima“, gde se prosečna vrednost ispostavlja tačnijom od svih nagađanja pojedinačnih favorita (kao npr. i pomoć publike spram pomoći prijatelja u popularnom „Milioneru“) (Surowiecki, 2004: 1–4): viši nivo ažurnosti Vikipedije od Enciklopedije Britanike (ili kolaborativne ekstrakcije filmskih/muzičkih onlajn preporuka spram rafinisanе arbitraže kritičara), oličava isti „sumrak elitističkih idola“.

utoliko bi društveno-tehnička sistematika Veba 3.0 valjala biti rukovodena ne samo zahtevima „redukcije“, nego i „produkcije kompleksnosti“, upornim kultivisanjem divergentnih paradigmi „stvaralačkog tumačenja empirijskih datosti“ (uz to bi ciljno „proširivanje“ margine neodređenosti binarnih kompjutacionih procesa moglo evocirati i latinski izraz *tendere* koji je u etimologiji pojmovima *intention/attention/retention* – kao indikator „razvučenosti“ čovekovih psihičkih zbivanja) (Stigler, 2016: 25–28, 37–41).²⁰

I digitalno-hermeneutički prilog teoriji kompleksnosti iz ugla kolektivne inteligencije zapravo bi se očitavao kako u „lekturi“ kataloga praktičnih aplikacija tradicionalnih pojmova iz „filozofskih antikvarnica“ (npr. Hajdegerove vizije „bivstvovanja-u-svetu/sa-drugima“ tj. „višestruke ugneždenosti u okolnim sistemima“ ili Gadamerove predstave „dijaloga kao igre razboritog stapanja horizonata“ tj. „stimulativne polarizacije na ivici haosa“), tako i hrabrijim ekskursima u smeru novih ispoljavanja „prostorno-relacionalnog obrta“ klasičnih disciplina: komercijalizacija ambijentalnog inkorporiranja obimnog asortimana skenera i detektora kao neizostavne „informacione armature“ pametnih gradova, uz fokus na lokalnu konektivnost tj. „robusnost“ struktura njihovih mrežnih dijagrama, koja jača opštu sistemsku „rezilijenciju“, trebala bi imati protivtežu u podsticaju dodatnom aktiviranju humane socijalne inteligencije, kroz usklađivanje novih tipova organske kohezije u hibridnoj sredini Veba 3.0 ili „srastanja“ topoloških formacija „skalno-slobodnih malih svetova“ u suptilne „asemblaže tela i mašina“ – egalitarni mit „parlamentarizma stvari“ koje međusobno komunciraju diskretnom voltažom morao bi se ipak ljudski ograničiti izvesnim „kontekstualnim integritetom“ velikih podataka. Lekcije „nauke o gradovima“ (nekada viđenih kao „enklava značenja“) bazirane na zakonima „alometrijskih skala“, koji omogućuju egzaktno praćenje njihovog rasta – analogno dinamici razvoja šumskih područja u odnosu na „ukupni metabolički protok energije kroz ekosistem“ (za gradove npr.

²⁰ Tako je npr. Pikasovo širenje vizuelne koncepcije lica ocrtao put geometrijskoj shematici kubističkog izraza. Kapacitet formalne apstrakcije *homo sapiens*-a blisko je vezan i za antropološki tok oslobađanja prednjih udova lokomocijne funkcije i „readaptacije“ prstiju (lat. *digitus*) u duhu artistskičko-numeričke „proteze intelekta“, kroz avanture koje sežu od aritmetičkih matrica abakusa pa do savremenih računarskih platformi – i uz reprodukciju arhetipski „digitalne“ moći podela, manipulacija, premeravanja i razvrstavanja prirodnih ili društvenih celina. Njen slavni istorijski zalag ipak se oslikao na uzajamnom kataliziranju procesa kodifikacije alfabetskog pisma i verbalizacije internog simboličkog mišljenja, čije je usložnjavanje donelo i spiritualne uspone „duboke pažnje“, ali i tekstualnu metamorfozu „transgeneracijske memorije“ kao monumentalni artefakt kolektivne inteligencije.

„premrežavanja selekcionim ukrštanjima i mutacijama kompanijskih DNK“) (West, 2017: 1–4) – takođe bi mogli podupreti naučne prerogative hermeneutičke discipline: možda baš na tragu njenog večito aktuelnog helenskog avatara Hermesa, božanskog glasnika i zaštitnika putnika, trgovaca, proroka, sportista, varalica, pastira, gomila i graničnih prelaza.

Milan Vukadinović

DIGITAL-HERMENEUTIC FUSION OF HORIZONS OF THE WEB 3.0, BIG DATA
AND THE POTENTIALS OF NETWORK SCIENCE AND COMPLEXITY THEORY
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

Summary

Advancements of internet technologies in the last decade of twentieth century have made possible some of the crucial discoveries on the World Wide Web infrastructure and provided ground for a series of empirical studies in the field of newly established network science, guided by canonical cases of “small world” and “scale-free” topology documented in a large number of physical, biological, and social networks (e.g. electric power transmission lines, synaptic projections in neuronal circuits, synchronization patterns in swarms of insects or income distributions in functionally diverse business ecosystems). By the same token, evolving conceptual apparatus of complexity theory has enabled new insights on the importance of local connectivity for the resilience of complex adaptive systems, which could be implemented in the future progress of Web 3.0 standards, “internet of things” and different platforms focused on benefits of collective intelligence. The aim of this paper is to elucidate those developments of the Web 3.0, big data and the potentials of network science and complexity theory from the specific point of view of collective intelligence, based on the forementioned topological “signatures” that allows for spontaneous emergence of both very differentiated network responses to environment stimuli due to the “high clustering coefficient” (i.e. a lot of proximal “strong” ties between elements) and quick global coordination of those responses due to the “low average degree of element separation” (because of a certain number of distal “weak” ties or random “bridges” between clusters) – some of the present day trends such as expansion of “smart city” architectures could also be remarkably instructive in understanding the universal structure of these phenomena.

Key words: Web 3.0, network science, complexity theory, collective intelligence, big data, small world and scale-free topology, digital hermeneutics

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PICTURE OF ROMANIA ON SOCIAL NETWORKS: CASE STUDY¹

The aim of this paper is to investigate the attitude of young people in Serbia towards Romania. Bearing all that in mind, it is the intention of the authors to show if there is a knowledge and familiarity with the neighboring country related to its cultural and historical heritage. Therefore, a questionnaire for this purpose was designed by using the Google Forms tables and was anonymously completed online during the six months, while the conclusions were elaborated based on answers of 635 respondents participating in research. Accordingly, the results obtained could give a good insight into the fact that Serbian young people, despite the geographic proximity of Romania and, furthermore, despite an open access to the multiple sources of information, do not have a vast knowledge about their neighbors, showing lack of proper historical, cultural and linguistic facts, also having a distorted ethnic image of Romania.

Key words: Romania, Serbia, neighboring countries, young Serbian people, Social Networks, attitude towards Romania

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

If we want to get to know a nation, we must get to know its culture, history, language and tradition, as the most important segments which contribute to rapprochement between two nations (Berlin 2013).

Nowadays cultures across the world are becoming more and more interconnected (House & Mansour 2004). Nevertheless, culture has a strong impact on the values held by individuals (Bowditch, Buono & Stewart 2008).

Today's cultural and political circumstances and the situation in the world have contributed to individual countries standing out and taking the lead in terms of recognition. Therefore, it could be spoken about national culture and politics, the

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culture and politics of the West or the East, the culture of the young, elderly etc. Moreover, it seems that people are familiar with the history, culture and tradition of those countries that have been in (Rubin 2008).

Although sometimes we know very little of the neighbouring countries, there are countries connected by historical, cultural and familial ties, nurtured over many centuries (Anholt 2002). With reference to this, we believe that Romania and Serbia could present a good example.

2. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ROMANIAN-SERBIAN RELATIONS

Romania and Serbia, two countries whose paths have crossed countless times throughout history, traditionally have good relations which date back many centuries. The famous saying that Romania had only two friends throughout history - the Black Sea and Serbia, is emphasized every time at the meetings of officials of both countries (Novaković & Đurđević 2015).

Back in the Middle Ages, the territories of today's Romania and Serbia were part of the same country (Radojčić 1956), showing that relations between the two nations existed even then (Vanku 2005). It is important to note the relationship between Wallachia and Moldavia with the territories inhabited by the Serbs in Hungary, also the relationship between the Branković dynasty in Srem and the Wallachian voivode (Гавриловић 1997). Further, the wedding of Tsar Stefan Uroš and the Wallachian princess Anne is also of importance (Милин 1995), as well as the relationship between Despot Stefan Lazarević and the Wallachian Prince Mircea, as a good example of great respect and honour between the two rulers (Константин Филозоф 1989).

At the time of Serbian struggle for liberation from Ottoman Empire, which began in 1804, Wallachia and Moldova, and then the United Principality, were an important pillar of the Principality of Serbia in its efforts to gain independence. (Гавриловић 2003).

Later, after their independence was formally confirmed at the Berlin Congress in 1878, Romania and Serbia have continued in maintaining good neighbourly relations (Dejan 1989). Although official diplomatic relations were established in 1879, communication representatives were presented in both countries long before the independence, during the first government of Prince Miloš Obrenović (1815-1839) (Nadoveza & Vanku 2015). In addition, the fact that the two queens of Serbia/Yugoslavia were Romanian noblewomen: Queen Natalia (Cheșcu), wife of the Serbian King Milan Obrenović and Queen Mary (Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen), wife of

the King Aleksandar Karađorđević of Yugoslavia, illustrates not only the level, but also the importance given to relations between the two countries (Radonjić 1921).

The 20th century has brought many turbulences on the world political scene, including the two world wars. In the Second Balkan War Romania took Serbia's side against Bulgaria, while during the peace concluded in Bucharest received a territorial extension to Dobrogea (Милин 1992).

At the beginning of the First World War, when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy occupied Belgrade, the festive meeting of the Institute of the South-East European Studies in Bucharest was held, where the Serbian anthem was intoned and where one of the biggest Romanian historian of all time, Nicolae Iorga, gave a lecture on the Belgrade fortress, finishing it with constatation that the occupation of Belgrade will last shortly and that the states will continue to exist, as well as Serbia with Belgrade (Nadoveza & Vanku 2015).

The End of the First World War is known, Romania has been territorially expended, incorporating a part of Banat and Transylvania, while the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, latter the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was established. The two countries, along with Czechoslovakia, founded the Little Entente, an alliance of countries which primarily should have been a barrier to both the Hungarian revisionism and revisionism on the whole. In parallel with this, parliamentary cooperation between Yugoslavia and Romania evolved. Still, this cooperation took place in difficult conditions of the global economic crisis in 1929. Therefrom, the Little Entente was not strong enough to become a barrier for the growing forces around it (Rămneanțu 2007). The outbreak of the Second World War collapsed the hopes in both the Little Entente and the Balkan Alliance. Although under the rule of General Antonescu Romania supported the Third Reich, neither took part in the occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, nor had territorial aspirations towards it. However, at the end of war, both countries have come under the communist dictatorship, Romania under the rule of Nicolae Ceaușescu, Yugoslavia under the rule of Josip Broz (Popi 2007).

During the first years of the postwar period, good relations between the two countries were kept. Still, a period of deterioration and worsening began along with the period of Cominform crisis, escalating after adoption of the Cominform Resolution at the meeting in Bucharest on 28 June 1948 (Милин & Милин 2004).

In years to come, tradition of good relations was resumed, starting with the implementation of capital projects, one of the the best known being the construction of the Gerdap hydroelectric power plant. Moreover, Yugoslavia, although a socialist

state, was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, giving a strong support to Romanian revolution in overthrowing the dictatorship of Ceaușescu (Flora 1968).


The current relations between Serbia and Romania are just confirming the good tradition by maintaining mutual political visits at highest level. Likewise, the economic relations between Serbia and Romania are also increasing. Thus the neighbouring country is considered to be an important economic partner of Serbia, expressing its continued interest in the realization of economic and infrastructural projects (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia 2018).

3. CORPUS, METHOD AND RESEARCH RESULTS

Bearing in mind the fact that relations between Serbia and Romania have been maintained and nurtured in a cultural, historical, religious and political sense over the centuries, having a long tradition, the aim of this research is to investigate the attitude of young Serbian people towards this country.

Hence, a questionnaire for that purpose was designed by using the Google Forms tables and was anonymously completed online during the six months, while the conclusions were elaborated based on answers of 635 respondents participating in research. A total of 635 participants responded, with an age ranging from 16 to 32 years. The most numerous are the respondents from 21 to 24 years old – 396 (62.36%), in the second place are the respondents from 16 to 20 years old – 119 (18.74%), 102 respondents (16.06%) are from 25 to 28 years old, 18 respondents (2.83%) are 29 to 32 years old. The participants are predominantly female - 57%, 42% are male, while 1% of the respondents did not state their gender identity (see Figure 1):

Figure 1. *Age ranging of the participants*



Research results related to the first part of the questionnaire were elaborated based on Likert scale², consisting of choosing the item related to Romania, the Romanian language and the Romanian nation, which the respondents found the most appropriate for each of the nine offered statements, expressing their attitudes (see Table 1):

Table 1. *Attitude towards country, language and nation*

	I disagree completely	I disagree	I am not sure	I agree	I agree completely
Romania is a rural country	9%	7%	15%	20%	49%
Romania is a safe country.	38%	21%	32%	4%	5%
Romania is a country I would live in.	84%	11%	2%	1%	2%
The Romanian language is beautiful.	31%	22%	40%	3%	4%
I would have a partner from Romania.	35%	22%	17%	6%	10%
Romanian people are Gypsy people.	18%	13%	20%	26%	23%
Romania is a poor country.	4%	5%	12%	33%	46%
The Romanians are a friendly nation.	8%	7%	2%	36%	47%
Romania is a country of vampires.	13%	16%	3%	28%	40%

Regarding the results presented, it could be seen that 49% of the respondents consider Romania to be a completely rural country, 20% agree with this statement, 7% of the respondents disagree with this statement, while 9% disagree completely. Further, Romania is also not perceived as being a safe

²A method of ascribing quantitative value to qualitative data, to make it amenable to statistical analysis. Likert scale usually have five potential choices (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree), sometimes going up to ten or more. The final average score represents overall level of accomplishment or attitude toward the subject matter. It was named after its inventor, the US organizational-behavior psychologist Dr. Rensis Likert (1903 – 1981).

country: only 5% of the respondents completely agree that Romania is a safe country, while 38% completely disagree. In addition, Romania is not a country which the respondents would live in: 84% of the respondents would not do that for sure, while only 2% would live there without any doubts.

With reference to the Romanian language, 31% of the respondents disagree completely with the statement that it is beautiful, 22% disagree, only 3% agree, while 4% agree completely. Also, most of the respondents (35%) completely disagree with the statement of having a partner from Romania, while only 10% agree completely. Moreover, 26% of the respondents agree that Romanian people are Gypsy people, 23% agree completely, while almost a half of the respondents (46%) agree completely that Romania is a poor country and a country of vampires (40% of the respondents agree completely with the statement), although friendly (47% of the respondents agree completely), clearly indicating the stereotypes about the neighbouring country.

The second part of the questionnaire consists of questions related to Romanian culture, history, tradition and economy - 34 in total. Of these, 28 questions offered three choices (two incorrect, one correct), 3 questions offered two choices (correct and incorrect), while 3 questions should be completed with the right answer.

On the basis of obtained results, regarding the question *Which countries does Romania border with?* 37% of the respondents have chosen the answer Bulgaria, Serbia and Belarus, 52.3% gave the correct answer - Moldova, Bulgaria and Hungary, while 10.7% think that Romania borders with Serbia, Lithuania and Ukraine. With reference to the second question: *Which is the largest ethnic minority in Romania?* most of the respondents answered correctly - the Hungarians (62%), 22% answered the Bulgarians and 16% think that the Serbs are the most numerous ethnic minority. The next question, *What time zone is Romania in?* the largest number of the respondents (76%) answered that Romania and Serbia are in the same time zone, followed by 0.9% of the respondents that have chosen the answer from +3 to +4 hours, while the remaining 23.1% answered accurately (+1 hour). Since Romania borders with Serbia, respondents concluded that it could be most likely to be in the same time zone. Regarding the question *Which is the largest mountain range in Romania?* the greatest number of the respondents (88.7%) gave the correct answer by selecting the Carpathians, 7.3% answered the Apuseni Mountains, while 4% have chosen the Rhodopes. Based on the comments of the respondents, most of them had heard of the Carpathians, since the Rhodopes and the Apuseni Mountain Range are less known. The next

question, *What is the terrain of Romania like?* 66.1% of the respondents knew the correct answer: predominantly mountainous and hilly, while 33.9% answered incorrectly, stating that it is lowland. The influence of film and literature on the respondents' knowledge is evident here, Romania being often portrayed as a mountainous country with many castles and fortresses. In consequence, the majority responded as shown in the statistics. With reference to the next question, *The population of Romania is mainly of which religion?* the majority of the respondents answered incorrectly - Catholic faith (54%), 40% have chosen the correct answer (Orthodox faith), while 6% answered Protestant faith. Bearing in mind the fact that the Romanians belong to the group of Romanic nations, unlike most of the neighbours, which belong to the Slavic group and Orthodox faith, respondents assumed that they are of a different religion. Regarding the question *Which are the most important rivers flowing through Romania?* 71% of the respondents answered that these are the rivers Danube and Prut, while 29% have chosen the rivers Timiș and Nitra. Another question, *Does Romania border a sea?* 58% of the respondents answered the Black Sea, 3.4% thought it borders two seas, while 39.7% thought Romania does not have access to the sea. Regarding the question, *The official currency of Romania is?* the results showed that question was answered correctly by 37.6% of the respondents - lei, 50.9% thought that euro is the correct answer, 11.5% said the lev. Although after joining the European Union in 2007 Romania kept its own currency, more than half of the respondents assumed that Romania, entering the eurozone consisting of countries which use the euro as the official currency, has proceeded the same, while others confused the lei with the Bulgarian currency, the lev. Another question, *Which is the number of the population of Romania?* 61% of the respondents answered that Romania has a population of 15-20 million, 11% answered less than 15 million, while 28% gave the correct answer - more than 20 million. Next one, *Which are the colours of the Romanian flag?* 57.3% of the respondents have chosen the correct answer - yellow, blue, red, 30% answered black, white and red, 12.7%, said green, blue and orange. The respondents who gave the correct answer most likely did so because of the influence of mass-media, mostly television and sports programmes. Regarding the question, *Which region does Romania share with Serbia and Hungary?* the following answers to the question were given: 15% have chosen Bačka, 38.9% answered Wallachia. Only 47% of the respondents have chosen other, which is the correct answer. It could be presumed that this happen because Banat was not listed as a choice and, as a consequence, the majority of the respondents did not take into account that Banat is situated within Romania and

Hungary. *What is Constanța?* 70.5% of the respondents answered it is the biggest port in Romania, while 29.5% thought it is the biggest spa. With reference to the next question, *What year did Romania become a member of the EU?* 61.6% of the respondents gave the correct answer - 2007, 22% thought it was in 2009, 16.4% have chosen 2004. The answers clearly indicate that the respondents were well informed of political and economic moves in the neighbouring country. Question about one of the greatest Romanian poets, *Who was Mihai Eminescu?* 45% of the respondents gave the right answer - a writer. 38.9% said that he was a ruler, while 16.1% answered that Mihai Eminescu was a scientist. Related to *Who is the president of Romania?* the majority of the respondents (55%) answered Traian Basescu, 29% said Victor Ponta, while only 16% of the participants gave the correct answer - Klaus Iohannis. Regarding the question, *Who is the coach of Romania's national water polo team?* 38.9% of the respondents answered Tibor Benedek, 26.2% Vlad Hagiu, 34.9% Dejan Stanojević. Considering that transition and cooperation of Dejan Stanojević with the Romanian national team was followed by high media coverage, respondents could be expected to know the answer to this question. Question about Romanian language *Did the Romanians write in Cyrillic?* 87% of the respondents answered no, while 13% chose the affirmative answer. Although the Romanians are the only Romanic nation to have written in Cyrillic, this topic could be considered as an interesting to the respondents and that they would know the answer. Next one, *Which city was declared the European Capital of Culture in 2007?* Regarding the European Capital of Culture, currently a topic of broad interest in Serbia, as Novi Sad and Timișoara were both competing for this prestigious award, we asked this question. 59.4% of the respondents gave the incorrect answer - Timișoara, while 40.6% said Sibiu. Timișoara, as a cultural centre in Romania, with a wide variety of cultural offers, is a town neither distant, nor unknown to the Serbian citizens. Therefore, most of the respondents have chosen this town as the right answer. Question about Romanian history, *What is the real name of the Romanian ruler "Count Dracula"?* 39% of the respondents gave no answer, 42% responded Vlad Țepeș, while 19% said Dracula Țepeș and another one *What does the word "dracul" mean in the name "Count Dracula"?* 11% of the respondents said bat, 18% answered dragon, 38% devil. Only 33% of the participants gave the correct answer, since *dracul* in translation means *dragon*. It could be supposed that the presentation of Dracula in the entertainment industry, with a black cloak and fangs, resembling a bat, resulted in large number of the wrong answers, creating prejudice and lack of interest in people to inform themselves through more reliable

sources. A question about politics *Who was Ceausescu?* 57% of the respondents answered a president, 18% a ruler, 25% a dictator. It could be observed that the respondents demonstrated a good knowledge of politics and its representatives. Next one, with the same subject, *When was Ceausescu killed?* 38.2% of the respondents answered correctly that this happened in December 1989, 30.8% answered December 1987, 31% May 1993. The participants were divided on this question: even though the highest percentage gave the correct answer, more than a half has chosen the wrong one. On the basis of obtained results, regarding the question *The Romanian Parliament building is by size?* 67% of the respondents placed the building in the fifth place in the world, 22% gave the correct answer - in the second, 11% said that it is the largest building in the world. The respondents have chosen the fifth place as the correct answer probably because of the belief that a structure of this size could not exist in a country so close to theirs, without attracting attention. Asked about cars, *Which famous car brand is from Romania?* 95% percent of the respondents gave the correct answer to this question - Dacia, while 5% gave no answer. Regarding the question, *Which is the Romanian internet domain name?* 74% of the respondents have chosen the answer *ro*, 13.1% *ru*, 12.9% *rum*. The large percentage of the right answers clearly indicates to which areas contemporary society pays the most attention to.

Next one, *What does the name Bucharest mean?* the answer *brotherhood* was chosen by 28.3% of the respondents, *joy* by 39.6%, *parade* by 32.1% of the participants. With reference to the question, *"Little Paris" or "Paris of the East" is the name of which city?* 32% of the respondents have chosen Timișoara, 40.1% Bucharest, 27.9% Cluj. It is obviously that the respondents were not sure about this question, choosing randomly between the two cities they are familiar with – Timișoara and Bucharest. Bucharest is well known as "Little Paris" due to the architectural projects and undertakings of French architects who, during the nineteenth century, frequently visited Romania, trying to establish closer relations between the two Romanic countries. Next question, *Of what origin was Queen Maria of Yugoslavia?* 73% of the respondents have answered Serbian, 22% Romanian, 5% Hungarian. Although Maria Karadorđević was the second daughter of the Romanian King Ferdinand Hohenzollern and the Romanian Queen Maria I, upon marrying the King Alexander I Karadorđević of Yugoslavia, she became a Yugoslav Queen, which could influence the respondents to believe she was Serbian. With reference to the question *Which city in Romania was the first to receive street lighting?* 47% of the respondents have chosen Timișoara, 41.4% Bucharest, 11.6% Cluj. Timișoara was the first city with electric street lights in the

world in 1884 and only a few years later it began using electric trams. These facts are less known among Serbian population, although the results have demonstrated the opposite. Also, *In which sport have the Romanians had the most success?* The greatest number of the respondents - 88% chose the correct answer – gymnastics, 7% thought it was cycling, while 5% answered badminton. The high percentage of the correct answers could be explained by the popularity of Nadia Comaneci in Serbia, also by the fact that Romania is presented in Serbian mass-media as a gymnastics superpower in Europe. Regarding *What was the name of the Romanian Intelligence Service?* only 32% of the respondents provided an answer, the correct one - Securitatea. Question about *Which antivirus was developed by the Romanian company Softwin?* 42% of the respondents have chosen the answer Kaspersky, Avast was chosen by 40%, while 18% of the participants gave the correct answer - BitDefender. As a product of the company Softwin, BitDefender became popular quickly, since it is being used in over five hundred million homes around the world. The last question, *Romania is the ninth largest producer of which alcoholic beverage in the world?* Wine, as the correct answer, was chosen by 52% of the respondents, 9% answered champagne, while 39% have chosen beer.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The results obtained could give a good insight into the fact that despite the geographic proximity of Romania and, furthermore, despite an open access to the multiple sources of information, Serbian young people do not have a vast knowledge about their neighbours, showing lack of proper historical, cultural and linguistic facts, also having a distorted ethnic image of Romania

The first part of the questionnaire revealed that there is a sense of animosity towards Romania, Romanian people and Romanian history, the stereotypes strongly prevailing in all areas. Of a total of nine statements, only one was assessed positively – the statement regarding Romanians as a friendly nation, which can be justified by the fact that in Serbia, Romania is known for being the only country which it was never at war with. On the other hand, the majority of the respondents believe Romania to be a rural, impoverished country, which they would not consider to live in, an unsafe country of the vampires, with language that does not sound beautifully. In addition, for most of the respondents, the Romanian people are synonymous with Gypsy people. This thinking could be influenced by the fact that in the eighties and the nineties years of the last century,

the people from here crossed over to Serbia to smug. Unfortunately, it seems that this picture has remained to this day, of course, without any basis.

Accordingly, the second part of the questionnaire confirmed that the respondents possess low or no knowledge about Romania. Taking into account that Romania is a country that shares its border with Serbia, as well as many cultural similarities, history and tradition, the research results could show a greater level of familiarity and a more positive attitude, based on real facts, not common stereotypes, confirming the theory that most of the times, we know little or nothing about the neighbouring countries.

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Appendix: The questionnaire

Dear Participant,

Your answers are strictly confidential. The questionnaire should take you not more than 20 minutes to complete it. Participation is voluntary and you can quit anytime.

Thank you!

Gender:

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

Age:

- ☐ 16 to 20 years old
- ☐ 21 to 24 years old
- ☐ 25 to 28 years old
- ☐ 29 to 32 years old

I. Choose the item you find the most appropriate:

Romania is a rural country:

- ☐ I disagree completely ☐ I disagree ☐ I am not sure ☐ I agree ☐ I agree completely

Romania is a safe country:

- ☐ I disagree completely ☐ I disagree ☐ I am not sure ☐ I agree ☐ I agree completely

Romania is a country I would live in:

- ☐ I disagree completely ☐ I disagree ☐ I am not sure ☐ I agree ☐ I agree completely

The Romanian language is beautiful:

- ☐ I disagree completely ☐ I disagree ☐ I am not sure ☐ I agree ☐ I agree completely

I would have a partner from Romania:

- ☐ I disagree completely ☐ I disagree ☐ I am not sure ☐ I agree ☐ I agree completely

The Romanian people are Gypsy people:

- ☐ I disagree completely ☐ I disagree ☐ I am not sure ☐ I agree ☐ I agree completely

Romania is a poor country:

- ☐ I disagree completely ☐ I disagree ☐ I am not sure ☐ I agree ☐ I agree completely

The Romanians are a friendly nation:

☐ I disagree completely ☐ I disagree ☐ I am not sure ☐ I agree ☐ I agree completely

Romania is a country of vampires:

☐ I disagree completely ☐ I disagree ☐ I am not sure ☐ I agree ☐ I agree completely

II. Choose / write the correct answer:

1. Which countries does Romania border with?

- ☐ Bulgaria, Serbia and Belarus
- ☐ Moldova, Bulgaria and Hungary
- ☐ Serbia, Lithuania and Ukraine

2. Which is the largest national minority in Romania?

- ☐ the Hungarians
- ☐ the Bulgarians
- ☐ the Serbs

3. What time zone is Romania in?

- ☐ the same as Serbia
- ☐ +1
- ☐ +3-4

4. Which is the largest mountain range in Romania?

- ☐ the Carpathians
- ☐ the Apuseni Mountains
- ☐ the Rhodopes

5. What is the terrain of Romania like?

- ☐ mountainous
- ☐ lowland

6. The population of Romania is mainly of which religion?

- ☐ Catholic faith
- ☐ Orthodox faith
- ☐ Protestant faith

7. Which are the most important rivers flowing through Romania?

- ☐ Danube and Prut

- ☐ Timiș and Nitra

8. Does Romania border a sea?

- ☐ Black sea
- ☐ two seas
- ☐ landlocked country

9. The official currency of Romania is?

- ☐ lei
- ☐ euro
- ☐ lev

10. Which is the number of the population of Romania?

- ☐ 15-20 million
- ☐ less than 15 million
- ☐ more than 20 million

11. Which are the colours on the Romanian flag?

- ☐ blue, yellow, red
- ☐ black, white, red
- ☐ green, blue, orange

12. Which region does Romania share with Serbia and Hungary?

- ☐ Bačka
- ☐ Wallachia
- ☐ Other

13. What is Constanța?

- ☐ the biggest port
- ☐ the biggest spa
- ☐ none of these

14. What year did Romania become a member of the EU?

- ☐ 2004
- ☐ 2007
- ☐ 2009

15. Who was Mihai Eminescu?

- ☐ writer
- ☐ ruler

- ☐ scientist

16. Who is the president of Romania?

- ☐ Traian Basescu
- ☐ Victor Ponta
- ☐ Klaus Iohannis

17. Who is the coach of Romania's national water polo team?

- ☐ Tibor Benedek
- ☐ Vlad Hagi
- ☐ Dejan Stanojević

18. Did the Romanians write in Cyrillic?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

19. Which city was declared the European Capital of Culture in 2009?

- ☐ Timișoara
- ☐ Bucharest
- ☐ Sibiu

20. What is the real name of the Romanian ruler "Count Dracula"?

21. What does the word "dracul" mean in the name "Count Dracula"?

- ☐ bat
- ☐ dragon
- ☐ devil

22. Who was Ceausescu?

- ☐ politician or president
- ☐ ruler
- ☐ dictator

23. When was Ceausescu killed?

- ☐ December 1989
- ☐ December 1987
- ☐ May 1993

24. The Romanian Parliament building is by size?

- ☐ fifth in the world
- ☐ second in the world
- ☐ the largest

25. Which famous car brand is from Romania?

26. The Romanian internet domain name is?

- ☐ ro
- ☐ ru
- ☐ rum

27. What does the name Bucharest mean?

- ☐ brotherhood
- ☐ joy
- ☐ parade

28. "Little Paris" or "Paris of the East" is the name of which city?

- ☐ Timișoara
- ☐ Bucharest
- ☐ Cluj

29. Of what origin was Queen Maria of Yugoslavia?

- ☐ Serbian
- ☐ Romanian
- ☐ Hungarian

30. Which city in Romania was the first to receive street lighting?

- ☐ Timișoara
- ☐ Bucharest
- ☐ Cluj

31. In which sport have Romanians had the most success?

- ☐ gymnastics
- ☐ cycling
- ☐ badminton

32. What was the name of Romanian Intelligence Service?

33. Which antivirus was developed by the Romanian company Softwin?

- ☐ Kaspersky
- ☐ Avast
- ☐ BitDefender

34. Romania is the ninth largest producer of which alcoholic beverage in the world?

- ☐ wine
- ☐ champagne
- ☐ beer

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